

NEWSLETTER ON
THE RESULTS
OF SCHOLARLY WORK

IN SOCIOLOGY, CRIMINOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AS A GLOBAL PROBLEM
OF MODERNITY

REINHART KOSELLECK
AND HAYDEN WHITE
AS METAHISTORIANS

CONSUMER SOCIETY,
MODERN BUSINESS,
AND PSEUDO-KNOWLEDGE


THE WORLD ECONOMY
DOES NOT EXIST WITHOUT
THE CRIME


CRIMINALS,
BUSINESS
AND STATE
IN POST-SOVIET
UKRAINE

DUELS
OF CAMORRA

ISSN (PRINT) 2699-9382

ISSN (ONLINE) 2699-9005





IS CRIMINOLOGY THE ALMA MATER OF BUSINESS IN THE 21ST CENTURY?

VOLUME 2, ISSUE 3, 2021

SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL «NEWSLETTER ON THE
RESULTS OF SCHOLARLY WORK
IN SOCIOLOGY, CRIMINOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE»

SCI-RESULT.DE

Business, as a relatively new phenomenon, systematically goes through changes in its environment. Global threats were there even before the emergence of business and will continue happening in the future. Business environment which has formed is still relatively unstable. People in business will have to improve their level of knowledge and skills regularly. In order to accomplish this task, it is recommended to choose a scientific discipline which would be closest to the business activity.

In the current century, criminology could be the primary scientific discipline for business. Today, criminology is becoming a fundamental environment that allows understanding current business trends. We present to your attention the next issue of the Journal "Newsletter on the results of scholarly work." This issue will help you answer the question: "Is criminology the alma mater of business in the 21st century?"

*Best regards,
Editorial Board*

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Dr. Harvey W. Kushner (USA)

Long Island University, Brookville, New York

INTERNATIONAL EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Dr. Eileen Barker (United Kingdom)

London School of Economics

Dr. Donal Carbaugh (USA)

University of Massachusetts Amherst

Dr. Oleg Danilyan (Ukraine)

Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University

Dr. James Finckenaue (USA)

Rutgers University

Dr. Liah Greenfeld (USA)

Boston University

Dr. Andrew Hoskins (UK)

University of Glasgow

Dr. Maximiliano E. Korstanje (Argentina)

University of Palermo

Dr. Jerome Krase (USA)

Brooklyn College CUNY

Dr. Arthur Kroker (Canada)

University of Victoria

Dr. Oleg Maltsev (Ukraine)

European Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Dr. Antonio Nicaso (Canada)

Queen's University

Dr. Kent A. Ono (USA)

University of Utah

Dr. Oleksandr Polishchuk (Ukraine)

Khmelnyskyi Humanitarian and Pedagogical Academy

Dr. Oleksandr Sahaidak (Ukraine)

European Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Dr. Emilio Viano (Italy/USA)

International Society for Criminology

Dr. Jolita Vveinhardt (Lithuania)

Vytautas Magnus University

CONTENTS

Duels of Camorra

Oleg Maltsev

8-21

The World Economy Does not Exist Without the Crime

Eugenia Tarasenko

22-37

Criminals, Business and State in Post-Soviet Ukraine

Vladimir Skvorets

38-51

Artificial Intelligence as a Global Problem of Modernity: Technological, Ontological, Anthropological Dimensions

Valentyna Voronkova, Vitalina Nikitenko

52-67

Reinhart Koselleck and Hayden White as Metahistorians: The Critique of Modern Historical Writing toward the End of the Modern Age

Patrick H. Hutton

68-85


Consumer Society, Modern Business, and Pseudo-Knowledge

Andrew McLaverty-Robinson

86-103

DUELS

OF CAMORRA



OLEG MALTSEV

EUROPEAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF UKRAINE

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8589-6541>

E-mail: drmaltsev.oleg@gmail.com

Oleg Maltsev is an author, scientist, criminologist, psychologist, photographer, and investigative journalist. He is the head of the Memory Institute, named after Grigory Semenovich Popov, and the author of groundbreaking scholarly works in criminology, psychology, and philosophy. He is a presidium member and academic member at the European Academy of Sciences in Ukraine (EUA-SU). He has been engaged in scholarly work for nearly 30 years and has conducted field research with the Expeditionary Corps of the Memory Institute, for a decade. This comparative international research explores the reasons why different nations and rulers attained power throughout history, with an emphasis on culture, military and scientific technique, and mentality. His recent work in English language is *Jean Baudrillard, Maestro: The Last Prophet of Europe* co-authored together with Dr. Lucien-Samir Oulabbib.

ABSTRACT

The author of the article presents the findings of an extensive criminological investigation into the Camorra, transcending the notion of the Camorra as a static and fleeting paradigm. In exploring the historical backdrop, origin, and evolution of this phenomenon within the context of historical events and societal shifts (Vahabi & Hassani-Mahmooui, 2016), the author not only categorizes the various types of Camorra conflicts but also elucidates the methods for resolving these conflicts, the weaponry employed, and the behavioral codes adhered



to by Camorra duellists. This scholarly endeavor is fortified by references to archival materials from researchers, criminologists, and historians spanning the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries who scrutinized and documented the Neapolitan criminal organization known as the “Camorra.”

The primary aim of this article is to debunk the myths surrounding Camorra duels, which have gained prominence in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It seeks to illustrate how eminent criminologists of more than two centuries ago conceptualized the Camorra phenomenon and its socio-cultural significance. Through a comparative analysis, it becomes evident that the contemporary portrayal of the Camorra in the twenty-first century is significantly removed from historical accuracy.

Keywords

Camorra, duel, criminal organization, weapons, duellist

INTRODUCTION

Examining a wide range of contemporary human science issues, the study of criminal organizations is particularly relevant (Astarita et al., 2018; Barone & Narciso, 2015; Chang et al., 2013; Gamba et al., 2018). Scientific interest in this field fosters interdisciplinary research (Bueger & Edmunds, 2020; Campaniello et al., 2016; Daniele, 2019; Ferrara et al., 2014; Meier et al., 2016). Of particular interest are criminal organizations of the South of Italy: Mafia, Camorra, and ‘Ndrangheta (Lavorgna & Sergi, 2014 see also Calderoni et al., 2020; Catino, 2015; Craparo et al., 2018; Nese et al., 2018). To gain deeper insights into the phenomenon of criminal organizations, this article conducts a historical exploration of the Neapolitan criminal organization, the Camorra. I note that historical research enables us to comprehend the essence of phenomena, which is why this research method is employed by many scholars in various fields (Bradfield et al., 2016, see also Ballandonne, 2020; Hollstein, 2019; Kalenda & Schwartzhoff, 2015; Varner, 2018).

At the outset of this research, several fundamental questions were formulated to guide the inqui-

ry into the Camorra: What is the Camorra? How did it originate and why? Where did the Camorra find its roots: on the streets of Naples or within the confines of prisons? How was this formidable institution constructed, and how has it endured for centuries? What mechanisms have bound this structure together and rendered it impervious to collapse?

The process of scrutinizing and analyzing sources commenced well before the author embarked on the task of writing the book “Perpetual Motion” (Maltsev, 2021). This preliminary research involved the examination of a wide array of historical materials and documents, authored by scholars, writers, and former law enforcement personnel, all of whom had connections to the Camorra. For the purpose of conducting a thorough comparative analysis, six prominent books were carefully selected, spanning the years between 1876 and 2006. This strategic selection allows for a comprehensive understanding of the Camorra by assessing the observations, conclusions, and factual accounts provided by authors hailing from both earlier and contemporary centuries. By leveraging this diverse sample of sources, it becomes possible to construct a holistic and multifaceted perspective of the Camorra, drawing from the insights of scholars and observers across different epochs.

METHODS

In understanding the heuristic model employed in the study, an examination was conducted on a selection of works of historical and cultural significance:

The list of works analyzed:

- Giuseppe Alongi (1890), “La Camorra. Studio di sociologia criminale” (“Camorra: A Study of Criminal Sociology”).
- Carlo di Addosio (1893), “The Duel of the Camorristi.”
- Eugenio de Cosa (1908), “The Camorra and the Malavita in Naples.”
- Cesare Lombroso (Lombroso, 1876/2006), “The Criminal Man.”
- M. Rignanesi and V. Tricarico (1992), “Story of Three Old Ancestors. Rules and Rituals of the Camorra.”
- Roberto Saviano (2006), “Gomorra.”




Figure 1. Covers of works analyzed

These works have been translated and made available through the “Centre for Criminology,” founded by the author of this article. The scientific director of the center is Dr. Maxim Lepskiy, an Academician of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Philosophy, and a Professor in the Department of Sociology at the Faculty of Sociology and Management at the Zaporizhzhya National University. The translations were carried out by Anna Filippova, a researcher at the “Centre for Criminology,” specializing in criminological and forensic research of subcultures in Southern Italy. Notably, due to legal restrictions, only two of these works are accessible in free access, namely Giuseppe Alongi’s “Camorra: A Study of Criminal Sociology” and Carlo di Addosio’s “The Duel of the Camorristi.” The remaining works are retained in the archives of the center for internal use.

In the context of this article, all these works hold relevance to varying degrees. However, the primary focus will be on the insights provided by Carlo di Addosio (1893) in “The Duel of the Camorristi” and Giuseppe Alongi (1890) in “Camorra: A Study of Criminal Sociology.” These two authors, in particular, offer qualitative descriptions of the origins and conditions of the Camorra, as well as the rules and methods governing duels, which are of particular interest for this research.

Giuseppe Alongi (1890) primarily attributes the emergence of the Camorra to several key factors. Foremost, he underscores the significance of the region’s favorable and temperate climate, which not only attracted people but also predisposed them to lead a carefree and irresponsible lifestyle. Here, life was remarkably affordable, with no pressing

concerns about shelter, even embracing open-air living, and minimal expenses for sustenance. The fertile land provided sustenance through the natural bounty of vegetation.

Additionally, Alongi (1890) emphasizes the socio-political conditions within the territory as crucial contributors. According to his perspective, the prevailing state system, marred by corruption, had thoroughly discredited itself. Deception and theft had become normalized as part of the legal framework, as even those responsible for curbing illicit activities were entangled in criminal ventures. This period witnessed a broader societal decay and moral erosion. From a socio-psychological vantage point, individuals in this region exhibited impulsiveness and a strong sense of individualism, cultivating a rebellious spirit that could only be quelled through significant force. This coercive and organized influence materialized in the form of criminal communities, which commanded fear and obedience.

Carlo di Addosio (1893) presents a contrasting viewpoint, suggesting that the Camorra was an artificially constructed organization directly “imported” from Spain. Whether this assertion

holds true remains to be fully substantiated. It is worth noting that, upon initial examination, there appears to be a certain apparent contradiction in the author’s statements: on one hand, di Addosio speaks of the “export” of the Camorra, while on the other, he indicates that it was assembled from local criminals known as “smargiassi.”

In Carlo di Addosio’s “The Duel of the Camorristi,” he notes that during the era of Masaniello, certain men were referred to as “guappi” in the Spanish style and “smargiassi” in the Neapolitan style (Addosio, 1893). These individuals instilled fear in the taverns of Mercato or Pendino, as well as under tents and shacks in Piazza Largo del Castello, and within numerous gambling establishments. Notably, one of the most renowned figures among them was Onofrio Catiero in 1647. Eventually, these figures would unite under a sect that would come to be known as the Camorra.

Furthermore, di Addosio (1893) posits that the Camorra is essentially a duplicate of the Spanish secret society called “LaGuarduna.” According to the author, “LaGuarduna” was established in 1417 in Toledo and consisted of marauders recruited from the galleys of Seville, Malaga, and Melilla.



GIUSEPPE ALONGI

1858 (PRIZZI) - 1939 (PALERMO)

- ITALIAN WRITER
AND POLICEMAN
- AUTHOR OF TWO OUTSTANDING
CRIMINOLOGICAL WORKS
- STUDENT AND FOLLOWER
OF CESARE LOMBRASO

Figure 2. Giuseppe Alongi

This connection is also mentioned by Arcangelo Badolati (2014) in his work “Mama ‘ndrangheta.”

The objective of the article is to conduct a critical examination of the mythologeme surrounding Camorra duels that emerged in the XX–XXI centuries. Additionally, it aims to illustrate how renowned criminologists conceptualized the Camorra phenomenon and its socio-cultural significance over 200 years ago. Through a comparative analysis, we can formulate the hypothesis that the contemporary portrayal of the Camorra in the 21st century diverges significantly from the historical reality. This proposition will be substantiated in the subsequent sections of this scientific study.

RESULTS

Transitioning to the next phase of the research, historical records reveal that in Palermo, there exists a Franciscan order composed of three branches, one of which is the Capuchin line. The Capuchin order was originally formed by repentant pirates, a rather intriguing historical fact. A criminal (a pirate), adopts a monastic life for a certain purpose. This intriguing “coincidence” warrants careful consideration.

Additionally, it is worthwhile to consider the enigmatic society known as the Beati Paoli. At times, it has been referred to as the order of knights and, alternatively, the order of avengers. Some viewed them as bandits, while Sicilians regarded them as “men of honor.” Legend has it that the Beati Paoli society was established in the 12th century in Palermo. It was founded by ten young aristocrats who took an oath to combat any form of arbitrary rule imposed by the church and the state. They would convene at night to determine who should be subjected to their brand of justice.

According to the historian Marquis Villabianca, who lived in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Palermo, the Beati Paoli indeed comprised a clandestine society of murderers (Gaetani, ca. 1802). They convened in utmost secrecy, strictly after midnight, within subterranean crypts located in the Capo neighborhood of Palermo. Their primary objective was to devise a strategy for seeking

vengeance, essentially forming a sort of “court” or punitive body. Remarkably, even in the twenty-first century, it is reported that Sicilians, when faced with insults or losses they cannot address through legal channels, often express a longing for the Beati Paoli’s existence, exclaiming, “Ah, if the Beati Paoli still existed!”

Indeed, the presence of the “Beati Paoli” phenomenon strongly suggests that we are dealing with individuals who functioned as hired assassins. This correlation becomes more evident when we consider Carlo di Addosio’s depiction of the Camorra’s structure in “The Duel of the Camorristi” (Addosio, 1893). He references a specific group known as “feritori di punta,” skilled in delivering lethal blows with precision. Additionally, within the Camorra’s composition, there exists another category of members referred to as the “baruffieri.” These individuals are known for their participation in fights. In “The Dueling Camorristi,” Carlo di Addosio further clarifies that the society had an elected leader, termed “Il fratello maggiore” or “The elder brother,” who commanded captains, referred to as “capatazos.” The general membership of the society consisted of individuals known as “guapo” (alternatively “guappi” or “bravi”), who were further divided into “feritori di punta,” and “baruffier.”

Addosio (1893) also points out that prospective members aspired to join either of these two categories of “guappi.” To attain such status, they needed to demonstrate passive obedience and a capacity for cold-blooded cruelty for a period of two years. At the lowest level were the “chivatos,” who, after a year of apprenticeship within the organization, could progress to the rank of “novices.”

Interestingly, during the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (in both capitals), centers were established for training individuals in different capacities. In Naples, a center was dedicated to the training of combatants, focusing on operational and tactical problem-solving, while in Palermo, a center specialized in training assassins. The process of entering these training centers followed a specific mechanism. To become a novice, individuals initially underwent a year of general training. During this period, they worked closely with Franciscan friars who evaluated their aptitude and determined the

category (militant or assassin) to which they should be assigned. After the year of apprenticeship, the candidates were directed to the appropriate training centers. Those designated for the militant class went to Puglia, while those assigned to the assassin class were sent to Palermo.

One might wonder why monks were involved in training future Camorra members, given their apparent detachment from weapons and combat expertise. This question can be answered by considering historical facts, notably the birth of the Templar order within the Franciscan order. The historical practice of educating knights existed within these religious orders, which sheds light on their role in the training process. More detailed information on this subject can be found in the article titled “The “Third Order” and its impact on world history” (Maltsev, 2019):

What is the true essence of the Franciscan Order? According to the established narrative, this order was founded by St. Francis of Assisi around the year 1209, in the vicinity of the Italian city of Spoleto, as a monastic mendicant order. Traditionally, Franciscan monks are recognized by their attire — a dark brown monastic cassock secured with a rope featuring three knots, symbolizing the three vows of St. Francis: poverty, chastity, and obedience. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that historians have grappled with the absence of reliable biographical information about Francis of Assisi. Many of the existing accounts are considered legends constructed by representatives of the Catholic Church and folk traditions. In essence, the narrative surrounding the creation of the Franciscan Order appears to be a blend of myth and uncertainty, lacking concrete evidence.

However, an alternate version of the Franciscan Order’s origin presents a compelling narrative — one that can be readily substantiated by a visit to Venice. As we discovered during one of our expeditions, Venice serves as the

cradle of all religious orders. In this alternative account, the initial Franciscan Order was actually established directly in Venice. It was within the confines of Venice that the Franciscans laid the foundation for a knightly order dedicated to Archangel Michael, an order that would eventually evolve into the renowned Order of the Templars. In essence, the Templar Order emerged within the framework of the Franciscan Order. This alternative perspective extends to the origins of other significant orders as well, including the Dominicans and the Hospitallers.

Origins of the Camorra

Giuseppe Alongi (1890), in his treatise “Camorra: A Study of Criminal Sociology,” delves into the origins of the Camorra. According to his perspective, the Camorra’s beginnings trace back to prisons, but he posits a rather intricate and somewhat ambiguous view, asserting that the Camorra emerged spontaneously, without any specific guiding force behind its inception.

In Alongi’s view, the Camorra found its roots within the confines of prisons, where merchants and individuals with violent tendencies were incarcerated. These individuals were eventually granted pardons for various reasons, transforming them into a legitimate and legalized force. They organized themselves within prison walls, gradually and inconspicuously imposing their Camorrist rules and laws upon both the populace and the government. The exact timing of its formation remains uncertain, but it is evident that the Camorra took shape and established its presence within the prison system.

While Giuseppe Alongi’s perspective on the Camorra’s origins is valid, it is important to note that during the analysis, an alternative theory emerged, suggesting a connection between the Camorra’s organization and the Franciscan Order. However, the precise manner in which the Franciscan Order may have played a role in organizing the Camorra requires further investigation. Subsequently, I embarked on the next scientific endeavor, which involved the intricate task of piecing together

and reconstructing the mechanism responsible for the birth of the Camorra.

It is proposed to examine the structure of the Franciscan Order. Publicly available sources reveal that the order was composed of three branches, a structure that continues to exist today:

- Order of Friars Minor, O.F.M.
- Order of Friars Minor Conventual, O.F.M.Conv.
- Order of Friars Minor Capuchins, O.F.M.Cap. (Established in 1525).

The historical record of the Franciscan Order reveals the existence of two additional branches. The second branch, known as the “Second (female) Order” (of Franciscan Order) or the Order of Saint Clare, was established in 1224, with St. Clara as a companion to St. Francis. The fifth branch of the Franciscans is the “Third Order of Saint Francis” (tertiaries), originally founded by St. Francis around 1221. In 1401, it received its independent charter, becoming officially known as the “Third Order of St. Francis” (Alberzoni, 2004). Notably, the Third Order of St. Francis included both tertiaries residing within monasteries and a significant number of tertiaries living in the secular world. Among the latter category were many illustrious individuals, such as Dante Alighieri, King Louis IX (Saint Louis), Michelangelo, Raphael, and Christopher Columbus.

In the context of the study of the Camorra, particular attention is directed toward the tertiaries living in the secular world, as they played a pivotal role in the formation of this criminal organization. These individuals were sometimes referred to as the “civilian corps of the Franciscan Order.” The civilian corps endowed the Franciscan Order with

a unique characteristic and presented numerous opportunities. Since not all members of the Franciscan Order resided in monasteries, these individuals lived in the wider world, concealing their affiliation with the Franciscan Order from public knowledge.

Giuseppe Alongi, in his treatise, mentions the existence of two Camorras: the superior Camorra and the inferior Camorra. Allegedly, the plebeian Camorra consisted of the lower classes, while the yellow-gloved Camorra comprised the upper classes. Alongi points out that similar to the distinction between the low and high Mafia in Sicily, Naples also recognized the existence of a low and high Camorra.

However, this division was not readily apparent to external observers, and the organization’s structure and purpose remained unclear. The two Camorras functioned as parallel systems, with a “right Camorra” and a “left Camorra” coexisting simultaneously. In this context, the “left Camorra” corresponds to the civilian corps of the Franciscan Order, while the “right Camorra” represents the Camorra they established. This Camorra, which developed and evolved over time, has ultimately endured and remains in existence to this day.

The organization of the Camorra in Naples can be attributed to the civilian corps of Franciscans, with a pivotal role played by individuals referred to as “provocateurs,” or as I have labeled them. They were also known as peacemakers or masters of arms. Carlo di Addosio (1893) mentions their role in his work “The Duel of the Camorristi” saying that after the most cruel and ridiculous insults, before challenging each other, they begin to praise the skill of their fathers. But it happens that




Figure 3. Famous Tertiaries

they immediately get into a fight until the peacemaker arrives. The peacemaker tries to reconcile, using his authority.

The Camorra was often referred to as the “many-headed hydra,” a symbol that encapsulates the significance of provocateurs who operated in various capacities, including peacemakers, masters of arms, and providers of resources. However, beneath these different guises often hid the same individuals who excelled in the art of masquerade. They were adept at constantly changing their appearances, donning various masks, and assuming different roles. What was their primary function? These individuals were instrumental in the formation of organized crime in Naples.

As Eugenio de Cosa (1908) elaborates in his work “Camorra e malavita a Napoli” (“The Camorra and the Malavita in Naples”), the criminal underworld of Naples was stratified into distinct classes, encompassing thieves, robbers, swindlers, counterfeiters, and more. Among these various criminal professions, some were easier to master than others. De Cosa notes that becoming a thief, robber, or even a counterfeiter was not as challenging as becoming a con artist. To excel as a fraudster, one needed “outstanding organizational skills and a certain intellectual level.” These observations are pertinent to understanding the intricacies of the Camorra organization.

The article also emphasizes the distinction between *borseggio* thieves and *truffatori*, the swindlers, who constitute a distinct class within the criminal hierarchy. These swindlers are regarded with a unique perspective. While anyone could become a “*lardodisciscasso*,” “*rappinante*,” or even a brash pickpocket, becoming a swindler was a far more intricate endeavor. This is because fraud hinges on deception and misleading the victim, making it essential for those engaged in this form of crime to possess the requisite skills and dexterity due to the complexity of their operations. A successful swindler had to project an appearance of masculinity, simplicity, a specific style of dress, and a witty demeanor — qualities that facilitate successful deception.

Swindlers were considered a privileged caste, and entering their ranks was exceedingly challeng-

ing, demanding a high level of intelligence and specialized skills. However, many young men aspiring to the underworld initially did not possess these traits. It was on the streets of Naples that individuals emerged who met all the requirements, individuals who were, in fact, representatives of the civilian corps of the Franciscan Order, concealed behind appropriate masks. With their level of training, they became authorities for street youth and others, effectively organizing crime in Naples. The question may arise: why did the Franciscans engage in such activities? The answer lies in the environment they created, from which they could select personnel for the Camorra. The Camorra exclusively recruited and accepted criminals into its ranks.

But why criminals? Allow me to share an story. In the Soviet Union, there existed certain unofficial educational institutions of a special nature. During the initial interview, candidates seeking admission to such institutions were posed questions such as: Could you rob a bank? Could you kill a person? Could you steal a specific item? Since the newcomers were Soviet citizens, they tended to answer that they could not engage in bank robbery or murder, citing moral and legal objections. Those who responded negatively were immediately categorized as “unsuitable” and were directed toward the category of “good” people because only “bad” individuals were educated in these institutions. One of my mentors once asserted that a intelligence officer should have a criminal disposition. While a he might receive ranks, accolades, and medals for serving their homeland, their actions on foreign soil might be considered criminal according to the laws of that country.

Back to the Camorra. The Camorra selected those who were not only ready to commit a crime, but also to commit it — that is, those who had already been tested in the field of criminal activity. A logical question arises: where was such a contingent? Correctly, in prison. The Franciscan Order invented and implemented the following mechanism: artificially created the criminal world of Naples. And those who committed crimes, sooner or later went to prison. And here they were already waiting for the very civilian corps of the Franciscan Order. In places of imprisonment there was a selection of “candidates” who met the requirements of the Camorra. There were, in particular, certain agreements with

the prison authorities, which allowed the civilian corps to come to the places of detention, disguise themselves as prisoners, stay there for the necessary amount of time, and then change into civilian dress and leave. In this way, prisons were turned into “academies of crime”, since this was where future camorristas began to be taught. There was plenty of time for this in prison.

However, before the recruits were trained, they were qualified, that is, they were determined who had what aptitudes. Above in the article considered a list of criminal activities, but in fact, the basis of their three: thieves, robbers and murderers (since the others were already occupied by the civilian corps of the Franciscan Order). Once the qualifications were determined, the training began; criminal activity required an enormous amount of knowledge and skill. For example, in order to commit a burglary, initially it is required to collect information about the object, to find out when the apartment is no one is in order to enter unnoticed. It is necessary to get into the apartment somehow — there are locks that will need to be opened — pick up the keys or act in another way. When the theft is successful, the stolen goods must be sold. As for this question, in the Camorra it was solved simply and definitely — all the loot was sent to the treasury of the Franciscan Order.

The wealth of the Franciscan Order was indeed substantial, making it one of the wealthiest monastic orders. As mentioned earlier, all stolen proceeds were directed to their treasury. To illustrate the Order’s affluence, consider the example of the Capuchin line, which inherited the entire wealth of the Habsburg dynasty upon their demise. It is worth noting that Charles V, who was the Emperor of the Holy Spanish Empire, hailed from the Habsburg lineage. Intriguingly, all the riches of the Spanish Empire ultimately flowed into the coffers of the Franciscan Order. The Habsburgs, a formidable monarchical dynasty during the Middle Ages and the Modern Age, wielded immense power in Europe.

To draw a comparison, let’s examine how bandit training unfolded in the post-Soviet space during the 1990s. Following the dissolution of the USSR, many individuals from the security apparatus found themselves in precarious positions, viewed as

representatives of the erstwhile communist regime. Exploiting this vulnerability, criminal groups recruited such individuals to impart training to the criminal element. In return, they offered a range of incentives, including apartments, cars, and money. Criminals recognized that in the altered landscape, survival and successful operation could only be assured by well-trained individuals, given the intense criminal competition of the 1990s, where nearly everyone dabbled in illicit activities. Since the skills of many aspiring criminals were deficient, schools were established to provide training in criminal activities. Former special forces personnel were often enlisted as instructors (Maltsev, 2021).

In the case of the Camorra, specialized training centers were established to groom boys between the ages of 13 and 15. Initial training spanned one year, after which candidates were assessed and qualified in one of three areas: thieves, robbers, or assassins. Subsequently, they were sent to designated training centers. Militants underwent a two-year training program in Puglia, while assassins were trained in Palermo. Those who completed their training and reached the age of 16 to 18 were designated as “piciotti,” or soldiers. If a candidate did not reach the age of 16 by the conclusion of their training, they remained in the monastery.

DISCUSSION

In formulating the hypothesis, let us outline the following cultural scenario. Once a young man graduated from a Camorra training center and was designated as a soldier, he embarked on a journey of fulfilling the tasks assigned by the leadership. While he possessed a certain level of knowledge and skills, it was imperative to both maintain and acquire new ones. To this end, the Camorra implemented a system that placed great emphasis on honing weapon skills through dueling. However, the significance and function of dueling within the Camorra extended far beyond mere practice in wielding weapons. The different types of duels offer insight into their broader role.

Within the Camorra, there are three distinct types of duels:

1. Examination.
2. Judicial.
3. Professional.

The first type of duel, known as the examination duel, served as a means of promotion within the organization. Failure to succeed in this duel would impede one's progress. The judicial duel was employed to resolve disputes that arose between Camorra members. Whenever disagreements occurred among comrades, a duel was scheduled to settle these issues. If someone lacked proficiency in wielding a weapon, they could face dire consequences, even death, without advancing in rank. The third type of duel could arise spontaneously during the execution of professional duties.

Several Russian-speaking commentators have erroneously asserted that knife duels constitute the primary form of Camorra dueling. This misconception may stem from a lack of familiarity with foreign languages, as contemporary "Camorra enthusiasts" often rely on questionable sources instead of direct primary materials from the era. Many tend to draw information from readily available open sources without delving into archival texts. It is important to note that this misinterpretation isn't exclusive to Russian-speaking authors; Italian authors have also been guilty of relying on open sources. Consequently, this has given rise to numerous myths and misconceptions surrounding the Camorra.

Carlo di Addosio's work, "Duel of the Camorristi," provides a detailed account of Camorristi duels (Addosio, 1893). He clarifies that Camorristi utilized not only knives but also firearms in their duels. Moreover, the primary form of Camorra dueling predominantly involved revolvers rather than knives. Di Addosio explains that revolvers were the most commonly used weapons in these duels, with knives or daggers occasionally employed if the duelists were authentic Camorristi. In such cases, the duel acquired a distinct name, "zumpata," denoting the combatants' propensity to leap (zompare) during the engagement. In rare instances, duels might involve a Genoese sword, particularly when the duel occurred between a man and a woman or between two women.

To understand the choice between using knives and revolvers in duels, we must distinguish between duels within prison and those outside prison walls. Inside prisons, revolvers were unavailable, so combatants engaged in knife duels. These knife duels had specific regulations: the knives' blades were required to match the size of a man's palm, and both duelists had to use knives of identical size. If one knife exceeded the other in length, the duel was postponed. Even within prison, peacemakers ensured that dueling rules were strictly followed.

Outside prison, duels fell into two categories:

1. Complex (Consecutive) Duels: These were meticulously planned affairs, scheduled at predetermined locations and times. The choice of location aimed to prevent friends of the dueling parties from intervening. Camorristi during complex duels employed various techniques, including pendulum movements, hiding behind obstacles, jumps, rolls, somersaults to evade a bullet. Duelists could wield one or two revolvers simultaneously and even fire shots with both hands. Equality between opponents was emphasized, extending to the number of weapons and bullets each duelist possessed.
2. Instantaneous Duels: These duels were impromptu and occurred when conflicts arose between individuals who were not Camorra members. In such cases, the winner was often the one who fired the first shot.

While it may be tempting to draw parallels with dueling scenes in movies, such as "The Quick and the Dead," it is important to note that these films typically portray events in the Wild West, rather than Naples or Italy (Raimi, 1995). Nevertheless, it is worth considering that the Wild West was once part of the Spanish Empire, as was Naples. Some movies, like "Headless Horseman," depict multi-stage duels (Vajnshtok, 1973). The analyzed source mentions that duels can occur not only between men but also between a man and a woman. In such cases, only cold weapons are used. Women can also engage in duels to resolve disputes within relationships, and in this scenario, only cold weapons are employed.

When it comes to a duel between two Camorrians outside the prison using edged weapons,

daggers are typically used in a Norman grip. Alternatively, a dagga (Spanish dagger) or a stiletto pin may be employed, in which case a fencing grip is used. In duels involving two men, a boarding sword with a blade length of 70 cm can be used, while in a duel between a man and a woman, a double-edged small boarding blade is employed. It is worth noting that all these weapons have maritime origins.

From the presented list of weapons used in duels, it is clear that folding knives, often associated with the Camorra, are not mentioned. These knives appeared later, in the 19th century. The primary form of duel among Camorrians involved revolvers. However, this list of duels in Naples is not exhaustive, and we will explore it in more detail later.

Carlo di Addosio (1893), in his work "Duel of the Camorristi," describes the duel in three stages: *appicceco*, *raggiunamento*, and *acustione*. He explains that these three-act duels can take the form of a "challenge" or an invitation, often referred to as an "appointment" in Camorra jargon. This means that one can challenge or invite for reasoning and clarification, essentially asking a question. An invitation to reason doesn't necessarily depend on real issues; it is a way for opponents or their associates to consider themselves defenseless. They engage in reasoning and attempt to clarify the situation. If the dispute remains unresolved after this initial stage, it progresses to the second stage, which is a formal question. This often leads to a spontaneous clarification of relations but may be scheduled for another time, possibly on a different day and at a different location.

It is important to highlight that duels occurred between both members of the Camorra and non-Camorra individuals, and these two scenarios involved different approaches. When ordinary people dueled, they could do so without adhering to any specific rules. However, when Camorrians organized a duel, a peacekeeper might intervene and forbid it. In such cases, Camorristi typically complied with the peacekeeper's decision because these peacekeepers were respected figures within the community but had no direct affiliation with the Camorra itself.

A duel between two Camorristas was always subject to the control of Camorra leadership. The elders of the Camorra would convene to assess the situation. If they couldn't reach a resolution, they might seek advice from a more knowledgeable Camorra representative. When disputes between the two sides couldn't be resolved through negotiation, they would resort to a duel. Carlo di Addosio (1893), in his work "Duel of the Camorristi," describes this process as follows:

The quarrel between the two *guappi*, which ends with a challenge, is beautifully depicted in two sonnets of Rousseau, which the author cites in the book. Wishing to find the reason for the origin of the dispute, from which the participants do not immediately proceed to the issue but postpone the firing to another time, it is safe to say that for the Camorra, it occurs as a sign of respect for discipline since it is forbidden to undertake anything without the prior authorization of the *capos* or those aware of what is going on.

Here is a sonnet by Rousseau in its original language, as cited by Carlo di Addosio (1893, p. 66):

Acciaccusielle! Picciuttielle 'e sgarra,
vuie ca purtate 'o cappelluccio 'a sgherra,
namazzaromano ca pare navarra
e sirascatevene 'o serra-serra,
e siguardate, staguardatasguarra
comm'ana lama int'apanza,
o pe terra fa scunucchià la gente pe caparra,
mo' scemiate pe nun ghi 'a guerra!
A vvuie, acciaccusiellepicciuttielle!
Chi lene core se facessennanza!
Jammo! Quann'eccacciatesticurtielle?!
Na zumpatellasola!...Peccrianza!...
E ch'è!... Facile 'e surde... 'e stunatielle?..
Vetramano 'e stentinerine 'a panza!

CONCLUSIONS

It is essential to emphasize that a reluctance to rely on primary sources in research and contentment with internet-based information can lead to the perpetuation of myths and misconceptions about



organizations like the Camorra in Southern Italy. These criminal structures continue to operate in the region today, but their historical origins and practices have often been obscured. Additionally, the documents and materials available have been shaped by policies and legislation aimed at revitalizing Italian culture, further complicating the understanding of these criminal organizations.

As a result, the duels currently taught by Italian “maestros” have no historical basis in the territory, especially not duels involving stick “ba-

stone”, which had no presence in Palermo, Naples, or Calabria. In his book “Fencing Science,” Blasco Florio (1844) mentions that sticks were used in fights among commoners, while knights were prohibited from wielding them.. Furthermore, in Palermo, knights were not allowed to duel with revolvers; doing so would be seen as opposing society. Firearms could be used in crimes like robberies and murders, but not in duels, which were considered dishonorable and subject to strict punishment.

The modern perception of the Camorra often deviates from historical reality. The mechanisms that established and sustained the organization were not fully understood by authors of 19th-century sources. However, through comparative analysis, it becomes possible to comprehend and reconstruct these mechanisms and find evidence supporting the conclusions drawn from six key books on the Camorra, written between 1876 and 2006.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.


REFERENCES

- Addosio, C. D. (1893). *Il duello dei camorristi* [The duel of the camorristis]. L. Pierro.
- Alberzoni, M. P. (2004). *Clare of Assisi and the Poor Sisters in the Thirteenth Century*. Franciscan Institute.
- Alongi, G. (1890). *La Camorra. Studio di sociologia criminale*. [Camorra: A Study of Criminal Sociology]. Bocca.
- Astarita, C., Capuano, C., & Purificato, F. (2018). The macroeconomic impact of organised crime: A post-Keynesian analysis. *Economic Modelling*, 68, 514–528. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2017.08.029>
- Badolati, A. (2014). *Mamma 'ndrangheta* [Mother 'ndrangheta]. Luigi Pellegrini Editore.

- Ballandonne, M. (2020). The history of futures studies: A note on Gilfillan's early work. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 157, 119983. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2020.119983>
- Barone, G., & Narciso, G. (2015). Organized crime and business subsidies: Where does the money go? *Journal of Urban Economics*, 86, 98–110. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2015.01.002>
- Bradfield, R., Derbyshire, J., & Wright, G. (2016). The critical role of history in scenario thinking: Augmenting causal analysis within the intuitive logics scenario development methodology. *Futures*, 77, 56–66. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2016.02.002>
- Bueger, C., & Edmunds, T. (2020). Blue crime: Conceptualising transnational organised crime at sea. *Marine Policy*, 119, 104067. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104067>
- Calderoni, F., Catanese, S., De Meo, P., Ficara, A., & Fiumara, G. (2020). Robust link prediction in criminal networks: A case study of the Sicilian Mafia. *Expert Systems With Applications*, 161, 113666. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2020.113666>
- Campaniello, N., Gray, R., & Mastrobuoni, G. (2016). Returns to education in criminal organizations: Did going to college help Michael Corleone? *Economics of Education Review*, 54, 242–258. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2016.03.003>
- Catino, M. (2015). Mafia rules. The role of criminal codes in mafia organizations. *Scandinavian Journal of Management*, 31(4), 536–548. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scaman.2015.10.001>
- Chang, J., Lu, H., & Wang, P. (2013). Search for a theory of organized crimes. *European Economic Review*, 62, 130–153. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.05.004>
- Craparo, G., David, V., Costanzo, G., & Gori, A. (2018). Cosa Nostra and the Camorra: Assessment of personality, alexithymic traits, and attachment styles. *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, 58, 17–26. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2018.02.010>
- Daniele, G. (2019). Strike one to educate one hundred: Organized crime, political selection and politicians' ability. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 159, 650–662. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.021>
- De Cosa, E. (1908). *Camorra e malavita a Napoli: agli inizi del Novecento* [The Camorra and the Malavita in Naples]. Gi Effe Edizioni.
- Ferrara, E., De Meo, P., Catanese, S., & Fiumara, G. (2014). Detecting criminal organizations in mobile phone networks. *Expert Systems With Applications*, 41(13), 5733–5750. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2014.03.024>
- Florio, B. (1844). *La scienza della scherma* [Fencing Science]. Del R. Ospizio di beneficenza.
- Gaetani, F. M. E. (ca. 1802). *Opuscoli Palermitani*. ms. Bibl.
- Gamba, A., Immordino, G., & Piccolo, S. (2018). Corruption, organized crime and the bright side of subversion of law. *Journal of Public Economics*, 159, 79–88. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.02.003>
- Hollstein, B. (2019). What autobiographical narratives tell us about the life course. Contributions of qualitative sequential analytical methods. *Advances in Life Course Research*, 41, 100248. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.alcr.2018.10.001>
- Kalenda, J., & Schwartzhoff, S. (2015). Cultural Sociology: A New approach to the study of the history of Education. *Procedia — Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 174, 3055–3062. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.01.1098>
- Lavorgna, A., & Sergi, A. (2014). Types of organised crime in Italy. The multifaceted spectrum of Italian criminal associations and their different attitudes in the financial crisis and in the use of Internet technologies. *International Journal of Law Crime and Justice*, 42(1), 16–32. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcj.2013.11.002>
- Lombroso, C. (2006). *Criminal Man*. Duke University Press. (Original work published 1876)

- Maltsev, O. V. (2019, December 5). "Tretij orden" i ego sled v mirovoj istorii [The "Third Order" and its impact on world history]. *Expedition*. <https://expedition-journal.de/2019/12/05/tretij-orden-i-ego-sled-v-mirovoj-istorii/>
- Maltsev, O. V. (2021). *Vechnyj dvigatel* [Perpetual Motion]. Izdatelskij dom "Patriot". <https://books.google.com.ua/books?vid=ISBN5043695595>
- Meier, S., Pierce, L., Vaccaro, A., & La Cara, B. (2016). Trust and in-group favoritism in a culture of crime. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 132, 78–92. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.09.005>
- Nese, A., O'Higgins, N., Sbriglia, P., & Scudiero, M. (2018). Cooperation, punishment and organized crime: a lab-in-the-field experiment in southern Italy. *European Economic Review*, 107, 86–98. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurocorev.2018.05.004>
- Raimi, S. (Director). (1995). *The Quick and the Dead* [Film]. TriStar Pictures; Japan Satellite Broadcasting; IndieProd.
- Rignanese, M., & Tricarico, V. (1992). *Storia di tre vecchi antenati. Regole e rituali della camorra* [Story of three old ancestors. Rules and rituals of the camorra]. Edizioni del Golfo.
- Saviano, R. (2006). *Gomorra* [Gomorra]. Mondadori
- Vajnshtok, V. (Director). (1973). *Vsadnik bez golovy* [The Headless Horseman] [Film]. Lenfilm.
- Varner, D. (2018). Nineteenth century criminal geography: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Pennsylvania Prison Society. *Journal of Historical Geography*, 59, 15–26. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.2017.09.008>

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) which allows reusers to distribute, remix, adapt, and build upon the material in any medium or format for non-commercial purposes only, and only so long as attribution is given to the creator.



THE WORLD ECONOMY DOES NOT EXIST WITHOUT THE CRIME

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.61439/AFSP1815>

EUGENIA TARASENKO


RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF WORLD MARTIAL ART TRADITIONS AND CRIMINALISTIC
RESEARCH OF WEAPON HANDLING

E-mail: spravom@gmail.com

Eugenia Tarasenko is the Director of the Research Institute of World Martial Art Traditions and Criminalistic Research of Weapon Handling. She is a lawyer and researcher at The Memory Institute. She holds an honorary membership in the Humanities Scientific Society and the Psychological and Philosophical Society, and she is a member of the Presidium of the Odessa Historical and Literary Society.

ABSTRACT

This article offers the author's analytical perspective on the lacuna within economic science, particularly concerning the essence and diversity of approaches to understanding the genesis of the economy. Primarily, the article provides a practical exploration of the prerequisites for the emergence of the New Age economy, examining the history of civilization,



criminology, wars, piracy, and the development of global criminal traditions. The main objective is to comprehend the role of crime and its influence on shaping the economy during this period. The article holds practical relevance for researchers working at the intersection of anthropology, psychology, sociology, philosophy, and criminology. Additionally, it is beneficial for entrepreneurs and individuals in the early stages of business design.

Keywords

economics, political economy, costs, profits, banks, offshore, crime, criminology.

INTRODUCTION

Economics encompasses a multifaceted examination of the economy, taking into account historical contexts, its various dimensions, methodologies, models, and tools (Christophers, 2014; Gerber & Scheidel, 2018; Pirgmaier, 2017; Rehman, 2016; Su et al., 2018). However, one of the less explored and often overlooked interdisciplinary inquiries pertains to unraveling the enigma surrounding the essence and origins of the economy.

According to E. G. Efimova (2005), contemporary economics can be defined as the study of the most efficient methods for satisfying humanity's boundless needs while working within the constraints of limited resources. It is crucial to recognize that this understanding of economics has evolved over an extensive period of its development as a scientific discipline. Economics serves a dual role, with the second function being practical and advisory. Drawing on empirical knowledge, economics provides recommendations and proposes strategies for economic practices and policies implemented by governments (Colby, 2020; Li & Liao, 2018; Lindsey & Santos, 2020; Reeves et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2020). These economic policies, aimed at achieving primary economic objectives, should be grounded in theoretical insights and principles established by the field of economics. Notably, the term "economics" has its origins in Greek, meaning "the art of household management."

Economics spans various scales, from the micro-level to the macro-level. Correspondingly,

the global economy can be envisioned as a vast "household" operating on a worldwide scale. This metaphorical "household management" ideally seeks efficiency, enhancing the well-being of all its inhabitants through everyone's contributions to the collective enterprise (Nanni, 2016). This endeavor involves prudent resource allocation, strategic planning, and a calculated approach to minimize losses while maximizing short-term gains and long-term prosperity (Coulibaly & Yogo, 2020; Fritz & Koch, 2014; Galvin, 2020; Gould et al., 2016; Tomich et al., 2019).

METHODS

The economic trajectory of the Modern Age, beginning in the 15th and 16th centuries, is intricately linked with various factors, including shifts in societal organization, technological advancements, geopolitical changes, conflicts, criminological occurrences, and the evolution of global criminal practices. Noteworthy elements in this trajectory include technological advancements in trade and colonial expansion, which facilitated intercontinental trade and contributed to the development of the global economy. The Industrial Revolution, spanning the 18th and 19th centuries, brought about significant changes in production methods, resulting in increased industrial activity and production levels.

Social transformation accompanied the development of capitalism, marking a transition from a feudal system to a capitalist economy characterized by a preference for market relations, thus stimulating economic growth. The Age of Great Geographical Discoveries involved the identification of new sea routes and territories, playing a crucial role in establishing fresh economic connections and markets. Military conflicts, including wars and criminal activities, played a role in driving technological and economic shifts, influencing societal lifestyle and culture.

Piracy exerted substantial influence on trade and international relations from the 16th to the 18th centuries. The emergence of criminal traditions and the establishment of global criminal networks were propelled by the evolution of trade and associated activities, leading to the formation of international criminal structures. Economic expansion spurred

the emergence of shadow economic sectors, encompassing activities such as smuggling, illicit trade, and other forms of criminality. To comprehensively understand the New Age economy, an examination through the lenses of civilization history, criminology, wars, piracy, and global criminal traditions requires a holistic methodological approach.

The application of methodological principles and techniques to analyze these factors provides insights into the interconnectedness of various facets of social life and their impact on the formation of the New Age economic system. Methods for addressing this issue:

1. Historical approach: emphasizing significant events and eras associated with the evolution of the New Age economy.
2. Comparative analysis: examining various regions and countries to discern shared patterns and distinctive characteristics.
3. Economic methodology: investigating institutional transformations, including the establishment of stock exchanges, banks, companies, and other pivotal economic entities.
4. Statistical examination: employing statistical data to gauge economic growth, trade, inflation, and other relevant indicators.
5. Sociological approach: scrutinizing shifts in social classes, population migrations, and social mobility.
6. Sociocultural investigation: comprehending the impact of cultural and societal factors on economic activity.
7. Criminological approach, scrutinizing crime and illicit activities: Investigating the influence of crime and the clandestine economy on the growth and operation of the economy. Examination of Criminal Organizations: Analyzing the configurations of criminal groups, including pirate gangs and trade networks.
8. Geopolitical strategy: assessing the influence of geopolitical elements by examining the effects of geographical location, territorial shifts, and wars on economic development.
9. Strategic assessment: evaluating state strategies concerning trade, colonialism, and geopolitical influence.
10. Interdisciplinary methodology: amalgamating insights from various disciplines, including his-

tory, economics, sociology, criminology, and geopolitics, to construct a holistic understanding.

11. Modeling and Forecasting: employing mathematical models for analyzing trends and predicting economic developments.

This comprehensive methodological approach offers a thorough comprehension of the genesis of the New Age economy and its connections to historical, sociocultural, criminological, and geopolitical phenomena. Employing a blend of these methods for a focused investigation into the New Age economy through the lenses of civilization history, criminology, wars, piracy, and global criminal traditions ensures a profound and holistic understanding of its development and intricate interplays with diverse facets of social life.

Applying this methodology allowed us to explore crime as a factor that, despite being undesirable within the framework of laws and ethical standards, can influence economic processes in certain instances. For instance, many countries exhibit a “shadow economy” or informal sector where activities operate without regulation or taxation. While some of these practices may involve illegalities, they can also offer stability in situations where formal avenues for service delivery and trade are either unavailable or inefficient.

International trade across borders, conducted outside official channels, can, in certain instances, contribute positively to the economy. This may encompass activities such as smuggling, illegal import-export practices, and other forms of illicit trade. Moreover, during economic crises, criminal organizations may serve as alternative sources of finance for businesses and individuals facing challenges in securing credit from banks or other official sources. Innovation and entrepreneurial activities also come into play in certain instances, as criminal organizations may function as innovators, introducing novel business methods and technologies into their operations. This dynamic can exert competitive pressure, fostering entrepreneurship.

Nevertheless, it is crucial to underscore that while crime might have a transient impact on the economy, its enduring repercussions — such as harm

to social stability, diminished trust in government and institutions, and potential adverse social effects — render it an undesirable phenomenon. In the majority of cases, legislative and law enforcement measures are directed at combating crime to uphold the well-being and stability of both the economy and society at large. Certain illicit activities, such as fraud, corruption, and financial crimes, are associated with white-collar crime and can significantly influence the economic system. These actions have the potential to impact financial markets, companies, and confidence in financial institutions. Criminal endeavors, like drug and arms trafficking, can generate substantial shadow markets and draw significant financial flows, influencing the economies of specific regions and shaping the geopolitical environment.


As information technology advances, the risk of technological crime, including cyberattacks, hacking, and cyber fraud, is on the rise. These criminal activities can inflict severe harm on businesses and nations by compromising economic infrastructure and data security. Criminal activities can sway the decisions of investors and business professionals concerning the growth of specific regions, with

elevated crime levels dissuading investment and impeding business development. Certain types of criminal behavior may arise from disparities in social and economic conditions, representing a response to limited opportunities and restricted access to resources, subsequently impacting the economic stability of a society. In the competition for scarce resources, like water and land, criminal entities can disrupt the allocation and control of these vital resources. Widespread criminal activity can undermine confidence in government, the rule of law, and economic institutions, creating unfavorable conditions for business development and investment.

In broad terms, although crime may transiently shape certain structures and impact economic processes, in the long run, it is predominantly viewed as a hindrance to the sustainable development of economies and societies. Combatting crime and establishing conditions for fair and transparent business stand as priorities for numerous countries and international organizations.

RESULTS

The realization of such an economy necessitates the presence of resources, primarily encompassing human resources, natural resources, and various material assets, including capital formed from these resources (Ducoing, 2019; Kalimeris et al., 2020; Kaufman, 2014; Fryer, 2017). Economics, often referred to as economy, comprises a complex network



of social relationships and societal practices that manifest within the framework of human economic activities. These activities encompass the production, distribution, exchange, consumption, and preservation of material goods, along with the management of these intricate processes.

The aspects of economic reality serve as the focal point for what is known as economic science, as well as a myriad of deliberated economic concepts and theories (Brown et al., 2018; Hafner et al., 2020; Spash, 2020). However, it is worth noting that these theories and concepts do not constitute a unified or all-encompassing framework. Consequently, the endeavor to establish a comprehensive and unified economic theory remains an ongoing challenge. However, no other discipline has been so lucky to isolate itself from everything as economics. Having no special knowledge, people are ready to argue on many topics: about climate changes, same-sex marriages, the war in Iraq or nuclear power plants. But when it comes to economics, many people immediately lose the desire to say or prove things (Chang, 2014).

Without understanding the nature of the economics, as well as any other phenomenon, it is impossible to study it in a systemic way, to penetrate comprehensively into its structure and patterns, and to make objective forecasts. In this case, what are the scientific realities of the contemporary economic science and in what dimensions or directions are scientific and research efforts being made?

According to the generally accepted paradigm of economic history, in primitive society, the level of economic development was low, allowing consumption on the edge of physical survival. Primitive people first obtained their livelihood by hunting and gathering, but as a result of the neo-lithic revolution, agriculture and animal breeding appeared. The development of the society led to the labour division — farming and herding tribes emerged, as well as craftsmen, the first of whom were blacksmiths. Social inequality, social classes and the state appeared. Slavery emerged (Sichkar, 2021).

Under low economic development, i.e. the absence of considerable monetary resources, the Egyptian pyramids were built, in particular (mod-

ern architects cannot repeat such structures today for various reasons). It should be agreed that this kind of construction is very capital-consuming. For some reason the actual situation (erected pyramids) does not coincide with the official paradigm (low level of the development in the conditions of the primitive and communal system). Or the pyramids were built later? The banking business also existed in ancient times. In Babylon in the 8th century BC banks were actively carrying out activities. Interesting details about the fairly advanced state of banking in ancient Babylon can be found in E. Revilu (Revülout) in his “*Les obligations du droit Egyptien comparé aux autres droits de l’antiquité*” (1886), in Peiser’s “*Keilinschriftliche Aktenstücke*” (1889, p. 101), and especially in the collections of the British Museum, where the family archive of the famous Babylonian banking house of Neboagiddin Edisibi is kept. It is interesting that Babylonian merchants even knew a kind of banknote called hudu, which had the same circulation as gold (Dzhivelegov et al., 2017).

Banks are the infrastructure of the economy. There was probably an economy in ancient times that is not told in modern textbooks.

Gradually developed the exchange of goods, which at first was carried out in the form of natural exchange (barter), but with the emergence of money turned into trade. Nevertheless, in the societies of the Ancient World and the Middle Ages, subsistence economy prevailed. With the Crusades, Europeans rediscovered spices, silk and other goods that had become rare in Europe during the Middle Ages. This discovery led to the expansion of trade and intensified trade competition with the countries of the East (Sichkar, 2021).

The proposed question for reflection is the following: was the subsistence economy able to provide the army with metal weapons on a mass scale? The era of the Ancient World and the Middle Ages is known to be a history of continuous conquests, land and sea battles. Building ships is not like planting vegetables (in terms of the level of task complexity and required skill). Industrial means of production, serious scientific knowledge, marine and astronomical instruments are necessary.

After the time of Crusades, the knightly orders become the richest. The war for the Holy Sepulchre was very profitable. This period is referred to as a historical chronology falsification by Uwe Topper (1998). He argued that figures such as Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Pindar, and Aristotle, who were previously thought to be separated by centuries, actually existed closer in time to each other and to us. According to Topper, they all belong to the same century, and their homeland is not ancient Greece but rather Italy during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It turns out that our understanding of Romans and Greeks needs to be revised, as they were, in fact, Italian humanists. Additionally, a significant portion of Greek and Roman texts written on papyrus or parchment, carved on stone or in bronze, are ingenious falsifications of Italian humanists. Italian humanism produced the written world of antiquity, the Bible and, together with humanists from other countries, the history of the early Middle Ages. The age of humanism was not only a time of scholars, ‘collectors and interpreters of antiquities’ — it was a time of enormously intense, tireless and fruitful spiritual activity: for more than five hundred years we have been following the path indicated by the humanists (Topper, 1998).

Has the modern paradigm of economics taken these data into account? It is an open question facing us in science. From the end of the XV century the Age of great geographical discoveries began, leading to the fact that the world economy was formed and the era of initial accumulation began. Since the last quarter of the XVIII century the Industrial Revolution began, leading to the fact that in the most developed countries the majority of the population by the end of the XIX century was no longer employed in agriculture, but in industry. Capitalism became the predominant economic system, and the process of traditional society transforming into modern society, agrarian society into industrial society took place (Sichkar, 2021).

Much earlier, the era of the next accumulation of funds, goods and material wealth was marked by the Crusades, in the course of which the Orient was subsequently plundered, not without religious attitudes and leverage over the masses. Genoa organized a bank, introduced bills of exchange, became the creditor of Charles V, and monopolized

the import of silver from America precisely due to the capital “accumulated” in the Crusades. In the large-scale arena of the Mediterranean, two competitors — Genoa and Venice — came face to face, and for centuries they struck at each other, plundered the coast, captured convoys, destroyed galleys, and acted against each other with the help of sovereigns — Anjou or Hungarian, Palaeologos or Aragonese.

Genoa changed its economic course a dozen times, each time assuming the necessary metamorphosis. To organise the outside world to keep it for itself, then to abandon it when it became uninhabitable or unusable; to conceive another, to build it — for example, at the end of the fifteenth century to abandon the East for the West, the Black Sea for the Atlantic Ocean, and in the nineteenth century to unite Italy to its own advantage — this was the fate of Genoa, an unstable organism, a super-sensitive seismograph that came to a head wherever the vast world moved. A monster of intelligence and on occasion of hardness, was not Genoa condemned to usurpe the whole world or not to live? (Braudel, 1982).

Great Britain “accumulated” its capital through licensed piracy and the plundering of the colonies. The colonies were “plundered” jointly by the British East India Company established in 1600, which operated until 1858. The founders of the British East India Company included not only English merchants, but also Dutch tradesmen and German bankers.

Portugal and Spain “accumulated” their capital by plundering colonies. The “Age of Discovery” was nothing more than a veil for the planned conquest of territories. With the beginning of the 15th century, the countries of Western Europe began to expand rapidly. This period is called the Age of Discovery in order to hide its real essence. At that time lands, resources and local population were seized, which became the labour force of colonizers. From the end of the 15th century, Portugal began to dominate Asia and Spain in the Americas. By the middle of the 18th century, North America was shared among Great Britain, France and Spain. Most of the Latin American countries were under Spanish and Portuguese rule until 1810–1820. Parts of India

were under the protectorate of Great Britain, France and Portugal. The settlement of Australia began around that time (the first convict settlement was established there in 1788). Africa was only partially colonized by Portugal and Holland (Chang, 2014).

In a detailed analysis of the logic of the change of historical epochs, we could by analogy consider the formation of civilisation in the key of the history of incessant wars (what are the 100-year and 30-year wars only worth). War is always connected with plunder and accumulation of captured resources. The ancient military custom of plundering a captured city within a set time period set by the commander has survived through the centuries to the present day. Another form of “appropriation” at the end of a war is the contribution.

In the 21st century, battlefields have moved to the Internet, and everyone is familiar with “hybrid warfare”. But in the last year we have a new kind of war — a pandemic. And this war is primarily economic — from eliminating competitors to capturing markets, it is a global war.

Thus any war has economic reasons and economic justification.

This is what we find in Engels’ *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*:

A military leader who had made himself a name gathered around him a band of young men eager for booty, whom he pledged to personal loyalty, giving the same pledge to them. The leader provided their keep, gave them gifts, and organized them on a hierarchic basis; a bodyguard and a standing troop for smaller expeditions and a regular corps of officers for operations on a larger scale. Weak as these retinues must have been, and as we in fact find them to be later — for example, under Odoacer in Italy — they were nevertheless the beginnings of the decay of the old freedom of the people and showed themselves to be such during and after the migrations. For in the first place they favored the rise of monarchic power.

In the second place, as Tacitus already notes, they could only be kept together by continual wars and plundering expeditions. Plunder became an end in itself. If the leader of the retinue found nothing to do in the neighborhood, he set out with his men to other peoples where there was war and the prospect of booty. (Engels, 1902, Chapter 7)

The following thought of F. Engels is extremely interesting:

With slavery, which attained its fullest development under civilization, came the first great cleavage of society into an exploiting and an exploited class. This cleavage persisted during the whole civilized period. Slavery is the first form of exploitation, the form peculiar to the ancient world; it is succeeded by serfdom in the middle ages, and wage-labor in the more recent period. These are the three great forms of servitude, characteristic of the three great epochs of civilization; open, and in recent times disguised, slavery always accompanies them. (Engels, 1902, Chapter 9)

According to Ha-Yun Chang (2014), capitalism as a form of modern economy emerged around the 16th-17th centuries in Western Europe and not in Asia or the Americas, which is a topic of constant passionate debate. The fact remains that capitalism first emerged in Western Europe.

And the flowering of capitalism occurred in the late nineteenth century, which gave rise to the current of political economy of Marxism and the development of trends in political economy.

Why and How did the Modern Economy Emerge?

Not the division of labour and classes, not the growth of commodity production caused the emergence of the economy. It is its consequence. The nature of the economy is completely different, according to the author’s complex analytical view.

Economy (like any other phenomenon) arises in a certain environment and in the presence of certain social conditions. These conditions are, for example, the absence of weapons and the emergence of the bourgeois class. At the same time, these conditions require an implementer, because nothing arises in society by itself, people need an initiator.

The formation of the crime and economic environment can be analysed by identical interdisciplinary methods. The initial accumulation of capital always takes place through criminal means (Crusades, piracy, robbery of conquered territories, plundering of treasury, the dashing 90s). In addition, there are geographical and climatic factors: the south is more favourable for living, so fugitive criminals go to the southern regions, bringing with them the capital of pirates who once came ashore.

Socially acceptable statuses are required to live in society and use capital for profit. Dynasties with fake pedigrees and new names, such as the Rothschilds, emerge. Money is put into circulation: estates and industries are bought up, money is invested in projects and kept in the bank. This is how the big bourgeois are created. It was the presence of large amounts of criminal money that caused the establishment of banks both in the ancient era and in Modern times. Other criminals travelled from Europe to America to the British, Spanish, Portuguese, French colonies to get rich, and in fact, to rob the local population. Everyone knows the story of the purchase of the half-island of Manhattan for a literal bundle of glass beads. Then the daredevils return to Europe with their “earned” fortune.


People in their masses are always drawn to satiety and security, which can be provided by those who have power and might. People are drawn to power. The age of consumer society has not yet arrived. This is how houses and belonging to a house arise. In cities, shops and guilds emerge to settle disputes and maintain order. A parallel horizontal system of power emerges, which created the preconditions for the emergence of constitutional monarchy. Monarchs have always been dependent on private money; even the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V borrowed money for the maintenance of his army from the financial genius of Genoa.

Having actual power, capitalists organise bourgeois revolutions in order to increase and spread their power and increase their dividends. This can be seen in Europe, where the first bourgeois revolution took place quietly and peacefully enough in the Netherlands in the 15th century. In France, on the other hand, during the 17th and 19th centuries, blood was shed and heads flew from guillotines. Power is nominally transferred to people with money.

The next stage forbids the use of weapons by all but the nobility. Nobles kill each other in duels: in Western Europe on swords, in the Russian Empire — on pistols. For criminals, however, the law is unwritten. All are skilled in weapons, having fought in wars and sea battles.

After the bourgeois revolution, laws were passed to establish general order, for example, the Napoleonic Code was adopted in France with the





slogan “liberty, equality, property”. The basis of the economy in Western Europe was the enterprise, in the Russian Empire — the artel and merchants. The enterprise requires technologisation. The way it emerged is a riddle of riddles. Eventually, a hierarchy of subjects and a consumer emerges.

In a state with new laws and social relations, it is impossible to steal money and rob, but to earn it: to produce your own products or to become an employee. There is another way to organise your own business. It is possible to act within the law, and it is possible to act outside the law. It all depends on the amount of profit a person wants to make and his determination. I am not talking now about a recommendation for action, I am just pointing out what options a person chooses for himself.

Thus, we could consider the phenomenon of economy as a set of factors and parameters of the environment, social conditions, complex social agreement, institutions and mechanisms, participants with different statuses and the state with monetary policy.

In my opinion, it is not by chance that in the 15th century philosophical justification of the existence of capital, production relations, and economic relations between people began. It was necessary to somehow explain the consequences of the capital accumulated by criminal means, to create a new philosophy and plant a new ideology. In 1776 Adam Smith's book 'An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations' was published, writing about an invisible hand. He wrote that, in directing their industry to maximize the value of its products, each individual pursues their own advantage. In this case, as in many others, they are guided by an invisible hand to an end that was not their intention. In pursuing their own interests, they often serve the interests of society more effectively than when they consciously endeavor to do so (Smith, 1776). A. Smith is the founder of classical economic theory, some people call him the father of political economy, the subject of which is still undefined and has been constantly debated for several centuries. In the scientific disciplines of economics and political economy, the debate between schools has been going on since the very beginning. That is, we are dealing with philosophy, which is inherent in the constant





Bestselling author, internationally recognised expert on organised crime; author of more than 30 books on criminal organisations; regular consultant to government and law enforcement agencies worldwide; lecturer at Queens University, Middlebury College Italian School in the USA and St. Jerome's University in Ontario.

Prof. Antonio Nicaso

discussion of problems by representatives of different schools, but not with the scientific category of economics.

The new direction of political economy is represented by international political economy research devoted to the global distribution of income (Landesman, 2008). That is, the mechanism of origin of the huge capital of individuals and structures underlying the economy, the nature of the economy, its genesis, system and structure are no longer of interest to anyone.

Political economy contains one of the constructs or elements in its composition — politics, which represents power. According to Braudel (1982), “power and wealth went hand in hand.”

In Europe, wealth determines power (the formula “money — status — power”). This way of coming to power is legitimate. The formula “power — money — status” is unacceptable and illegal. Those who came to power in Europe in the previous times, who got huge capital and high statuses in society, forbade other people to get the same by the same way. Only by the way of “money — status — power”. First earn money, prove your status in society,

only then you will be allowed to go to power. The only way to earn a lot of money is through illegal means. Therefore, crime is an integral part of the state, moreover, it is the state that generates crime (Maltsev, 2021a).

In our country in particular and in the post-Soviet space in general, the formula “power — money — status” operates. That is, the level of power gives an opportunity to get a big score and acquire a socially acceptable status. That is why there is no economy in our state, because if we take away power, it will not be possible to earn money and get favourable statuses.

So out of the depths of reasoning, a key question appears on the surface:

What is the Source Of Money?

“I can account for every million except the first,” is a famous quote often attributed to John Rockefeller.

At a roundtable on criminology held in Odessa in 2019, Professor Antonio Nicaso (bestselling author, internationally recognised expert on organized crime; author of more than 30 books on criminal

organizations; regular consultant to government and law enforcement agencies around the world; lecturer at Queens University, Middlebury College Italian School in the US and St Jerome's University in Ontario) highlighted the following theses (APSI Academy, 2021).

The principle of “power — money — status” utilizes crime, particularly of southern Italy. It is not a question of street crime, but of criminal (from the point of view of the state) organizations, among them the most powerful and wealthy — the ‘Ndrangheta. The interest of criminals is money and power. Crime has a hierarchy of power, unlike street crime. Membership in a criminal organization is exclusive, optional. You can't just get in from the street. Each criminal organization has its own subculture.

Fear guards territories better than guns. Knowing that they can kill, use violence, subdues people. The power of fear is unchallenged. Criminal activity is the very economy in essence with a system of social relations, a system of experts, minimal cost and high profitability. Criminal connects the underground and society through the so-called gray zone, which is called a dual status in criminalistics.

There is corruption without Mafia, but there is no Mafia without corruption. Crime has moved from murder to bribes and putting its people in all echelons of political power, including church authorities.

There is No Country in the World Without Corruption. Crime is eternal. And it is not about its structure, it is about connections. The ‘Ndrangheta is everywhere — in the police, in the courts, in the government. Corruption as an instrument has replaced weapons. The ‘Ndrangheta's goal is power at the global international level, and loyalty is the currency. The ‘Ndrangheta therefore sponsored the German Christian Democratic Party in the 1990s.

The ‘Ndrangheta's knowledge of the laws of the market helped it become competitive to Colombian heroin cartels. The ‘Ndrangheta found a free zone in the form of cocaine. Now cocaine is shipped around the world by submarine in 5 to 10 tonnes. The submarines are sunk after delivery. Apparently it is absolutely cost-effective and not

unprofitable to buy a submarine and sink it after a single use. Drugs make super-profits.

The current reality is black exchanges on the Internet with millions of dollars in turnover. In the Congo, the ‘Ndrangheta has become interested in the birth of lithium. In its sphere of interest is diamond mining. One small diamond replaces a lot of money. A very convenient way of payment. The ‘Ndrangheta prefers the euro, and instead of bitcoins advises investing in the cryptocurrency MONERO, which is untraceable. It was the first to turn to the euro, because this currency is more expensive than the dollar, respectively the total amount (weight) is less.

DISCUSSION

The separate stage is money laundering. The ‘Ndrangheta does not launder money, it buys specialists who do it. The largest channel of money laundering is the banking system. Money from the illegal world, after laundering, flows into the banking system. The most interesting question: *Where Does the Money Come From to Set Up a Bank and Carry Out Banking Operations Such as Loans and Cash Withdrawals?*

For the whole world, money laundering is a criminal offense. However, in Delaware (USA), in London, the law allows money laundering and the countries are interested in it.

Today, the center of money laundering is the City of London, which is completely autonomous in terms of management and control. On the island of Sark, located in Gibraltar, the Queen of Great Britain launders money. It is her fiefdom, her personal property. There are 6,000 banks and 5,200 insurance companies registered in one small town. But you won't find banks and insurance companies there. There are 73 banks in the Cayman Islands. Their total annual turnover is over \$500 billion. Offshore zones are not only a place to save money, but also to launder it.

For money laundering a fee of 25 percent is charged—the so-called price of risk. In the zone of 3 borders (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay) 8% is

charged. A minimum of \$20 million per transaction is laundered there.

- Criminal money is very good for the economy.
- The criminal structures have merged with the government and have infiltrated politics.
- The Mafia has been laundering money in the Vatican for the last 25 years.

And our “businessmen” build temples and launder money in the form of donations. The scheme is standard. One of the types of money laundering is the purchase of Eurobonds. It is not possible to withdraw them from circulation, because they are issued for an amount for which there is not enough money. A 500 euro Eurobond costs 550 euros on the black market. And they are sold by weight. In 2020 they stopped issuing them. But they still haven’t been taken out of circulation. Without money laundering, business development and security are impossible. There’s no reason to suffer from your wealth. Money must work. They buy jewellery, art, cars, yachts, houses.

In Quebec Canada, only lawyers may not confirm suspicious transactions. A lawyer can buy a client’s property and make any transactions involving large sums of money. All criminal organizations have their branches in Canada, which is the best “washing machine”. Canada has the most banks in the Caribbean. You can deposit \$20 million in an offshore bank account. There will be no questions asked. The transfer is made in Canada and the money is legally invested in the business.

A branch of an offshore company can buy property in Canada. No one is interested in the source of income. This is how property prices in Toronto have been driven up. In Vancouver, Asian crime has driven up property prices. Now you can simply analyse property prices in major world cities and regions, and it will become clear why it is so expensive there.

“Three Border Zone” — Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay — is not even visited by police officers. It is where the money of all criminal organizations is laundered and where drug deals are made. In 2012, the UK planned to introduce its own version of the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (Fatca) in

the crown dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, as well as in its overseas territories such as the Cayman Islands. But not a word about Sark.

“We were shocked by how little information is freely available about most companies’ subsidiaries,” said Katharine Teague, co-author of the report, which reveals previously unpublished data about FTSE100 companies (Aid, 2014).

FTSE100 Index (Financial Times Stock Exchange Index) is a stock index calculated by the Financial Times. It is considered one of the most influential stock exchange indicators in Europe. It began to be calculated on 3 January 1984 from the level of 1000 points.

The index is based on the share prices of 100 companies with the largest capitalisation listed on the London Stock Exchange. Companies whose shares are included in the calculation of the FTSE100 index must fulfill the conditions set by the FTSE Group:

- To be listed on the London Stock Exchange;
- The value of FTSE100 shares must be in pounds or euros;
- To pass a test of state ownership;
- FTSE100 shares must be publicly traded and readily liquid.

“*Secrecy is not the exception but the norm...*” is the major finding of a report published by Christian Aid (2014) analyzing the disclosure of economic and financial information of almost 30,000 subsidiaries of the 100 largest companies whose shares are traded on the London Stock Exchange (the FTSE100). These are well-known companies in which millions of people invest through their pension funds and savings. But the secrecy is so deep and widespread that it is like blindfolding everyone who has financial dealings with these companies.

The new research also highlights the intensive use of tax havens by FTSE100 companies. More than 90 per cent of their subsidiaries are based in locations identified by the Financial Secrecy Index as ‘secret jurisdictions’. Almost a half of these subsidiaries are based in the UK (which is itself considered ‘moderately secret’). Of the remaining

14 per cent are in ‘very secret’ tax havens such as Switzerland, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. “The FTSE100 sectors with most subsidiaries in highly secretive tax havens are investment and finance (with 37 per cent of their subsidiaries in such locations), banks (28 per cent), mining companies (19 per cent) and real estate (18 per cent)” (Aid, 2014).

Crime, corruption and tax evasion pulled \$946.7 billion out of developing countries in 2011, up more than 13.7 per cent from 2010. According to the Washington analytical centre Global Financial Integrity, the cumulative outflow of illegal finance from developing countries is US\$5.9 trillion. “As the world economy sputters along in the wake of the global financial crisis, the illicit underworld is thriving — siphoning more and more money from developing countries each year,” said GFI President Raymond Baker (Dawson, 2013).

Global industry has emerged, involving the world’s largest banks, legal practices, accountancy firms and specialized providers who design and sell secret offshore structures for their clients who evade tax and the law. “Competition” between “secret jurisdictions” (tax havens) has become a central feature of the world’s financial markets, especially as the era of financial globalization began in the 1980s.

The purpose of the ‘Ndrangeta–business and power. Developing quietly in the shadows, the ‘Ndrangheta stands as the least examined (and consequently, the most perilous), the most influential, and the most globally widespread criminal organization in the world. Within Italy, it reigns supreme, demonstrating unmatched profit growth rates. With a staggering annual turnover exceeding 44 billion euros, excluding funds from money laundering, the ‘Ndrangheta stands as a wealthier, more assertive, and more deeply entrenched enterprise. It has adeptly infiltrated both the economy and public institutions, distinguishing itself as the sole truly globalized entity, boasting branches across nearly every Italian region and extending its reach into Europe, Africa, Asia, the Americas, and Oceania.

Remarkably, the ‘Ndrangheta has remained impervious to the impacts of the pandemic, with its profits not only holding steady but even showing

an increase. The organization deftly exploits the rapid transformations of our ever-evolving times to its advantage. The influence of crime on the New Age economy was substantial, manifesting in various aspects. Smuggling and illegal trade proliferated as trade expanded, influencing informal commerce. Maritime piracy in the 16th to 18th centuries impacted global trade, introducing risks and costs for enterprises. Large criminal organizations emerged, engaging in corruption by influencing decision-making in economic and law enforcement matters.

These organizations funded military conflicts, affecting the geopolitical landscape. Maritime pirates obstructed trade routes, influencing economic activities. Criminal groups shaped public opinion, influencing business and consumer decisions. They aimed to control natural resources, impacting economic development, and instilled fear, negatively affecting economic progress. Certain criminal activities, like smuggling, created alternative markets, diversifying the economy. Overall, crime significantly shaped the New Age economy, altering trade processes, relations, and public opinion.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, comprehending the intricacies of economic dynamics, including its origins, development patterns, structure, participants, and mechanisms, provides a comprehensive perspective enabling effective planning, forecasting, and the application of viable business models and strategies. This understanding is particularly critical in today’s swiftly changing world, which presents unexpected challenges like the COVID-19 pandemic.

Regrettably, in the contemporary era, spanning the last two to three decades, many individuals fail to succeed in business or advance professionally due to their lack of understanding of the fundamental nature of their endeavors. To establish a successful business, various elements are indispensable, including market presence, financial resources, and commercial transactions, but the linchpin is adept organization and effective management, with the paramount factor being human resources. Recognizing that the advent of business marked a

transformative epoch in Europe and worldwide is essential. Without this comprehension, it becomes challenging to appreciate how these shifts have made profound spiritual, social, psychological, and economic alterations. The commonly held notion that the twentieth-century bourgeois revolutions inaugurated the era of business is, in reality, a retrospective assessment. These historical events essentially marked the culmination of a political upheaval, solidifying the foundations of the modern world in Europe. Subsequently, the process of business formation encompassed the vast majority of nations (Maltsev, 2021b).

It is vital to recognize that expertise does not emerge spontaneously. Individuals aspiring to establish or expand a business venture must study economics from historical, criminological, and psychological perspectives to comprehend its origins and navigate various scenarios effectively.

Given the contemporary challenges, businesspersons must become quasi-scholars. Alternatively, they can collaborate with consultant-scientists engaged in interdisciplinary research. In our rapidly changing world, adaptability is imperative to ensure resilience and leverage prevailing conditions to achieve power and prosperity.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

REFERENCES:

- Aid, C. (2014, March 13). New research reveals a black hole at the heart of London's FTSE100. *Global Policy Forum*. <https://archive.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/221-transnational-corporations/52625-shocking-evidence-shows-scope-of-company-secrecy-in-the-uk.html>
- APSI Academy. (2021, March 15). *Sark Island: money laundering as oxygen for the legal economy*. Antonio Nicaso [Video]. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fEHjA-DD85o>
- Braudel, F. (1982). *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th century: The Perspective of the World* (Vol. 3). University of California Press.
- Brown, P., Mason, I., & Regehr, C. (2018). Finding an ethical foundation for economics in the Anthropocene. In *Encyclopedia of the Anthropocene* (pp. 11–20). <https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-809665-9.10466-5>
- Chang, H. (2014). *A Pelican Introduction Economics: A User's Guide*. National Geographic Books.
- Christophers, B. (2014). From Marx to market and back again: Performing the economy. *Geoforum*, 57, 12–20. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.08.007>
- Colby, B. G. (2020). Acquiring environmental flows: ecological economics of policy development in western U.S. *Ecological Economics*, 173, 106655. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106655>
- Coulilaly, A., & Yogo, U. T. (2020). The path to shared prosperity: Leveraging financial services outreach to create decent jobs in developing countries. *Economic Modelling*, 87, 131–147. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2019.07.013>
- Dawson, S. (2013, December 12). Amount of dirty money leaving developing world jumped 14 percent in 2011: report. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-global-illicit-idUSBRE9B-B00H20131212>
- Dzhivelegov, A., Belov, V., Muromtsev, S., Kony, A., Chuprov, A., Manuilov, A., Sudeykin, V., Brun, M., Grabar, V., Yanovsky, A., Miklashevsky, A., Verblovsky, G., Rosenberg, V., Herzenstein, M., Barats, S., & Nechaev, V. (2017). *Civil and Commercial Law (Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron)*. Izdatelstvo Yurajt.
- Ducoing, C. (2019). How to handle natural capital within the context of the green economy? In *Handbook of Green Economics*



- (pp. 19–30). <https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-816635-2.00002-x>
- Efimova, E. G. (2005). *Ekonomika: Uchebnoe posobie* [Economics: Textbook]. MGIU.
- Engels, F. (1902). *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*. Charles H. Kerr & Co.
- Fritz, M., & Koch, M. (2014). Potentials for prosperity without growth: Ecological sustainability, social inclusion and the quality of life in 38 countries. *Ecological Economics*, 108, 191–199. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.10.021>
- Fryer, R. G. (2017). The production of human capital in developed countries. In *Handbook of economic field experiments* (pp. 95–322). <https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hefe.2016.08.006>
- Galvin, R. (2020). Yes, there is enough money to decarbonize the economies of high-income countries justly and sustainably. *Energy Research & Social Science*, 70, 101739. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101739>
- Gerber, J., & Scheidel, A. (2018). In search of Substantive Economics: Comparing today's two major socio-metabolic approaches to the economy — MEFA and MUSIASEM. *Ecological Economics*, 144, 186–194. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.08.012>
- Gould, D. M., Melecký, M., & Panterov, G. L. (2016). Finance, growth and shared prosperity: Beyond credit deepening. *Journal of Policy Modeling*, 38(4), 737–758. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2016.06.004>
- Hafner, S., Anger-Kraavi, A., Monasterolo, I., & Jones, A. (2020). Emergence of New Economics Energy Transition Models: A review. *Ecological Economics*, 177, 106779. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106779>
- Kalimeris, P., Bithas, K., Richardson, C., & Nijkamp, P. (2020). Hidden linkages between resources and economy: A “Beyond-GDP” approach using alternative welfare indicators. *Ecological Economics*, 169, 106508. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.106508>
- Kaufman, B. E. (2014). The historical development of American HRM broadly viewed. *Human Resource Management Review*, 24(3), 196–218. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hrmr.2014.03.003>
- Landesman, B. (2008). Political economy. In W. A. Darity, *International encyclopedia of the social sciences* (Vol. 6, pp. 302–304). Macmillan Reference USA.
- Li, Z., & Liao, Q. (2018). Economic solutions to improve cybersecurity of governments and smart cities via vulnerability markets. *Government Information Quarterly*, 35(1), 151–160. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2017.10.006>
- Lindsey, R., & Santos, G. (2020). Addressing transportation and environmental externalities with economics: Are policy makers listening? *Research in Transportation Economics*, 82, 100872. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2020.100872>
- Maltsev, O. V. (2018). *Obmanchivaya tishina* [Deceptive silence]. Serednyak T. K. <https://books.google.com.ua/books?vid=ISBN6177599958>
- Maltsev, O. V. (2021a). *Tajna ili prestuplenie: Nastoyashaya zhizn i ekonomika* [Mystery or Crime: Real Life and Economics]. Izdatelskij dom “Patriot.”
- Maltsev, O. V. (2021b, May 18). What is the purpose of a businessman in a consumer society? Report Ph D. Oleg Maltsev. *Criminological Center*. <https://criminology-center.org/v-chem-czel-biznesmena-v-obshhestve-potrebleniya-doklad-phd-olega-malczeva/>
- Nanni, P. (2016). “Well-Being” before “Welfare society”: Historical Realities and Language. *Agriculture and Agricultural Science Procedia*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aaspro.2016.02.062>
- Pirgmaier, E. (2017). The neoclassical trojan horse of Steady-State economics. *Ecological Economics*, 133, 52–61. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.11.010>
- Reeves, P., Edmunds, K., Searles, A., & Wiggers, J. (2019). Economic evaluations of public health implementation-interventions: a systematic review and guideline

- for practice. *Public Health*, 169, 101–113. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.puhe.2019.01.012>
- Rehman, T. U. (2016). Historical context of behavioral economics. *Intellectual Economics*, 10(2), 128–132. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intele.2017.03.006>
- Revillout, E. (1886). *Les obligations en droit égyptien comparé aux autres droits de l'Antiquité*. E. Leroux.
- Sichkar, T. (2020). *Economika sokrovichsh i globalnye problem chelovechestva* [The Treasure Economy and the Global Challenges of Humanity]. Publishing House “IMC.”
- Smith, A. (1776). *An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. W. Strahan and T. Cadell.
- Spash, C. L. (2020). A tale of three paradigms: Realising the revolutionary potential of ecological economics. *Ecological Economics*, 169, 106518. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.106518>
- Su, R., Bramwell, B., & Whalley, P. A. (2018). Cultural political economy and urban heritage tourism. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 68, 30–40. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annals.2017.11.004>
- Tomich, T. P., Lidder, P., Coley, M., Gollin, D., Meinzen-Dick, R., Webb, P., & Carberry, P. (2019). Food and agricultural innovation pathways for prosperity. *Agricultural Systems*, 172, 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agsy.2018.01.002>
- Topper, U. (1998). *Die “Große Aktion”. Europas erfundene Geschichte* [The “Big Action”. Europe’s invented history]. Grabert.
- Wang, T. J., Hsu, S., Zheng, S., Chen, J. H., & Li, X. I. (2020). Renewable energy micro-grids: Economic evaluation and decision making for government policies to contribute to affordable and clean energy. *Applied Energy*, 274, 115287. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2020.115287>

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) which allows reusers to distribute, remix, adapt, and build upon the material in any medium or format for non-commercial purposes only, and only so long as attribution is given to the creator.

CRIMINALS, BUSINESS AND STATE IN POST-SOVIET UKRAINE

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.61439/ICMH8067>



VLADIMIR SKVORETS
ZAPORIZHZHIA NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7558-0773>
E-mail: skvorets.v.o@gmail.com

Vladimir Skvorets is a Doctor of Philosophy, Associate Professor, Head of the Department of Sociology at Zaporizhzhia National University. Academician of the European Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Member of the Sociological Association of Ukraine. He is an author of 127 scientific and methodological publications, among them 3 monographs (one of them is collective), 7 manuals. He cooperates with representatives of public organizations that are engaged in the development of the debate movement in Ukraine (NGO «New Vision», Dnipro, «IDEA» and others).

ABSTRACT

On the thirtieth commemoration of Ukraine's independence, the present condition of the country highlights the necessity of contemplating the historical trajectory that post-Soviet Ukrainian society has traversed. This is not merely a retrospective consideration encompassing the past and present, but also, perhaps more crucially, a for-

ward-looking assessment of Ukraine's future. While Ukraine exhibited a sense of cohesion and significant societal integration shortly after declaring independence, as evidenced by the outcomes of the All-Ukrainian referendum conducted on December 1, 1991, the year 2021 reveals a notable departure from these characteristics (State Archival Service of Ukraine, 2013). Present-day post-Soviet Ukrainian society has become fragmented, marked by discernible social fault lines. As Samuel Huntington (1996) observes, Ukraine is a nation divided along cultural lines, with two distinct civilizations. The fault line between these civilizations, demarcating the West from Orthodoxy, has bisected the nation for centuries (Huntington, 1996). Over the post-Soviet era, Ukraine has experienced a profound transformation in the role of the state, which has rapidly diminished in its capacity to effectively manage the fundamental pillars supporting society. Throughout this period, Ukrainian society has grappled with an enduring systemic crisis. The erstwhile Soviet framework of existence in Ukraine was dismantled, yet efforts to establish a novel system predicated on principles like market economy, human rights, and democracy have encountered significant challenges. While the contemporary Ukrainian society may project an appearance of stability, it conceals vulnerabilities to the deleterious trends stemming from its transformation, which are driven by three primary factors: the state, business entities, and criminal elements.

The article aims to delineate the roles played by criminality, business, and the state in the social governance of post-Soviet Ukraine.

Keywords

business, criminality, state, illusion of stability, economic trends, social transformation.

INTRODUCTION

The research field of Ukraine-related issues is very broad (Chaisty & Whitefield, 2018; Lazarenko, 2020; Kushnir, 2019; Kvartiuk & Curtiss, 2019; Papagiannis et al., 2021). Much attention is paid to EU integration issues (Davydchyk et al., 2018; Garman et al., 2020; Powell et al., 2015; Shevchenko, 2019;

Spiliopoulos, 2014). On the thirtieth commemoration of Ukraine's independence, the present condition of the country highlights the necessity of contemplating the historical trajectory that post-Soviet Ukrainian society has traversed.

The post-Soviet transformation of Ukrainian society is a transition from the Soviet model to the models of the post-Soviet social system, in the formation of which several determining factors can be identified. The movement of Ukrainian society from the late Soviet period to the post-Soviet state was characterized by the imbalance between social reproduction and transformation. Eminent English sociologist E. Giddens (1996) defined the study of the relationship between social reproduction and transformation as an important sociological problem. He argued that continuity and variability in social life can be visualized as a 'mixture' of intentional and unintentional consequences of human actions. The task of sociology, as Giddens wrote, is to investigate the resulting balance between social reproduction and transformation. Social reproduction demonstrates how societies 'keep themselves alive' through time, while transformation refers to the changes to which societies are prone. Society is not a mechanical device like a clock or an engine that "keeps itself running" because it has an inbuilt source of energy. Social reproduction is a consequence of the continuous actions performed by people from day to day and from year to year, as well as of the continuity of the diverse social practices to which people are committed (Giddens, 1996).

The dialectics of social reproduction and social transformation of Ukrainian society in the post-Soviet period was determined by the influence of three main factors: the state, business and criminality. Let us make an attempt to determine the role of each of these factors in the post-Soviet transformation of Ukrainian society. It should be noted that the study of the role of each of these factors is presented with a very large degree of difference in the depth and completeness of research results. As in all countries of the world, the least studied factor in this triad remains the criminality, while the largest number of scientific publications reveals the role of the state in social changes in Ukraine.

Every state by its social essence is an organization of political power, which is represented by the authorities, establishes the law regulating relations between people on a certain territory, has sovereignty (supremacy) of power on this territory, has the right to gather taxes, as well as the exclusive right to compulsion and violence. The social purpose of the state consists in the duty to ensure the security of citizens and territory, unity and integrity of the country. Among the basic powers of state power in modern societies, the most important is the right to dispose of natural, human, industrial, technological, and other resources on behalf of the people and the resulting duty to act within the national interest (i.e., for the benefit of all citizens who constitute that people).

METHODS

For a more concrete grasp of the methodologies and principles employed in researching criminality, business, and the state in post-Soviet Ukraine, let us delve into potential approaches in greater detail:

- Quantitative methods involves scrutinizing statistical data, utilizing official statistics to discern criminality trends and their correlation with business and the state.
- Conducting interviews with entrepreneurs, law enforcement agencies, and citizens to gather quantitative data and statistics.

- Engaging in conversations with experts from diverse fields (law enforcement, entrepreneurs, activists) to gain a profound understanding of problems and interconnections.
- Conducting interviews with participants and witnesses of specific cases to unveil details and specifics.
- Examining laws and policy documents to comprehend the formal structure and role of the government in regulating business and combating crime.
- Utilizing data from government reports, investigative journalism, and other sources to verify facts and support conclusions.
- Undertaking in-depth analyses of individual events, exploring case studies of business, government, and criminal interactions to identify characteristics and factors in the success or failure of countermeasures.

These approaches can be employed for general research on criminality. The study of criminality, business, and the state in post-Soviet Ukraine specifically adheres to key principles:

1. Objectivity: Maintaining neutrality and objectivity in data collection and analysis to avoid bias and subjectivism.
2. Complexity: Employing a variety of methods to create a comprehensive picture of the interaction among business, the state, and criminal structures.
3. Ethics and Confidentiality: Adhering to ethical standards when interacting with research participants, especially in handling sensitive information.
4. Systemic Approach: Examining interrelationships in the business-government-crime system, both domestically and internationally.
5. Contextualization: Considering the historical, political, and socio-cultural context to better understand the issues and dynamics.
6. Practical Relevance: Focusing on the practical applicability of results to make recommendations and improvements.
7. Verifiability of Results: Designing research so that findings can be tested and replicated by other researchers.



By combining these methods and principles, researchers can gain a comprehensive understanding of criminality, business, and state issues in post-Soviet Ukraine. The concept of criminality in this context has been influenced by various factors, including economic, political, socio-cultural changes, corruption, organized crime, a growing drug problem, and international influences. It is crucial to recognize that opinions on these issues may vary, and the information provided offers a general overview. The processes of criminality formation and development in post-Soviet Ukraine constitute a complex and interrelated problem, necessitating a holistic approach involving law enforcement, societal engagement, economic institutions, and political structures.

RESULTS

In Ukraine, which represents one of the largest countries in Europe, three decades ago social processes were set in motion that quickly led to the destructive consequences. Among the key destructive processes, the leading place is occupied by the population depopulation. It's important to highlight that the issue of depopulation continues to be a subject of contemporary scientific discourse in other countries as well (De Lucas & Prats, 2020; Larraz & García-Gómez, 2020; Meijer & Syssner, 2017; Onge & Smith, 2020; Vaishar et al., 2020). Throughout the whole history, Ukraine reached the largest population as of 01.01.1993, when it was 52.244 million people. As of 01.01.2018, the total population of Ukraine, according to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, amounted to 42.234 million people (cash population). Thus, within a quarter of a century, the population of modern Ukraine decreased by 10 million people (by 19%). Since these losses are not inferior in number to the losses from the two great tragedies (from the Holodomor of 1932–1933 the losses were between 4 and 6 million people, and in the Second World War — about 9 million people), some demographers estimate them as a demographic catastrophe in modern Ukraine. These losses are one of the clear signs of social trauma in contemporary Ukrainian society.

Among the main reasons of mass population depopulation in post-Soviet Ukraine we should

single out the reasons of socio-economic nature. In the transformation process, the key role was played by neoliberal market reforms aimed at transferring industrial enterprises, trade facilities, consumer services, and the agricultural sector from state to private ownership.

These reforms brought about fundamental changes in the social structure of post-Soviet Ukrainian society. Firstly, new social groups were formed: industrialists, entrepreneurs, merchants, traders, bankers, farmers and others. Secondly, there was a process of erosion of the old structure: the number of the working class was rapidly decreasing; the collective farming peasantry disappeared as a layer with the liquidation of the collective farm system; the intelligentsia underwent a period of certain socio-cultural transformation. Changes in the social structure of the population are characterized by the following indicators: in the period from 1988 to 2001 in Ukraine the number of the highest strata of the population decreased from 19.3% to 2%, the middle strata — from 75% to 9.8%, and the lowest increased from 5.7% to 88% (Dubrovsky & Andrushchenko, 2002).

O. Soskin (2014) proves that Ukraine has a damaged social and property structure of society, which indicates the total hegemony of monopolistic corporate capital. Its social cross-section now looks like this: 1–2% — the rich (billionaires), 15–18% — the conditionally middle class, 75–80% of the poor. The structure of national wealth distribution in Ukraine was as follows: in the hands of 1–2% of the rich are concentrated 65–70% of wealth, and 75–80% of the poor own only 5% of wealth (Soskin, 2014). According to the results of the survey conducted from 13 to 21 March 2021 by the “Rating” Sociological Group on behalf of the Centre of Analysis and Sociological Research of the International Republican Institute, the financial condition of Ukrainian citizens was determined. According to the results, the very poor make up 20%, the poor — 34%, the low-income — 21%, the well-off — 14% (Sociologichna grupa “Rejting,” 2021).

In post-Soviet Ukraine, deindustrialisation has become a source of massive degradation of the labor force and marginalization of the population. In the period from 1990 to 2015, the number of

workers in the main sectors of the economy decreased as follows (Skvorets, 2019): in industry from 7.8 million to 2.2 million (3.5 times); in construction — from 2.4 million to 0.2 million (12 times); in agriculture from 4.4 million to 0.5 million (8.8 times); in transport from 1.8 million to 0.7 million (2.5 times); in education, culture, science and art from 3 million to 1.7 million (1.7 times). The total number of people employed in these sectors of the economy decreased from 19.3 million to 5.3 million (3.6 times).

Market reforms led to a multiple reduction of the resource base of post-Soviet Ukraine. “The expenditures of the consolidated budget from 1990 to 1998 decreased from 78.2 billion dollars to USD12.4 billion. In other words, 6.3 times, including education — 12.4 billion USD to 1.8 billion USD. This includes education — \$12.4 billion to \$1.8 billion (6.7 times); health care — from \$7.9 billion to \$1.5 billion (5.3 times); culture — from \$1.3 billion to \$0.1 billion (13 times)” (Pavlovsky, 2001).

Thus, the transformation of post-Soviet Ukrainian society caused by market reforms was accompanied by a powerful destruction of industrial (deindustrialization), labor (degradation of the workforce), scientific, technical, educational, cultural and demographic (depopulation) potential of Ukraine.

The study of the business role in the transformation processes of the post-Soviet Ukrainian society indicates the increasing role of this factor in the life of the country (Kuzio, 2018). As a result of reforms and privatization of state property, there was a transition from the dominance of state ownership, the share of which was about 95% in 1990, to the domination of private property, the share of which was estimated by analysts at 93% in 2015. This means that the dominant role in the economy has shifted from the state to business. The goal of neoliberal reformers was achieved — to create a liberal state that does not interfere in the economy and plays the role of a “night watchman” for the interests of private owners.

The authors of the fundamental work, devoted to the problem of researching the socio-economic situation of Ukraine, identified the second actor af-

and “in envelopes”. As a result of excessively liberal foreign trade, the country was overrun with cheap imported goods with which domestic goods could not compete, leading to the decline and complete collapse of our industry, especially light industry. Corruption of customs officials contributed to this process, which gave a green light to contraband (Shulga, 2011). Considering this issue, it's worth noting that despite efforts to reduce the shadow economy, its share in the total national product continues to increase. This phenomenon is the subject of interdisciplinary research (Alvarado et al., 2021; Bashlakova & Bashlakov, 2021; Chen et al., 2021; Hajilee et al., 2021; Mazhar & Méon, 2017).

According to the assessment of one of the leaders of the Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine G. Osovyi (2002), in the 90s of the 20th century there was a total increase in the exploitation of labor force on the part of employers, the state abandoned strict regulation of the market, liberalized it in every possible way, letting prices go. All the forces of the ruling class were thrown into the initial piling up of capital and then its “laundering”. The main sources of such enrichment were state property and depreciation of labour force. The researcher claims that during 10 years of privatization, state property worth 120 billion hryvnias was denationalized, but only about 6 billion hryvnias went into the state treasury. At the same time, “lucky businessmen” annually exported billions of dollars worth of capital through offshore zones. It came to the point that in order to supplement working capital, which was in short supply, employers began to massively delay wages since 1995. Through such forced illegal confiscations from their employees, they received in 1999 an “interest-free loan” of more than 7 billion hryvnias. Paradoxically, the state, following the private owners, resorted to such “savings” and stopped paying wages to public sector employees in a timely manner (Osovyi, 2002).

Many scientists recognise that corruption has become the cause and consequence of the shadow economy, which has led to a significant property differentiation of society, a decline in morality and degradation of social and political life. The problem of corruption in Ukraine to a certain extent reflects the general discourse of current socio-behavioral research (Akbari et al., 2019; Litina & Palivos, 2016;

Modesto et al., 2020; Orosz et al., 2018; Ryvkin & Serra, 2020; Salmon & Serra, 2017; Van Deurzen, 2017). *In Ukraine, as in other post-Soviet countries, business and power have no distinction.* The tendency to merge business and politics through formal and informal influence of oligarchic groups on decision-making by the highest government institutions, which was established in the mid-1990s, has now reached its peak. Corruption can be seen as a creation of capital, which turns everything into a commodity, and in particular seeks to commercialize the services of state power and administration. Power, by its intermediary nature, is like money, and the political system is like a market. All public goods that are monopolistically produced by the state are non-market in nature, but the recipients of corruption rent turn them into goods (Piasecka-Ustych, 2016).

The phenomenon of corruption is considered as a phenomenon that is determined by social conditions and processes. Identification of the essence of corruption requires a systemic approach, which makes it possible to analyze it in terms of social, political-legal, legal and economic approaches. Corruption as a socio-economic phenomenon in a broad sense is revealed in the “corrosion” of power, when state officials and other public persons authorized to perform managerial functions use their official position, status and authority of their position for personal enrichment or in group interests. Corruption as a political and legal phenomenon is a way of criminalisation of political power and public administration system, its transformation from an institution expressing national interest into an apologist and secret defender of the corporate interest of power elites. Corruption as an economic phenomenon is a latent, illegal, implemented through rent-oriented behavior of officials, form of non-sanctioned relations of exchange, distribution and appropriation of economic goods, money, securities and assets, which limit economic freedom, equality of competition and access of citizens and businesses to national resources. Under these conditions, officials convert power into property and capital, provide non-economic advantages in competition (primarily in the resource markets) to business representatives who pay corruption rent (Piasecka-Ustych, 2016).

ter the ruling class of Ukraine, which was interested in the implementation of this model of transformation of Ukrainian society (Heyets et al., 2009). This actor is international capital. Ukrainian scientists state that Ukraine at the time of independence is undergoing the process of transformation into the periphery of the world capitalist system, which means its inclusion in the world value chains as a source of raw materials, cheap labor and a place of concentration of low-tech environmentally harmful industries that produce products with low added value. Scholars prove that Ukraine’s peripheralization is a consequence of its inclusion in the global capitalist system based on the principles of the Washington Consensus. Neoliberal reforms, which included privatization, liberalization of finance, trade, and deregulation of the economy, were aimed at opening up new, previously closed to transnational capital, and at integrating countries with economies in transition into the global capitalist system as exploited periphery. Therefore, “the neoliberal strategy of socio-economic transformation of Ukrainian society was not an independent work of the Ukrainian power community, it was an action ordered by pro-capitalist forces, but it agreed to this way of “entering the world community of civilized countries because it opened up opportunities for extremely rapid enrichment even at the cost of a well-predicted and managed social catastrophe” (Heyets et al., 2009).

The main actors behind the primary accumulation of capital in post-Soviet Ukraine were representatives of the bureaucracy, business and criminals. The links between them were so strong that one and the same person simultaneously belonged to two or even three of these elements. The common interests of these three elements in the fastest possible accumulation of capital became the basis for the formation of Ukraine’s shadow economy.

According to experts, legislative deficiencies and socio-cultural peculiarities of society created the necessary conditions for the existence of the shadow economy. It was rooted in all types of business — large, medium and small. Its scale reached 50 per cent of production. Profits of enterprises were concealed, criminal schemes for tax evasion were created, wages existed in two forms — official

Analyzing the contradictions in the transformation of Ukrainian society, V. Heyets (2009) defined the socio-cultural content of these social changes. He wrote that although it was declared that the country had set the task of becoming a nation with a civilized market economy and achieving results that would serve as a fundamental model of life, in reality, the previous model of state absolutism in Ukraine, as in other countries, was evolving towards market absolutism. A social atmosphere was formed in which the “new ideology” was synonymous with “total freedom,” allowing individuals to pursue enrichment without any restrictions. Pseudo-market relations dominated in many areas, especially in the interaction between the state and business (Heyets, 2009).

Market absolutism means turning everything that is possible into a commodity. This means that in the public consciousness there have been such changes that allow to turn into a commodity not only manufacturing products, services, natural resources, labour power, land, but also a human being, human life, power, public office, and if possible, not only the body, but also the soul of a person.

In my memory I recall a case of communication with one of my good acquaintances, who was a successful farmer, leased about 1.5 thousand hectares of land (shares) and within 10 years bought several jeeps. In a word, he was not a poor man and could earn a lot of money. Once during one of his meetings he shared with his friends his impressions of his meeting with the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) general in his house near Kiev. The farmer was amazed by the general's three-storey mansion and the luxury it contained — collections of weapons, paintings and other valuables. The farmer was dumbfounded: where could the general get the money for all this luxury? I asked the farmer: “Is the power that the general has, his ability to influence the fate of people and the conduct of business, access to information containing state, military, scientific, or other secrets, worth nothing?” If there is an opportunity to “trade ranks or positions”, it is already a source of considerable income. And society is aware of the widespread practice of dishonest operation of positions in government and local self-government bodies, in court, in law enforcement agencies, prosecutors' offices, and even in the army. In 2015, there

was a video on the Internet about the certification of the chief prosecutor of Dnipropetrovsk, which showed that this “prosecutor”, when asked by a member of the commission about the principles of legal proceedings in Ukraine, could not name any of these principles. A person who has no elementary knowledge of jurisprudence acted as a verdictor of the fates of many people. It is hard to imagine how many human destinies were mutilated as a result of such “prosecutor's practice” and how many real criminals were able to escape justice. This is how the “absolutism of the market” influences people's outlook and behaviour, and ultimately leads to the degradation of social systems.

Analyzing the participation of the most active social groups of Ukraine in the socio-political life of the country in the period of transition to independence, N. Shulga (2011) identified a certain role of such groups as the nomenclature, intellectuals, miners and criminals. The researcher believes that the role of criminal elements in these processes consisted in the fact that they were also interested in the collapse of the socialist type of economic management, because it did not give the opportunity to legalize large-scale embezzlement, funds obtained as a result of various frauds, to transfer them by inheritance. These social elements cannot be called a group in its exact sociological meaning, firstly, because everyone who engaged in illegal activities, hid, concealed it, secondly, because there were no stable ties between them at the level of the whole society. This does not exclude the existence of any local organized criminal groups (Shulga, 2011). As noted above, the model of neoliberal reforms implemented in Ukraine has opened fabulous opportunities for the criminal world to strengthen its influence not only by using racketeering, raiding, bribing officials, but also by penetrating into the power structures.

In the conditions of merging of power and business, spread of corruption and shadow economy in the post-Soviet society, the most favourable ground for the flourishing of criminality has been created. Unfortunately, there are very few studies of criminality in post-Soviet Ukrainian society at the level of scientific research. It should be noted that economists, sociologists, political scientists, specialists in public administration have conducted a lot

of research on the study of post-Soviet Ukrainian society, while historians avoid these problems. And not by chance. The reason lies in the fact that it is impossible for historians to avoid a comprehensive consideration of destructive processes in society, and thus the assessment of the activities of social actors who, in pursuit of wealth, power or glory, destroyed the national heritage of Ukraine. There is an understanding that an objective study of the real processes of social transformation in Ukraine, especially containing information about the role of specific individuals in them, creates dangers for the researcher, which no one can protect him from: neither law enforcement agencies, nor the prosecutor's office, nor the court, nor the state authorities.

The book "Donetsk Mafia", authored by S. Kuzin, is dedicated to the criminal world of Ukraine (Kuzin, 2006). In the Introductory speech B. Penchuk notes that the very first laws of the state aimed at transition to the market, especially in

the development of small business, were used by criminal groups to launder funds of the "shadow" economy, accumulate strategically important initial capital, and further — to introduce their representatives into the economic and power structures. A mafia similar to American-Sicilian groups has formed in the region, which has achieved full power not only in Donetsk (the most densely populated and industrially developed) region of the country, but is also gaining strength, becoming on its feet in the whole Ukraine. This domestic mafia — not just organised crime, but acting for many years in full contact with representatives of power structures, aspiring and able to become a state. The book contains biographies of many leaders and businessmen of Donetsk region, who are accused of criminal acts and, in particular, of illegal actions that hindered the investigation of 55 high-profile murders related to the redistribution of property and business (Kuzin, 2006).




Figure 1. The cover of the book «Donetsk Mafia» by S. Kuzin.



Figure 2. The cover of the book «Crimean Gambit» by A. Kochkina.

The second book in the series “Mafia in Ukraine” was written by A. Kochkina and it is called “Crimean Gambit”. This book describes the activities of criminal groups for a decade and a half in Crimea, shows the connection of representatives of the criminal world with specific leaders, and provides documents and photographs of the crime victims (Kochkina, 2006).

There is no doubt that there is enough evidence to write books about criminal groups in all other regions of Ukraine, but the problem is not that, but what to do with all this legacy. One can find information in the sources about the actions of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Vinnytsia, Lviv, Zakarpattia and other influential clans that developed during the post-Soviet transformation of Ukrainian society. Criminalisation and then oligarchization of society became the main factors in the formation of the ruling class of Ukraine, and all this means that its representatives are ready to commit any new crimes for self-preservation. The post-Soviet period saw the deaths of many prominent politicians, businessmen, and state officials who became victims of fierce struggles for power, property, or influence in the country. In November 1996, Ukrainian politician and businessman Yevhen Shcherban was killed on the airport airfield in Donetsk. On 23 April 1998, the former head of the National Bank of Ukraine, financier and politician Vadym Hetman was shot dead in the lift of his home in Kiev. In March 1999, Vyacheslav Chernovol, one of Ukraine’s political leaders, was killed in a car accident. The investigation into the tragedy was to answer the question of whether the accident was staged. On 4 March 2005, former Ukrainian Interior Minister Yuriy Kravchenko was found dead at his dacha in Koncha-Zaspa, near Kiev, with two gunshot wounds to the head. Whether it was murder or suicide remains an open question. In January 2007, influential politician Yevhen Kushnaryov suffered a gunshot wound during a hunting trip, from which he died shortly afterwards, but it remains a mystery whether it was an accidental death or a premeditated murder.

Mysterious was the death of two heads of the State Property Fund of Ukraine V. Semenyuk-Samsonenko (in August 2014 “suicide” with a double-barrelled shotgun) and M. Chechetov (in February 2015 he threw himself from his flat on the

17th floor). They knew too much about privatization and the fierce struggle between claimants for state property (Zanuda, 2015). The inability of the state authorities to solve all these high-profile crimes and punish the perpetrators is evidence of their weakness in countering the influence of the criminal world.

The degree to which citizens protect their property rights can be judged by statistics reflecting the percentage of court judgements enforced, but this percentage is not high, and it must also be taken into account that it takes months, and often years, to get to a court judgment and to spend a lot of money on lawyers. Therefore, judicial defense for the majority of citizens becomes simply inaccessible. An ordinary citizen remains defenseless before arbitrary behavior of officials, before employers, before the criminal world. True, if a person has the opportunity to enlist the support of criminal authorities, watchmen, then he gets a real chance to restore the violated justice. In this case, the problems are solved by the methods of Don Corleone from the film “The Godfather” (Coppola, 1972). And it must be said, it is solved quickly and effectively. The spread of social practices of solving by criminals those issues that should be solved by law enforcement agencies or other state bodies testifies to very serious and understudied changes in the culture of post-Soviet society.

Ukraine’s social governance, as it was mentioned above, has established a one-factor model of economy, which focuses exclusively on maximizing profit, and therefore the country is doomed to degradation. In the modern world, those social systems that are based on a multifactor management model have been successful. In such a model, in addition to economic efficiency (maximum profit), social efficiency (the ability to solve social problems, overcome social contradictions and conflicts, invest resources in human and social capital) and public safety (which is determined by the ability to ensure the stability and integrity of society, the positive nature of social change) are also ensured.

The change in the ratio of the state, business and criminal influence on social governance has led to such processes as deprofessionalisation in all spheres, but especially in public administration, and

a decrease in the scientific justification of decisions. An example is the decision to liquidate the sanitary-epidemiological service in Ukraine. It turned out that this service is an important tool for combating epidemics and in those countries where it functions, the response to the coronavirus pandemic was more successful than in those countries where it is absent. At the parliamentary level, a decision was made to restore the sanitary-epidemiological service in Ukraine, but it turned out that it would require significant resources and two years time. Over the last 7–8 years in Ukraine, the practice of appointing non-professionals as heads of institutions, enterprises, state campaigns and even ministries has become widespread, and this has always led to destructive consequences.

Investigating the problem of the split between oligarchs as a threat to the integration of Ukrainian society, sociologist N. Shulga (2018) denies the existence of oligarchic consensus in post-Soviet Ukraine. He proves that since the early 90s there has been a fierce competitive struggle between groups of businessmen, who quickly enriched themselves and gradually formed as oligarchs, which resulted in showdowns with violence, torture, shootings in lifts, car and stadium explosions, and great loss of life. It is impossible to speak of any consensus of the oligarchs in the following decade.

DISCUSSION

The exploration of criminality, business, and the state in post-Soviet Ukraine is intricate and multifaceted. Since 1991, when Ukraine gained independence, notable changes in the political, economic, and social spheres have significantly influenced the dynamics among criminal structures, business, and the state. Several key aspects of this complex topic include:

- **Oligarchy:** Ukraine has witnessed the emergence of an oligarchic system, where a small group of affluent and influential businessmen, known as oligarchs, wield control over large enterprises and sectors of the economy. These oligarchs often maintain close connections with political elites, leveraging their influence to safeguard their interests.
- **Corruption:** A pervasive issue in Ukraine, corruption extends across various sectors, including business and government. Elevated levels of corruption can facilitate illicit transactions and shield the interests of criminal organizations.
- **Organized Crime:** Ukraine is home to diverse organized criminal groups engaged in activities such as smuggling, drug trafficking, and arms trafficking. These groups may have affiliations with both business and political entities.
- **Anti-Corruption Reforms and Efforts:** Since 2014, Ukraine has embarked on numerous initiatives to combat corruption and enhance transparency within state institutions. These endeavors encompass the establishment of anti-corruption bodies like the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) and the creation of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Court.
- **Geopolitical Factors:** Developments in geopolitics, such as the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the country's relations with Russia, exert a profound impact on the political and economic landscape. These factors contribute to the intricate interplay between criminality, business, and the state in the region.
- **Economic Crisis and Instability:** Ukraine has faced economic crises since gaining independence, contributing to potential growth in the shadow economy and increased criminal activity.
- **Energy Sector:** The strategic importance of Ukraine's energy sector attracts attention from both oligarchs and foreign interests, potentially leading to unfair deals, including energy smuggling.
- **Media and Information Warfare:** Media and information resources are often manipulated to advance political and corporate interests, influencing public opinion and shaping consciousness.
- **Competition for Resources and Influence:** Intense competition for access to natural resources, infrastructure, and influence over government decisions may lead to illegal competition methods and power struggles.
- **International Intervention:** Various international actors are drawn to Ukraine, and their interests and influence play a significant role in the dynamics between criminal structures, business, and the state.

Fighting crime and corruption, along with reinforcing the rule of law, remains a top priority for the Ukrainian government and society. These efforts are crucial for ensuring stability, economic development, and building trust in state institutions. Investigating and understanding the intricate interconnections between criminal structures, business, and political elites poses an ongoing challenge for Ukrainian authorities.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of the impact exerted by the state, business, and criminal elements on social dynamics within post-Soviet Ukrainian society yields several noteworthy conclusions:

1. Throughout the course of social transformation in Ukrainian society, a notable reconfiguration of influence occurred among the state, business, and criminal elements.
2. During the twilight years of the Soviet era, specifically during the period of perestroika, state authority still occupied a predominant position in the realm of social governance. In contrast, the realm of legal business was in its nascent stage, and the criminal underworld was just beginning to emerge from the shadows. However, the 1990s marked a pivotal turning point in this landscape.
3. Neoliberal reforms precipitated a substantial shift wherein the state relinquished its commanding role in the economy, ceding this position to the burgeoning business sector. In this transition, criminal elements played a decisive role. Through methods such as extortion, hostile takeovers, corruption, and engagement in the shadow economy, they established control over the country's primary resources.
4. The critical facet of social reproduction, as elucidated by E. Giddens (1996), which serves as the lifeline of any society, experienced significant erosion in post-Soviet Ukraine. This erosion manifested itself in the depletion of demographic, production, industrial, scientific, technological, labor, social, educational, cultural, and human capital.
5. The process of social transformation in post-Soviet Ukraine, driven by the evolving roles and influences of the state, business, and criminal elements in societal governance, has assumed a destructive character.
6. With the diminished capacity of state authorities, law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary to effectively discharge their functions, the influence of criminality in maintaining control over society and preserving the existing social order has been on the ascent.
7. The challenges stemming from the transformation of post-Soviet Ukrainian society underscore the necessity of fortifying the state's role, reasserting its agency as a proactive actor in fostering positive trends within the realms of social reproduction.

The future exploration of these issues should center on substantiating strategies, means, and methodologies to optimize the impact of the state, business, and criminal elements on social reproduction and social transformation within Ukrainian society.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

REFERENCES

- Akbari, M., Bahrami-Rad, D., & Kimbrough, E. O. (2019). Kinship, fractionalization and corruption. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 166, 493–528. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.07.015>
- Alvarado, R., Tillaguango, B., López-Sánchez, M., Ponce, P., & Işık, C. (2021). Heterogeneous impact of natural resources on income inequality: The role of the shadow economy and human capital index. *Economic Analysis and Policy*, 69, 690–704. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eap.2021.01.015>
- Bashlakova, V., & Bashlakov, H. (2021). The study of the shadow economy in modern

- conditions: Theory, methodology, practice. *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, 81, 468–480. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2020.10.032>
- Bilorus, O. G. (Ed.). (2001). *Globalizaciya i bezpeka rozvitku: monografiya* [Globalization and security of development: monography]. Kyiv National Economic University.
- Chaisty, P., & Whitefield, S. (2018). Critical election or frozen cleavages? How voters chose parties in the 2014 Ukrainian parliamentary election. *Electoral Studies*, 56, 158–169. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.08.009>
- Chen, M., Sinha, A., Hu, K., & Shah, M. I. (2021). Impact of technological innovation on energy efficiency in industry 4.0 era: Moderation of shadow economy in sustainable development. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 164, 120521. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2020.120521>
- Coppola, F. F. (Director). (1972). *The Godfather*. Paramount Pictures; Alfran Productions.
- De Lucas, F. M., & Prats, M. (2020). Why do some areas depopulate? The role of economic factors and local governments. *Cities*, 97, 102506. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2019.102506>
- Davydchuk, M., Mehlhausen, T., & Priesmeyer-Tkocz, W. (2018). The price of success, the benefit of setbacks: Alternative futures of EU-Ukraine relations. *Futures*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2017.06.004>
- Dubrovsky, M., & Andrushchenko, A. (2002). Sistema i transformaciyi: programne abezpechennya rozvitku suchasnogo profspilkovogo ruhu v Ukrayini [System and transformation: programming for the development of the modern trade union movement in Ukraine]. *Profspilki Ukrayini*, 5, 25–28.
- Garman, G., Weijts, W., Douw, F., Keukens, R., Liausedas, A., & Van Voren, R. (2020). Reforming prison mental health services in Ukraine. *Forensic Science International: Mind and Law*, 1, 100011. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsimpl.2020.100011>
- Giddens, A. (1996). In *Defence of Sociology*. Polity.
- Hajilee, M., Stringer, D. Y., & Hayes, L. A. (2021). On the link between the shadow economy and stock market development: An asymmetry analysis. *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, 80, 303–316. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2021.02.011>
- Heyets, V. M., Danylenko, A., Zhulynskyi, M., Libanova, E., & Onyshchenko, O. (Eds.). (2009). *Socialno-ekonomichnij stan Ukrayini: naslidki dlya narodu ta derzhavi. Nacionalna dopovid* [Socio-economic situation in Ukraine: consequences for the people and the state. National report]. NVC NBUV.
- Heyets, V. M. (2009). Razvitie i krizisy v Ukraine — protivorechiya transformacii [Development and crises in Ukraine — contradictions of transformation]. In *Metodologiya, teoriya ta praktika sociologichnogo analizu suchasnogo suspilstva: zbirnik naukovih prac* [Methodology, theory and practice of sociological analysis of modern society: a collection of scientific papers] (Vol.15, pp. 341–348).
- Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Simon and Schuster.
- Kochkina, A. (2006). *Krymskij gambit* [Crimean gambit]. Izdatelstvo S. Pantyuka.
- Kushnir, I. (2019). The development of policy actors involved in the Bologna reform in Ukraine. *Communist and Post-communist Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2019.04.006>
- Kuzin, S. (2006). *Doneckaya mafiya* [Donetsk Mafia]. Izdatelskij dom “Poligrafkniga.”
- Kuzio, T. (2018). Russian and Ukrainian elites: A comparative study of different identities and alternative transitions. *Communist and Post-communist Studies*, 51(4), 337–347. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.10.001>
- Kvartiuk, V., & Curtiss, J. (2019). Participatory rural development without participation: Insights from Ukraine. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 69, 76–86. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2019.04.002>

- Larraz, B., & García-Gómez, E. (2020). Depopulation of Toledo's historical centre in Spain? Challenge for local politics in world heritage cities. *Cities*, 105, 102841. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2020.102841>
- Lazarenko, V. (2020). Mapping identities: Narratives of displacement in Ukraine. *Emotion, Space and Society*, 35, 100674. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emospa.2020.100674>
- Litina, A., & Palivos, T. (2016). Corruption, tax evasion and social values. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 124, 164–177. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.017>
- Mazhar, U., & Méon, P. (2017). Taxing the unobservable: The impact of the shadow economy on inflation and taxation. *World Development*, 90, 89–103. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.019>
- Meijer, M., & Sysner, J. (2017). Getting ahead in depopulating areas — How linking social capital is used for informal planning practices in Sweden and The Netherlands. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 55, 59–70. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2017.07.014>
- Modesto, J. G., Keller, V. N., Saraiva, R. B., & Pilati, R. (2020). Belief in a corrupt world: A cross-cultural mediation model of beliefs about justice, punishment, and corruption. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 164, 110127. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110127>
- Onge, J. M. S., & Smith, S. (2020). Demographics in rural populations. *Surgical Clinics of North America*, 100(5), 823–833. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.suc.2020.06.005>
- Orosz, G., Tóth-Király, I., Bóthe, B., Paskuj, B., Berkics, M., Fulop, M., & Roland-Lévy, C. (2018). Linking cheating in school and corruption. *Revue Européenne De Psychologie Appliquée*, 68(2), 89–97. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erap.2018.02.001>
- Osovyi, G. (2002). Zarobitna plata yak dzerkalo chesnoti derzhavi, poryadnosti robotodavciv i sili profspilok [Salary as a mirror of the virtue of the state, decency of employers and strength of trade unions]. *Profspilki Ukraini*, 5, 19–20.
- Papagiannis, F., Gazzola, P., Burak, O., & Pokutsa, I. (2021). A European household waste management approach: Intelligently clean Ukraine. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 294, 113015. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2021.113015>
- Pavlovsky, M. A. (2001). *Strategiya rozvitku suspilstva: Ukrayina i svit (ekonomika, politologiya, sociologiya)* [Strategy of society development: Ukraine and the world (economics, political science, sociology)]. Tehnika.
- Piasetska-Ustych, S. V. (2016). Fenomen korupciyi v Ukraini (politiko-ekonomichnij analiz) [The phenomenon of corruption in Ukraine (political and economic analysis)]. *Global and National Problems of Economy*, 14, 20–25.
- Powell, D., Kuzmina, S., Yamchynska, T., Shestopalyuk, O. V., & Kuzmin, Y. (2015). Educational Technologies for maturing democratic approaches to educational practices in Ukraine. *Procedia — Social and Behavioral Sciences*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.01.485>
- Ryvkin, D., & Serra, D. (2020). Corruption and competition among bureaucrats: An experimental study. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 175, 439–451. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.026>
- Salmon, T. C., & Serra, D. (2017). Corruption, social judgment and culture: An experiment. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 142, 64–78. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.06.004>
- Shevchenko, V. (2019). The reform of the higher education of Ukraine in the conditions of the military-political crisis. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 65, 237–253. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2018.08.009>
- Shulga, M. (2018). *Zbij socialnoyi matrici* [The failure of the social matrix]. Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.
- Shulga, M. O. (2011). *Dreif na uzbichchya. Dvadcyat rokiv suspilnih zmin v Ukraini* [Drifting to the margins: twenty years of social change in Ukraine]. Drukarnya “Biznespoligraf.”

- Skvorets, V. O. (2019). *Transformaciya socioistorichnogo organizmu Ukrayini: analitika socialnih procesiv* [Transformation of the socio-historical organism of Ukraine: analysis of social processes]. Zaporizkij nacionalnij universitet.
- Sociologichna grupa "Rejting." (2021, March). *Suspilno-politichni poglyadi v Ukrayini*. Rating Group. https://ratinggroup.ua/ru/research/ukraine/opros_iri_obschestvenno-politicheskie_nastroeniya_v_ukraine.html
- Soskin, O. I. (2014). *Narodnij kapitalizm: ekonomichna model dlya Ukrayini* [National capitalism: the economic model for Ukraine]. IST.
- Spiliopoulos, O. (2014). The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement as a Framework of Integration between the Two Parties. *Procedia. Economics and Finance*, 9, 256–263. [https://doi.org/10.1016/s2212-5671\(14\)00027-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/s2212-5671(14)00027-6)
- State Archival Service of Ukraine. (2013). *Vidomist pro rezultati Vseukrayinskogo referendumu, 1 grudnya 1991 r* [Information on the results of the All-Ukrainian referendum, December 1, 1991.]. https://web.archive.org/web/20131203032951/http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/15r-V_Ref/index.php?11
- Vaishar, A., Šťastná, M., Zapletalová, J., & Nováková, E. (2020). Is the European countryside depopulating? Case study Moravia. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 80, 567–577. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2020.10.044>
- Van Deurzen, I. (2017). And justice for all: Examining corruption as a contextual source of mental illness. *Social Science & Medicine*, 173, 26–34. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2016.11.033>
- Zanuda, A. (2015, March 2). Is the Head of the State Property Fund a dangerous position? *BBC*. https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/business/2015/03/150302_fdm_danger_az

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) which allows reusers to distribute, remix, adapt, and build upon the material in any medium or format for non-commercial purposes only, and only so long as attribution is given to the creator.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AS A GLOBAL PROBLEM OF MODERNITY: TECHNOLOGICAL, ONTOLOGICAL, ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.61439/CPGR2192>

VALENTYNA VORONKOVA

ZAPORIZHZHIA NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0719-1546>

E-mail: valentinavoronkova236@gmail.com

Valentyna Voronkova, Doctor of Philosophy (D.Sc.), Professor, Academician of the Academy of Higher Education of Ukraine, Head of the Department of Management of Organizations and Project Management, Engineering educational and scientific Institute of Zaporizhzhia National University, Editor-in-Chief (Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine).

VITALINA NIKITENKO

ZAPORIZHZHIA NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9588-7836>

E-mail: vitalina2006@ukr.net

Vitalina Nikitenko is a Doctor of Philosophy (D.Sc.), Professor of the Department of Management and Administration, Y. M. Potebnya Engineering Education and Scientific Institute of Zaporizhzhia National University (Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine).



ABSTRACT

The significance of research into artificial intelligence in a digital society is underscored by several driving forces for change, including space exploration, biotechnology, and emerging technologies. These developments have profound implications for human society, impacting various contemporary concerns such as economics, politics, ethics, law, and conflict resolution. In navigating this digital landscape, anthropology must reexamine the place of humans within a society increasingly intertwined with artificial intelligence, encompassing consciousness and even the physical body. The primary objective of this study is to conceptualize artificial intelligence as a catalyst for ecosystem growth within the realms of technological, ontological, and anthropological dimensions.

Keywords

artificial intelligence, machine learning, automation, augmented reality, big data

INTRODUCTION

The specific aims of the study are as follows:

1. To scrutinize artificial intelligence as a potential and versatile resource applicable across all sectors of the economy, within the context of technological dimensions.
2. To explore the convergence of big data with artificial intelligence and its fundamental components, within the framework of ontological dimensions.
3. To unveil the role of artificial intelligence in enhancing the efficiency of digitalizing society and human life, within the scope of anthropological dimensions.

The article focuses on the contributions of eminent scientists who have made breakthroughs in comprehending artificial intelligence as a multifaceted social, economic, and cultural phenomenon. These scholars include Regina Andriukaitiene et al. (2017a), Nick Bostrom (2014), Ashley Vance (2014), Sunil Gupta (2018), Diamandis & Kotler (2020), Patrick Dixon (2015), Kai-Fu Lee (2018), Kevin Kelly

(2018), Dagogo Altreide (2019), David Rowan (2019), Chris Skinner (2018), Christopher Steiner (2012), Max Tegmark (2017), Klaus Schwab (2017), along with our own research.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Variety of methodological approaches have been analyzed, with a particular emphasis on the anthropogenic component. The research methodology employed here is rooted in the information-anthropogenic analysis method, based on the fundamental premise that any processes involving artificial intelligence necessitate the involvement of information as an object and humans as subjects of cognition. All exchanges of substance, energy, or information are contingent on human goals and interests, subject to human control and programming, and rely on information interaction and components. The Agile methodology, known for adapting complex socio-economic systems, and the synergetic method, grounded in self-organizing processes, have played pivotal roles in shaping the concept of artificial intelligence and its associated principles, factors, conditions, models, and mechanisms governing human-society interaction.

The research has established that artificial intelligence (AI) is a comprehensive term encompassing machines that emulate human intelligence, incorporating pattern recognition and computational capabilities that enable the identification of patterns in vast datasets, often referred to as “big data.” An AI system is defined as a machine system that possesses varying degrees of autonomy and the capacity to impact its environment by generating outputs, including predictions, recommendations, and decisions, all tailored to specific goals aimed at advancing society’s digitalization. However, the rise of artificial intelligence also brings forth a multitude of challenges, including concerns related to polarization, heightened surveillance, loss of control, privacy infringements, increased inequality, and the potential for unjust power structures within states.

Central to this evolution is the convergence of big data and artificial intelligence, which stands as the most significant development shaping the future of organizations leveraging data and analytical

capabilities for their operations. While the terms “artificial intelligence” and “machine learning” are often used interchangeably, they represent distinct concepts. Both terms come up a lot when talking about big data, analytics and the big waves of technological change that are sweeping the world. Machine learning, as a class of algorithms, automates the construction of analytical models that empower computers to learn without explicit programming. These algorithms iteratively learn from data, enabling computers to uncover concealed insights without the need for explicit instructions.

In light of emerging technologies such as automation, the Internet of Things, augmented reality, drones, 5G connectivity, and artificial intelligence, industries spanning construction, engineering, utilities, communications, manufacturing, automotive, and state and local government sectors are presented with unprecedented opportunities to address their most intricate challenges through the transformative influence of artificial intelligence.

Analysis of Recent Studies and Author’s Reliance for Initiating Problem Solution

The author relies on the work and contributions of several scientists who have made significant breakthroughs in the study of artificial intelligence as a complex phenomenon. These researchers include Regina Andriukaitiene et al. (2017a), Nick Bostrom

(2014), Ashley Vance (2014), Sunil Gupta (2018), Diamandis & Kotler (2020), Patrick Dixon (2015), Kai-Fu Lee (2018), Kevin Kelly (2018), Dagogo Altreide (2019), David Rowan (2019), Chris Skinner (2018), Christopher Steiner (2012), Max Tegmark (2017), Klaus Schwab (2017). Additionally, the article draws from conceptual publications by various authors, including V. Voronkova et al. (2021a; 2021b), V. Nikitenko et al. (2017), R. Oleksenko, Y., Kivlyuk, V. Marienko (2021), A. Cherep et al. (2020). These publications contribute to the understanding of artificial intelligence’s place and role in the digital society.

Addressing Unresolved Aspects of the General Problem at the Heart of this Article

Artificial Intelligence tools have introduced a range of innovative capabilities for businesses, offering new opportunities and efficiencies (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2021; Kulkov, 2021; Moradi & Dass, 2022; Wei & Pardo, 2022). However, the adoption of AI technology also gives rise to significant ethical concerns (Wright & Schultz, 2018; see also Omrani et al., 2022). Many of the most advanced AI tools are underpinned by deep learning algorithms. The effectiveness of these algorithms depends on the data they are exposed to during training. Since humans curate the data used for AI training, there is an inherent risk of introducing human bias into AI systems. Consequently, meticulous control measures are necessary to mitigate this risk effectively.

Moreover, some industry experts argue that the term “artificial intelligence” carries a strong association with popular culture, which has led to unrealistic fears among the general public regarding AI’s capabilities and potential impact. Conversely, there are also exaggerated expectations regarding how AI will revolutionize workplaces and daily life. In response to these perceptions, researchers and marketers are exploring the use of the term “augmented intelligence.” This alternative label has a more neutral connotation, aiming to convey the idea that artificial intelligence will primarily enhance products and services rather than replace human roles entirely. As the understanding of artificial intelligence continues to evolve, it is transforming into a comprehensive framework composed of principles, factors, conditions, models, and mechanisms (Voronkova & Nikitenko, 2022).



Defining the Task and Establishing Article Goals

The primary objective of this article is to provide a comprehensive conceptualization of artificial intelligence as a catalyst for rapid growth within the technological ecosystem and its profound impact on human life. The research endeavors to achieve the following key objectives:

1. To assess how artificial intelligence can serve as a valuable resource across diverse segments of the economy.
2. To investigate the synergy between big data and artificial intelligence, including an examination of their core components.
3. To uncover the conceptual and practical aspects of artificial intelligence and its pivotal role in enhancing the efficiency of societal digitalization processes.

ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

The theory of artificial intelligence is inherently multidisciplinary, residing at the intersection of various fields such as economics, sociology, computer science, mathematics, and psychology. To comprehend the intricacies of artificial intelligence, it necessitates an interdisciplinary approach that synthesizes knowledge from these diverse domains. This approach is vital for elucidating the content and operational principles of the complex, invariant system that is artificial intelligence.

To analyze the contemporary model of artificial intelligence effectively, a systemic institutional-evolutionary approach is indispensable. This approach accounts for the evolution of artificial intelligence within different stages of human civilization development, including the agrarian (pre-industrial), industrial, post-industrial/information, and anthropogenic society phases. It is imperative that this civilizational approach not only considers logical and historical regularities but also incorporates integral aspects of

the interplay between the historical development of theories and processes and their current states (Voronkova et al., 2021b).

In the study of artificial intelligence, the method of sublimation is crucial, as it allows for the identification of the content within various transformational stages and facilitates comparative analysis. Constructing the logical framework of any theory involves two key phases: induction and deduction. The induction phase entails moving from the concrete to the abstract, where central system-forming concepts, axiomatic requirements, or unified research approaches are defined. Subsequently, the deduction phase involves moving from the abstract back to the concrete, applying theoretical knowledge to practical contexts. This deductive method holds significant practical importance within the realm of artificial intelligence.

In addition to the deductive method, it is imperative to complement the analytical framework with an empirical approach when exploring artificial intelligence. This empirical approach entails adopting the fundamental tenets of artificial intelligence through a rigorous analysis of reliable empirical data. When evaluating various methodological approaches, it becomes evident that there is a significant anthropogenic dimension at play.



The methodology of scientific research hinges on the method of information-anthropogenic analysis, rooted in the foundational belief that any processes related to artificial intelligence are intrinsically intertwined with information as an object and human as a subject of cognition. This perspective underscores that all exchanges involving substance, energy, or information are fundamentally influenced by the goals and interests of individuals. Such exchanges are meticulously controlled and programmed by humans and are founded upon the principles of information interaction and components. Additionally, within the realm of artificial intelligence, two specific methodologies, the Agile method, and the synergetic method, have played pivotal roles (Voronkova et al., 2021a).

Examining artificial intelligence (AI) as a contemporary global concern is a crucial undertaking, given its profound influence on diverse facets of society, potentially giving rise to ethical, social, political, and economic dilemmas. Several vital elements characterize the methodology for scrutinizing AI as a prevailing global issue:

1. A comprehensive approach: The analysis of AI necessitates consideration of multiple scientific disciplines, encompassing computer science, philosophy, psychology, economics, law, sociology, and others. It is imperative to comprehend the far-reaching effects of AI across all societal domains.
2. Ethical dimensions of AI: A pivotal facet of the examination involves delving into the ethical considerations associated with AI. This encompasses inquiries into responsibility, transparency, security, fairness, and the ramifications for human rights and freedoms.
3. Societal repercussions: In evaluating AI, it is crucial to explore its impact on various societal domains, including employment, education, healthcare, and communication. While AI presents new possibilities, it also introduces potential challenges.
4. Legal considerations: The scrutiny of AI involves an appraisal of the necessity for novel laws and regulations governing its usage and advancement. This may encompass issues such as copyright, data protection, and establishing liability for AI actions.
5. Economic ramifications: AI possesses the capacity to reshape the economic terrain, influencing employment, business models, and market dynamics. A comprehensive examination of AI's impact on the economy is instrumental for informed strategic decision-making.
6. International collaboration and security: When scrutinizing AI, it is imperative to acknowledge its global character and the necessity for international cooperation and regulation, particularly in the realm of autonomous systems and AI weaponry, to address security concerns.
7. Public knowledge and education: Fostering awareness and educating the public about AI, elucidating its benefits and risks, assumes paramount importance. This initiative aims to ensure increased citizen engagement in policymaking and regulatory processes.
8. Exploration and ingenuity: The examination of AI should encourage ongoing research and the creation of innovative technologies while discerning possible challenges and corresponding solutions. The approach to analyzing AI as a worldwide concern should be methodical and inclusive, encompassing all facets of its influence on society and the global landscape. Striking a balance between AI advancement and upholding ethical, social, and legal standards is crucial to safeguarding the well-being of individuals and society.

AI examination should encourage collaboration among various sectors, including business, government, academia, and civil society. Cooperative endeavors are instrumental in addressing intricate challenges and ensuring the balanced advancement of technology. The methodology for AI analysis should encompass a monitoring system and risk assessment, enabling timely identification and resolution of issues. Given that artificial intelligence transcends national boundaries, a global analysis is imperative, considering diverse cultural, social, and economic contexts. Citizens ought to have the capacity to shape AI policymaking by actively engaging in discussions, public debates, and voting processes. This fosters a more democratic and equitable environment. The methodology for AI analysis should consider the requirements of diverse populations, including vulnerable groups, to promote inclusive technology development and mitigate inequalities.

Establishing international standards and norms for AI regulation is crucial to ensure consistency and cohesion across nations and regions.

The scrutiny of AI should be a continuous and adaptable process, given the rapid evolution of the technology. It is crucial to adjust the methodology in response to emerging challenges and revelations. The approach to analyzing artificial intelligence as a contemporary global issue should be thorough, with a focus on ensuring safety, fairness, efficiency, and ethical utilization of the technology. Additionally, active engagement of all segments of society is essential, contributing to addressing the challenges posed by artificial intelligence in the context of contemporary issues.

RESULTS

1. Artificial intelligence represents a multitude of driving forces for change, including but not limited to space exploration, biotechnology, and emerging technologies.

Characteristics of AI:

- All-encompassing: AI has the potential for application across various economic sectors, including but not limited to medicine and the arts.
- Scalable: Once an algorithm is developed, AI can be widely deployed at minimal cost to address problems of varying complexity.
- Automation of Human Cognitive Abilities: AI aims to automate a range of human cognitive abilities, from audiovisual perception to memory processes.
- Disruptive Force: AI is a disruptive force, rapidly integrating into our daily lives (Voronkova et al., 2017).

2. The merging of big data and artificial intelligence is a critical development shaping data-driven firms. Although the terms artificial intelligence and machine learning are often used interchangeably, they are not precisely the same. The real value to businesses in both cases depends on data, leading to occasional confusion.

3. While humans can distinguish between their representations and the external world, arti-

ficial systems pose a unique challenge with a gap between their ontology and the human agent's. The biosemiotic perspective is crucial for creating autonomous ontologies in artificial agents, enabling subjective judgments. Current AI systems excel in specific tasks, but closing the conceptual gap between cognitive sciences and AI technologies is essential for meaningful progress.

DISCUSSION WITH JUSTIFICATION OF SCIENTIFIC RESULTS OBTAINED

1. Artificial Intelligence as a Potential Resource for Utilization Across All Economic Sectors: Technological Dimensions

Artificial intelligence represents a multitude of driving forces for change, including but not limited to space exploration (Bird et al., 2021), biotechnology (Artico et al., 2022), and emerging technologies. These advancements have far-reaching implications for human society, touching upon various contemporary issues such as economics, politics, ethics, law, and conflict (Carrillo, 2020; De Felice et al., 2022; Nguyen & Vo, 2022; Rajendra et al., 2022; Rodrigues, 2020). In light of these developments, anthropology, which traditionally studies the complexity and diversity of human societies, must now redirect its focus towards understanding the existence of human beings in a world intertwined with artificial intelligence, consciousness, and the very nature of their physical bodies. Artificial intelligence, often abbreviated as AI, serves as a broad term encompassing machines that emulate human intelligence.

The general problem at hand pertains to the multifaceted implications of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on society. AI is a broad term denoting machines that replicate human intelligence, particularly in recognizing patterns within extensive datasets, often referred to as "big data." An AI system is characterized as a machine capable of influencing its environment by generating outputs like predictions, recommendations, or decisions with varying degrees of autonomy. Key attributes of artificial intelligence include its utilization of data, the autonomy it exhibits in making decisions, and

its capacity for interacting with the environment, other machines, and humans. These fundamental characteristics define artificial intelligence as a technology branch that underpins numerous daily applications (Andriukaitiene et al., 2017a).

AI exhibits several noteworthy characteristics. Firstly, it is all-encompassing, with the potential for application across various economic sectors, spanning from medicine to the arts. Secondly, it is scalable, meaning that once an algorithm is developed, it can be widely deployed at minimal cost to address problems of varying complexity (Bostrom, 2014). Thirdly, AI aims to automate human cognitive abilities, ranging from audiovisual perception to memory processes. Lastly, it is a disruptive force, rapidly integrating into our daily lives (Voronkova et al., 2017). This amalgamation of features positions AI as a potent force with considerable socio-economic impact, extending its influence not just as a technological advancement but also as a source of economic, political, and cultural influence. Given its multifaceted nature and its profound implications across social, economic, ethical, legal, and cultural domains, addressing the challenges posed by AI necessitates an interdisciplinary approach that transcends mere technological considerations. AI offers numerous opportunities, such as enhancing cognitive abilities for analyzing, modeling, and predicting events based on information, as well as improving environmental management. However, it also presents challenges, including potential polarization, increased surveillance, loss of control, privacy concerns, heightened inequality, and the potential for unjust power structures.

To ensure that AI development does not replicate current societal failures in addressing pressing global issues like climate change or poverty, it is imperative to underpin AI development with a critical analysis of historical, economic, cultural, and political structures shaping the human experience. This provides an opportunity to reevaluate what it means to be human in a world no longer centered solely on humanity, as we interact within a broader ecosystem comprising people, machines, and other artifacts.

The European Union's recent efforts to regulate AI through the Artificial Intelligence Act reflect

the need for a balanced approach. The proposal categorizes AI programs based on their risk levels to fundamental rights and security, ranging from unacceptable risk (prohibited acts) to minimal or no risk, and stipulates corresponding requirements for AI systems at each risk level (Vance, 2015; European Commission, 2021).

Within the realm of data, the European Data Strategy promotes the establishment of various thematic data spaces where data can be shared among civil society, the public, and the commercial sector. Additionally, the European Data Governance Act seeks to facilitate voluntary data sharing by individuals and businesses while harmonizing the conditions for utilizing specific public sector data.

A significant and recent initiative is the future Data Protection Act, which extends user rights to access and share data generated by the products or services they engage with. This, along with other legislation governing digital services and the digital marketplace, aims to prevent major players from exploiting their dominant positions in ways that may detrimentally impact citizens, businesses, and consumers. The integration of these legal instruments serves to delineate the parameters for the advancement of artificial intelligence technologies in a manner that aligns with the core values of the European Union. These values encompass the utmost respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and the safeguarding of human rights, all of which form the foundational bedrock of human existence.

Anthropological foundations of Artificial Intelligence aspires to redefine the concept of humanity in a world increasingly driven by AI. The ultimate goal is to steer our societies away from pervasive inequality, discrimination, and injustice. This collective endeavor necessitates the amalgamation of knowledge from diverse disciplines and critical social analyses to identify intricate connections and envision potential futures (Andriukaitiene et al., 2017b).

2. Converging Big Data and Artificial Intelligence: Exploring Ontological Dimensions

The convergence of big data and artificial intelligence represents the foremost transformative development

that is shaping the future of businesses leveraging data and analytics capabilities. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have become ubiquitous buzzwords, often used interchangeably, especially in discussions revolving around big data, analytics, and the sweeping technological changes permeating our world. Both artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) are commonly discussed in the context of big data, analytics, and the sweeping technological changes reshaping our world. The real worth these technologies offer to businesses is contingent upon data. However, while closely related, AI and ML are not identical concepts and can sometimes cause confusion.

Artificial intelligence (AI) embodies the intelligence displayed by machines, applied when a machine replicates “cognitive” functions typically associated with human intelligence, such as “learning” and “problem-solving.” On the other hand, machine learning (ML) constitutes a class of algorithms that automate the construction of analytical models, equipping computers with the capability to learn without explicit programming. This iterative learning process enables computers to uncover hidden insights from data, all without requiring specific programming.

In our rapidly evolving technological landscape, featuring emerging innovations like automation, the Internet of Things (IoT), augmented reality, drones, artificial intelligence, and 5G connectivity, various industries, ranging from construction and engineering to utilities, manufacturing, communications, automotive, and state and local government, are presented with novel opportunities to tackle their most intricate business challenges. Consequently, the launch of the Oracle Industry Lab outside of Chicago serves as an incubator and testing ground, where potential customers and partners can explore the potential of 5G and other transformative technologies (Voronkova et al., 2017a).

Communication service providers (CSPs) are making substantial investments, amounting to billions of dollars, in constructing 5G and fiber networks. These investments are opening up new revenue opportunities within the enterprise market (Gupta, 2018). These opportunities span a wide range of applications, from powering intelligent

factories and interconnected construction sites to facilitating robotic surgical procedures. The capabilities of 5G play a pivotal role in handling the vast volumes of data necessary for the rapid and effortless creation of digital cities. A remote resource known as “Spot” offers real-time environmental data, enhancing smart workflows. Oracle Communications technologies further enhance remote operations by facilitating intelligent, secure, and precise data sharing among the workforce, from the field to management or the cloud. 5G’s capabilities make it well-suited for supporting smart grid deployments, characterized by low latency, high reliability, and secure communication. As individuals continue to strive for sustainable living, 5G can serve as the cornerstone for modernizing energy grids.

By providing consumers with a more dependable and seamless experience when interacting with smart and environmentally friendly home applications, we can expect increased usage and adoption. To illustrate the impact of consumer behavior on energy consumption, Oracle Energy and Water collaborated with Oracle Communications and Oracle Construction & Engineering to create a physical representation of the Connected Hub, or Tiny Town, within a laboratory setting. Through a virtual tour of the Connected Hub, viewers can engage with a simulated city and replicate real-world scenarios, observing how their actions influence the energy efficiency and reliability of the utility grid (Diamandis & Kotler, 2020).

This simulated city showcases smart utility technologies, including poles, wires, transformers, solar panels, a wind turbine, and even a miniature substation and gas assets linked to the electrical grid. The Connected Hub serves as a demonstration of how Oracle Energy and Water solutions can collaborate with communities to optimize energy efficiency, enhance reliability, and deliver cost savings to customers.

By employing machine learning, CSPs have the capability to proactively identify issues as they arise, ensuring consistent quality of service across their network, be it wireless or wired. This commitment to closed-loop automation aims to deliver a comprehensive experience for both customers and employees. While fiber networks can serve

as a distinguishing service offering, it's essential to maintain continuous monitoring to prevent or minimize customer frustrations stemming from network failures.

Effective communication plays a pivotal role in enabling billions of people to engage in work, social interactions, shopping, and entertainment within the digital realm. By embracing an ecosystem-oriented approach driven by research and development, the communications industry is poised to assist service providers and other technology firms in exploring and validating use cases that will expedite new revenue opportunities with 5G support.

The terms “anthropogenesis” and “technogenesis” represent two facets of the same phenomenon, highlighting the profound symbiotic relationship between them. In the context of digital technogenesis, the very essence, characterized by information and electrical elements, undergoes closer interaction and interference between these two functions (Dixon, 2015).

This convergence results in the concept of the “digital technological self,” which entails the continuous reprocessing of data in collaboration with machines. The ultimate aspiration of artificial intelligence has long been the creation of synthetic minds capable of human-like thinking (Hibbard, 2002). There are several paradigms within artificial intelligence:

1. Traditional artificial intelligence (GOFAI).
2. Machine learning (ML) systems.
3. Artificial neural networks (ANN).
4. Situational, dynamic systems (SED).

However, it's important to note that the real-world ontologies internalized by these artificial intelligence paradigms do not align with the external world; there exists an ontological gap. In other words, how these systems internally represent the external world differs significantly from the actual state of the world. Artificial intelligence systems, regardless of the paradigm used, do not establish a connection with reality in the same manner as humans, and thus, they do not construct a comprehensive ontology that encompasses both the internal world and external reality (Lee, 2018).

A URI, which stands for Uniform Resource Identifier, serves the purpose of uniquely identifying a resource. This resource can encompass anything possessing a distinct identity, represented as a string that adheres to web address syntax. In the realm of artificial intelligence, ontology finds extensive utility, primarily contributing to the enhancement of data quality within training datasets. It plays a pivotal role in ensuring greater consistency and facilitating seamless navigation for users seeking to transition from one concept to another within the ontology structure. Furthermore, ontologies can be leveraged to construct a knowledge graph comprising individual facts. Knowledge, in this context, is portrayed as a collection of entities, wherein nodes and the connections between them elucidate the nature and relationships between these entities (Kelly, 2018).

Notably, there has been a recent trend in implementing ontologies using the Web Ontology Language (OWL). A subject-oriented ontology represents a fusion of AI-driven tools for data analysis,



capable of offering pertinent data insights and identifying emerging trends and data patterns. This implies that ontologies can adapt to the unique objectives of each organization by employing logical, semantic, or mathematical methodologies.

3. Artificial Intelligence's Contribution to Human and Societal Digital Evolution: Anthropological Insights

Human consciousness actively constructs an internal ontology rather than passively receiving it. The conceptualizations of an external ontology are considered more or less accurate, primarily because this accuracy is essential for effective communication with the external reality. This signifies that we bear responsibility for the ontology we formulate. We can discern between our mental representations and the external world, recognizing the distinctions between them and comprehending their implications. In essence, we acknowledge the existence of the ontological gap, particularly in relation to artificial systems. In the context of artificial agents, a unique distinction arises — the gap that separates the ontologies of artificial agents from those of human agents. From this perspective, an individual's physical interaction with reality permits them to identify and emphasize meaningful aspects of that reality (Marienko, 2021).

It can be posited that the application of the biosemiotic perspective plays a pivotal role in enabling the development of autonomous ontologies within artificial agents. This forms the foundation for achieving the capability to formulate subjective judgments in synthetic agents. While we have created artificial intelligence systems that surpass human capacities in specific, narrowly defined tasks, these achievements fall short of our ultimate goals. The conceptual criterion necessitates that proposed solutions bridge the conceptual gap, including the ontological gap, between the field of cognitive sciences and AI technologies (Nikitenko et al., 2022).

In the realm of intelligent interaction, computers not only comprehend the semantic content of a user's message but also grasp the contextual nuances surrounding the message. For instance, human interactions often involve language and

bodily gestures. To attain truly intuitive communication, computers will require their own forms of vision and language that seamlessly integrate with the human world. Machine learning, as a subset of artificial intelligence, empowers computers to learn without relying solely on explicit programming. Within the rapidly evolving technology ecosystem, artificial intelligence (AI) and its subdomains, such as machine learning, take a prominent role. Gartner defines AI as the application of advanced analytics and logical techniques to model human intelligence, presenting a complex system with numerous applications for individuals and businesses across various industries. The current landscape offers a multitude of AI-driven solutions designed to support, automate, and enhance human tasks, reflecting the expansive potential of artificial intelligence (Nikitenko & Vasylychuk, 2022).

These technological advancements hold the promise of simplifying intricate tasks with both speed and precision, opening the door to novel applications that were once deemed impractical or unattainable. While some may speculate about the perpetual use of this technology or its potential to surpass human capabilities in certain business scenarios, its widespread adoption and popularity are undeniable. As expected, the increasing integration of AI at the enterprise level has resulted in rapid growth within the global AI software market. Gartner projects this growth to reach USD62.5 billion in 2022, reflecting a remarkable 21.3% increase compared to its value in 2021 (Gartner, 2021). IDC further forecasts that this market will expand to reach an impressive US \$791.5 billion by 2025 (Jyoti & Kuppaswamy, 2022).

1. Machine learning, which has evolved from the study of pattern recognition theory and computational learning within the field of artificial intelligence, delves into the development of algorithms capable of learning from data and making predictions. These algorithms transcend the constraints of static program instructions by generating predictions and data-driven decisions based on models constructed from input data samples. Machine learning finds application in various computational challenges where conventional explicit algorithms cannot be devised and programmed.

Machine learning essentially enables a computer to perform tasks without explicit programming. Deep learning, a subset of machine learning, can be seen as the automation of predictive analytics. It encompasses three primary categories. Firstly, Supervised learning when datasets are labeled, allowing the algorithm to detect patterns and subsequently apply them. Secondly, Unsupervised learning when it employs datasets without predefined labels. Instead, it organizes the data based on similarities or differences. Thirdly, Reinforcement learning is a method that utilizes unlabeled datasets, with the AI system receiving feedback after executing actions. Computer vision is a technological field focused on capturing and analyzing visual data through the use of cameras. This technology is employed to recognize signatures or analyze medical images (Altreide, 2019).

2. *Natural Language Processing (NLP)* is a specialized field within artificial intelligence that focuses on the interaction between computers and human languages. Its primary objective is to program computers to efficiently handle natural languages. Neural networks, which are interconnected units designed to mimic human brain patterns, play a role in recognizing and learning patterns. NLP enhances AI's capacity to comprehend, interpret, and process human speech, while computer vision

instructs computers to gather and analyze crucial information from images and videos.

These capabilities are harnessed to develop artificial intelligence software for various applications, with notable use cases including knowledge management, virtual assistance, and autonomous vehicles. Given the increasing volume of data that businesses need to process to meet customer demands, there is a growing demand for faster and more precise software solutions. Challenges in natural language processing often revolve around tasks such as understanding human language, generating natural language, exploring the interplay between language and machine perception, and managing human-computer dialog systems (Rowan, 2019).

3. *Robotics* falls under the umbrella of artificial intelligence and encompasses the fields of designing, constructing, operating, and utilizing robots and computer systems for their control, sensory feedback, and information processing. Researchers are currently exploring the application of machine learning to develop robots capable of interacting in social settings. The fundamental goal of robotics is to create machines that can perform tasks typically carried out by humans. Robots find application across diverse scenarios, including hazardous environments like bomb detection and deactivation, industrial processes, or situations where human presence is unfeasible. Robots come in various forms, with some designed to resemble humans (Skinner, 2018).

4. *Software* plays a crucial role in the realm of artificial intelligence, and its definition can vary. From an economic perspective, it can be described as software that emulates intelligent human behavior. Taking a broader view, AI software is seen as computer programs that learn patterns from data and analyze information to provide intelligent responses to specific customer issues. The AI software market encompasses not only technologies featuring built-in AI processes but also platforms that enable developers to construct AI systems from scratch. This includes a spectrum of offerings, ranging from chatbots to deep and machine learning software, as well as platforms equipped with cognitive computing capabilities (Steiner, 2012).



AI solutions serve a variety of purposes across different industries, whether it's assisting in surgical procedures in healthcare, identifying fraudulent activities in financial transactions, enhancing driver assistance systems in the automotive sector, or personalizing educational content for students. These AI solutions can be broadly categorized into functional areas:

1. Process Automation: Process automation is a fundamental goal of AI solutions. It involves making systems or processes work automatically, reducing the need for human intervention. For instance, Robotic Process Automation (RPA) can be programmed to perform repetitive tasks more quickly than humans. AI applications aim to minimize human involvement in tasks, whether they are routine or complex. By collecting and interpreting large volumes of data, AI can determine the next steps in a process and execute them efficiently. Machine learning algorithms play a crucial role in creating knowledge bases from both structured and unstructured data. Process automation remains a significant challenge for businesses, with many planning to implement intelligent automation in the near future. Contrary to automating manual tasks, AI frequently handles various computerized tasks efficiently and reliably. In this form of automation, human queries remain crucial for tailoring the system and posing relevant questions. This customization and interaction with AI are vital components that enable systems and processes to function automatically. For instance, Robotic Process Automation (RPA) can be programmed to execute repetitive tasks at a much higher speed than humans (Tegmark, 2017).

2. Data Analysis and Interpretation: AI solutions, especially in the corporate world, primarily focus on building knowledge bases from structured and unstructured data. These solutions analyze and interpret data before generating predictions and recommendations based on the findings. This process is referred to as AI analytics, leveraging machine learning to explore data and identify patterns. Whether the analytical tools are predictive, prescriptive, augmented, or descriptive, artificial intelligence plays a central role in data preparation, uncovering novel insights, identifying patterns, and predicting business outcomes.

Enterprises are increasingly turning to AI to enhance the quality of their data, recognizing that AI can maximize the value of data. When machine learning-powered algorithms are employed, data itself can become a valuable intellectual asset. The insights and solutions lie within the data; AI's role is to extract and present them. Consequently, data has never been more critical and can offer a competitive edge. In highly competitive industries, having the best-quality data, even when employing similar methods as others, can be a decisive advantage.

Artificial intelligence (AI) involves the emulation of human cognitive processes by computer systems. These processes encompass three key phases:

1. **Learning:** The acquisition of information and the rules governing its use.
2. **Reasoning:** The utilization of these rules to formulate approximate or definitive conclusions.
3. **Self-correction:** Selected applications of AI include narrow AI, facial recognition, and computer vision.

AI, particularly with the use of neural networks featuring multiple hidden layers, enables the analysis of extensive datasets at a deeper level. In the past, constructing a fraud detection system with five hidden layers was nearly impossible. However, advances in computing power and the availability of big data have changed the landscape. Deep learning models require substantial data for training, and this reliance on data has led to stringent regulations like GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) governing the use of consumer data (Cherep et al., 2020).

3. Personalization and User Engagement: Establishing and nurturing customer relationships are now paramount for attracting and retaining customers. AI enhances existing products by infusing them with intelligence. It is typically not marketed as a standalone app but rather as a feature that enhances products users are already familiar with. For example, Siri is an AI feature integrated into newer Apple products.

The integration of automation, conversational platforms, bots, and intelligent machines with big data presents opportunities for enhancing various

technologies across personal and professional domains. These applications span from security to financial investment analysis. AI leverages advanced learning algorithms and data-driven programming to adapt and evolve. It excels at uncovering underlying structures and patterns within data, effectively acquiring skills such as classification and prediction. Just as AI can autonomously learn to play chess, it can independently make product recommendations online. Furthermore, AI models continue to adapt as new data becomes available, aided by techniques like backpropagation, which allows models to self-adjust and learn from their mistakes.

AI can be classified into two categories: weak AI (narrow AI) and strong AI. Weak AI refers to systems designed and trained for specific tasks, such as virtual personal assistants like Apple's Siri. Strong AI possesses human-like cognitive abilities and can tackle unknown tasks without human intervention. However, the implementation of AI, whether in terms of hardware, software, or personnel, can incur significant costs. To facilitate AI adoption, many vendors now incorporate AI components into their standard offerings and provide access to AIaaS (artificial intelligence as a service) platforms. AIaaS enables individuals and organizations to experiment with AI and explore multiple platforms before committing. Some of the most prominent cloud AI offerings include Amazon AI services, IBM Watson Assistant, Microsoft Cognitive Services, and Google AI services.

Artificial intelligence tools offer a wide array of new capabilities for businesses, but their adoption also raises important ethical considerations. Many of the most advanced AI tools rely on deep learning algorithms, which are fundamentally shaped by the data they are exposed to during training. Since humans are responsible for selecting and providing this training data, the risk of human bias is an inherent concern that requires vigilant control.

Some experts within the industry argue that the term "artificial intelligence" has become closely tied to popular culture, leading to unrealistic fears and expectations among the general public regarding AI. In an effort to address this issue, researchers and marketers are exploring the use of the term "augmented intelligence," which carries

a more neutral connotation. The goal is to help people understand that AI's primary role is to enhance products and services rather than replace the individuals who use them (Schwab, 2017).

Arend Hintze, an associate professor specializing in integrative biology, computer science, and engineering at the University of Michigan, has categorized artificial intelligence into four types, including some that are still in the realm of potential development (Hintze, 2016).

1. **"Reactive Machines":** This category includes examples like Deep Blue, the IBM chess program that famously defeated Garry Kasparov in the 1990s. Reactive Machines like Deep Blue excel at tasks like identifying pieces on a chessboard and making predictions. However, they lack memory and the ability to learn from past experiences. Their functionality is limited to the specific task they were designed for, such as analyzing possible chess moves and selecting the most strategic one. They cannot adapt to different tasks or situations.
2. **"Limited Memory":** AI systems in this category have the capacity to use past experiences to inform their future decision-making. For instance, some decision-making functions in autonomous vehicles operate on this principle. These systems can learn from previous observations but do not retain this information indefinitely. Their learning is focused on improving performance within their designated tasks.
3. **"Theory of Mind":** This type of AI is a concept that does not currently exist but is an area of ongoing research. In psychology, "theory of mind" refers to the ability to understand and attribute beliefs, desires, and intentions to others, which in turn influence their decision-making.
4. **"Self-awareness":** This category represents an even more advanced form of AI that is currently theoretical and does not yet exist. "Self-aware" AI would possess an understanding of its own existence and internal states, akin to human self-awareness. It would have the capacity to introspect, recognize its own limitations, and potentially even modify its own behavior and objectives based on this self-awareness.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH PROSPECTS IN THIS FIELD

Artificial intelligence has found its way into various domains. For instance, in healthcare, machine learning is enhancing diagnostic processes for quicker and more accurate results. In the business sector, machine learning is seamlessly integrating with analytics and customer relationship management (CRM) platforms to provide improved customer service. Chatbots are also being employed on websites to assist customers with inquiries. In the realm of education, artificial intelligence is automating tasks like grading, potentially reshaping the way students learn and even raising questions about the role of teachers.

The financial sector benefits from AI's ability to gather personal data and offer financial guidance, with applications like IBM Watson being utilized in processes such as home buying. Moreover, manufacturing is a leading industry in adopting robots within workflows, though the emergence of unmanned vehicles introduces safety and ethical concerns. These vehicles, equipped with computer vision, image recognition, and deep learning capabilities, rely on AI to autonomously navigate, especially in scenarios involving unexpected obstacles like pedestrians. The idea of autonomous vehicles gives rise to safety and ethical concerns. These vehicles are not immune to mechanical failures, and in the event of an accident, determining liability can be challenging. Furthermore, unmanned vehicles may encounter situations where an accident is inevitable, requiring artificial intelligence to make ethical decisions aimed at minimizing harm. The proliferation of AI also raises issues related to misuse and security, as hackers increasingly employ advanced machine learning tools to breach sensitive systems. In sum, artificial intelligence has played a significant role in fostering ecosystem growth across technological, ontological, and anthropological dimensions.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

REFERENCES

- Altreide, D. (2019). *ColdFusion Presents: New Thinking. From Einstein to Artificial Intelligence, the Science and Technology That Transformed Our World*. Mango Media Inc.
- Andriukaitiene, R., Voronkova, V., Kivlyuk, O., & Nikitenko, V. (2017a). Stanovlenie i razvitie SMART-obshestva kak vysokorazumnogo, vysokotekhnologicheskogo, vysokointelektualnogo [Formation and development of smart society as a highly intelligent, high-tech and highly intellectual community]. *Humanitarian Bulletin of Zaporozhye State Engineering Academy*, 71, 17–25.
- Andriukaitiene, R., Voronkova, V., Kivlyuk, O., Romanenko, T., & Rizhova, I. (2017b). Conceptualization of smart society and smart technologies in the context of the development of modern civilization. In *Mokslas Ir praktika: Aktualijos Ir Perspektyvos* (pp. 11–12). Lietuvos sporto universitetas.
- Artico, F., Edge, A. L., & Langham, K. (2022). The future of Artificial Intelligence for the BioTech Big Data landscape. *Current Opinion in Biotechnology*, 76, 102714. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cop-bio.2022.102714>
- Bird, J. J., Petzold, L. R., Lubin, P. M., & Deacon, J. (2021). Advances in deep space exploration via simulators & deep learning. *New Astronomy*, 84, 101517. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newast.2020.101517>
- Bostrom, N. (2014). *Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies*. Oxford University Press.
- Carrillo, M. R. (2020). Artificial intelligence: From ethics to law. *Telecommunications Policy*, 44(6), 101937. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2020.101937>

- Cherep, A., Voronkova, V., & Nikitenko, V. (2020). The reverse side of technological innovations and their consequences in the conditions of the innovation-information society. In *Theory and Practice: Problems and Prospects (Scientific Articles)* (pp. 462–471). Kaunas Lithuanian Sports University
- De Felice, F., Petrillo, A., De Luca, C., & Baffo, I. (2022). Artificial Intelligence or Augmented Intelligence? Impact on our lives, rights and ethics. *Procedia Computer Science*, 200, 1846–1856. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2022.01.385>
- Diamandis, P., & Kotler, S. (2020). *The Future Is Faster Than You Think: How Converging Technologies Are Transforming Business, Industries, and Our Lives*. Simon & Schuster.
- Dixon, P. (2015). *The Future of Almost Everything: How our world will change over the next 100 years*. Profile Books.
- European Commission. (2021, April 21). *Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts*. European Union. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex-3A52021PC0206>
- Gartner. (2021, November 22). *Gartner Forecasts Worldwide Artificial Intelligence Software Market to*. Gartner. <https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2021-11-22-gartner-forecasts-worldwide-artificial-intelligence-software-market-to-reach-62-billion-in-2022>
- Gupta, S. (2018). *Driving Digital Strategy: A Guide to Reimagining Your Business*. Harvard Business Press.
- Haenlein, M., & Kaplan, A. (2021). Artificial intelligence and robotics: Shaking up the business world and society at large. *Journal of Business Research*, 124, 405–407. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.10.042>
- Hibbard, B. (2002). Social synthetic characters. *Computer Graphics*, 36(2), 5–7. <https://doi.org/10.1145/566656.566659>
- Hintze, A. (2016, November 14). Understanding the four types of AI, from reactive robots to self-aware beings. *The Conversation*. <https://theconversation.com/understanding-the-four-types-of-ai-from-reactive-robots-to-self-aware-beings-67616>
- Jyoti, R., & Kuppaswamy, R. (2022, August). Worldwide Artificial Intelligence Software Forecast. IDC. <https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=US49571222>
- Kelly, K. (2018). *The Inevitable: Understanding the 12 Technological Forces That Will Shape Our Future*. Penguin Books.
- Kulkov, I. (2021). The role of artificial intelligence in business transformation: A case of pharmaceutical companies. *Technology in Society*, 66, 101629. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2021.101629>
- Lee, K. (2018). *AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order*. Houghton Mifflin.
- Marienko, V. Y. (2021). Informational and communication technologies as a factor of increasing the efficiency of innovative potential of the organization. *Humanity Studies*, 9(86), 154–167.
- Moradi, M., & Dass, M. (2022). Applications of artificial intelligence in B2B marketing: Challenges and future directions. *Industrial Marketing Management*, 107, 300–314. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2022.10.016>
- Nguyen, Q. P., & Vo, D. H. (2022). Artificial intelligence and unemployment: An international evidence. *Structural Change and Economic Dynamics*, 63, 40–55. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2022.09.003>
- Nikitenko, V., & Vasyl'chuk, G. (2022). Model of digital city as a factor of creative development. *Humanities Studies*, 11, 48–58. <https://doi.org/10.26661/hst-2022-11-88-05>
- Nikitenko, V., Vasyl'chuk, G., & Merzhynskiy, Y. (2022). Network economy as a factor of increasing the efficiency of digitalization in the context of digital society development from 1g to 5g. *Humanities Studies*, 10, 112–121. <https://doi.org/10.26661/hst-2022-10-87-13>

- Omrani, N., Riviuccio, G., Fiore, U., Schiavone, F., & Agreda, S. G. (2022). To trust or not to trust? An assessment of trust in AI-based systems: Concerns, ethics and contexts. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 181, 121763. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2022.121763>
- Rajendra, P., Kumari, M. K., Rani, S., Dogra, N., Boadh, R., Kumar, A., & Dahiya, M. (2022). Impact of artificial intelligence on civilization: Future perspectives. *Materials Today: Proceedings*, 56, 252–256. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.matpr.2022.01.113>
- Rodrigues, R. (2020). Legal and human rights issues of AI: Gaps, challenges and vulnerabilities. *Journal of Responsible Technology*, 4, 100005. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrt.2020.100005>
- Rowan, D. (2019). *Non-Bullshit Innovation: Radical Ideas from the World's Smartest Minds*. Bantam Press.
- Schwab, K. (2017). *The Fourth Industrial Revolution*. Penguin UK.
- Skinner, C. (2018). *Digital Human: The Fourth Revolution of Humanity Includes Everyone*. Wiley.
- Steiner, C. (2012). *Automate This: How Algorithms Came to Rule Our World*. Portfolio Hardcover.
- Tegmark, M. (2017). *Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence*. Penguin UK.
- Vance, A. (2015). *Elon Musk: Tesla, SpaceX, and the Quest for a Fantastic Future*. Blackstone Publishing.
- Voronkova, V. G., & Nikitenko, V. O. (2022). *Filosofiya cifrovoyi lyudini i cifrovogo suspilstva: teoriya i praktika* [Philosophy of the digital person and digital society: theory and practice]. Liha-Pres.
- Voronkova, V., Kivlyuk, O., Rizhova, I., & Nikitenko, V. (2017). Stem education as a factor in the formation and development of smart society. In *Formation and development of the information society as a basis for ensuring Ukraine's competitiveness in the world and sustainable development of society and the state* (pp. 81–84). Zaporizhzhia State Engineering Academy.
- Voronkova, V., Nikitenko, V., & Andriukaitiene, R. (2021a, February 9). Development of Artificial intelligence society in postmodernity: problems, risks, challenges. *Newsletter of Odessa Scientific-Humanitarian Society*. <https://ohss.fi/2021/02/09/razvitie-obshhestva-iskusstvennogo-intellekta-v-usloviyah-postmodernosti-problemy-riski-vyzovy/>
- Voronkova, V., Nikitenko, V., Andriukaitiene, R., & Oleksenko, R. (2021b, April 27). Artificial Intelligence: a Transformative Power Shaping the Future of Humanity. *Centre for Criminology*. <https://criminology-center.org/iskusstvennyj-intellekt-kak-glavnaya-reshayushhaya-sila-kotoraya-mozhet-izmenit-chelovechestvo/>
- Wei, R., & Pardo, C. (2022). Artificial intelligence and SMEs: How can B2B SMEs leverage AI platforms to integrate AI technologies? *Industrial Marketing Management*, 107, 466–483. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2022.10.008>
- Wright, S. A., & Schultz, A. E. (2018). The rising tide of artificial intelligence and business automation: Developing an ethical framework. *Business Horizons*, 61(6), 823–832. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2018.07.001>

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) which allows reusers to distribute, remix, adapt, and build upon the material in any medium or format for non-commercial purposes only, and only so long as attribution is given to the creator.



REINHART KOSELLECK AND HAYDEN WHITE AS METAHISTORIANS:

THE CRITIQUE OF MODERN HISTORICAL WRITING TOWARD THE END OF THE MODERN AGE

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.61439/TPJN6568>

ABSTRACT

My purpose in this essay is to consider how the classic philosophy of history was reinvented as metahistory toward the end of the twentieth century. The German historian Reinhart Koselleck and the American historian Hayden White were its most prominent practitioners. Both scholars responded to the challenge of rethinking problems in historiography in light of the breakdown of the grand narrative of modern history, born of the European Enlightenment. Both rejected the teleological designs of the philosophy of history, yet are of particular interest for their inquiry into alternative conceptions of transcendence in historical interpretation. Koselleck reached toward a science of anthropology from his training in the idealist tradition of German philosophy. White, by contrast, reaffirmed history's ancestral ties to the arts of writing. In juxtaposing these scholars, I highlight historiographical issues they raise about the relationship between the experience of the past and writing about it.

Keywords

philosophy of history, metahistory, Reinhart Koselleck, Hayden White, critique of historicism, conceptual history, historical time, grand narrative

INTRODUCTION. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY RECONCEIVED

The classic philosophy of history has long been viewed with suspicion by professional historians. Yet theorizing about the nature of history as a field of intellectual inquiry has re-emerged in our times as a search for transcendental perspectives on the nature of modern historical writing. My purpose in this essay is to consider how the classic philosophy of history was reinvented as metahistory toward the end of the twentieth century. The German historian Reinhart Koselleck (1923–2006) and the American historian Hayden White (1928–2018) were

PATRICK H. HUTTON
UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0009-0006-5768-8725>
E-mail: phutton@uvm.edu

Patrick Hutton is Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Vermont, USA, where he taught European intellectual history and historiography. Academician of the European Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Hutton was the recipient of a number of national fellowships, including awards from the Danforth Foundation, the Fulbright Program, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the American Council of Learned Societies. His teaching experience: European intellectual history, the history of collective mentalities, the history of private life, cultural contexts of memory, historiography, philosophy of history, etc. Patrick Hutton is the author and editor of several books, including *History as an Art of Memory* (1993).



its most prominent practitioners. They led parallel lives as pathbreaking theorists among late twentieth century historiographers, at a time in which doubts about long-standing conceptions of history had come into play. In this essay, I compare their theories.

The emergence of the classic philosophy of history was coeval with the rise of modern historical writing during the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. Philosophers such as Nicholas Condorcet (2012) and Immanuel Kant (2015), and their nineteenth-century successors such as Jules Michelet (1831/2013) and Karl Marx (1975), read the patterns of the past as a direction of change toward a beckoning future, and so gained currency as prophets of the transformative effects of historical change that augured the fulfillment of human destiny. Practical historical scholarship developed out of this intellectual matrix.¹ Over the course of the nineteenth century history acquired a professional identity of its own. Professional historians claimed to base their authority upon the findings of empirical research, but tacitly retained the faith of the philosophers of history that their work was contributing to what would eventually become a unified narrative of history as the story of the progress of humankind in the making of modern civilization. Broadly conceived, that faith was labeled historicism. As the philosopher of history Giambattista Vico (1984) was the first to remark: humankind has created its own human world apart from that of nature. Therefore it can recreate the path of its construction. In the guise of historicism, historians aspired to contextualize all human experience within the continuum of a single timeline, leading out of the past into the present.² Such thinking informed the design of textbooks in modern history and courses about the rise of the modern nation-states as agencies of progress, even though the history of the twentieth century was fraught with crises of catastrophic proportions.³ Given two world wars, the rise of totalitarianism, and the genocide of the Holocaust, the ideal of prog-

ress as the loadstar of modern historical writing became an empty promise. Moreover, the practice of history was expanding beyond politics into broadly conceived realms of social and cultural history, as these played out on a global scale. The 1960s were to become a golden age in the expansion and diversification of these new approaches to historical scholarship.⁴ Those who would expound upon the nature of history, therefore, faced a paradox. Historical scholarship flourished as never before, though the theory that had once guided historical practice had become remote from the directions that scholarly research was taking.

In the face of this crisis of modern historiography, both Koselleck (1959/2000, 1979, 1985, 1987, 2002, 2018) and White (1957, 1973, 1976, 1978, 1999, 2010, 2014) sought to explain its larger meaning by revisiting issues of theory. Neither was inclined to return to the deterministic schemes of the philosophers of history of the nineteenth century. Rather than looking for intelligible patterns in the realities of the past, they sought to identify the underlying modes of composition through which historians construct their interpretations. Both scholars responded to the challenge of rethinking problems in historiography in light of the breakdown of the grand narrative of history born of the European Enlightenment. Both were attuned to the pluralism of historical interests in their own times, and of the myriad ways in which the past might be presented. Both rejected the overarching designs of the classic philosophers of history, yet are of particular interest for their inquiry into alternative conceptions of transcendence in historical interpretation. As opposed to the grand schemes of the philosophers of history, both sought to build their theories upon the most basic intelligible units of historical meaning: for Koselleck, working concepts of historical understanding; for White, tropes of literary expression that inform historical discourse. Koselleck reached toward a science of anthropology from his training in the idealist tradition of German philosophy. White, by contrast, reaffirmed history's

¹ Vincenzo Ferrone (2015), *The Enlightenment; History of an Idea*.

² Georg G. Iggers (1995), "Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term."

³ Mark Mazower (2000), *Dark Continent; Europe's Twentieth Century*; Henry Rousso (2016), *The Latest Catastrophe; History, the Present, the Contemporary*.

⁴ Felix Gilbert and Stephen Graubard, *Historical Studies Today* (Gilbert & Graubard, 1972).

ancestral ties to the arts of writing. In juxtaposing these scholars, I highlight historiographical issues they raised about the relationship between the experience of the past and writing about it.

In developing his theory, Koselleck had recourse to Immanuel Kant's notion of transcendental concepts of human understanding as a point of departure for the elaboration of a conceptual understanding of historical interpretation during the modern age.⁵ White, in turn, harked back to Giambattista Vico's axioms about the role of rhetorical figuration in ancient mythology as the groundwork of the narratives that shape historical thinking to this day.⁶ Koselleck sought to show how history had emancipated itself from its beginnings in the rhetoric of storytelling to become an autonomous science, while at the same time accounting for the new directions that historians were exploring in their research and writing. White, by contrast, returned to history's roots in rhetoric as a way of understanding its ongoing role since antiquity as a form of storytelling. The effect was to internalize the search for larger patterns in historical inquiry in the activities of historians themselves.

From these starting points, they went their separate ways into worlds of theorizing apart by adopting different foundational principles of historical composition. For Koselleck, concepts served as abstract ways of grasping the meaning of historical change through time. For White, tropes provided the poetical formulae that set the shape of historical narrative. Both were matrices of the kind of narration that followed from them: for Koselleck the rational transformation of evidence into intelligible historical meaning; for White the poetical figuration of plotlines that shape the content of storytelling. For Koselleck, conceptualization was a new and modern form of conveying the temporality of the human condition. Conceptualization

opened historical interpretation to unprecedented possibilities for conveying meaning, permitting the advance of history to a new level of understanding as a science of time. For White, figuration was as old as the mythology that had once flowed from it. The figural narratives of mythology were an ancient form of time-factoring, revealing how humankind went about solving problems over time. As an art of storytelling, the rhetoric of figuration plays into historical interpretation to this day. Koselleck argued for the necessary interplay of research and writing, contending that the experience of life is deeper than anything that language can convey. White set issues of research aside in favor of concentrating on those of composition. All historical writing, he contended, involves representation, which is the only means of communicating an otherwise inaccessible past.⁷

Both built upon these foundations to develop comprehensive models of historical writing based upon a calculus of structural pairings in historical interpretation. Koselleck formulated a theory about the inverse relationship between the experience of the past (collective memory) and hope (longing for a transcendent future).⁸ White proposed a theory of the integral relationship between form (narration) and content (figuration of the storyline).⁹ Within these guidelines, both established unifying platforms for a plethora of ways to interpret the past: for Koselleck, variations in the dynamic interplay of repetition and innovation considered over time; for White, configurations of the many ways in which narratives may be plotted out of linguistic resources. Both arrived at theories of historical composition that are at once comprehensive yet flexible.

METHOD

This article conducts a comprehensive examination of the metamorphosis from classical philosophy of

5 Reinhart Koselleck (1985), *Futures Past; On the Semantics of Historical Time*, 30, 37, 203-04, 246, 259, 280.

6 White (1976), "The Tropics of History: The Deep Structures of the New Science," in *Giambattista Vico's Science of Humanity*, ed. Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Donald Verene, 65-85; idem, (White, 1978), "Fictions of Factual Representation, *Tropics of Discourse; Essays in Cultural Criticism*, 127.

7 Koselleck (2018), "Fiction and Historical Reality," *Sediments of Time; On Possible Histories*, 17-23, idem, Koselleck, (2002), "Social History and Conceptual History," *The Practice of Conceptual History; Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, 24-29; White (1987), "Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory," *The Content of the Form; Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation*, 45.

8 Koselleck (1985), "'Space of Experience' and 'Horizons of Expectation': Two Historical Categories," *Futures Past*, 267-88.

9 White (1999), "Literary Theory and Historical Writing," *Figural Realism; Studies in the Mimesis Effect*, 3-10, 16-21.

history to metahistory, juxtaposing the methodologies of two preeminent figures, Reinhart Koselleck and Hayden White. A nuanced exploration unfolds, elucidating the distinct approaches of these scholars towards conceptualization, one of the most complex categories in philosophy, and postmodernism. Furthermore, a meticulous review is undertaken, encompassing the entire body of work produced by both historians. The analysis aims to unveil the intricacies of their contributions, offering a scholarly perspective on the convergence of historical philosophy and metahistory within the discourse of these influential thinkers.

THEORIZING HISTORY IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR TIMES

Koselleck and White came of age during the era of the Second World War and entered into their prime as scholars in a postwar culture that witnessed an explosion of interest in history as both professional discipline and pedagogical course of study in higher education. A comparison of their experiences as young men coming of age in the midst of a world war is suggestive about the route that each would take in making his way into the study of history as a professional vocation. Koselleck had been a soldier, caught up in the errant cause of German imperialism. During combat on the eastern front, he suffered physical injury that maimed him for life, followed by the added psychological trauma of internment for over a year as a prisoner of war in Russia. He later remarked that his personal experience of hardship shaped his perspective on modern history, for all his life he was haunted by the German catastrophe under Nazi rule.¹⁰ He was disposed to think of history in terms of obstacles to smooth transitions, and to harbor suspicion of abstract theories about prospects for the future. After the war, Koselleck returned to the university as a sanctuary in which to reflect on the larger meaning of his personal encounter with history. As he entered the profession, he was influenced by the ideas of the

conservative historian Carl Schmitt, whom he had known when he was a student before the war, and to whom he turned for professional and personal support as an aspiring scholar.¹¹ Although Koselleck later thought of himself as an outsider in the profession in Germany, he complied with traditional expectations within the profession. He taught at several prestigious universities, and participated in collaborative ventures at the cutting edge of German historiography, pioneering new ways of theorizing history in keeping with new avenues of scholarly research. Early on, he won respect among German historians for his work as a practicing historian of the radical Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. His research as a young historian played into his reflections on modern historiography during his later years. His pathway to international scholarly recognition as theorist of history germinated slowly, leading out of Germany into continental Europe before arriving in the Anglo-American world.

As a young man, White had been a sailor in the United States Navy as the war drew to an end. To my knowledge he never saw combat. He took advantage of the GI Bill to go to college, and so was one among that cohort of veterans who took to their studies with more enthusiasm and diligence than had their prewar predecessors. In an age in which higher education in the United States was expanding rapidly, he had the opportunity as a graduate student to observe both the burdens and opportunities of American historical scholarship.¹² Like Koselleck, White trained as a practicing historian, and wrote a doctoral dissertation about the Papacy at the end of the Middle Ages.¹³ But early in his career, he became fascinated with the place of history within the larger context of the humanities, and set about familiarizing himself with the classics of literature as well as of history. It was this broad intellectual reach that led him to reflect on the prospect of new directions in theorizing about history. Reading R. G. Collingwood's *Idea of History* was an epiphany for him (Collingwood, 1946). Against the grain of conventional historical scholarship conceived as a social

¹⁰ Niklas Olsen (2012), *History in the Plural; An Introduction to the work of Reinhart Koselleck*, 12-14;

¹¹ Ibid, 23-26.

¹² Tyler Stoval (2018), "In Memoriam Hayden V. White," *Perspectives on History*. See also Herman Paul (2011), *Hayden White; The Historical Imagination*.

¹³ Robert Doran, "Editor's Introduction," *The Fiction of Narrative; Essays on History, Literature, and Theory*, by Hayden White (2010), xiv.

science in the tradition of Positivism, Collingwood argued that if history was a science it was one of a special kind, giving primacy to the imagination of the historian in telling the story of the past. White saw Collingwood as a renegade from the profession, and identified with him.¹⁴ Like Koselleck, he enjoyed a distinguished professional career, teaching at several respected universities before becoming director of an interdisciplinary program in historical consciousness at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Following Collingwood, White challenged the Positivist proposition that the meaning of history inheres primarily in the data collected through research. Most historians, he allowed, pursued scrupulous research without much attention to rhetorical strategies for its communication. Professional historians wrote for one another rather than for the educated public, thereby abdicating their responsibility to contribute to the public forum their well-informed judgments about the meaning of the past for understanding the present.¹⁵ White wondered about the viability of practice to the exclusion of theory. Whereas so much attention had been devoted to method in research, issues about the writing of history had hardly been considered at all. He therefore set himself an agenda for investigating the historians' rhetoric of composition, the linguistic building blocks of their prose about which they themselves might not have been aware. The styles that historians adopt matter, he argued. Their poetical resources hold the secrets of their most profound insights into the meaning of the past for the present. That is why, he suggested, great historical writing may appear in any age, not just at the cutting edge of today's research.

In this way, White positioned himself on the crest of the wave of interdisciplinary studies in theory that during the 1970s became the most publicized arena of scholarly interest. From the publication of his first book, *Metahistory*, he became popular in the scholarly community worldwide for the originality of his take on modern historiography (White, 1973). His contribution to the revival of discussion about the formative power of rhetoric in historical interpretation, dormant in historiography for nearly two centuries, resonated with corresponding interest across the humanities in what might be characterized as the power of discourse to shape the meaning of a past whose realities are no longer a presence. One might say that he announced the coming of the "rhetorical turn" in contemporary historiography, in tune with the flourishing of "French theory" so closely associated with the celebrity of Michel Foucault.¹⁶

Koselleck and White were well aware of one another. Indeed, they developed a professional friendship. Their commentary on one another's work was polite without being deeply analytical. Koselleck acknowledged the importance of White's contribution to scholarship and assigned some of his writings to his students. He allowed, however, that he had misgivings about White's theory of history, for it seemed to him to be a retreat into the field of rhetoric from which history had emancipated itself in the work of historians




Figure 1. Cover of R. G. Collingwood's "Idea of History"




Figure 2. Cover art for the book "Metahistory" written by Hayden White

14 Hayden White (1957), "Collingwood and Toynbee; Transitions in English Historical Thought," in *Fiction of Narrative*, 4-22.

15 White (2010), "The Politics of Contemporary Philosophy of History," *Fiction of Narrative*, 136-45.

16 Robert Doran (2010), "The Work of Hayden White 1: Mimesis, Figuration, and the Writing of History," in *The Sage Handbook of Historical Theory*, 106-18.




Figure 3. Cover of Reinhart Koselleck's book "The Practice of Conceptual History"

during the Enlightenment. White's theory about the rhetorical foundations of historical writing was not really about history at all, he contended, but was rather a contribution to literary theory with applications across the humanities. He pointed to White's neglect of issues about research and evidence, focusing exclusively on those of historical composition.¹⁷ White was more forthright in promoting the value of Koselleck's scholarship, and he played a major role in acquainting Anglophone historians with his work. He wrote a forward to the English translation of Koselleck's *The Practice of Conceptual History* to attest to the importance of his contribution to modern historiography (Koselleck, 2002). But his discussion was essentially a synopsis of Koselleck's key ideas with little critical assessment of them. His one distinguishing comment was mention of Koselleck's observation that the experience of defeat has a silver lining in disposing such an historian to offer counterpoints to dominant historical interpretations.¹⁸ It is worth pointing out that White never attempted a searching analysis of Koselleck's writings, in the manner with which he treated contemporary theorists such as Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Fredric Jameson, and Paul Ricoeur, all reflective of the trend toward post-modern thinking about historical discourse. Still, White took Koselleck's work seriously. From his brief and random references to his work, White saw Koselleck as engaged in the rehabilitation of historicism by modifying and elaborating upon its conceptions.

KOSELLECK ON THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN HISTORIOGRAPHY

Koselleck thought of history as the rise of a science that has developed since the eighteenth century through the growing sophistication of the historians' capacity for conceptualization, as they refined their methods and entered new domains of historical research.¹⁹ His references to historians hark back into antiquity, with notable discussion of the historical perspectives of Herodotus and Thucydides. But he was especially interested in the transformation of historical thinking during the age of Enlightenment, or more precisely the closing decades of the eighteenth century. This time in history he characterized as the "saddle period," a threshold in historical understanding in which historical scholarship coalesced as an autonomous science apart from the natural sciences.²⁰ Historians came to understand time in a new way, and thereby gained an unprecedented capacity to invest the relationship between past and future with transcendental meaning. The new conception of time developed over several centuries, from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, a response to the new science and its technical applications, the quickening of commerce worldwide, the consolidation of the political power of nation-states,

17 Koselleck (2018), *Sediments of Time*: "On the Meaning and Absurdity of History," 184; "Historians in the Plural: An Interview with Carsten Dutt," 261; idem, "Introduction to Hayden White's *Tropics of Discourse*," *Practice of Conceptual History*, 38-44 (Koselleck, 2002).

18 White (2010), "Forward," *The Practice of Conceptual History*, by Reinhart Koselleck (2002), ix-xiv; idem, "Guilty of History," *The Fiction of Narrative*, 330, 333; Olsen (2012), *History in the Plural*, 240-41.

19 Koselleck (1985), "Begriffsgeschichte and Social History," *Futures Past*, 73-85.

20 Koselleck (2002), "The Need for Theory in History," *Practice of Conceptual History*, 5.

and through it all, the process of secularization that cast doubts on the teachings of revealed religion. Sensitivity to these long-range factors were given a sense of immediacy by the dramatic disruption of traditional ways of life by the French Revolution.²¹ Before the coming of the modern age, Koselleck argued, the human experience appeared to historians to be timeless. The value of history was believed to be contained in the lessons it taught about how to live well despite adversity. But there was nothing new in the human condition. History was believed to proceed under the auspices of a benign Providence, which guided the course of history and ordained how it would end in a Last Judgment. Through the Middle Ages, its coming was prophesied to be imminent. Anticipated without ever arriving, the notion of an end to time became a prophetic tradition of expectation, a never-ending promise of the fulfillment of God's plan for humankind. Time, therefore, was compressed between the now of the present and the not yet of the end of time.²²

The move toward the secularization of human experience contributed to the re-visioning of history by the late eighteenth century. It marked the emancipation of profane history from the sacred framework in which it had long been enshrined. With secularization, the notion of an overseeing Providence lost its hold on historiography, as humankind became aware of its responsibility for making its own history. This idea became the foundational proposition of the emerging theory of historicism. The study of history told the story of humankind's self-creation. For Koselleck, this revolution in historical thinking generated a new idea about the workings of time.²³ Change was henceforth recognized as the dynamic element in the human condition, as humankind exercised its powers to fashion present realities in ways that furthered its expectations of the future.²⁴ The modern age was a new era for understanding

the historical nature of the human condition. The future, once believed to be preordained and theologically predictable, became open to human possibilities of initiative, creativity, and resourcefulness. Historians noted unprecedented events that followed from these qualities of character. The quickening pace of innovation in all spheres of life led to the perception that the human condition was not only changing but accelerating.

The promise of the new regime of time, Koselleck argued, led into great expectations for the future, while the once prized lessons of the experience of the past came to matter hardly at all, at least in the minds of the most radical historians of the Enlightenment. But the emancipation implicit in this new conception of historical time also introduced uncertainties about what the future might hold. The future became an arena for speculation about ways to perfect the human condition. If hope for a transforming future incited a yearning for an earthly destiny, however, inherent qualities of human nature set limits upon its prospects. Koselleck mentions such factors as a disposition toward contention, hierarchies of power, asymmetry in social relationships.²⁵ For him, inquiry into these deeply engrained elements of human behavior provided groundwork for the makings of a science of anthropology with which to sort out the relationship between human nature and human ambition for fashioning its own future.²⁶

For Koselleck, the most important consequence of the modern understanding of historical time was the discovery of the human capacity to conceptualize the temporality of the human condition. It provided historical scholarship with its purpose in the modern world. He noted the way historians by the late eighteenth century were substituting the term *Geschichte* for that of the older

21 Koselleck (1985), *Futures Past*: "Modernity and the Planes of Historicity," 5-12; "Historical Criteria of a Modern Concept of Revolution," 39-54.

22 Koselleck (1985), *Futures Past*, "Historia Magistra Vitae," 21-27; "History, Histories, and Formal Structures of Time, 98-104.

23 Koselleck (2002), *Practice of Conceptual History*: "Time and History," 110-14; "The Unknown Future and the Art of Prognosis," 131-47.

24 Koselleck (1985), "'Neuzeit': Remarks on the Semantics of the Modern Concepts of Movement," *Futures Past*, 233-58; idem, "The Eighteenth Century as the Beginning of Modernity, *Practice*

25 Koselleck (1985), "The Historical-Political Semantics of Asymmetric Counterconcepts," *Futures Past*, 159-97; idem, "Goethe's Untimely History," *Sediments of Time*, 67-73 (Koselleck, 2018).

26 Koselleck (2002), "Concepts of Historical Time and Social History," *Practice of Conceptual History*, 115-18.

term *Historie* to characterize the nature of their work.²⁷ *Historie* reported upon the vicissitudes of the past in a world in which the human condition itself was perceived to be unchanging. History was exemplary. It taught edifying lessons about the past. The meaning of history lay in the charm of the storyteller and the ethical principles of the story told. *Geschichte* implied that the meaning of history was to be found in change itself, and so of the relationship between past experience and future possibilities. Depending on the weight one attributed to each in shaping decision-making, the historian's judgment about the relationship opened upon a spectrum of possibilities for modern historical interpretation. The new history involved an interplay between experience of the past (habit) and expectation for the future (hope). Experience has the stabilizing authority of heritage; expectation entails risk toward transcendence. Experience leans toward the habits of repetition, in favor of caution over initiative. Expectation anticipates unprecedented events, and so implies volition, choice, and contingency. Conservative historians batted upon the former; progressives the latter. Herein lay the birth of ideology.²⁸

The new conception of time involved a spatial as well as a temporal dimension, a synchronic alongside a diachronic perspective. In grasping the diversity of experience in the wider world of a more cosmopolitan age, Koselleck explained, historians came to appreciate that time is experienced differently depending upon one's social milieu. Time, therefore, is relative to social circumstances, and these vary from place to place and within the echelons of society. At any moment in time, one can identify a spectrum of attitudes toward the pace of change. The speed with which political events succeed one another differs from that of social customs, while environmental change proceeds at a still slower pace. Some groups take to change with

enthusiasm; others resist. The conceptualization of the relationship between space and time, therefore, contributed to the rise of social history.²⁹ Experience is spatial and plays out in its diversity. Its conception of time is synchronic. Expectation is temporal and seeks fulfillment on a timeline of anticipation. Its conception of time is diachronic. Koselleck avoided such notions as progress, decline, and destiny in his conceptualization of history. In solving some problems, he argued, others present themselves. There is neither salvation nor redemption in history, only the burdens of human responsibility to work for practical reform. There Koselleck lodged his sense of moral purpose as an historian.

WHITE ON THE TROPICS OF GRAND NARRATIVE

Like Koselleck, White identified the beginnings of modern styles of historical writing with the historians of the Enlightenment.³⁰ Modern narrative was grand narrative, a story with continuity from distant origins to present circumstances, with horizons of the future always in mind. His point was to show that these historians regarded their grand narratives as the fulfillment of the promise of the modern age.³¹ All of the prominent historians of the modern age, he explained, aspired to tell the truth about the past in the sense that the events they represented corresponded to the facts they marshalled to tell the story.³² Yet each told the story in a different way. White sought to identify the hidden poetical keys to historical composition, for he wished to show that all historians draw upon the same rhetorical resources and appropriated a style of writing from its repertoire of possibilities.

Whereas Koselleck had recourse to philosophical conceptualization as the ground of modern historiography, White revived the lost art of rhetoric

27 Koselleck (1985), *Futures Past*: "Historia Magistra Vitae," 27-38; "Perspective and Temporality," 140-45; "On the Disposability of History," 200-02.

28 Koselleck (1985), *Futures Past*: "On the Disposability of History," 206; "Neuzeit; Remarks on the Semantics of the Modern Concepts of Movement," 259-66; "'Space of Experience' and 'Horizons of Expectation,'" 287.

29 Koselleck (2002), "Social History and Conceptual History," 20-37, *Practice of Conceptual History*; idem, "Space and History," *Sediments of Time*, 24-33 (Koselleck, 2018).

30 White (1973), "The Poetics of History," *Metahistory*, 45-48.

31 White (1973), *ibid*, 38-42.

32 White (1978), "The Burden of History," *Tropics of Discourse*, 48-50.

as his point of departure. He argued that historical writing has a common denominator in language as a mode of communication that is universal. The key to the rhetoric of historical writing, he contended, lies in its deep poetical structures. These are based upon figures of speech (tropes), the most elemental forms of imagination through which the meaning of human experience can be conveyed. All historical composition has its origins in and develops out of these tropes of preliterate understanding.

White also offered a corollary to his theory: historical discourse has no poetics of its own. It appropriates the forms of literature to fashion its narratives. He argued, therefore, that in any age there is an equivalency between the style of an historian and that of a fictional writer. Both draw upon the same resources of language. During the modern age, for example, the literary counterpoint of historicism was realism. The nineteenth-century novelists created fictional characters. But they were cast upon a background that conformed to historical context. As White argued, both the historian Karl Marx and the novelist Gustave Flaubert were realists in their use of narrative. The events of their narratives, and the profiles of their characters, reflect the realities of their times.³³

As theorist, White saw his task as inventorying and analyzing the varieties of historical writing within a framework of rhetorical possibilities. He traced the gradient of tropological representation from the most immediate toward the most abstract forms for imagining human experience—from metaphor (the most concrete), through metonymy (the most salient), via synecdoche (the most comprehensive) toward irony (the most detached). Figures of speech shape the plotlines of storytelling, and so once served as the matrices of mythology.³⁴ Ancient myth was a primordial method of factoring historical time. Humans are problem solvers, but need

time to meet their challenges. Myths prefigure the kind of narratives that modern historians continue to employ. The tropes that historians adopt provide hidden keys to the forms of their interpretations. Whereas the poets of antiquity composed their stories out of the interplay of plot and character, modern historians pursue an approximation of this interaction as the integral relationship between form and content. There can be no history without evidence, he allowed. But evidence has no historical meaning except through narration. Facts do not speak for themselves. They acquire meaning only when they become points of reference within the figuration of narrative.³⁵

White further proposed that there is more complexity in the figuration of modern historical narrative than in tropes alone. Tropes are foundational in historical interpretation, but historians have recourse to other rhetorical resources in building their narratives. These include their modes of emplotment (romance, tragedy, comedy, satire); of explanation (formal, organic, mechanical, contextual); and of ideology, considered as the matrix of political intention: (anarchist, conservative, radical, liberal).³⁶ Together these resources constitute a repertoire of possible ways to configure a historical narrative, depending upon the choices historians make among them. Such choices reveal styles of writing that are unique to the authors, yet grounded in a poetics that they share with others.³⁷ In his scholarship, White classified the most prominent historians of the modern age within this underlying rhetorical framework. To illustrate his argument, he formulated two models of composition that informed the writings of prominent nineteenth-century historians. First, he sorted out leading nineteenth-century European historians in terms of the literary genre that each one favored in his storyline: Jules Michelet romance, Leopold von Ranke comedy, Alexis de Tocqueville tragedy,

33 White (2010), "The Problem of Style in Realistic Representation," *Fiction of Narrative*, 169-86.

34 White (1973), "The Poetics of History," *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 31-38.

35 White (1978), "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact," *Tropics of Discourse*, 81-99; idem, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," *The Content of the Form*, 20-21.

36 White (1973), "The Poetics of History," *Metahistory*, 7-14; idem, White (1999), "Literary Theory and Historical Writing; Marx and Flaubert," *Figural Realism*, 10-11.

37 White (1973), "The Poetics of History," *Metahistory*, 29-31.




Figure 4. Cover of Reinhart Koselleck's book "Critique and Crisis"

and Jacob Burkhardt satire. Second and as a separate pairing, he identified prominent philosophers of history with figures of speech that epitomized the narrative they employed: Georg Hegel with synecdoche, Karl Marx metonymy, Friedrich Nietzsche metaphor, Benedetto Croce irony. The interpretation of history at which each scholar arrived bore his personal signature. Yet each drew upon shared resources of literary expression. Each had merit and a claim upon the truth about the past. But there was no objective approach to historical interpretation upon which they could all agree.

SOBER ASSESSMENTS OF THE MISFORTUNES OF THE MODERN AGE

Both Koselleck and White were sensitive to the reversal of fortune of the idea of progress over the course of the twentieth century, and with it the dissolution of the grand narrative with which its story had been told. Both arrived at sober assessments of the perils of the modern age. For Koselleck, the meaning of modern history should be read as tragedy, the consequence of unrealistic expectations of the prospect of human perfectibility. History in the guise of historicism had been the auspicious god of the modern age. But the most radical among the philosophers of history of the Enlightenment, he argued, had dismissed the experience of the past and given themselves to abstract speculations about what the future might hold. Koselleck addressed the inadequacies of historicism, founded upon the prospect of earthly transcendence, now to be evaluated anew as the disappointment of a "future past." The denouement of the history of the modern age revealed the overweening pride of the expectations of the historians of the Enlightenment.³⁸ His first book, *Critique and Crisis*, centered upon an indictment of the French Revolution for its degeneration into terrorist politics, and of the most radical thinkers of those times for pernicious speculation about the future based on utopian fantasies that would play into the totalitarian movements of the twentieth century.³⁹ In the new conditions of the modern age, conflict emerged about how the promise of the future was to be fulfilled. Here Koselleck explained how the Enlightenment's understanding of the relationship between experience and hope had been reversed.

Koselleck challenged the grand narratives of conflict resolution devised by Georg Hegel (2019) and Karl Marx (1975). They forecast the dialectical synthesis of opposing points of view in a transcendent synthesis. In their view, the trend in history would be toward greater harmony, tending toward some future destiny that would culminate in an end to conflict in history. Koselleck rejected the eschatology implicit in such forecasting. He pointed out that it is unrealistic to think that conflicting positions can be so easily integrated, for inevitably one viewpoint prevails over all others.⁴⁰ As the

38 Koselleck (1985), "Modernity and the Planes of Historicity," *Futures Past*, 18-20; idem, "The Temporalization of Utopia," *Practice of Conceptual History*, 92-93 (Koselleck, 2002).

39 Koselleck (1959/2000), *Critique and Crisis; Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society*, 5-12, 130-37.

40 Koselleck, "The Historical-Political Semantics of Asymmetrical Counterconcepts," *Futures Past*, 159-97.

counter-Enlightenment thinker Johann von Goethe had earlier observed, tensions between opposing points of view tend to be resolved in asymmetrical ways.⁴¹ One approach prevails over all others in the establishment of hierarchies of social and political power. Pragmatic solutions that address the realities of social and political relationships prove to be more effective, as Koselleck argued in his analysis of Lorenz von Stein's modest expectations of the Prussian reform movement in the mid-nineteenth century.⁴² Sensible planning matters. The future is always provisional. Solving present problems plays into the generation of new ones.⁴³

For Koselleck, the great expectations of the historians of the Enlightenment became the great disappointments of their twentieth-century successors. Most infamous among these was the German catastrophe under Nazi rule. In a late-life essay, he catalogued the failings of humankind during the twentieth century. In retrospect, he argued, the German catastrophe was only the most salient manifestation among others of a like nature. These included racist imperialism, the rise of totalitarian regimes, the killing fields of the world wars, forced mass displacements of people out of ethnic rivalries, the trampling of human rights by late capitalism, the Nazi extermination of Jews as the most salient among a number of genocides, the sovereignty of nations splintered by warring factions, the high stakes of the cold war between the superpowers that played into local proxy wars.⁴⁴ All of these conflicts, he argued, were exemplary of the principle of asymmetry that he had developed in his theoretical writings. Attempts at building harmony among rival groups rarely worked as anticipated. The tenor of violence was deepened by the introduction of terror into the unconscious psyche of ordinary people living under the surveillance of totalitarian regimes. Its insidious effects troubled their dreamwork, and not just among the most conspicuous victims.⁴⁵ In the social sphere, he noted that the

space of experience was shrinking in the face of the accelerating speed of technological innovation in commerce, transportation, and communication. The platforms of media, first auditory, then visual, contributed to a blurring of the line between reality and fantasy. The prospect of the hyperbolic ascent of technological innovation upon innovation, with the promise of more to come, distanced humankind from the natural world.

Over the array of quickening change during the late twentieth century loomed the threat of thermonuclear annihilation, a new kind of terror of globalizing importance. With the high stakes of mutual self-destruction in the political crises of the Cold War, the doomsday of humankind presented itself as a possible future. He worried that the grim weight of twentieth century experience was turning the tide against hope for the future. Such a prospect played into his stance on the historians' debate about a modern/postmodern divide. For him, postmodernism as a way of conceptualizing the future of history provided nothing new. Rather discourse about its role as a threshold for historiographical periodization signaled only the depletion of the creative resources for dealing with the problems of the modern age. The energy that had animated the reformers of the Enlightenment had dissipated in the late twentieth century, as in a process of entropy. Amidst the gathering complexity of modern life in the late twentieth century at all levels of experience, the call for planning for the future was welcomed, but in the tacit understanding that most of its long-range projects would never be implemented, and that those that were, would fall short of human need.⁴⁶

White, in turn, analyzed the crisis of historicism in the move from a modern to a "modernist" style of writing, particularly in literature, signaling diminished expectations for finding meaning in history. If his early work focused on an analysis of

41 Koselleck (2018), "Goethe's Untimely History," *Sediments of Time*, 67-73.

42 Koselleck (1985), "Historical Prognosis in Lorenz von Stein's Essay on the Prussian Constitution," *Futures Past*, 55-69.

43 Koselleck (2018), "On the Meaning and Absurdity of History," *Sediments of Time*, 183-86.

44 Koselleck (2018), "Behind the Deadly Line: The Age of Totality," *Sediments of Time*, 225-37; Olsen (2012), *History in the Plural*, 43-47.

45 Koselleck (1985), "Terror and Dream," *Futures Past*, 218-25; "Afterword to Charlotte Beradt's *The Third Reich of Dreams*," *Practice of Conceptual History*, 327-39 (Koselleck, 2002).

46 Koselleck (2018), "Beyond the Deadly Line," *Sediments of Time*, 229-30.

modern history's devotion to grand narrative, his later writings turned to its dissolution, first in the literary modernism of the late nineteenth century, and subsequently in the postmodern historiography of the late twentieth century. Symptoms of doubt about meaning in grand narrative, he contended, surfaced in the writings of leading novelists of the turn of the twentieth century, such as James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, and Ezra Pound, who in their rhetorical strategies dismissed the notion of the all-knowing author, and that of a coherent framework in which a story might be told. Modernists presented the same story from a variety of detached vantage points, and experimented in odd juxtapositions of characters and events. Along the way they dispensed with the notion that the present moment needs to be contextualized in a larger historical narrative. The realism of modern literature gave way to the "de-realization" of its modernist successor. Modernist writers expressed alienation from a past that seemed oppressive in its demands for conformism to social conventions.⁴⁷ White argued that modernism as rhetorical style was a reaction against "modernization," conceived as the pursuit of rational technical processes that homogenized the diversity of the human experience. The modernist perspective was presentist and anti-historical. It settled into the sickness of nostalgia for a lost past that in fact had never existed. Without a grounding in historical context, modernist narratives lost the stabilizing boundaries that historicism had once provided. The integral relationship between form and content dissolved, making it possible to tell their stories as a mix of fact and fantasy.⁴⁸

White's literary critique of modernism monitored the professional historians' repudiation of grand narrative as a storyline of progress, a conception so remote from the realities of the twentieth century as to be unusable. His catalog of its catastrophes was in keeping with that offered by Koselleck. For White, the ultimate modernist event was the Holocaust. White devoted special attention

to its place in modern historiography because of its testing of the value of narrative in historical interpretation. In the Historians' Dispute in Germany during the 1980s, some prominent historians dismissed the need for narrative altogether in coming to terms with an event of such traumatic importance. Historians such as Berel Lang and Saul Friedländer argued that submitting its existential realities to narrative threatened to idealize and aestheticize its horrors. The meaning of the Holocaust as history would forever be bound up with the trauma of its victims and could never be communicated without distortion. Such a position was at odds with White's contention that events of the past can have no meaning apart from their place in narrative.⁴⁹ While respectful of the position of his adversaries, he argued for the historical significance of narrating the events of the Holocaust as a cautionary tale for posterity.

REMEMBERING THE MODERN AGE

Koselleck and White contributed to the rising historiographical interest in collective memory toward the turn of the twenty-first century. It suited their reflections on promise and regret in modern historiography. A vision of progress into the future turned into a search for redemption in remembrance of a past that had gone awry along the way. Recollection of the disappointments of "futures past,"—visions of the future as conceived over the course of the modern age—played into Koselleck's thinking about collective memory. He referred to the misfortunes of the modern age as "negative memory."⁵⁰ Unhappy experience had come to prevail over once expectant hope. Late in his career, he wrote about the short-lived afterlife of commemorative war statuary. War memorials, he explained, were constructed to perpetuate the sacrifice of soldiers in modern wars. But collective memory as enshrined in such artifacts is protean and quickly loses the emotional immediacy of mourning. He suggested a logic to the way intended meanings fade

47 White (1999), "Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth in Historical Representation," *Figural Realism*, 40-41.

48 White (1999), "Auerbach's Literary History; Figural Causation and Modernist Historicism," *Figural Realism*, 87-100.

49 White (1999), "Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth in Historical Representation," *Figural Realism*, 33-38; idem, *The Practical Past*, 77-92 (White, 2014).

50 Koselleck (2018), "Forms and Traditions of Negative Memory," *Sediments of Time*, 246-49.

into collective memories of a different nature, as he illustrated in photographs of German and French war memorials during the nineteenth century. Faith in particular ventures of the nation-state, the projects for which combatants had given their lives, could not exercise their emotional hold for very long. He noted how these grandiose monuments to the sacrifice of the war dead lost touch with the cause that they honored, as its realities disappeared from living memory. Koselleck also remarked upon the remarkable similarity of the iconography of commemoration, whatever the nation and whatever its cause. No memorial, he contended, can hold fast to the original meaning of its commemoration. Gradually its specific intention drifts into abstraction. Interest in the content of the message the memorial was designed to convey in time gave way to that of the form of the monument itself. Eventually, the aesthetics of its design becomes its only legacy. Koselleck's interpretation of nineteenth-century commemorative practices was a prelude to his discussion of twentieth century practice. As mass death in battle was democratized, portrayal of its meaning in memorials became a more challenging task. The remembrance of all the victims of genocide during the twentieth century, of which there were so many in different settings, has defied all attempts at adequate commemoration.⁵¹

White's take on commemoration followed a different line of interpretation, based upon his appreciation of Erich Auerbach's theory of mimesis: rhetorical strategies for presenting the past as a prelude to the present. Auerbach was interested in the way writers have reconstructed the past through narratives in which events prefigure their eventual fulfillment, as in the way Dante in his *Divine Comedy* casts life on earth as prefiguration of an otherworldly afterlife (Alighieri, 1320/1995). His accent was upon the promise of the present as it augured the future, a prospective on a time yet to come. White employed Auerbach's rhetorical model in reverse mode to show how retrospection from the present creates a "mimetic effect," a genealogical search for simulacra in the past with which to redeem the present in its wayward failings. The effect was to rescue the present through time travel to like circumstances in the past so as to claim a connection between past and present in the search for the meaning of a lost cause.⁵² For White, the mimetic effect is an expression of commemorative rhetoric. The author looks to the past out of fidelity to its once auspicious promise. No one, White allowed, ever imagined that the destiny proposed would in time be realized. But one could remain faithful to a cause despite all the obstacles to its fulfillment along the way. The task of looking back upon the frustrated hopes of the past for the future confirmed continuity of commitment to a lost cause. His argument has affinities with Eric Hobsbawm's notion of the invented tradition, or better still, Walter Benjamin's famous meditation on the angel of history.⁵³




Figure 5. Cover of Dante Alighieri's book "The Divine Comedy"

51 Koselleck (2002), "War Memorials: Identity Formation of the Survivors," *Practice of Conceptual History*, 285-326; idem, "Sluices of Memory and Sediments of Experience," *Sediments of Time*, 216-24 (Koselleck, 2018).

52 White (1999), "Auerbach's Literary History," *Figural Realism*, 87-100.

53 Eric Hobsbawm (1984), "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. By Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, 1-14; Walter Benjamin (1968), "Theses on the Philosophy of History" In *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, 253-64.

STRADDLING THE POSTMODERN DIVIDE

In their theorizing, Koselleck and White concentrated on the fortunes of modern historiography, roughly the period from the late eighteenth through the late twentieth century. They surveyed its transit from the promise of progress during the era of the French Revolution to the reversal of its fortunes in the traumatic catastrophes of the twentieth century. Their shared interest in this period in history permits a pairing of their interpretations. Their differences turn on opposing attitudes toward the idea of a modern/postmodern divide in styles of historical writing that emerged toward the end of the twentieth century. The idea of the postmodern is a potentially expansive concept, and in my view is best understood in the limited sense of a subversive change in thinking about historical representation. Koselleck saw postmodern thought as a move into deepening abstraction in its devotion to language theory, and its theorists as engaged in the dangerous game of ignoring the concrete realities that historians had always made the object of their investigations. He remained sympathetic to the notion that the protocols of historical writing developed during the modern age endure in a developing science, if in ever more complex ways.

Whereas Koselleck dismissed postmodernism as a concept with little meaning, White accepted the idea of a postmodern history as a logical response to the growing role of new technologies of communication in the culture of our times, even though it unsettled the quest for historical objectivity. He suggested that postmodern thought surfaced in the intellectual life of the late twentieth century because of the revolution in electronic communication as it played into mass media. Its force in reshaping contemporary culture produced an overload of imagery, and so greater awareness of the multiform ways in which the representation of the past can be fashioned. Doubts about the reality of the past as a stable historical referent led to postmodernism's detachment from it, thus denying continuity between past and present. The past was

transformed from matrix into de-contextualized heritage upon which scholars could draw to suit their purposes. The idea of time travel displaced the historicist notion of a continuous pathway from past into present. The need for causal explanation was excised from historical interpretation. Free play between past and present superseded notion of a temporal structure that situated both.⁵⁴

For White, postmodern thought raised further doubts about the possibility of objectivity in historical scholarship. Just as the texts composed by historians are open to interrogation, so too are the texts they adduce as evidence for their interpretations. Texts, White affirmed, are "paradigms of culture."⁵⁵ But so too are their source materials. Both are cultural productions, neither of which has stable grounding. White proposed that historical research, like historical composition, harbors a fictive element. To take a documented reference at face value is to engage in rhetorical fundamentalism. The notion of lifting a document out of the past into the present as objective evidence is an illusion. Texts retrieved out of the past have deeper origins, problematizing their authority. The researcher may not know the conditions under which textual evidence was produced without further interrogations of its sources. As a referent to a past reality, a text hides its own forms of representation, and there is no guarantee of its objectivity. Its content is relative to the rhetoric through which it is conveyed. In pointing out the obscurity that underlies source material, White headed into genealogical regression. The past can have no fixity, he allowed, and the form in which it is recalled is based upon the historians' need to relate its meaning to present realities. One finds what one is looking for. Accordingly, White argued that the lens through which the historian filters the past is not only fictive, but also ideological.⁵⁶ In postmodern discourse, one speaks of the uses of the past for the present, no longer the past for its own sake. The historians' task becomes inherently anachronistic—the imposition of present-mindedness upon the past in the act of

⁵⁴ White (2010), "Postmodernism and Textual Anxieties," *The Fiction of Narrative*, 304-17.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 311.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 313.

interpretation, once considered a misreading of the past and as such the bugbear of historicism.

White, therefore, was cast by his admirers as a pioneer in the application of linguistic theory to historical discourse, in which the analysis of texts displaced that of empirical facts as the basis of the search for meaning in the past. Historiography was returning to its ancestral beginnings as an art of storytelling. Each, therefore, had a different kind of appeal as a theorist of history: Koselleck as a sophisticated interpreter of modern historiography, building upon yet remaining true to its conceptual foundations; White as herald of a postmodern way of thinking about modern historical writing.⁵⁷ For contemporary historiography, one might argue, they resurrected the venerable debate about history as science versus history as art, reconsidered in light of historical practice during the modern age.⁵⁸

CONCLUSION. ON THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF METAHISTORY

Koselleck and White provide comprehensive interpretations of the search for historical meaning during a time in history that is now passing amidst an onslaught of cultural change, however one labels it. But theory, like practice, is time-bound. Their theorizing responded to the interests of practicing historians of the late twentieth century, who had come to acknowledge the inadequacy of the tacit theoretical underpinnings of modern historiography. Their analysis of historical practice was retrospective, and they stopped short of addressing the driving historical force of today's cultural trends, such as the revolution in gender relations, the globalization of historical interpretation, the effects of climate change, as well as advances in biotechnology and the coming of artificial intelligence as scientific achievements with far-reaching consequences for our species. Accordingly, the French historiographer François Hartog has used Koselleck's theory as a springboard to advance his own thesis that history

in our times favors the present over the past as its primary referent for understanding historical time, and so our present age has entered a new "regime of historicity" beyond the "modern regime" of the late eighteenth century identified by Koselleck.⁵⁹

Metahistory as elaborated in the theories of Koselleck and White nonetheless highlighted the growing complexity of making sense of historical writing during the modern age. Modern historical writing, they argued, lay claim to a mode of transcendence beyond that of earlier expressions, but of a more modest nature than that proclaimed in the classical philosophy of history. The patterns historians identify do not inhere in the past itself, but rather reside in the narratives that historians employ in giving form to the content of writings. Poetical tropes, like philosophical concepts, are matrices of narrative interpretation. The patterns they subtend are not linear designs of the course of history, but rather narratives that historians devise to lend structure to their interpretations of the past. It is in these structures that historical narratives convey the existential timefulness of the human condition.

Modest too was the claim of Koselleck and White for the value of metahistory vis-a-vis the honest labors of ordinary historians who do not ruminate much on theory. In his last book, White pointed out the significance of Koselleck's take upon the historical meaning of the experience of the past as a wellspring of popular culture.⁶⁰ Its heritage has served as the basis for a practical history attuned to the needs of the public at large for interpreting a time in history that was passing from a professional into a popular mode of understanding, the sort of historical writing that returned time and again to prominent figures and defining events of the past of enduring appeal in the popular imagination. Meanwhile, White commented, professional historians remain free to carry on their research at the cutting edge of history, setting the stage for new kinds of metahistorical theorizing.

57 Keith Jenkins (1997), ed., *The Postmodern Reader*.

58 H. Stuart Hughes (1964), *History as Art and as Science: Twin Vistas on the Past*, 1-21, 68-88.

59 François Hartog (2015), *Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time*, 15-19.

60 White (2014), *The Practical Past*, 10, 15, 101.

Given the outsized attention that they have received in contemporary discussion about theorizing modern history, Koselleck and White have established a place for the return of the philosophy of history in the historiography of our times, but with a different purpose in mind. The historiography of the modern age had presented their work as a search for what ultimately was an objective certainty about the realities of the past. For the metahistorians Koselleck and White, elements of subjectivity in pursuing that quest are inescapable. Historians not only discover the meaning of the past in their research. They create it in their writings as well.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

REFERENCES

- Alighieri, D. (1995). *The Divine Comedy* (A. Mandelbaum, Trans.). Everyman's Library. (Original work published 1320)
- Benjamin, W. (1968). Theses on the Philosophy of History. In H. Arendt (Eds.), *Illuminations* (pp. 253–64). Schocken Books.
- Collingwood, R. G. (1946). *The idea of history*. Oxford University Press.
- De Condorcet, N. (2012). Condorcet: Political Writings. In S. Lukes & N. Urbinati (Eds.), *Cambridge University Press eBooks*. Cambridge University Press.
- Doran, R. (2010). The Work of Hayden White 1: Mimesis, Figuration, and the Writing of History. In N. Partner & S. Foot (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Historical Theory* (pp. 106–118). Sage.
- Ferrone, V. (2015). *The Enlightenment; History of an Idea*. Princeton University Press.
- Gilbert, F., & Graubard, S. (Eds.). (1972). *Historical Studies Today*. W.W. Norton & Company.
- Hartog, F. (2015). *Regimes of historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time*. Columbia University Press.
- Hegel, W. F. G. (2019). *The Collected Works of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel*. e-artnow
- Henry Rousso, H. (2016) *The Latest Catastrophe; History, the Present, the Contemporary*. University of Chicago Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1984). Introduction. In E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (Eds.), *The invention of tradition* (pp. 1–14). Cambridge University Press.
- Hughes, H. S. (1964). *History as art and as science: Twin Vistas on the Past*. Harper & Row.
- Iggers, G. G. (1995). Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 56, 142–51.
- Jenkins, K. (1997). *The postmodern history Reader*. Routledge.
- Kant, I. (2015). *The Collected Works of Immanuel Kant*. PergamonMedia.
- Koselleck, R. (1979). 'Space of Experience' and 'Horizons of Expectation': Two Historical Categories. *Futures Past*, 267–88.
- Koselleck, R. (1985) *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*. The MIT Press. <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb04876.0001.001>
- Koselleck, R. (1987). *The Content of the Form*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Koselleck, R. (2000). *Critique and Crisis; Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society*. MIT Press. (Original work published 1959)
- Koselleck, R. (2002). *The practice of conceptual history: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*. Stanford University Press.
- Koselleck, R. (2018). *Sediments of time: On Possible Histories* (S. Franzel & S.L. Hoffmann, Trans.). Stanford University Press.
- Marx, K. (1975). *Collected Works: Karl Marx, 1857–61*. Lawrence & Wishart.
- Mazower, M. (2000). *Dark Continent; Europe's Twentieth Century*. Random House.

- Michelet, J. (2013). On History: Introduction to World History. In F. Kimmich, L. Gossman, & E. K. Kaplan (Trans.), *Open Book Publishers*. <https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0036> (Original work published 1831)
- Olsen, N. (2012). *History in the Plural; An Introduction to the work of Reinhart Koselleck*. Berghahn Books.
- Paul, H. (2011). *Hayden White; The Historical Imagination*. Polity Press.
- Stoval, T. (2018, September 4). In Memoriam Hayden V. White. American Historical Association. [https://www.historians.org/research-and-publications/perspectives-on-history/september-2018/hayden-v-white-\(1928%E2%80%932018\)](https://www.historians.org/research-and-publications/perspectives-on-history/september-2018/hayden-v-white-(1928%E2%80%932018))
- Vico, G. (1984). *The new science of Giambattista Vico* (T. G. Bergin, Trans.). Cornell University Press.
- White, H. V. (1957). Collingwood and Toynbee; Transitions in English Historical Thought. In *Fiction of Narrative* (pp. 4–22). Johns Hopkins University Press.
- White, H. (1973). *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- White, H. V. (1976). The Tropics of History: The Deep Structures of the New Science. In G. Tagliacozzo & D. Verene (Eds.), *Giambattista Vico's Science of Humanity*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- White, H. (1978). *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- White, H. (1999). *Figural Realism: Studies in the Mimesis Effect*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- White, H. (2010). *The fiction of narrative: Essays on History, Literature, and Theory, 1957–2007* (R. Doran, Ed.). Johns Hopkins University Press.
- White, H. (2014). *The practical past*. Northwestern University Press.

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) which allows reusers to distribute, remix, adapt, and build upon the material in any medium or format for non-commercial purposes only, and only so long as attribution is given to the creator.

CONSUMER SOCIETY, MODERN BUSINESS, AND PSEUDO-KNOWLEDGE

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.61439/SSYT3569>

ANDREW MCLAVERTY-ROBINSON
INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER

E-mail: mclavertyrobinson@gmail.com

Andrew McLaverty-Robinson is a political theorist and activist based in the UK. He is the co-author (with Athina Karatzogianni) of *Power, Resistance and Conflict in the Contemporary World: Social Movements, Networks and Hierarchies* (2009). He has published a series of books on Homi Bhabha, he regularly writes in the 'In Theory' column for *Ceasefire*.



ABSTRACT

This article examines the psychological and existential significance of the work of Baudrillard (1994) and Maltsev (2021) by situating these in relation to psychoanalytic theories of sociohistorical changes in the structuring of social desire, particularly in those types taken as good subjects. It suggests that a systematic worsening has occurred from the 1980s onwards, focused on the denial and suppression of embodied phenomena of the type captured by the Freudian concept of the id. Both morality and money are historically based in reactions against the id, but these have now gained unprecedented primacy in social life, at least in the global North. A new regime of *simulated* control, management, and public relations/marketing has generated a general trance-state conditioned on the exclusion of the id, a trance-state the crisis tendencies of which render the situation permanently unstable. This repeats a historical tendency in capitalist ideology towards a Puritan, masochistic disavowal or condemnation of the body, and a corresponding attempt to convert irrational passions into rational interests. The crisis includes a general corrosion of cathexes of the social and material worlds, to which the only viable solution is a revalorisation of the id.

Keywords

Baudrillard, pre-modern, alienation, behavioral management, cognitive-behavioral psychology, consumer society

INTRODUCTION

This contribution explores other analyses which overlap usefully with these approaches, analyzing the psychological structure of consumer society in terms of its impacts on psychodynamic forces within individuals. It focuses on the contributions of five scholars: A. O. Hirschman's work on the taming of "passions" as "interests", Elias's overlapping work on the "civilizing process", Erich Fromm's analysis of the Reformation, Ni-

etzsche's account of the origins of punishment, and Hakim Bey/Peter Lamborn Wilson's wide-ranging analyses of "cyber-gnostic" capitalism (Bey, 1995, 1996, 2002, n.d.a, n.d.b; Elias, 1937, 1939; Fromm, 1942, 1973; Hirschman, 1977; Nietzsche, 1887/1996). It shows that simulation is closely linked to a propensity to purge the id from social life, or at least to deny its presence. Modern society and knowledge were formed as an alliance of ego and superego to exclude the unruly id. This unleashed a process of disenchantment, decathexis and loss of meaning which has now reached crisis performances. It ultimately generates a *simulated*, false reality, because it is unable to connect with the true sources of meaning, knowledge and life in vital forces.

Maltsev's work has shown how late-medieval society was far more knowledgeable than moderns give it credit for, and had capabilities lost sometime between 1700 and today (Maltsev, 2021). This coincides with a move from qualitative, vitalist and pragmatic views of science/knowledge, similar to indigenous/local knowledge systems, to science-as-simulation, in which knowledge is produced abstractly from models and formulae (what Baudrillard terms simulation). This has corrupted science, which no longer engages with actual processes of life—either in terms of social practices or energetic flows—and tends to degenerate into tautology and ego-boosting. This is borne-out in studies of local knowledge. Local, premodern and indigenous knowledge-systems are very diverse, but they are generally more open to the flow-state level of reality, which is associated with the "lower" body and desire, than is modern reason (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983; Foucault, 1980; Usher, 2000; Berkes, 1999; Stevenson, 1996; Smith, 2007).

This paper argues that the degeneration into a *simulated* reality is broadly captured by the Situationist/immediatist idea that people are induced to live through images and information systems, and to either ignore or recuperate/sublimate their bodily/affective, social and imaginal experience and creativity. More fundamentally, it argues that




Figure 1. Cover of Oleg Maltsev's book "Maestro. Jean Baudrillard. The Last Prophet of Europe"


simulation lacks meaning and intensity because it is in large part an *idless world*. Consumer society is *simulated* because it is *idless*. This is not exactly what Baudrillard (1994) says, but it is implicit in his critique of the loss of symbolic exchange. In Freud's and Reich's theory of the (modern) psyche, there are three main operative forces: the id, ego and superego (Freud, 1999; Reich, 1972). The id is the most basic, appearing even in infants and animals. It operates as a flux and flow-state which, according to Deleuze and Guattari (1983), forms assemblages of desiring- and social-production with elements of its environment. It is driven by bodily experiences of pleasure, and drives such as hunger, defensive aggression and sexual enjoyment. The ego is carved out later from the aspect of the id which is concerned with self-preservation (and arguably also with deferred gratification). It pursues reality-testing and distinguishes real from illusory satisfactions, and it is also concerned with instrumental calculation and knowledge.

The superego is later carved-out from the ego, usually as an introjection of parental commands and morals. Initially obedience is also an ego-function, used to avoid punishment, but it mutates into a separate internal moral force which is largely independent of reality-checking and self-interest. Crucially, this psychological topography means that the elements are not equal: the superego necessarily draws on the energy of the ego as it is an overdeveloped sub-component of it, and in the same way, the ego gets all its energy from the id. It is not known to what extent all three functions exist in all social systems or if they are specific to modernity. It is widely observed (eg. in decolonial theory) that modern European thought (Descartes, 2015; Kant, 2015) involves an overblown ego, comparatively speaking. However, these scholars do not use a psychoanalytic model and all too often attempt to cure excessive ego with injections of superego, bashed by humility/humiliation and ego-bashing. This necessarily fails, as the superego draws all of its energy from the ego: if the ego collapses, then so does the superego.

METHOD

In this article, the research methodology is centered on an extensive literature review and thorough analysis situated at the intersection of postmodern studies, historical inquiry, psychology, and the evolution of European thought from the late 19th century to the contemporary era. The study is founded on a meticulous examination of scholarly works, theoretical frameworks, and historical narratives, drawing upon a diverse range of sources to construct a nuanced understanding of the subject matter. Through the lens of postmodern studies, engagement with the complexities and nuances of cultural, social, and intellectual shifts explores the ways in which postmodern thought has influenced and reshaped perceptions of reality.

Concurrently, the historical analysis delves into the late 19th-century European intellectual landscape, establishing connections and disjunctions between the philosophical underpinnings of that era and the multifaceted realities of the present day. The hypothesis posited here suggests that the



original basis of life was the id (or passions), and these have been alienated twice over.

They were first alienated in the medieval period and other premodern systems by means of religion as a superego assemblage functioning through reactive force, as theorised by Nietzsche. However, the decline of religious power in the late medieval period (accompanied by the Thirty Years' War, the Reformation, the legalisation of usury, and the military primacy of expensive weapons) led to a period of ego-driven absolutism. Following this period, the superego function was re-established as liberalism, which closely enmeshes ego and superego functions to the disadvantage of the id. I shall trace this process through readings of a series of historical investigations, mostly focused on the late-medieval/early-modern periods.

In many ways, it is bizarre that Freud had to “discover” the id and the unconscious, which premodern people already knew about. It is also bizarre that so much of today's academia and theory ignores this discovery: Rawls's “persons”, for example, are strangely *idless*, as are the signal-responsive nodes of cybernetics, the positionalities of identity politics, rational-choice theory and behavioral economics, the risk-groups of criminology, cognitive-behavioral psychology (where thoughts are assumed to cause feelings), cultural studies and ideology-critique, poststructuralist theories of language, posthumanist theories of interconnected assemblages, etc. If id appears at all, it either gets misread as ego or superego (for instance, tamed into “preferences” or “interests”), demonized as a monstrous deviation from the ego/superego-derived cosmic order (as in the “bad thoughts” or thoughtcrimes deemed to produce “radicalisation”, “criminal thinking styles”, “male fragility”, etc.), or idealized into a truth-like role with a superego function (for instance, the cult of the “experience of victims” or of the oppressed).

For consumer society, only the “higher”-money, reason, interest, spirit-exists. Of course, people may manage to libidinally cathect either objects available in consumer society or the entirety of the current system; the point is that, if this happens, it is in a sense unintended, or intended only at the level of effects. Indeed, the system quietly depends on people finding their own ways to cathect what it

offers (duly summarised in Rawls's “responsibility for ends”); however, it is not organized around this, and disavows it at every opportunity.

MONEY AND ALIENATION

The idea of money as alienation (commodity fetishism) is best-known from (early) Marx (1975), although money is much older than the starting-point Marxists set for capitalism. Money was likely itself originally a form of symbolic exchange expressing vital force, but one which has been sapped of vitality over time. Sublimation/phantasy allows different things to be identified, so that an image or representation can be taken as the thing itself. Aboriginal Australians traditionally believed that pictures are the things they represent. Some Polynesian societies circulated items believed to contain concentrations of the *mana*, or creative vital force, of the creator, thus bonding different groups to one another. Some Native Americans used *wampum*, or beads tied together in culturally meaningful ways, as currency. In the Sahel and Sahara, cows, which were not originally “owned” but merely herded away from farmlands, were sources of status similar to money. This would initially have marked a skill in luring and herding the animals, thus a sign of *mana*. Hence money starts as a way of symbolising creative force or aspects of the self which have already been mixed with objects, to facilitate giving, exchanging or circulating these fragments of creative force.

Money in the modern sense seems to have started as visual representations of cows held in a temple, which could be given to others and then exchanged for actual cows (Wilson, 1998): in a sense, they were part of the “substance” of the cow, tied to it imaginably in fantasy. Early money is also intensely symbolic, often referring to the divine sun and moon (the origins of gold and silver coinage) as well as the then mythically-endowed ruler. In short, money was a *fragment of vital force*, of the power of production and creativity. This is what Marx (1975) intuited with the idea that money is congealed labour-power. However, money becomes more and more abstract. While it initially *expresses* vital force, actual wealth, attributes of gods, etc., once established as a system it can be *simulated*: someone can possess the symbols without the underlying realities. Money becomes

increasingly abstract and can be accumulated without reference to what it represents. It is modelled libidinally on a “sexuality of the dead” (Bey, 1996), chaos without the vital life-force, operating as inorganic reproduction via constant splitting. Money begets more money (M–C–M’). This mode of reproduction eliminates sexuality, the id, and difference from reproduction, providing the basis for an *idless* human reality in which the id-functions are alienated to money/virtuality.

Bey believes this approach stems from gnostic mind/body dualism and later, from Puritanism, both of which maintained that the body, flesh, passions and desires are products of the devil, but that (some) humans contain fragments of a higher, divine principle which should subordinate or destroy the lower nature. The resultant renunciation of bodily pleasures leads to a pursuit of the purely mental or spiritual. (All too often, critics of dominant systems also adopt this same valorisation of the “higher” against the “lower”, whether in the *idless* “liberation” of orthodox Marxism, the language-fixated positionality-politics and Buddhist-like ascension of identity-oriented poststructuralism, the purely *moral* critique offered by fundamentalists and decolonialists, the illusion that education or therapy or spirituality can redeem modernity, the image of the nation as providing what is lacking in mercantile instrumentalism, etc). Although modern capitalism aspires to be *idless*, it also captures fragments of id if they are subordinated to ego or superego. This is the source of the dynamic of recuperation. Capitalism tends to corrupt hermetic practices designed initially for immediacy and liberation, instead using them for control. The effect is that people are alienated, put in a bad trance, rather than enchanted (Wilson, 1998).

Money takes vital force—which is necessarily local, part of the id-flow—and makes it transferrable and exchangeable. Today it has instead become the only register of value. Hence, capital operates on the same magical/symbolic/interpretative level as resistance to it, and as the vital force which has been lost (Bey, 1996). The process of abstraction saps some of the vital force it captures. Things which are commodified often lose their meanings, their emotional intensity, their ability to provide peak experiences. This “disenchantment”, or decathexis,



is termed “cool” by Baudrillard and has become especially widespread in modernity. Another of the dangers is that people can simulate vital force by simply “printing more money”. When someone prints more money, they appear to possess—to summon magically—a fragment of the cosmic life-force. Wampum disappeared as currency when European settlers learned to mass-produce beads. States can simply print banknotes, saving state finances but causing inflation. Today the main method of “printing money” is credit. (This may be why usury was seen as so dangerous and sinful in the Middle Ages). All these methods also have regressive distributive effects: powerful actors can capture a larger share of money by “printing” it, even if it is devalued. This process could have progressive effects if the people “printing money” were the poor, but most often, it is either the existing elite or an emerging elite. Either way, they perform a kind of parlour trick to transfer real wealth to themselves by transferring its signifier.

This also explains the difference between good and bad art, science, or theory. Immediate practices are often *expressive*: they draw on the id directly, sublimating it only minimally so as to render it communicable. The best creative productions are minimally sublimated products of the id (Heshusius, 1994). However, expressive creations can be *simulated* by people who know how the life-force works

from the outside, for instance by observing human “behavior”, or who copy and duplicate the models used by genuinely expressive creators. For example, a person (or an algorithm) can observe that people enjoy stories about wizards, tear-jerkers, romances, and mass-produce these to a formula (leading to clichéd genre fiction); scientists can mechanically reapply methods which were intuited previously. As a result, a powerful system can create entire realms of images which *seem to come from the life-force but do not* (or which mix things which partially come from, but capture, this force with others which do not). This is Baudrillard’s world of simulation, or consumer society. This tends to falsify the leftist dogma that excludes the idea of genius in favour of collective and participatory creativity. It is true that everyone has an id, that this comes out in collective processes, and that these collective effervescences are wrongly attributed to individuals. However, it is also true that a person in touch with their id (generally a pre-Oedipal type) can create expressively, and their work differs qualitatively from that of people producing similar “creations” at the levels of ego and superego only (or with only marginal quantities of id). Today’s academia, culture industry, etc. are structured so as to filter out the id-driven, who typically cannot cope with the endless performance demands, hoop-jumping, virtue-signalling, requirements to submit and obey so as to be validated, etc. This is why creativity is drying up: there is no “peak libido”, only blocked libido. The rare exceptions (eg. in tech industries) prove the rule.

MORALITY AND SUPEREGO

The rise of the superego is distinct from the rise of money but also similar. It happens earlier, and produces an initial form of superego already present in the Middle Ages, but it gains its malevolent power only recently, with the fusion of superego and ego in alliance against the id. The origin of superego is subordination, powerlessness. For Nietzsche (1887/1996), every animal, including humans, strives for optimal conditions to release its power and feel its strength. Deleuze reads Nietzsche as primarily meaning *power-to*, in which case Nietzsche’s view posits a striving for peak experience and flow-states (though Nietzsche sometimes seems to confuse *power-to* and *power-over*). This striving can be turned

against itself—turned reactive—in ways which block its functioning (Deleuze, 1983). In Freudian terms, the id and ego aspire to power-to but the superego comes to value powerlessness, to act against the will-to-power of the other parts (Freud, 1999).

Moral language, such as “good” and “right”, was for Nietzsche self-definition by the “noble” or powerful, in the sense of those with peak experience. I would add that classical ethical theory associates moral language strongly with an image of cosmic order and the idea that a well-lived life will bring a certain kind of ultimate satisfaction because it accords with one’s cosmic nature, or optimally arranges the vital forces. Nietzsche (1887/1996) theorises punishment as a capture of the sadistic type of id-energy. The later ideas of guilt and deterrence are overwritten on a practice which was initially fatalistic (people experienced the threat of punishment much like occupational hazards, natural disasters, etc). Punishment arises from a relationship of debt—which I would add, was probably rooted in early views of cosmic order in which balance could be restored by an equal and opposite reaction in the reverse direction to an initial imbalancing (the process operating energetically and impersonally). The archetypal binary is the creditor and debtor, and punishment consists in the creditor (the so-called victim or survivor) extracting ‘a sort of pleasure’ from the debtor (the so-called criminal). It gives the feeling of having defeated an enemy and treating them as one wishes, a joy which has its original root in *power-to* (in the fact of victory), but which in punishment is simulated through *vicarious* enjoyment of the victories of the powerful.

Punishment has a central role in the emergence of modern humans, because, while it rarely deters or instils guilt, it “hardens” people and makes them more cautious (put simply: they try not to get caught). It thus strengthens the ego as self-preservation force. Punishment inscribes memories more strongly, “contracts” experience onto particular dangers, and thus strengthens identities (as opposed to the identity-loosening effects of relaxation; one can here compare Bergson). People’s identities as separate, distinct persons are stronger in fight-or-flight, survival situations where self-preservation is paramount, than in situations of relaxation or enjoyment. (The present, widespread dogma that

discomfort and anxiety encourage existential openness to the other is not empirically valid, a practice validating what are functionally violent technologies of hardening by pretending they are technologies of opening).

Superego is a secondary phenomenon which Nietzsche (1887/1996), suggests is derived from the need of disempowered people for meaning, ie. an attempt to restore the lost id. Slaves need strong egos to survive. The social straitjacket of fear makes people more calculable, and thus allows them to be treated as objects. (Today, via techniques of “nudging”, this can even be done in systems which are not explicitly coercive: these systems rely on the predictable “individual” having already been moulded). Emotional lability decreases. Stronger “walls of affects” are built—what Reich calls character-armour—serving as strong interpersonal boundaries splitting each person from the others. Slaves cannot vent their aggression outwardly, because of fear. (We see in Fanon, Solomon, and others how empowering it is when this inhibition is overcome). Aggression therefore turns reactive and turns inwards.

People seek meaning in life. Yet the masters’ world seems to slaves as hard, cold, cruel, unfeeling, amoral, and bloody (indications in Kleinian interpretation of the bad-mother archetype). Denied the

pursuit of meaning through pleasure or self-empowerment, subordinates instead find it in asceticism, *ressentiment* and slave morality—the will-to-power turned against itself (Nietzsche, 1887/1996). This will to self-torture leads people into *sin-hunting*, the practice of hunting for sin inside themselves, and usually in others too. This can be very fulfilling, as every misery of the world can be taken to be a product of sin. The powerless do not thereby regain their power and their id; everywhere except a few millenarian and esoteric heresies, sin is identified with the id (as well as or instead of the ego). The weak remain weak—they obtain neither id-satisfactions nor ego-power—but they seek counter-power at the level of the superego. They conceal weakness behind goodness, attaching positive moral values to weakness and positing their own superiority to the masters, whose less-constrained ids and egos make them “evil”.

This leads to a bizarre situation where a sovereign bar—the bar separating morally-valued from “bare” life, which necessarily relies on the strength of the sovereign—is directed *against* noble traits and for those of slaves. In the end there are no nobles, the id is everywhere repressed or besieged. A system of slave-morality may check the extremes of absolutism which warlords left to their own devices engage in. However, it also generates threats of death, or of social death, against anyone who is unable or unwilling to perform the required degree of self-control—a degree which constantly becomes more rigid and more exacting. The system operates, in effect, as a system of privilege accruing to the most self-controlled, those with the least id (and of course, this also means nobody enjoys life or gets much meaning from it).

During the Middle Ages, the process was incomplete. It seems the European peasants in the early medieval period were beset by bandits and warrior-bands arising from the collapse of Rome. They made peace with individual bandits/warlords, gaining access to the powerful defensive technology of castles in return for paying part of their crop. This suited both sides, as bandits preferred a regular but recurring income to the unpredictability of raiding. The balance between peasant and lord differed across time and place, with lords trying to reduce peasants to a slave-like status and peasants



trying to make the relationship more reciprocal. The warlords/landlords were still prone to violence (glory-seeking, war, cruel punishment), and religious organisations emerged nearly everywhere to check this tendency (the Catholic and Orthodox Churches in Europe, the *ulema* of scholars in the Muslim world, the Buddhist approach—for instance in the *Ratnavali*—in India, etc). At an elite level, this led to a power-balance between priest and warrior castes (respectively, superego and ego castes) within medieval society; merchants were a third, and rather low-ranking, group.

These elites hovered over a subsistence/artisanal society in which the life-force persisted strongly. In the ancient and medieval worlds, everyone had a fairly active id, and superegos had less force. All but the most poor owned or had stable access to a house and either land or a trade providing a stable income (guilds restricted entry to ensure work always guaranteed a given standard of living). The usual peasant morality was that, so long as one lived a good/normal/decent life and refrained from certain outrageous (but easily avoided) transgressions, one was destined for salvation. Trade took place within a “moral economy” (Scott, 1979; Thompson, 1971) oriented to maintaining a subsistence minimum and meaningful lives. Peasants’ superegos were thus not especially demanding or persecutory. They would use infrapolitics to resist most of the demands for subordination made by the two elites (see Scott, 1990).

THE RISE OF MODERNITY

The situation worsens with the rise of modernity: the new merchant elite seeks to drive the id from public life. This is shown for instance in Elias’s research on the “civilising process”. Feudal lords controlled populations as landlords, and held land based on conquest. It was not expected that lords would inhibit themselves: they could be violent, cruel, sexually insatiable, gluttonous, proud, etc. In early modernity, the mercantile bourgeoisie began to displace the warlord elite. Elias (1939) studies books on manners/etiquette, and finds a strong tendency over time towards increasingly rigid self-control. For instance, eating with fingers is first limited to separate plates, then replaced by knives and forks, then

the “polite” handling of knives and forks became increasingly precise. This seems to be associated with the merchants’ attempts to distinguish themselves from the warlords. In particular, this process involved intensified self-control of ‘short-term affects’ (Elias, 1937) such as hunger, aggression and sexual desire, and the exclusion of certain bodily flows and activities (including killing and punishing, as well as shitting, pissing and fucking) from public space and polite discourse. Animal slaughter moves from streets to abattoirs; punishment moves from town squares to prisons; the “mad” are confined; sex and nudity are restricted to “private” spaces; shitting and pissing are restricted to the bathroom/toilet. In effect, the id is excluded from public life; “society” from now on is limited to egos and superegos. However, this is achieved not by overcoming the id, but by repressing it both socially and (later) in the individual psyche. Civilisation does not remove violence; it hides it. It still depends on constant threats, punishment, compulsion, and pressure.

In Elias’s account, the power of the superego increases greatly during the “civilising process”. States identified with superego functions begin to predominate over lords and religious bodies. If a society is state-dominated, inner selves tend to be ruled by superegos identified with the will of the state. The system also becomes capable of using “cold” violence more and more wantonly, since it completely disregards human needs and desires. Berardi’s statement that the current neoliberal system reserves no sympathy whatsoever for suffering human bodies is completely to the point, but it is not a *moral* failing; it is an incapacity to see the id, because of cyber-gnosis (Berardi, 2016). A person who cannot feel pain, may not intuit why they should not do something painful to someone else; the psychological equivalent of this situation is today widespread, and often intensified by trance-like “hallucinations” of what an actual situation is (from police imagining guns in the hands of black men, to rapists believing sex is consensual). Incapacity to feel one’s own id leads to insensitivity to others’ ids; no amount of “emotional literacy/intelligence” or “social skills” (abstract knowledge of *idless* beings and/or learned scripts) will substitute for the id. In addition, conditions of fear and insecurity combined with (often justified) distrust of the state tend to generate a decivilising process which puts

the general trend in reverse. Elias uses this concept mainly in relation to fascism, but it also characterizes moral panics and authoritarian populism more broadly. The gains of the “civilising process” are thus not very great: violence is not reduced, but hidden, and even this hiding is precarious and often reversed. This also explains why modern, “civilised” humans would lose connection with vital forces and geometries in the natural/physical world, since there is now a barrier between their own vital forces and those of the world. One might even say that lockdowns are the “civilising process” taken to its natural conclusion: the attempted elimination of all human-to-human contact, from handshakes to raves.

Foucault (1977) suggests that resentment has increased in the transition from sovereign to disciplinary power—a transition also situated in early modernity. In particular, disciplinary power aims to control and disempower others—a theme also found in Virilio’s work (eg. Virilio, 2012). Confinement brings with it control. Not only must people learn self-control to confine given activities to invisible spaces; the spaces of confinement provide opportunities to surveil, psychologically manipulate, and (in phantasy at least) to remould the confined people. “Criminals”, “madmen”, hospital patients, schoolchildren, military conscripts, are held in total austere institutions so as to mould them into people useful for the powerful or suited to a desired type of society. Where the process partially succeeds, it installs a persona oriented entirely to the gaze of the imagined observer. The underlying person is not remolded, but a secondary, fake self is placed over the top of their previous self as an interface between self and world. While specific forms of torturous punishment have been partly eliminated, sadists within the state machine keep finding new ways to break the wills and personalities of those under their control. Ultimately, the entire process is necessarily abusive: it is not possible to force a person to imagine they are just a persona, or a node in a cybernetic network, without traumatizing them so much as to shatter their sense of self.

In the Absolutist period, the cult of control fused with the older warlord orientation to produce a new wave of tyrannies. In his study of theatrical norms through time, Boal (2008) argues that the

early bourgeoisie promoted an ethic of Machiavelian *virtù*, in which shrewd manipulation of others, self-control and doing what is necessary are the ultimate goods. This ethos has disguised itself, moving outside ethical theory and into the realm of business and self-improvement literature (“How to Win Friends and Influence People,” Carnegie, 1935). While hardly anyone professes the ethos, it is still often what is looked for in “strong” leaders, and is often dramatized in movies, novels and the like: Jack Bauer, Christian Gray, Donald Trump. (Historically westerns were a major site for such phantasies; today it is more common for the hero to be a grizzled special forces veteran or—most often—a cop). This layer of ruthless ego-performance persists as an implicit norm, contrasted with the passions of villains. The political right is particularly good at exploiting this quasi-moralised ego-level without seeming to be outright amoral, or hostile to the “public good”.

In a different vein, Fromm (1973) suggests that malignant aggression only appears in modernity. Malignant aggression is a particular mixture of necrophilia—a preference for dead, object-like matter over living matter—with the exterminatory (rather than controlling) subtype of sadism. Theweleit (1987) shows, at least for a subset of fascistic soldier-males, that life is associated with unpredictability and with being “flooded” with unwanted affect/id; in today’s jargon, killing “eliminates a threat”. Necrophilia becomes common as social systems focus on making people machine-like or subordinating them to machines (an issue also raised by Mumford, Illich, Perlman, etc). Theweleit also shows that this orientation arises from a subset of contexts in which the future fascists are exposed to extreme violence or abuse, such that the body is experienced mainly as a site of pain, not pleasure. Such a pain-body can become a source of meaning only indirectly, through the flood/dam complex: repression of bodily flows as potentially painful and anxiety-inducing, and valuing of the dams or rocks which contain the floods.

Liberal ideology arises in the same period, and is clearly associated with superego functions. Reich (1972) specifically analyzes liberalism as an attempt to tame ego-level impulses with superego, and believes it fails against fascism for this very

reason: fascism returns to the more basic, ego level, though not all the way down to the id. This is probably what happens in all the “decivilising processes”: the underlying ego re-emerges with a vengeance, loaded with reactive affects. Modern politics thus takes place between parties of the ego (rightist) and the superego (liberal/leftist), in which the former has an unfair advantage. The id remains unrepresented; politically, it is the domain of countercultures, direct action, etc.

PASSIONS AND INTERESTS

Hirschman's *The Passions and the Interests* provides a particularly insightful account of the modern transformation of values, which throws much light on the psychodynamic forces involved (Hirschman, 1977). In the Middle Ages, aristocratic and heroic ideals of chivalry were prominent, and religious discourse juxtaposed the passions/vices to the virtues, with faith in the strength of the latter. Glory, not money, was the goal of elite life. Money-making activities were at best tolerated. In Augustine for instance, there are three major lusts: for sex, for money/possessions and for power. All are roughly equal in their virulence; if any is a “lesser evil”, it is the lust for power.

In the Renaissance and Absolutist period, the church receded and the pursuit of glory took central place in social life. However, both the heroic ideal and the constraint of passions by religious virtues became unpopular ideas, since they did not constrain the princes of the era. Theorists instead started articulating statecraft based on ostensibly realist views of “men as they are”. They relied either on reason as restraint on passions, or on behavioral manipulation. With Hobbesian repression proving ineffective (partly because rulers remained unconstrained), theorists looked to harness or sublimate passions, with a vision of the state as civiliser, molding good from evil through intelligent lawmaking—the same project expressed today in cybernetic nudging, good governance

discourses, analytical liberalism, etc.

Hirschman (1977) shows that the idea of interest evolved over time. In the earliest works, writers like Spinoza, Bacon, Hume and Mandeville talk openly about harnessing some passions to constrain others. Later, in writers like Adam Smith and Helvetius, the “passions” are toned-down into a distinct concept of “interest” or “advantage”. The term “interest” is initially assigned to the passion which happens to be given the countervailing function. Later, it involved a passion plus ‘an element of reflection and calculation’ (Hirschman, 1977): in other words, ‘interest’ meant a mixture of id and ego. It gradually came to refer only to the desire for money/wealth. The result was an idea of reasonable self-love which was a hybrid of id and ego. This was later further refined, with the “calm” desire for wealth (interest) contrasted with outright greed (passion).

This interacted closely with the “civilising process”. It was believed that pursuit of money was an innocent, nonviolent, calm, harmless passion, associated with the gentle, polite or polished (*douceur*), as opposed to the rude and barbarous passions of the warlord class (a binary which Hirschman (1977) sees as the root of the later developed/underdeveloped). At the time, the *doux*, peaceful, inoffensive trader could easily be contrasted with looting armies and murderous pirates. For many writers such as Montesquieu, the passions of the powerful for glory/power are the most dangerous. Interest is meant to force states and rulers to be

more restrained and less arbitrary. Interest is meant to create a web of interdependence which restrains everyone from conflict and from other passions. (This argument, most often mobilized *against* capitalism by communitarians, ecologists, relationalists, Levinasians and so on—“we need to realize that we are all interconnected and constituted by our relations!”—is actually part of the intent behind capitalism from the start).

There were always counter-vailing views, either that such a




Figure 2. Cover of Albert Hirschman's book "The Passions and the Interests"

powerful passion as “greed” would destroy everything else (prefiguring Marx), or that it is not strong enough to restrain the other passions. It was also gradually realized that self-interest can also cause authoritarianism through a fear of loss or a desire to keep the economy running at any cost and the depoliticisation of society. In the twentieth century, a heavily mercantile world proved not to be immunized against war or despotism. The “greed restrains glory” theory was already largely abandoned after the Napoleonic Wars. Later theorists such as Smith substitute the previously implausible idea that interests themselves are natural and identical to passions, which later expands into rational-choice/neoclassical economics. Interest has to be molded violently from passions, but the more this process of molding is naturalized, the more interest can be assumed to be basic.

Also, the interests have not proven strong enough to restrain “dangerous” passions, especially fear (consider the economic disruption caused by COVID-19 lockdowns: this is one evil which

self-interest certainly *would* have prevented). Later critiques have also increasingly seen the harms of alienation, boredom, emptiness, inhibition/repression, one-dimensionality and so on—although these paradoxically refer to things self-interest was *meant* to cause. With the id marginalized in social life, the formation of meaning became increasingly difficult. People came to interact as artificial personas, to produce a social “consensus” which is simply an aggregation of trace-states, and to become increasingly alienated from their own psychological structures. By extension, people also became less sensitive to the vital forces in others, and to the operation of vital forces in nature. It is, however, difficult to reverse or modify these kinds of historical processes: by the time the early justifications for the “civilising process” were falsified, the process was entrenched, and elites had vested interests in its continuation. New rationalizations were found, although the old ones periodically resurface: the 1980s-90s arguments for “globalisation” involved such repetitions as “democratic peace theory”, the taming of states through enmeshment, the Internet as force for radical democratization, and even the idea that capitalist relations will open people’s minds by exposing them (whether they like it or not) to other cultures and ways of seeing. Not surprisingly, these bubbles have also largely burst.

The process of using passions to neutralize one another may well have produced the modern ego and superego, as found in Theweleit, Reich and Lowen. The ego is rooted in self-preservation and in the pursuit of status and riches as substitutes for pleasure. It thus develops more strongly in circumstances of austerity and insecurity, provided its formation is not disrupted too much by traumas. Interest also serves to make people calculable and governable, leading eventually to cybernetic forms of power. Ultimately therefore, the ego and superego ally against the id: the ego tames the id by means of rational calculation of interest, which is then manipulated by the superego by altering the incentive-structure to produce “moral” effects.

PURITANISM AND REPRESSION

The repression of the id is implicit in Hirschman’s history, but becomes explicit in Fromm (1942).



Fromm suggests that medieval people were both constrained—tied to their roles—and secure, with sources of meaning and social life. Modern humans are less constrained, but insecure, meaning-deprived and isolated. By early modernity, artisans and businesspeople started falling through the cracks of medieval social security, engaging in a fierce life-and-death struggle to preserve their power and ‘squeeze... pleasure out of life.’ Traders faced the world alone, depended on effort and luck, and were threatened on all sides by competitors, more powerful elites, and a radical “rabble”. Their overwhelming affects were feelings of insecurity, powerlessness, aloneness, doubt, anxiety and being helpless or “nothing”.

The Reformation arose because it met their psychological needs. Luther and Calvin offered solutions through masochistic submission (Methuen, 2011). Humans are naturally powerless and wicked; their actions are determined by the will of God or of Satan. In Calvin especially, the main road to salvation is self-humiliation and the destruction of human pride. When dignity, including the source of meaning in pleasure or empowerment, is absent, human goals—even religious salvation—cannot be the goal of life. People then submit to external forces: an uncaring God, capitalism, fascism, etc. The older religious view that humans are (at least potentially) good and have free will—that sin is a forgiveable frailty—starts to be challenged by doctrines positing basic evil and powerlessness. People find certainty by obliterating their individuality and submitting to an overwhelmingly strong power. This, for Fromm, is the source of the modern superego.

These doctrines do not in fact eliminate doubt or its sources, but they destroy *awareness* of doubt. As Weber already observed, Calvinists take worldly success as a sign of salvation, even though they are determinists and do not believe in good works: they prove to themselves that they are among the chosen (an approach which is also “strict liability” so to speak, ie. intent is irrelevant). They engage in compulsive activity to escape anxiety, and they express their hostility either inwards, in self-flagellation, or through projection, in the form of the malevolence of a despotic God. Suffering is rendered tolerable by conceiving it as collective atonement for humanity’s

basic evil; anxiety, insecurity and powerlessness are managed through self-humiliation.

The key virtues here are unceasing effort, sobriety, justice (reciprocity) and piety—not generosity, tolerance or compassion. Fromm (1973) believes this solution to an existential condition is the source of the compulsive work-ethic, the functioning of work as compulsion (or “workaholism”), which he thinks is new in modernity. Medieval people either worked from sheer necessity (thus as little as they could get away with), or to gain fulfilment through work-activity. In modernity, the superego becomes a slave-driver, acting-out hostility against the self, promoting values which seem to be one’s own but are actually introjections of external pressures. Such a superego can act in *place* of, but in an equivocal role to, an external slave-driver, harnessing a greater amount of effort (and life-force) for the work process.

Historians (eg. Oldridge, 2000) have shown that Calvinism/Puritanism leads to an experience of life as a constant struggle against one’s own id. The more people dissociate from and try to utterly deny their impulses, the more these tend to take an intrusive, compulsive and hostile form. A Puritan thus comes to feel besieged by “the devil” inside their own body. One can see here the roots of the dam/flood complex theorised by Theweleit (1987): the experience of the id as a threatening flood which brings decomposition and death and is coded as evil, against which one devivifies, erects dams, tenses up like a rock, and so on. There is an entire existential choice against pleasure and desire involved in this orientation.

There are strange similarities in today’s supposedly progressive, identitarian ideologies, which repeat the Calvinist mixture of determinism plus responsibility, being possessed either by evil or good, inherent evil (here “evil” is replaced by supposedly determinant structures such as masculinity and whiteness, which implant conditioned habitual behaviours and biased preconscious thoughts *which in practice are identified with the id*), ego-bashing and effacement of ego, a seeking for salvation/justice as something received passively from someone radically other, and a secret security arising from the conviction that, by reacting impulsively on the

“right” side, one is actually one of the saved. More subtly, one finds similar phenomena in Third Way and post-Washington Consensus ideology (for example, the publications of the WEF). These works often seek to forecast and adapt to a fate or process of change which they conceive as inevitable and involuntary, with resistance to such changes (for example, “globalisation” or the 4th Industrial Revolution) deemed both futile and harmful. History is thus turned into a series of challenges or tests which one passes or fails, usually through “good leadership”. The COVID-19 medical technocrats use a similar approach, with reliable knowledge replaced by abstract computer modelling which is never reality-checked, and then invoked as a fatalistic reality to which others must submit: the death of western democracy is a “medical necessity”. It is also no coincidence that this kind of “pawn of history” stance is found both in Stalinism and in Nazism. What these apparently diverse ideologies have in common is renunciation of desire as the source of life and submission to a hostile destiny as source of salvation.

CONCLUSION

The problems arising from the suppression of the id have been widely documented from Freud onwards. For instance, Lowen (1971, 1984) shows



that modern people suffer a loss of meaning due to disidentification with pleasure and systematic blockages of vital force in the body. Pleasure, with a tendency to flow-state, is the most basic drive; power and wealth are secondary, ego drives. Children are trained by systems of conditional love into suppressing pleasure and authenticity, instead putting up an act in an attempt to “earn” love—an attempt which necessarily fails, since it is earned by the persona and is conditional. In later life, the pursuit of status, fame, money, and other such goals is valued as an imagined means to pleasure, but the pleasure cannot be achieved, as the entire process is linked to renunciation of pleasure. The solution is returning *downwards* to the id and pleasure, rather than *upwards* to the superego. However, much of mainstream psychology remains committed either to the “car mechanic” model of psychological problems as fixable flaws (Miller, 2007), or the flight to superego, numisphere, wishful (“optimistic” or “realistic”) thinking and “higher” meaning as the solution.

The media-trance generates a state of inattention to one’s own life, one’s immediate habitat, one’s emotional states and their sources, the repression or frustration of one’s id, to the point where one may be completely unaware that they are happening. Fromm (1942) recounts the case of a mass-citizen who believes he is happily attending parties, when his unconscious meanings (revealed in dream-interpretation) show he is actually deeply dissatisfied and anxious, and is attending the parties only for status reasons. His persona—his artificial secondary self—is so dominant in his personality that he is not even able to distinguish it from his actual feelings. Situationism reaches similar conclusions: people attach more reality to passively-observed images of their lives than to their feelings, desires or experiences.

This is how consumer society works. It is not a hedonistic system, it is a system of manufacture and satisfaction of false needs—needs which happen to conform to the products the system offers (Illich, 1971, 1973). Consumer society provides the illusion that people can express themselves—at the id level—either by appearing in representations (eg. posting on social media, being represented in politics or art or sociology, “speaking truth to power”)

or by adopting a lifestyle consisting of particular commodities. However, this promise is a lie, because commodification saps things of meaning and substance. The system also tends more and more to ban and interfere with unmediated pleasures—everything from drugs and sex to living in nature. Capitalism itself seeks, not to satisfy desire, but to exacerbate longing, deferring gratification endlessly so as to stimulate product turnover (Bey, 1996).

Like Baudrillard, Bey suggests modern life has been reduced to de-intensified simulation. At its current stage, capitalism has become a ‘trance-like state’, a ‘bad consciousness’, a false consensus based on information and images (Wilson, 1998, p. 132), lacking affective immediacy and tending to vampirise whatever it absorbs. Someone inside this consciousness sees what is represented (and thus emptied), not what is present or existentially meaningful; consensus perception filters out much of what exists. Capital is seeking to transcend the body into a pure spirit of information (Bey, n.d.a). Today, money escapes production as pure symbolisation (1996, p. 91). Capital has escaped into a ‘CyberGnostic heaven or numisphere’ (Wilson, 1998, p. 39) which now contains over 90% of money. This sphere is self-enclosed and self-referential. It cannot really escape production, but puts up a good show of doing so. The 90% Bey refers to here is the same (roughly) 90% which according to Harvey, now takes the form of fictitious capital.

The result is a kind of socio-demographic partition. The world is split between those who can accompany capital into cyber-gnosis, and others who are socially triaged-out or depleted (Bey, n.d.a). Debt prevents most people from ever reaching cybergnostic heaven (Wilson, 1998). The global is not truly global: a company claiming to be a “global brand” will often have no branches in Africa or the Middle East. The signifier “global” is identical with the numisphere. The absurd hopes that globalisation will bring a global ethical conversation or a subversion of western identities fall down utterly on this fact.

Ideologically, cyber-gnosis relies on disembodiment, even when it is full of references to bodies, passions, “real” selves, etc. In the cybernetic fantasy, people are just nodes (Terranova, 2004;

McLaverty-Robinson, 2012), *idless* nodes, responding solely to external signals in an endless feedback cycle tending towards homeostasis. This still relies on people being creatures of self-interest, or alternatively, having predictable, nudgable emotional reactions, to be managed by the state and opinion leaders into a superego-valued outcome. Like the people susceptible to Calvinism, people today are not entirely unfree, but are insecure and held responsible for their own success or failure in a harsh world where they are alone and besieged. The result is similar: pleasure, meaning, and empowerment are insufficient sources of fulfilment, so people turn to masochistic submission to cruel masters (whether these are medical technocrats during COVID-19 or strongmen like Trump, or the crowdsourced cruelty of self-policing identity-political movements).

The system is crisis-ridden because it is also out-of-control. Even the elite have now lost control of virtual capital. Many of the calculations are now done by computers. There is no need for a technological singularity when businesses needing investment effectively have to fool computers into thinking they are a good gamble. However, modernity is not going down quietly; the system’s decline is marked by death-spasms of control-by-terror (Bey, n.d.b). The more the system loses control, the more it lashes out against anything which escapes its control—the forces of the id, of life. This reaches its culmination in ecstatic media events (Chouliaraki, 2006) in which populations can be intensively drawn into manufactured emotional worlds through emotive, propagandistic media coverage. According to Bey, people were hypnotised by the media for two or three weeks after 9/11. This produced a ‘neurotic, obsessive, trance-like consciousness’ (Bey, 2002). Propaganda is not new, but such herd-psychoses were previously hard to produce. Today they are endlessly repeated.

The situation has proven hard to fight because there is no clear adversary, and nobody knows what is true and what is “fake news” or “alternative facts”. The system works partly by suggestion or placebo effect. The system’s weakness is that it is not reflected in everyday life; it does not register in affect or bodies, and experiences are far from the images in the Spectacle. It has to keep people distracted from their life-conditions to survive. The mechanisms

used to propel Trump to power, are simply a refined version of the technologies which are used day-to-day to manage perceptions. Most people cannot understand or theorise the current system of rule by virtual capital which is itself largely invisible. This leads to scapegoating, and divide-and-rule strategies (left and right typically both see aspects of the problem, but ignore others) (Globalism, Tribalism). Knowledge today is an empty shell, because certain important advances (notably those of Freud and Marx) are systematically denied or warded-off.

Debt is absolutely central here, along with the new “vectoral” technologies. 90% of capital is now fictitious (Harvey, 2003). Rates of profit in non-financial capitalism have been falling steeply since the 1980s (Wade, 2008). This means banks are lending nine times the amount of money that is present in the sectors from which they expect repayment. Even if the entire value of these sectors was used for repayment, less than 1 in 9 loans would be profitable. 8 of 9 will never be paid back. These loans have spread out across the whole economy, encompassing productive companies, governments (particularly after the US started borrowing in the 1980s), and consumer debts such as mortgages. Bankers/investors (or the algorithms they rely on) would be foolish to invest at such long odds, and are either unrealistically optimistic or just playing the game.

So long as people keep borrowing to pay back their loans, lenders keep up the performance. In practice, debt turns into a behavioral management system: banks keep giving loans to those individuals, companies and governments which seem creditworthy, ie. which put up a performance of conforming to a normative model of creditworthiness (which necessarily bears little resemblance to the minuscule odds of repayment). This in practice gives banks a great deal of control, similar to that exercised by the IMF and World Bank in imposing structural adjustment in the 1980s-90s. Debt as social control has been widely discussed (Gill, 1995; Graeber, 2001; Escalate Collective, 2011). Authors like Harvey (2003) and Konings and Panitch (2008) also show how American elites can use Wall Street, the IMF/World Bank and the US Treasury to make or break poorer countries, leveraging credit for *political* control. For Harvey, this makes the US an unproductive rentier power. This is also tied-in

with the emergence of what Wark (2004) calls the vectoralist class, including financiers as well as owners of technological platforms and gig economy sites. Vectoralists do not exploit labour-power or land, but instead, exploit flows of information passing through bottlenecks they control. China is positioned as the next hegemonic challenger by a further innovation. In China, the banks themselves are government-owned, and effectively print money for government-favoured companies. Exporters have capital costs close to zero, an economic ‘nonsense’ but one which, with government support, can continue indefinitely (The Economist, 2005).

Debt as social control is more indirect than either command or wage-labour. The system’s role in judging and ranking is concealed; individuals are instead perceived as having “failed” relative to an impersonal reality like Calvin’s God or fate, and are either subject to social waste-disposal (such as mass incarceration) or to endless commandist reconditioning (education, therapy, spiritual practice, retraining...). This further conceals coercion relative both to direct command and to wage-labour (which is modelled as a transaction, but a compulsory one). This extends into a general obligation to be communicable, to self-brand, market oneself, network, manage appearances, an entire array of practices which are unproductive in the traditional sense, but necessary to be part of a *simulated* economy. Studies of selfie-takers suggest that people present primarily an ideal self, a persona; for instance, most select and even edit or filter their images (Chua & Chang, 2015; Grogan et al., 2018; Seehafer, 2017; Uski & Lampinen, 2014; Vainikka et al., 2017). However, people perceive this ideal self as their authentic self, even as more real than their bodily or emotional self. Some go as far as to turn up at plastic surgeons, wanting to look like their filtered online persona. This is the depth alienation has now reached.

This further creeps across into wider social practices of risk-management/risk-society, preventionism, and so on: requirements to jump through hoops to appear “safe” to powerful others. A constant duty to prove one’s innocence and avoid arousing suspicion is today replacing any presumption of innocence. Instead, absence of proven innocence indicates guilt. People try to “prove their inno-

cence” with endless supererogatory conformisms, virtue-signalling, joining witch-hunts against anyone caught-out, etc. It is like a globalised re-run of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, but with liberal/conservative slogans switched-in for socialist ones. The need for a “reasonable excuse” to go out in 2020—to prove one’s right even to the exceptions allowed by governments—is only the latest in a series of such measures, from suspicion-based no-fly lists to widespread police searches, indirect and risk-based offences, measures of the ASBO type, “danger zone” legislation, etc. There are also now tides of behavioral manipulation initiatives using opportunity structures, incentive/deterrence structures, nudges, signalling, information management and so on, to trick or coerce “free” actors into doing the wishes of the powerful. The next stage is the Chinese idea of “social credit”, which distributes rights/privileges to citizens based on a social/moral performance ranking calculated similarly to credit scores. Petty deviance, dissident views, “bad” friends and so on, lower one’s rating.

We have thus come full-circle. Debt is associated psychoanalytically with guilt, and thus with the superego. People feel themselves to be guilty in response to the introjected demands of parents and other authority-figures, and their resistance to or incapacity for carrying out these demands. This brings us right back to Nietzsche and the origins of punishment. However, the system also relies on the taming of passions as interests. Baudrillardian masses have no interests (hence their black-hole-like subversion of sociometry), and their passions either escape or implode the system. The stability of consumer society has two sources: people’s failure to test the system in relation to their own (or others’) needs, desires, or pleasure, and the prevalence of certain negative emotional states which prevent people from acting (for example, anxiety and fear). The moment the trance-state lifts, people find themselves in a sharp antagonism between tendencies to autonomy and systems of control which are now seen from the outside. It is in this field that counterinsurgency ideology comes into play. The trance and the counterinsurgency state are what separate us from the id, from vital energy forces, and from happiness.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

REFERENCES

- Baudrillard, J. (1994). *Simulacra and simulation*. University of Michigan Press.
- Berardi, F. (2016). *Kognitarci in Semiokapital/Cognitarians and Semiokapital*. Maska.
- Berkes, F. (1999). *Sacred Ecology*. Routledge.
- Bey, H. (1995). *Globalism, Tribalism and Autonomy*. Hermetic Library <https://hermetic.com/bey/pw-0895>
- Bey, H. (1996). *Millennium*. Autonomedia.
- Bey, H. (2002). *Sakhra l’Assal Interviews Peter Lamborn Wilson*. Hermetic Library <https://hermetic.com/bey/pw-interview-2>
- Bey, H. (n.d.a). *NoGoZone*. Hermetic Library <https://hermetic.com/bey/nogozone>
- Bey, H. (n.d.b). *The Information War*. Hermetic Library <https://hermetic.com/bey/info-war>
- Boal, A. (2008). *Theatre of the Oppressed*. Pluto. (Original work published 1974)
- Carnegie, D. (1935). *How to win friends and influence people*. Simon & Schuster.
- Chouliarakis, L. (2006). *Spectatorship of Suffering*. Sage.
- Chua, T. H. H., & Chang, L. (2016). Follow me and like my beautiful selfies: Singapore teenage girls’ engagement in self-presentation and peer comparison on social media. *Computers in Human Behavior*, 55, 190–197. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2015.09.011>
- Descartes, R. (2015). *The Collected Works of Rene Descartes*. PergamonMedia.
- Deleuze, G. (1983). *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, G. & F. Guattari (1983). *A Thousand Plateaus*. Athlone.

- Elias, N. (1937). *The Social Constraint Towards Self-Constraint*. In C. J. Calhoun, J. Gerteis, & J. Moody, *Contemporary Sociological Theory* (2nd ed., pp. 417–427). Blackwell.
- Elias, N. (1939). *The Civilizing Process* (Vol. 1). Blackwell.
- Escalate Collective (2011). *Salt*. <https://libcom.org/files/Salt.pdf>
- Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and Punish: Birth of the Prison*. Penguin.
- Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*. Pantheon.
- Freud, S. (1999). *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (J. Strachey & A. Freud, Trans.). Hogarth Press.
- Fromm, E. (1942). *Fear of Freedom*. Ark.
- Fromm, E. (1973). *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*. Fawcett.
- Gill, S. (1995), 'The Global Panopticon? The Neo-Liberal State, Economic Life and Democratic Surveillance', *Alternatives* 20 (1), pp. 1–49.
- Graeber, D. (2001). *Debt: The First 5000 Years*. Melville House.
- Grogan, S., Rothery, L., Cole, J., & Hall, M. (2018). Posting selfies and body image in young adult women: The selfie paradox. *Social Media + Society*, 7(1), 15–36. http://derby.openrepository.com/derby/bitstream/10545/622743/6/Hall_2018_Posting_selfies_and_body_image_in_young_adult_women_published_CCBY.pdf
- Harvey, D. (2003). *The New Imperialism*. Oxford University Press.
- Heshusius, L. (1994). Freeing ourselves from objectivity: managing subjectivity or turning toward a participatory mode of consciousness? *Educational Researcher*, 23(3), 15–22. <https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189x023003015>
- Hirschman, A.O. (1977). *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its Triumph*. Princeton. Princeton University Press.
- Illich, I. (1971). *Deschooling Society*. Penguin.
- Illich, I. (1973). *Tools for Conviviality*. Harper and Row.
- Kant, I. (2015). *The Collected Works of Immanuel Kant*. PergamonMedia.
- Konings, M., & Panitch, L. (2008). US financial power in crisis. *Historical Materialism*, 16(4), 3–34. <https://doi.org/10.1163/156920608x357710>
- Lowen, A. (1971). *The Language of the Body*. Macmillan.
- Lowen, A. (1984). *Narcissism: Denial of the True Self*. Simon and Schuster.
- Maltsev, O. V. (2021). *Maestro. Jean Baudrillard. The Last Prophet of Europe* (L. Oulahbib & A. McLaverty-Robinson, Eds.; K. Tur-sunbaeva, Trans.). Publishing House "Patriot." <https://books.google.com.ua/books?vid=ISBN6179511438>
- Marx, K. (1975). *Collected Works: Karl Marx, 1857–61*. Lawrence & Wishart.
- McLaverty-Robinson, A. (2012, April 27). *Jean Baudrillard: The Code*. Ceasefire Magazine. <https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-5/>
- Methuen, C. (2011). *Luther and Calvin: religious revolutionaries*. Lion Books.
- Miller, J. A. (2007). Afterword: The Response of Psychoanalysis to Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy. In V. Voruz & B. Wolf (Eds.), *The Later Lacan* (pp. 261–268). SUNY Press.
- Nietzsche, F. (1996). *On the Genealogy of Morals* (D. Smith, Trans.). Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1887)
- Oldridge, D. (2000). *The Devil in Early Modern England*. Sutton Publishing.
- Reich, W. (1972). *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*. Straus and Girous.
- Scott, J. C. (1979). *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press.
- Scott, J. C. (1990). *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. Yale University Press.
- Seehafer, D.M. (2017). *#Nofilter: Exploration of Instagram and individuals Conception Of Self*. Fargo. <https://library.ndsu.edu/ir/bitstream/handle/10365/28395/%23NO-FILTER%20Exploration%20of%20Instagram%20and%20Individuals%E2%80%99%20Conception%20of%20Self.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

- Smith, B. R. (2007). Indigenous' and 'Scientific' Knowledge in Central Cape York Peninsula. In P. Sillitoe (Ed.), *Local Science vs Global Science* (pp. 75–90). Berghahn.
- Stevenson, M. G. (1996). Indigenous knowledge in environmental assessment. *Arctic*, 49(3). <https://doi.org/10.14430/arctic1203>
- Terranova, T. (2004). *Network Culture: Politics for the Information Age*. Pluto.
- The Economist. (2005, July 7). The dragon tucks in. *The Economist*. <http://www.economist.com/node/4127399>
- Theweleit, K. (1987). *Male fantasies* (Vols. 1–2). University of Minnesota Press.
- Thompson, E. P. (1971). The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century. *Past & Present*, 50(1), 76–136. <https://doi.org/10.1093/past/50.1.76>
- Usher, P. J. (2000). Traditional ecological knowledge in environmental assessment and management. *Arctic*, 53(2). <https://doi.org/10.14430/arctic849>
- Uski, S., & Lampinen, A. (2014). Social norms and self-presentation on social network sites: Profile work in action. *New Media & Society*, 18(3), 447–464. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444814543164>
- Vainikka, E., Noppari, E., & Seppänen, J. (2017). Exploring tactics of public intimacy on Instagram. *Participations: journal of audience and reception studies*, 14(1), 108–128. <http://www.participations.org/Volume%2014/Issue%201/contents.htm>
- Virilio, P. (2012). *The Administration of Fear*. Semiotext(e).
- Wark, M. (2004), *A Hacker Manifesto*, Cambridge. Harvard University Press.
- Wilson, P. L. (1998). *Escape from the Nineteenth Century and Other Essays*. Autonomedia.

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) which allows reusers to distribute, remix, adapt, and build upon the material in any medium or format for non-commercial purposes only, and only so long as attribution is given to the creator.



PRODUCTION TEAM

The production team consists of several specialized units, encompassing the layout team, proofreading editors, translators, final check editors, quality control editors etc.

Inna Kharchenko

Layout Designer
The Memory Institute

Iryna Lopatiuk

Scientific Editor
The Memory Institute

Alyona Merevskaya

Compiling Editor
The Memory Institute

Olga Panchenko

Compiling Editor
European Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Aleksey Samsonov

Designer and Author of the Cover
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences

Mary Saparkina

Translator
European Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Kanykei Tursunbaeva

Contact Person
European Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

Scientific Journal «Newsletter on the results of scholarly work in sociology, criminology, philosophy and political science»

Anschrift:

Neuwiehler Str. 33, D-51674 Wiehl

Telefon: +49 (0)151 54284669

E-Mail: hello@sci-result.de

Geschäftsführer:

Sergej Engelmann

Verantwortlicher gem. §55 Abs. 2 RStV: Sergej Engelmann

Ust: 212/5052/2947

<https://sci-result.de/journal>

