Volume 5, Issue 2, 2024 Scientific Journal

ISSN (PRINT) 2699-9382
ISSN (ONLINE) 2699-9005

NEWSLETTER ON THE RESULTS OF SCHOLARLY WORK

IN SOCIOLOGY, CRIMINOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

SCI-RESULT.DE



UNEXPLAINED PHENOMENA IN SCIENCE

VOLUME 5, ISSUE 2

SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL "NEWSLETTER ON THE
RESULTS OF SCHOLARLY WORK
IN SOCIOLOGY, CRIMINOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE"

SCI-RESULT.DE
https://doi.org/10.61439/RSW39510

We are deeply grateful to everyone who contributed to this issue, including the members of the editorial board, peer reviewers, layout designers, conceptual contributors, and, of course, authors.

Your dedication made this publication possible.



EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

INTRO

In this issue of *Results of Scholarly Works*, I continue to bring our readers research representing a variety of different disciplines. As always, I am committed to having this research represent the works of scholars from around the globe with oftentimes differing opinions. In this way, our readers, no matter where they might hang their hats, are exposed to academic viewpoints that might be absent from their regional journals.

The ten articles we offer for your consideration and perusal need no further introduction. All are penned by authors deeply immersed in the content of their work. As I can say with full confidence, our authors all have skin in the game. As you will see, all address current issues we face as a community of students, academics, and citizens. Their titles go beyond scholarly ruminations to add meaning to issues we all face no matter our intentions and callings.

As stated in my last editor in chief's introduction, *Results of Scholarly Works* truly contributes to advancing scholarly research devoid of tendencies that smack of academic ethnocentrism. The end result of this intended exposure to new ways of thinking can result in solutions that better contribute to a field of knowledge, and, more importantly, the betterment of mankind.

Results of Scholarly Works will always endeavor to present research that not only has scholarly worth but practical application that can translate in public policy.

My performance as editor in chief rests on the quality of the offerings in these issues of *Results of Scholarly Works.* Of course, without the assistance and guidance of the entire Production Team of *Results of Scholarly Works* any contribution I make would be impossible. To them, thank you for all you do in making *Results of Scholarly Works* possible.

I now invite you to peruse our latest issue of the journal to encounter the work of our diverse group of academics. As always, *Results of Scholarly Works* is committed to bring you cutting-edge research and dynamic opinion that illuminates and educates our readers. Until our next issue, we remain academically yours,

Sincerely,
Harvey W. Kushner
Long Island University
Brookville, NY

DR. JEROME KRASE

Emeritus and Murray Koppelman Professor at Brooklyn College of The City University of New York and is an activist-scholar who works with public and private agencies regarding urban community issues. President of European Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. He researches, lectures, writes, and captures photographs about urban life and culture globally.

DR. LIAH GREENFELD

Professor of Sociology, Political Science and Anthropology at Boston University. She has a PhD in Sociology of Art from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and has taught Sociology in several American universities, including Harvard, Chicago and MIT.

DR. VADYM PALAHUTA

PhD in Philosophy, Doctor of Philosophical science, Professor of the Department of Philosophy and Pedagogy of the National University of Technology.

ENRICO TOMASELLI

Geopolitical analyst at the magazine Giubbe Rosse. He has been researching conflicts and wars both from a historical, political, strategic and tactical point of view. Enrico studied art and graphics in Palermo and Rome, and now lives and works in Naples.

GILMORE CROSBY

Gilmore Crosby has been an Organization Development (OD) practitioner since 1984. He has international experience in Egypt, Spain, Mexico, Chile, Poland, Canada, Germany, Czechia and Jamaica, as well as years spent at PECO Nuclear and as an IT Change Management Consultant with EDS.

DR. MAKSYM LEPSKYI

Professor in the Sociology Department at Zaporizhzhia National University in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine. Professor Lepskiy has both academic and governmental administrative experience and currently heads the Research Board in Social Forecasting of the Sociological Association of Ukraine. He is an Academician of the European Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

DR. MARCO ANDREACCHIO

He was awarded a doctorate from the University of IIllinois for his interpretation of Sino-Japanese philosophical classics in dialogue with Western counterparts and a doctorate from Cambridge University for his work on Dante's Platonic interpretation of religious authority.

DR. ALAN N. SHAPIRO

Full visiting professor of design at the Folkwang University of the Arts, taught "future design research" at the University of Lucerne for many years, and currently teaches media theory at the Art University of Bremen. He was called the leading "science fiction theorist" by the journal Science Fiction Studies.

IRYNA LOPATIUK

PhD candidate at the Zaporizhzhya National University in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine. She serves as secretary of the Psychological-Philosophical Scientific Society, honorary member of the Historical and Literary Society, and editor-in-chief of the scientific-popular journal Hippokrates issued by the Medical Scientific Society.

DR. SINIŠA MALEŠEVIĆ

Full Professor of Comparative Historical Sociology at the University College, Dublin, and Senior Fellow at CNAM, Paris. His recent books include Why Humans Fight (2022), Contemporary Sociological Theory (with S. Loyal, 2021), Grounded Nationalisms (2019), The Rise of Organised Brutality (2017) and Nation-States and Nationalisms (2013). His work has been translated into 14 languages.

SEEING AND NOT SEEING:
UNEXPLAINED PHENOMENA IN SCIENCE

DOI: https://doi.org/10.61439/ABOH4822



DR. JEROME KRASE

BROOKLYN COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

- *ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3738-631X*
- *Email: jkrase@brooklyn.cuny.edu*

Dr. Jerome Krase is an Emeritus and Murray Koppelman Professor at Brooklyn College of The City University of New York and an activist-scholar who works with public and private agencies regarding urban community issues. He is the President of the European Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. He researches, lectures, writes, and captures photographs about urban life and culture globally. Krase authored numerous pioneering works on visual sociology and gentrification; his recent books include *Diversity in Local Contexts (2017)* and *COVID-19 in Brooklyn (2022)*. He co-edits *Urbanities* and serves on the editorial boards of *Visual Studies*, and the *Journal of Video Ethnography*.

ABSTRACT

Why, beyond competitive and pecuniary interests, do scientists disagree with each other when presented with the same evidence. As they are also ordinary social beings much can be explained by their different socialization experiences and especially their professional education. To better understand these difficulties it is suggested here that a visual ethnographic approach might be of value. Metaphorically scientists are either unwilling or unable to "see" the validity of the evidence presented to them. Therefore in order to demonstrate such valid yet varying interpretations of the same data, this brief visually enhanced essay focuses on two photographs that might defy agreement among viewers as each depends upon either prior knowledge and/or different orientations to the subject/object.

Keywords

visuality, vernacular landscapes, qualitative methods, quantitative methods

INTRODUCTION

In my work I emphasize and accentuate those theories, methods, or simply ideas that are in one way or another "visual" and to weave them together in a sort of narrative. I argue that society, and therefore the study of society, is essentially dependent on the visible. As to visual ethnography of the unnumerable urban spaces and places that I have studied, I have concluded that:

> *"When we pass through urban spaces such as a residential neighborhood we haven't visited before, we are like tourists using our eyes to decipher the clues and cues that loudly and quietly surround us. We might ask ourselves, Is this a safe or a dangerous place? Am I welcome here or should I leave before it is too late? What kind of neighborhood is it? Are the people who live here rich or poor? What is their race, ethnicity, or religion and how (or why) does it matter? Some things are easy to tell on a street, such as whether there are things for sale. Legitimate merchants make it obvious that they are seeking customers with signs that compete for attention, but for the sale of illicit goods, the signs vendors give off are subtler. Yet it seems that for the knowledgeable customer they are in plain view. This reading of the "street signs," so to speak, is not merely an aesthetic exercise. What we see makes a difference in how we respond to the places and the people we encounter in our increasingly complex and changing urban surroundings."*
>
> *(Krase, 2012, p. 1)*

METHODOLOGY

Although I have engaged in a wide variety of research methods to study cities around the globe, I believe that visual sociology offers some unique insights. For example, this brief visually enhanced essay discusses two photographs that engender different explanations that emanate from prior knowledge and/or different orientations to the subject/object. Most laypersons think scientists are a homogenous community of believers. While science, or the scientific method itself can be seen that way, scientists themselves are often ideologically and otherwise diverse. that can lead to disagreements. The distinctions they most often make among themselves are based on their memberships in diverse disciplines and, even within the same discipline, the different research methods they employ in their work (Oevermann, et al. 1987; Williams, 2005; Russo, 2006). Of course political ideology is also equally divisive and can lead the rejection of otherwise valid scientific conclusions. For instance, my own field of Sociology almost disappeared in the Soviet Union as an independent discipline between the 1930s and 1960s as its honest pursuit would have been critical of the regimes. Similarly in the United States today polemical social science approaches like Critical Race Theory are under attack in several states (Ray & Gibbons, 2021).

As a visually oriented social scientist who studies urban life and cultures, I have long had to navigate disciplinary and methodological boundaries. The testy relationship between qualitative and quantitative research has historical, as well as logico-deductive, roots that continue to challenge agreement in the social sciences. My intention here is to argue for more attention to be paid to what social scientists do best as opposed to the labels they apply to each other and their trades. As the positivist founders of sociology would agree, social science is not exempt from the laws of social science. For almost a century there has been an intradisciplinary debate over the use of quantitative versus qualitative methods. For example, Follari referred to this schism as a "Paleozoic Debate" (Follari, 2014). Arguments over the relative value of qualitative and quantitative research is more social than logical. When we conduct research, we do it within shared social life worlds, with and among, as well as for, our peers as part of particular social organizations. I am not the first to argue that social research is itself a social act (See Cicourel, 2004; Krase, 2018).

As in all socially organized systems, social science research is also hierarchical and "quants" or quantitative analysts, are at the top of the scale. Consequently, qualitative researchers in general, and ethnographers in particular, often feel the need to "justify" their practices to those seen as of a higher order. Within ethnography itself there is a rank order ranging downward from classical through auto-ethnography. At the bottom of the methodological barrel is the short-term visual auto-ethnography in which I often engage.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Over the many decades of study I have concluded that academic disciplines and their internal sub-denominations serve more political as opposed to hermeneutic ends. That is, I need not be a certified anthropologist or sociologist to employ the methods, theories, and techniques of either discipline, yet the importance of these labels persists. The phenomenological sociology in which I engage emphasizes, if not exaggerates, the requirement that understanding social events requires an understanding of how the participant/creators themselves understand them (Psathas, 1973). Therefore, the question of how social and other scientists understand their own activities is critical.

As Gadamer argued — "truth" and "method" were in conflict because approaches to the humanities were in conflict. One approach to understanding a particular text was modeled upon the natural sciences, and the other implied that its interpretation of required knowledge of the original intention of its author. For him, although meaning cannot be reduced to the author's intentions, it is however dependent on the context of the interpretation. For Gadamer people have "historically-effected" consciousness and are embedded in the particular history and culture that shaped them. These "prejudices" affect their interpretations, but rather than being a hindrance he argued they are prerequisites to interpretation. That is, the scholar interprets the history of a text by connecting it to his own background (Gadamer, 1996). According to Malpas, Gadamer's work, in conjunction with that of Heidegger, was "…not a rejection of the importance of methodological concerns, but rather an insistence on the limited role of method and the priority of understanding as a dialogic, practical, situated activity" (Malpas, 2013).

The social construction of my academic own life world is informative in this regard. I was introduced to the twin sister disciplines



of anthropology and sociology in 1961 at the Anthropology-Sociology or Sociology-Anthropology Department at Indiana University. In the freshman year sequence the first introductory course was Anthropology and the second was Sociology. The primary distinction was that anthropologists studied culture, such as norms, or ways of acting, while for sociologists it was the statuses, or positions, and their relations in social structures. When the department split, the defining characteristic of the Sociology Department was its quantitative, statistical emphasis and for Anthropology it was ethnography.

Sorokin wrote in *Fads and Foibles of Modern Sociology*:

> *The younger generation of sociologists and psychologists explicitly claims that nothing important has been discovered in their fields during all the preceding centuries; that there were only some vague "arm-chair philosophies"; and that the real scientific era in these disciplines began only in the last two or three decades with the publication of their own researches and those of members of their clique. Claiming to be particularly objective, precise, and scientific, our sociological and psychological Columbuses tirelessly repeat this delusion as scientific truth. Accordingly, they rarely make any references to the social and psychological thinkers of the past. When they do, they hardly veil the sense of their own superiority over the unscientific old fogies." (Sorokin, 1956, pp. 3–4. Citation from Haney, 2008, p. 129)*

In addition to the too often referenced Qualitative-Quantitative divide, another methodological dichotomy that is often misrepresented is that between Descriptive as opposed to Analytic studies. In general, analytic scholarship is given higher "scientific" status because it implies the need for quantification; that is, its validity and reliability are dependent on the employment of formulae and/or numbers. "Analytic" studies create new knowledge from data as opposed to merely describing it. Deduction and Induction are also commonly presented as mutually exclusive dichotomies without taking note of its valuable synthesis of Analytic Induction. The disciplinary separation of anthropology from sociology reflected the evolution of Znaniecki's (Znaniecki, 1934, see also Denzin, 2007) version of analytic induction as at first a quantitative (enumerative) methodological and theoretical innovation into Glaser and Strauss's thoroughly qualitatively "Grounded Theory" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). At the time, quantitative testing of hypotheses logico-deductively drawn from established theories was becoming *de rigueur* for doctoral candidates; with minor adjustments necessary for those willing to employ those of Merton's "middle range" (Merton, 1968). The result was that social scientists were defined more by the methods that they used than the subjects that they studied.

According to Key:

> *Qualitative research is a generic term for investigative methodologies described as ethnographic, naturalistic, anthropological, field, or participant observer research. It emphasizes the importance of looking at variables in the natural setting in which they are found. Interaction between variables is important. Detailed data is gathered through open-ended questions that provide direct quotations. The interviewer is an integral part of the investigation […]. This differs from quantitative research which attempts to gather data by objective methods*

> *to provide information about relations, comparisons, and predictions and attempts to remove the investigator from the investigation. (Key, 1997)*

In the "hard' sciences such as analytic chemistry that some social scientists wish to emulate, things are a bit more direct. Qualitative analysis is designed to identify the elements or compounds in an unknown substance; "What is in this sample?" answers usually simple yes/no questions. Quantitative analysis determines the quantity of particular chemicals in a substance. It asks "How much?" The modeling of qualitative analysis on the quantitative norms is typical and even the best arguments for ethnography — such as that by Small (2009) who playfully asked "How many cases do I need?" — are defensive. However, Small strongly cautioned ethnographers against retreating toward models designed for statistical descriptive research and enjoined them to enhance their own.

> *Generally, the [qualitative] approaches call for logical rather than statistical inference, for case rather than sample-based logic, for saturation rather than representation as the stated aims of research. The approaches produce more logically sensible hypotheses and more transparent types of empirical statements. Regardless of the method, ethnographers facing today's cross-methods discourse and critiques should pursue alternative epistemological assumptions better suited to their unique questions, rather than retreat toward models designed for statistical descriptive research." (Small, 2009, p. 28)*

While some qualitative researchers offer excuses for being qualitative, Cicourel had shown decades ago that the findings of quantitative researchers are also impacted by the social and psychological contexts in which the craft is practiced. He was not opposed to quantification but "My concern has been with the way social scientists often ignore biases introduced by the variations in the way different research analysts USE methods. There is no way to avoid such biases. The best we can do is to try and identify such biases and take them into account when we discuss our results" (Cicourel, 2004, p. 5). The COVID-19 pandemic and the scientific uncertainties that accompanied it in our Risk Society (Adam, Beck & Loon, 2000) are a tragically recent example the lack of agreement between not only scientists but government agencies. The differences were both scientific and ideological (Krase & DeSena, 2023). The result in the United States was the unnecessary loss of more than 450,00 lives (Bor et al, 2021). In all these cases of scientific disagreement, I argue that they were due to a lack of knowledge and, metaphorically a lack of willingness or ability to see. Allow me to turn now to two examples from my extensive visual research on vernacular landscapes (Jackson, 1984) that I hope will show these differences.

LOOKING THE OTHER WAY IN GERMANY

My late colleague, Elmer Luchterhand (1911–1996) served as an officer in the US Army in Germany (1943–1946) and while there helped to liberate a forced labor camp. He told me that what he saw there compelled him to try to understand how people could deny "knowing" what they could "see" going on around them in what appeared to him as an attractive small town nestled in the Harz Mountains. As to seeing, I must note in this regard that the Nazis tried to re-create the atmosphere of *Gemeinschaft*, and the nations homier past. They preferred to use traditional materials and building methods to create a comfortable setting for traditional family life. In this way, National Socialism sought to establish the family with all its sacred traditional accompaniments in fecundity and perpetuity. "German housing officials put first on the list: *the people hate a flat roof.* … And everywhere — around Berlin, near big industrial cities, outside Munich, Nuremberg, Frankfurt and cologne — you see, as a reflection of these homely ideas, the little warm-roofed dwelling which are stopping the *landflucht*, spreading contentment and checking the growth of unconventional ideas" (Gloag, 1939, pp. 56, 58–59,61–62; see also de Grazia, 1948, pp. 179–80).

The pleasant streetscape of Herzberg, Germany shown in the 2001 photograph below belies its wartime history. It also belies the presumption of moral *Gemeinschaft* as it provided the backdrop for unspeakable horrors.

> *"On the eastern outskirts of Hersbruck, beside the road to Nuremberg, was Hersbruck Concentration Camp. An outcamp of Flossenbürg, it had at its height nearly 6,000 prisoners crowded into*

Figure 1. Streetscape of Herzberg, Germany

> *its twenty barracks. They were divided into three shifts for round-the-clock work, digging tunnels for the underground armaments plant in the mountain at the edge of Happurg. Although the shifts were sometimes transported by train, more often they marched under SS guard, sometimes assisted by dogs, to and from work in their 'zebra uniforms' and clogs, through residential streets of Hersbruck, and the full length of Happurg. The Geisterzug (processions of ghosts), was what local people called these prisoner formations travelling their streets, six times in a day and night." (Luchterhand, 1982, p. 255)*

In 2001, I retraced and photographed the route of the *Geisterzug* from which Figure 1 is taken. During one of our many conversations in the Brooklyn College Department of Sociology Luchterhand related to me that the people who he interviewed that lived along the route said that they "did not see" what was happening as if that meant, they did not know or were not responsible. While in the area, I also photographed the crematorium where the bodies of overworked slave laborers were disposed of and imagine that, if asked, they would say that their olfactory senses were also similarly impaired. In this unsettling instance, as in many of my other visual and nonvisual works on bias, Racism, anti-Semitism, and other equally noxious attitudes can impede the recognition of community, as every imagined nation seems to have its own version of intolerance (Krase & Shortell, 2013; Krase, 2013).

LITTLE ITALY IN NORTH DENVER COLORADO

While in Hersbruck, local people obviously did not wish to see the atrocities occurring in front of them, in the Italian American ethnic enclave in Denver, Colorado the invisibility of what was in front of my eyes was due to my own ignorance. My study of Italian American enclaves (Krase, 1982a, 1982b, 1983a, 1983b) settlements and in Italy itself should have prevented my visual error. In the summer of 1983, I drove with my family from Brooklyn, New York to visit the Grand Canyon. On the return trip we stopped in Denver, Colorado. While in the city, I came across a column in *The Rocky Mountain News* entitled "Spicy Meatballs Order of the Day." The writer playfully and stereotypically described the Highlands neighborhood of North Denver as a place "… where old Italian men play bocce in the park, and where geraniums still bloom in window boxes" (Amole, 1983). Following his street references and bolstered by my discovery of Our Lady of Mount Carmel Church that offered masses in Italian I discovered the remnants of the original Italian immigrant settlement in an area called "The Bottoms," which was then occupied by Mexican Americans. Most of the Italians had

Figure 2. Little Italy in North Denver, Colorado

moved up the hill from The Bottoms to a "better neighborhood" where, the vernacular landscape was so un-stereotypical of Little Italy that the mail carrier told me that it was not an "Italian" neighborhood despite all the Italian names on the mailboxes. Despite his misinformation, I decided to travel block by block around the neighborhood and visually document the vernacular landscape as I had in many other venues. In the process, I came across several commercial establishments such as Baldi's Grocery store, an Italian restaurant and other establishments sporting the names of what I assumed were their Italian American owners. Only a few of the single-family houses visually exuded the cues found in well-known Little Italies in cities like New York and Boston.

Figure 2 is a photo of one of the houses I assumed was owned by an Italian American because of the tricolor flag painted on the board outside the fence. However, a year later when I was giving a visual presentation of Italian and Italian American neighborhoods across the country to a group of Italian immigrants, I showed this photograph and gave my reason for choosing it. In response, a member of the audience informed me that I had missed seeing the small grotto containing a statue of the Virgin Mary in the corner of the brick house. They told me that this was a common practice for such structures in Italy and obviously the custom was carried to the United States. since that revelation I have seen them in many other Italian enclaves.

SUMMARY

In this visually enhanced essay I have attempted to demonstrate why scientists might disagree with each other's interpretations when presented with the same evidence by looking closely at two photographs. I have argued that scientists are social beings and therefore much can be explained by their different socialization experiences and especially their professional education. Similarly, understanding Italian American ethnic vernacular landscape in the Highlands neighborhood of North Denver depended upon prior knowledge of the culture that produced it. An accurate interpretation of the pleasant vernacular landscape in Herzberg, Germany however, required not only an understanding of German residential architecture but the historical events that belied its congenial appearance. Even more important was the reluctance or psychological inability of its residents to see the horrors that passed in front of their eyes. Analogously, scientists are sometimes either unwilling or unable to "see" the validity of the evidence presented to them.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

REFERENCES

Adam, B., Beck, U., & Van Loon, J. (Eds.). (2000). *The risk society and beyond: Critical issues for social theory*. Sage.

Amole, G. (1983, August 16). Spicy meatballs order of the day. *Rocky Mountain News*, p. 4.

Bor, J., Himmelstein, D. U., & Woolhandler, S. (2021, June). Trump's policy failures have exacted a heavy toll on public health. *Scientific American*. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trumps-policy-failures-have-exacted-a-heavy-toll-on-public-health1/

Cicourel, A. (2004). Aaron Cicourel in conversation with Andreas Witzel and Günter Mey. *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 5*(3), Article 41. http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/549/1186

Denzin, N. (2007). Analytic deduction. In *Blackwell encyclopedia of sociology online*. http://www.sociologyencyclopedia.com/public/LOGIN?sessionid=4b6c7f369ba6b-11325fa92b8f61dee08&authstatuscode=404

Follari, J. B. (2014). Quantitative/qualitative: The Paleozoic debate. *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 15(2). http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs140279

Gadamer, H.-G. (1996). *Truth and method*. Continuum.

Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). *The discovery of grounded theory*. Aldine.

Haney, D. P. (2008). *The Americanization of social science: Intellectuals and public responsibility in the postwar United States*. Temple University Press.

Jackson, J. B. (1984). *Discovering the vernacular landscape*. Yale University Press.

Key, J. P. (1997). *Research design in occupational education. Module R 14: Qualitative research*. http://www.okstate.edu/ag/agedcm4h/academic/aged5980a/5980/newpage21.htm

Krase, J. (1982a). The Mediterranean-American neighborhood. *Proceedings of the Mediterranean Sociopsychiatric Association, Second Mediterranean Congress of Social Psychiatry: Realities and Perspectives of Social Psychiatry in the Mediterranean Area*. Udine, Italy.

Krase, J. (1982b). Lo spazio di Brooklyn. In *Integrato Metropolitano: New York, Chicago, Torino tre volti dell'emigrazione italiana* (pp. 135–142). Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli.

Krase, J. (1983a). Traces of home. *Places: A Quarterly Journal of Environmental Design, 8*(4), 46–55.

Krase, J. (1983b). The Italian American community: An essay on multiple social realities. In R. N. Juliani (Ed.), *The family and community life of Italian Americans* (pp. 95–108). American Italian Historical Association.

Krase, J. (2012). *Seeing cities change: Local culture and class*. Ashgate.

Krase, J. (2013). Seeing inclusion and the right to the city. In W.-D. Bukow et al. (Eds.), *Inclusive city: Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Mobilität und Diversität zur Stadtgesellschaft* (pp. 23–42). VS Verlag.

Krase, J., & Shortell, T. (2013). Seeing Islam in global cities: A spatial semiotic analysis. In R. R. Williams (Ed.), *Seeing religion: Toward a visual sociology of religion* (pp. 61–84). Routledge.

Krase, J., & DeSena, J. N. (2023). *COVID-19 in Brooklyn: Everyday life during a pandemic*. Routledge.

Malpas, J. (2013). Hans-Georg Gadamer. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy* (Winter ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/gadamer/

Merton, R. K. (1968). *Social theory and social structure*. The Free Press.

Oevermann, U., Allert, T., Konau, E., & Krambeck, J. (1987). Structures of meaning and objective hermeneutics. In V. Meja et al. (Eds.), *Modern German sociology* (pp. 436–447). Columbia University Press.

Psathas, G. (Ed.). (1973). *Phenomenological sociology: Issues and applications*. John Wiley & Sons.

Ray, R., & Gibbons, A. (2021, November). Why are states banning critical race theory? *Brookings*. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-are-states-banning-critical-race-theory/

Russo, F. (2006). The rationale of variation in methodological and evidential pluralism. *Philosophica*, *77*, 97–123.

Small, M. L. (2009). How many cases do I need? On science and the logic of case selection in field-based research. *Ethnography*, 10(1), 5–38.

Sorokin, P. A. (1956). *Fads and foibles in modern sociology*. Henry Regnery.

Znaniecki, F. (1934). *The method of sociology*. Farrar & Rinehart.

WHAT IS ANTISEMITISM
AND WHY DOES IT CONTINUE TO EXIST?

DOI: https://doi.org/10.61439/ABYI4823



DR. LIAH GREENFELD

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

- *ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-0197-4701*
- *Email: lvg@bu.edu*

Professor of Sociology, Political Science and Anthropology at Boston University. She has a PhD in Sociology of Art from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and has taught Sociology in several American universities, including Harvard, Chicago and MIT. Since the publication of her book *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Harvard University Press, 1992), Greenfeld has become an essential reference in the field of nationalism studies.
She has continued her research with *The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth* (Harvard University Press, 2001), winner of the Donald Kagan Best Book in European History Prize. A third book, *Mind, Modernity, Madness: The Impact of Culture on Human Experience* (Harvard University Press, 2013), closes this trilogy on the political, economic and psychological aspects of modern culture. A collection of essays constituting an introductory reader on Greenfeld's theses has been published in Catalan (*Nacionalisme i modernitat*, Editorial Afers, 1999). Her most recent book, *Pensar con libertad. Mi visión de Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Ben-David, Shils, Aron, Bell y Gellner* (*Thinking Freely: My View of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Ben-David, Shils, Aron, Bell and Gellner*), has been published in Spanish by Arpa Editores (2016).

ABSTRACT

Antisemitism is often regarded as a peculiar expression of xenophobia, the natural hostility towards those perceived as outsiders. However, this article argues that xenophobia is a modern construct rooted in historical and ideological developments rather than instinctual human or animal behavior. Antisemitism precedes xenophobia by two millennia and therefore cannot be the latter's expression. The article explores the unique characteristics of antisemitism, its persistent presence in human societies, and its intersection with nationalism. It is composed by the editors out of passages from Liah Greenfeld's essay *Antisemitism as a Civilizational Phenomenon: An Analytical Essay*, the winner of the 2024 Bernard Lewis Prize, and quotations from the interview with the author.

Keywords
antisemitism, xenophobia, monotheism, civilization, hate

INTRODUCTION. WHAT ANTISEMITISM IS NOT (Essay)

Antisemitism is usually considered a variety of xenophobia — hostility towards strangers, outsiders — and as such an expression of human nature. Xenophobia, we say, is ubiquitous: everywhere humans prefer members of the in-group to those who are outside it, the *others* whom they know and therefore trust less, easily imagining them as dangerous. This we believe is a given of human psychology, reflecting in turn its biological substratum: after all, animals with highly developed nervous systems, such as wolves, lions, meercats,

are xenophobes too, ready to fight to the death with outside groups from their own species and cruel to individuals who do not belong. Such is nature, red of tooth and claw. And while among humans this instinctual bloodthirstiness can be combatted, restrained, and perhaps altogether eliminated through training and cultivation of tolerant and accepting attitudes, there is really nothing much to explain about it above the elucidation of evolutionary mechanisms which would apply to meercats and wolves as much as to humans.

Any human group can be, and in the course of history probably was, on the receiving end of xenophobia. If Jews have met with it significantly more often than other groups, this is attributable to their unlucky history which since the 7th century BCE at first repeatedly placed many of them in exile and after 1st century CE for two thousand years dispersed them in foreign lands where they lived as a recognizable minority within various host populations, becoming the conventional target of these populations' natural xenophobia. Other than that, there is no difference between antisemitism and xenophobia directed against non-Jewish groups, and had their accidental, historical circumstances been different, Jews themselves, instead of being continuously victims of this natural proclivity, would be as likely as any other population to be xenophobic towards other populations.

Xenophobia often expresses itself in violence, and given that Jews have been victims of xenophobia continuously for over two and a half millennia in an exceptionally large number of naturally xenophobic host communities, it stands to reason that Jews have experienced more violence than any other group and occasionally violence which was greater than violence ever experienced by other groups. The Holocaust was one such occasion, and it is usually presented by Jews and non-Jews alike as the most striking example of *what human beings can do to other human beings*, a regrettable possibility, ever present because inherent in human nature itself, from which every minority group that may be a target of xenophobia must be protected at any cost.

Historical scholarship of antisemitism derives from this (fundamentally biological) understanding of the problem. The questions addressed in it, as a rule, are what triggered the natural xenophobia in any particular case and what were the specific characteristics of the episode. This makes each eruption of antisemitism independent and explained by its particular historical context (unless one can demonstrate an historical — that is, still accidental — connection between several historical contexts).

However, history proves this understanding false. In its original incarnation as "anti-Judaism," antisemitism was clearly not a variety of common xenophobia, both in the sense that it predated xenophobia by some 20 centuries, and in that it was nothing common. It was of high birth, fathered, simultaneously with the Church, by the best Christian minds as early as the 2nd c. AD/CE as the patristic polemics "against the Jews" and by the 4th century was already a venerable tradition, perhaps the most venerable Christian tradition, with its own proper name, "adversus Iudaeos." That is, it was precisely antisemitic. Even its new obfuscating name (invented in 1871) predated "xenophobia," a neologism which made its first appearance in 1880. Humanity captures all its significant experiences in words. The absence of a word implies that an experience has no meaning within certain borders, and it is safe to assume that not long before "xenophobia" was first printed in *Daily News* in London, Englishmen who had a traditional dislike of foreigners pretending to equality with them, did not know generalized xenophobia which most of us today believe was bequeathed to us by wolves. It was news indeed.

When university administrations in America after October 7, 2023, condemn antisemitism, they invariably preface this by the condemnation of all forms of racism and xenophobia and necessarily pair antisemitism with Islamophobia, which is supposed to be as problematic and widespread. Were xenophobia natural, it would make sense that hostility to a religious group of about 2 billion people, foreign to the West, would — in the West — be quite common. But it is not. According to the FBI statistics, hate crimes motivated by anti-Muslim sentiments are very few, and there are no world-wide surveys of Islamophobia among the non-Muslim populations. In the United States, which, unlike Western Europe, experiences no massive Muslim immigration, it is clearly an imagined, uncharacteristic attitude. In the modern context of competition between nations one does observe anti-Americanism, Anglophobia, Francophobia, Russophobia, but only occasionally, sometimes in one country, sometimes in another. These are never sentiments shared across numerous borders and they very rarely reach the intensity of a hatred among large groups of people or lead to mass violence. Such phobias develop only against specific political background,

and, remarkably, *always against a culture considered by the "phobes" superior to their own*. Islamophobia, which American campuses (and the federal government) combat, however, is not associated with international competition or the assumption of Islam's superiority and supposed to develop simply because Muslims espouse beliefs different from those of this largely Christian society, in strict parallel to Jews, when they are defined as a religious group. This suggests that it is a strawman, invented to downplay and divert attention from the singularity of antisemitism (i.e., in effect, to not come to grips with it).[1]

However accurate is our knowledge of wolves (which, probably, should be taken with at least a grain of salt), generalized xenophobia — fear or dislike of strangers — is certainly not a natural human sentiment and could not have been typical in the relations between groups before *nationalism* reached very deep into populations defined as nations. The idea itself that populations within certain political borders were nations — that is, sovereign communities of shared identity and fundamentally equal members — did not exist before the 16th century and for a long time affected only the thinking of people in the narrow upper classes of societies to which it spread. It is obvious that a feudal lord's (or peasant's) conception of a stranger has nothing in common with the contemporary notion of *ethnic* (ethno-cultural) strangers, viewed as strangers by the entire population of a country, irrespective of class and status, because such a view could only be entertained if this population viewed itself as an ethnic (ethno-cultural) community. Antisemitism predated this nationalistic ethnic imagination by many centuries. The simplest, original Greek concept associated with strangers — *xenia* — is the concept of hospitality (Robb, 2019).[2] It is a similar idea of strangers — as those to whom one must be particularly hospitable and kind — that we meet in the Hebrew Bible as well.How did we get from *xenia* to xenophobia is an interesting historical-sociological question, but it is safe to assume that the roots of xenophobia are to be sought in recent history, modernity, rather than our primitive animal nature.

Still, this mistaken narrative underlies the current understanding of antisemitism. It is shared by Jews and non-Jews (including antisemites), and it lets antisemites (non-Jews or Jews)[3] off the hook very easily. It is a lazy understanding, it explains antisemitism away without attempting any explanation of it; and it is rooted in the fundamental weakness of the social sciences — their unwillingness to explore the human nature, that is the nature of humanity. One would not be able to explain any particular phenomenon in biology (cell division, let's say, heart disease, or the evolution of a species) without having the basic understanding of the life process in general. To attempt an explanation of antisemitism, similarly, we'll have to begin with the basic understanding of the reality to which this specific phenomenon belongs. And one thing we can say from the outset is that this reality is not biological.

METHODS (Interview)

This study adheres to basic scientific methods, particularly the method of conjectures and refutations. This method is characterized by both logical reasoning and empirical testing. The essence of this approach lies in the formulation of a hypothesis — an educated guess about the relationships between certain phenomena — and the testing of this hypothesis against evidence. Science, akin to art, begins with creativity. It is not a purely technical enterprise but one that involves imagination, whereby the researcher hypothesizes connections between variables. These variables must be rigorously defined to ensure the logical consistency of the theory, as logic is grounded in the principle of non-contradiction.

1 This pairing of antisemitism and Islamophobia in taking measures against them is analogous to bringing to a hospital emergency room two patients, one coughing blood because of tuberculosis and the other feeling an itch due to a mosquito bite, and attempting to address the problem of the discomfort they experience by applying anti-itch ointment on the skin of both at the place where the mosquito bit the latter.

2 Kevin Robb, "*Xenia, Hiketeia,* and the Homeric Language of Morals: The Origins of Western Ethics," in William Wians (ed.) *Logoi and muthoi : further essays in Greek philosophy and literature*, SUNY Press, 2019. The best hotels in Greece are still called "XENIA."

3 Self-hatred, a loathing of an aspect of one's identity, is a well-recognized psycho-pathology. Jews, just like any other human beings, are not immune to it. Therefore, Jews can be antisemites. Such "auto-antisemitism" (Theodore Lessing's term), like any self-hatred is explained psycho-historically.

Once the hypothesis is clearly formulated, the next step is to search for data that can contradict it. The deductive nature of this method stands in contrast to inductive reasoning; the hypothesis is proven wrong when a single contradictory instance arises, such as the discovery of a black swan after assuming all swans are white. This deductive cycle — formulating a hypothesis and testing it against relevant data — drives scientific progress. It is not based on an accumulation of data, as is often seen in historical studies, but on the careful testing of a well-defined hypothesis.

RESULTS (Interview)

The main conclusion of this work is that antisemitism is a psychological dynamic created by borrowed monotheism. This dynamic generates a complex of inferiority and existential envy among those who have adopted monotheistic beliefs. Existential envy, in turn, leads to the painful, self-destabilizing psychological complex. This inferiority complex inevitably transforms into hatred and violence.

Antisemites, driven by a need to prove to themselves that they are not inferior to Jews, seek to demonstrate their superiority. This is often achieved performatively — by humiliating, oppressing, or even killing Jews. In this way, they attempt to resolve their deep psychological issues through violent acts, using these actions as a form of therapy.

This phenomenon is largely present among individuals with Christian or Muslim backgrounds, although not all the people with these backgrounds are antisemites. People among them who are not antisemitic do not experience the same complex of inferiority. However, they may still question why so many around them hold antisemitic views. Cultures not rooted in Christianity or Islam (e.g., China, Japan, India) do not have indigenous antisemitic traditions.

In addition, individuals can change their views. Through experiences such as educational settings, some antisemites, upon recognizing their own antisemitic beliefs, feel shame because of their inferiority and undergo a transformation, shifting from antisemitism to actively fighting against it. This suggests that self-awareness and education can play a critical role in addressing and overcoming antisemitism.

DISCUSSION

What Is Antisemitism (Essay)

"Antisemitism" is a code word, referring specifically and exclusively to the Jew-hatred. Unlike many other words, it was invented intentionally — by the German leftist small-time writer Wilhelm Marr in 1871 — to replace the traditional term for Jew-hatred, "anti-Judaism," and to stress that the nature of the sentiment was racial, rather than religious (religious Jew-hatred was thereby subsumed in racial Jew-hatred). The word is nothing but a sign for the sentiment. Therefore, it applies to all the expressions of the hostility to the Jews *as a group* (i.e., as a race, a religion, a class, a state) and, unlike a symbol, is not open to interpretation. In distinction to symbols naturally evolving out

of the changing contexts, intentionally invented signs are inseparable from the referent which they were originally intended to signify. All arguments about antisemitism as if it represents a reality out there, independent of the term (e.g., Arabs are Semites, therefore cannot be anti-Semites), are irrelevant[4], they do not touch on the phenomenon of Jew-hatred (Lewis, 2005; Herf, 2009).

When the object of hatred is a group, rather than individuals, individuals are not seen as agents but as embodiments of the group agency. It is then justified to hate completely innocent people who have done nothing wrong and even theoretically could not have done anything wrong, babies and children. Put in this emblematic — explicitly symbolic — position, individuals are hated not because of what they do, but because of what they are. This testifies to the *irrational* nature of antisemitism (Jew-hatred) — that is, to its rationally unjustifiable character (Greenfeld, 2013).[5]

From its earliest origins antisemitism, *adversus Iudaeos,* was expressed in a furiously emotional language, i.e., ranting. It was — and propagated — hatred. To quote from the preaching of just one 4th century saint: Jews were "the most worthless of all men. They are lecherous, greedy, rapacious. They are perfidious murderers of Christ. They worship the Devil. Their religion is a sickness. The Jews are the odious assassins of Christ and for killing God there is no expiation possible, no indulgence or pardon. Christians may never cease vengeance, and the Jew must live in servitude forever. God always hated the Jews. It is essential that all Christians hate them." (St. Ambrose, 379 AD)

Hatred is a psychological phenomenon. Its explanation must, at the very least, have a psychological component. Occasional hatreds are, no doubt, contingent; their psychological component — the human ability to hate — is nothing but a condition in which historical (contextual) causes are allowed to operate. But a continuously targeted hatred, cutting through particular historical contexts, while, perhaps, triggered (strengthened and activated) by historical contexts, is caused, and must be fully explained, psychologically. Its relevant historical context, or framework, includes all the particular historical contexts within which it occurs, depriving them of causal significance; it is the historical context which creates the specific psychological dynamic.

What are the psychological dynamics of a continuous targeted hatred? In my studies of nationalism, I was able to trace it to a *complex of collective inferiority.* Though always personally experienced, a continuous hatred which lasts for generations cannot be related to personal grievances or offences by particular individuals; it must derive from a grievance of a group against another group. It is necessarily irrational, not provoked by the threat to objective, i.e., actually entertained and empirically provable interests and attempts to realize them, because such interests change from generation to generation, as do the agents who oppose them. Nationalism, which was created as a result of an historical accident, a unique set of circumstances in England, that could not be replicated anywhere else, spread through importation, first, from England, then from societies that defined themselves as nations early in the process. (Thus, France imported its nationalism from England; Germany from France and England; Russia and numerous other societies from the generalized West.) Importer societies or their agents *chose* the source of importation as their model, an object of admiration deserving of imitation. Originally, they believed

4 This is analogous to the patently absurd scenario of a gazelle mentally debating whether the smell of a lion truly represents the lion's presence. As the introduction to the second edition of the Arabic translation of *Mein Kampf* made clear and as Nazi officials on numerous occasions explained to Arab diplomats, the term "antisemitism" and the corresponding sentiment applied only to Jews. See, *inter alia*, Bernard Lewis (posthumous), "The New Antisemitism: First Religion, Then Race, Then What?" *The American Scholar*, December 2005; *Jeffrey Herf, Nazi Propagnada for the Arab World.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

5 Indeed, the inability to distinguish between symbols and their referent (in distinction to signs and their referents, which are indistinguishable) is a symptom of psychotic disease. Far from being an expression of human animal nature, as presupposed by the idea of antisemitism as a variety of natural xenophobia, antisemitism belongs with varieties of mental diseases of *organically unknown origin*, such as depression, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, and milder expressions (at the time of Freud's popularity called "neuroses") of their specter. The stubborn refusal of these obviously real diseases to reveal their biological causes, despite the enormous effort and money spent on research into them, means that their origins at least as well may be cultural – in agreement with the brief exposition above, namely, that these mental diseases are diseases of the mind, the cultural – symbolic, historical, mental – process on the individual level. See Liah Greenfeld, *Mind, Modernity, Madness: The Impact of Culture on Human Experience*, HUP, 2013.

this source to be superior to themselves — and themselves, naturally, inferior to the source and in need of improvement through imitation — but were certain that they would a) soon become equal to, if not better than, their models and b) be admired by them for their efforts. As a rule, this optimistic anticipation was not fulfilled: equality proved impossible or at least was infinitely delayed, and, worse than that, the models might have regarded being imitated as a compliment to themselves but never thought much of the imitators' efforts. Thus, the imitators were left with the nagging sense of the inerasable superiority of their models and insupportable, humiliating suspicion of their own permanent inferiority.

Under this emotional distress their initial admiration of the model gave way to a much less benign sentiment of envy — existential envy, that is, the envy of the model's existential significance which, by comparison, deprived the imitators' very existence of value. A powerful irritant, constantly rekindled by the model's presence, this envy poisoned them from within, festered, and turned to hatred. Actuated by hatred, they then transformed the model into the anti-model, ascribing to it as many vices as they previously discerned in it virtues and making the struggle against it a central orientation of their national consciousness. (The vices were likely to be the virtues turned upside down or, very often, the very vices they recognized in themselves, that originally made them feel inferior to the model.) Following Nietzsche and Scheller, I called this psychological syndrome *ressentiment*. In its nature it is not very different from the process triggered by (born of) "mimetic desire" which Rene Girard recognized in ancient Greek tragedy and used in the explanation of the centrality of violent sacrifice in the practice of Greek religion.[6] One does not have to see in "mimetic desire" a universal historical mechanism everywhere tying the sacred to violence (as Girard appears to argue) to appreciate the



6 Rene Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, first published in French in 1972.

power of profound envy, necessarily based on the sense of inferiority, to generate hatred and violence. The connection between making a recognized superior one's model to imitate (thereby acknowledging one's inferiority), the frustration of the mimetic desire (to become the same as the model), the transformation of the model into the anti-model to be destroyed (to assuage this frustration), and violence, observed in such different historical contexts as Greek religion and tragedy, on the one hand, and the spread of nationalism in the 18th and 19th centuries proves this power. In the case of the spread of nationalism, interestingly, *ressentiment* would be particularly lasting and pervasive when the material resources of the importing society encouraged it to compete with its model for dignity (standing in the world, international prestige) and it had no history of recognized cultural achievement prior to developing national consciousness. German, Russian, and Arab nationalisms clearly attest to this.

Jew-hatred, antisemitism, belongs to the same class of psychological phenomena. Motivated continuously and irrespective of the specific historical context by the sense of inferiority to Jews, existential envy of them, in contrast to common forms of hostility to the out-group, which are always context-dependent, antisemitism is irrational. As such it emerges only with the spread of Christianity beyond its original Jewish converts (Carroll, 2002; Fredriksen, 2014; Vinzent, 2020).[7] While anti-Zionism, demonstrably irrational as it is, is unquestionably an expression of antisemitism, Ancient Egyptian, Babylonian, Hellenistic, and Roman hostility to the Jewish kingdoms and original territorial community is not. This ancient hostility was perfectly rational; it was a hostility to an enemy (however special because of its obdurate resistance)[8] which frustrated one's political interests, similar to the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and Ukraine, England and France, Greece and Percia, Athens and Sparta, Rome and Germania, Rome and Britannia, Rome and Gaul, etc. This fundamentally rational attitude does not merit being called antisemitism. Antisemitism does not result from any declared political (or economic) interest; the interest it expresses cannot be declared, because its very acknowledgment would prevent its realization (indeed, very often antisemitism goes against the antisemites' declared interests)[9]: it is a way to assuage the pain of the complex of inferiority which necessarily arises from comparing the antisemite's community (religious or political) to the Jews, a form of self-therapy which won't work if one understands its psychological roots (Aronson, 2006; Mosse, 2006).

It should be noted that rationally-motivated violence differs in kind from violence that is motivated irrationally. Violence accompanying rational (political) conflicts is *instrumental*, when the declared goal is achieved, it ceases. In modern warfare, the destruction of enemy combatants puts an end to the conflict. It is the efficiency of combat, not the suffering inflicted on the enemy, that is valued. Even regarding the enemy combatants, persuasion is preferred to killing. Even if killing is unavoidable, the speed, not cruelty of death is what matters (just as happens in the animal world: predators must eat — they kill as quickly as possible and do not torture their victims). Collateral damage, destruction of civilian lives, as a rule, is regretted. Even if

7 In the first two Christian centuries, with the overwhelming majority of Christians still Jews, antisemitism does not yet exist. The New Testament is no more an expression of antisemitism than the Hebrew Bible, although both provide "a gold mine" for future antisemites, for they represent a record of Jewish self-criticism and arguments, however passionate and acrimonious, of Jews against other Jews. See, among others, James Carroll, *Constantine's Sword: The Church and the Jews, A History*, 2002; Paula Fredriksen, "Jewish Romans, Christian Romans, and the Post-Roman West: The Social Correlates of the *contra Iudaeos* Tradition," pp. 23-53 in I. S. Yuval and R. Ben-Shalom (eds.), *Conflict and Religious Conversation in Latin Christendom: Studies in Honor of Ora Limor*, 2014; Markus Vinzent, "'Christianity': A Response to Roman-Jewish Conflict," pp. 473-489 in Katell Berthelot (ed.), *Reconsidering Roman Power: Roman, Greek, Jewish and Christian Perceptions and Reactions*, 2020.

8 Vinzent, op. cit., writes: "The last of the Jewish revolts (132-135) … was the bloodiest war ever waged by a Roman Emperor … 'one of the most difficult 'police actions' of Rome.' [Dio Cassius noted] the losses on the Roman side which seem to have outweighed those of the Jews: 'Therefore Hadrian in writing to the senate did not employ the opening phrase commonly affected by the emperors, 'If you and your children are in health, it is well: I and the legions are in health.' … [The suppression of the revolt was a defeat for the Romans.] The humiliation remained fresh in Roman memory." Pp. 475-476.

9 Diverting German trains needed to bring troops to the front during WWII to instead deliver Jewish children, women, and elderly to the gas chambers is only one well-known example of the irrationality of antisemitism. See, for instance, George Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology*; Shlomo Aronson, *Hitler, the Allies and the Jews*, CUP, 2006.

intentionally pursued in the interest of persuasion, as in the bombing of Dresden or (however inexcusable) the Japanese cities, it is the speed of destruction, not the cruelty of the process that matters.

Not so with violence inspired by a psychopathology such as inferiority complex and the resulting *ressentiment*. In such a case violence, directed specifically at civilians irrespective of age or sex, who pose no objective threat to perpetrators whatsoever, is *expressive*, and the achievement of the declared military goal has virtually nothing to do with it. It can end only with the complete emotional relief (which it is its actual goal to provide) of those who initiate it. In its exercise cruelty, suffering inflicted on the victims before death, is more important than efficiency, even if, as in killing by gas, it is paid lip-service. Torture and humiliation of the defenseless victims, by starvation, transportation without water in packed cattle wagons, and beatings, by such senseless affronts as mandatary undressing before being put to death, all of which give the perpetrators the sense of superiority over the people in their power, are essential for this kind of violence.[10] The perpetrators *enjoy* what they do — they undoubtedly experience an influx of endorphins — which counteracts the disturbing sense of inferiority which turns them into violent haters — sadists[11] — in the first place (Lobbestael, 2023). This violence, however, provides the perpetrators only temporary relief[12], which is why it is constantly renewed. The continued collective existence itself of the victims (not to mention their successes) sustains the perpetrators' complex of inferiority, and nothing but extermination — ultimate humiliation of the object of their existential envy — can relieve them permanently. Given this *psychological*, this psychopathological, nature of Jew-hatred, nothing but the disappearance of Jews from history as a recognizable group can lead to the disappearance of antisemitism.

Antisemitic expressive violence insists on presenting itself as defensive in a rational, instrumental way, a response to specific actions or threats of the Jews. These threats are always imaginary, reflecting cultural tropes — be they deicide, financial control of the world, or settler colonialism — not reality. In the modern era, these presumed crimes and dangers often take the form of actual schizophrenic delusions as in Hitler's literal conception of Jews as parasites, which his audience might have considered a metaphor but he most probably truly believed, or — fortunately private — psychotic fantasies of John Nash.

Why Is There Antisemitism (Essay)

Now we can tie all these historical, sociological, and psychological considerations together and, at last, explain antisemitism, answering the innocent question my Chinese erstwhile student asked and I found startling. It requires a true outsider's perspective to see that antisemitism runs like a red thread through the entire history of the cultural framework which unites all Western societies[13] — all societies, that is, that are Western from the point of view of China and India.

In the encompassing view of these two ancient civilizations, the West is composed, in the main, of Christianity and Islam, meaning that it is, in fact and as suggested in the brief discussion of civilizations in this essay, the monothe-

10 The symbol of the Holocaust and the measure of its crime is six million of the Jewish dead, a third of the Jewish people. However staggering the figure, this focus is misplaced. It is not the number of the killed, but the *targeted* killing of Jews, unrelated to any military objective, which makes the Holocaust genocide, but even the perpetration of the genocide is not the main reason for the unique horror of this historical event. The essence of the Holocaust is the diabolical cruelty of suffering intentionally caused to those who perished in it and those who survived it. It is this intentional and inventive infliction of suffering before and in the process of killing, the only purpose of which is to demonstrate the ability of the murderers to degrade their victims and feel superior to them, which makes the massacre of the 7th of October strictly comparable in its intention to the Holocaust.

11 Sadism – enjoyment of inflicting suffering on others – is recognized as a psychopathology (mental disturbance) since 1886, when it was analyzed as such by the German psychiatrist Richard Kraft-Ebbing. For a recent review see Lobbestael J., Slaoui G., Gollwitzer M., "Sadism and Personality Disorders," *Current Psychiatry Reports*, Nov. 2023, 25(11), 569-576.

12 The temporary, performative nature of the sense of superiority they experience vis-à-vis their victims is, among other things, expressed in the desire to leave a record of it for sharing with others – in photographs, videos, or (as happened on October 7) mobile phone calls in real time: "See, I actually did shoot, behead, torture Jewish children!" "We actually made naked Jewish women run to gas chambers in the snow," "Mommy, mommy, be proud of your son: I just killed ten defenseless Jews!"

13 Though a remarkably comprehensive historian, such as David Nirenberg (in *Anti-Judaism*, op. cit.), could reach this conclusion on a purely inductive basis.

istic civilization. And a distinguishing feature of this civilization, uniting the many Christian and post-Christian, Muslim and post-Muslim societies despite their numerous differences, is antisemitism. Our socio-cultural world is based on monotheism. In other words, all of our civilization's creative qualities were conditioned, if not directly caused, by monotheism and would not be possible without it. This, in turn, means that it developed out of the Jewish civilization, which preceded its formation by some three thousand years[14] and was later incorporated in it, never losing its formative influence. Today the monotheistic civilization is shared by over 4 billion people, more than a half of the human population. If, to make calculations easier, we limit ourselves to 4 billion, 99,9605% of people the monotheistic civilization today contains (i.e., 4 billion minus 15 million Jews) are those for whom monotheism is not original, their own, but ***borrowed***. It is still monotheism — the faith in One God, with everything that follows from such faith. But this God is borrowed from the Jews, and this is recognized in the Holy Scriptures (such as the Bible and the Quran) and by the faithful.



Borrowed monotheism inevitably leads to 1) the complex of religious inferiority and 2) existential envy — *ressentiment*, hatred — towards the people whose God is borrowed/from whom God is borrowed. Antisemitism, in other words, is implicit in it. *Our civilization — the monotheistic civilization, almost entirely a civilization of borrowed monotheism — may be properly named* ***the antisemitic civilization.***

As was noted above, it has been observed in widely divergent contexts that what Girard calls "mimetic desire" — a desire for making one's own an admired possession or quality of another and the choice of this other as a model for imitation — under certain conditions leads to the paradoxical transformation of the admiration into hatred and of the model into the anti-model. This happens when the appropriation of the desired possession or quality proves impossible and the model refuses the imitator recognition. Given that the imitator, by definition, regards oneself or one's group as inferior to the model (an individual or a group), the initial sense of inferiority develops into a self-destabilizing psychological complex and leads to *ressentiment*. The enormous creative potential of *ressentiment* on the group level — its ability to shape collective consciousness and orient action is clearly demonstrated in the history of nationalism, the development of collectivistic ethnic nationalism, specifically. An expression of the sense of inferiority by comparison to the model one (architects of an imported nationalism) wants to imitate, it is experienced as a feeling of existential envy,

14 Some historians point to the fact that, this early, Jewish monotheism was practiced rather inconsistently. This is so. It should be stressed that the behavior of a population is only one and not necessarily the most accurate marker of the character of a belief system, not even actual beliefs of a population would often accurately reflect it. Beliefs require articulation. Most people do not have articulate beliefs, unless they are spelled out in authoritative texts. A complex, elaborate belief system such as Jewish monotheism (which, among other things, encourages thinking and discourages ritualistic repetition that leads to the formation of tropes) must be codified in written language and transmitted over generations before it can be expected to be adequately attested to in widespread practice. In the sixth century BCE, such a codification of monotheism came into being in the Hebrew Bible. There it was: consistent monotheism, with a truly universal deity at its source, and the monotheistic image of reality.

the desire for one's nation to replace/take the place of the initially admired other and, in full blossom, hatred which becomes built into the national identity and consciousness through the transvaluation, inversion of the borrowed values and the projection of one's originally unproblematically, and then only dimly, perceived vices onto the model turned anti-model. (That's why ethnic nationalism, built on *ressentiment*, is so often exclusionary, encouraging the identification of nationalism as such as right-wing, the prime example being Germany).

The same psychological dynamic may be operative on the level above nationalism — that of civilization — when the first civilizational principles are borrowed and civilizational identity of the borrower by definition references the lender and is not self-sufficient. This makes the permanence and ubiquity of antisemitism within the monotheistic civilization — in which it has been operative — understandable. Judaism is the foundation of the monotheistic (i.e. Western) civilization. The One God billions of Christians and Muslims worship is the Jewish God, the God of the Hebrew Bible, the Creator of and the central participant in the history of the Jewish people it depicts. The attention of Christians and Muslims is of necessity fixed on Jews[15]; their identity (as Christians and as Muslims) is not self-sufficient, it depends on a justification of their separation from Jews, on explaining why they (Christians and Muslims) — believers as they are in the Jewish God — are not Jews themselves. Psychologically, this cannot be explained by their being insufficiently good Jews, it must be explained by some egregious failing on the part of the Jews.[16]

The psychological problem in which Christianity and Islam find themselves as a necessary result of their acceptance of Jewish monotheism is dramatically magnified by to them undeniable God's choice of the Jews as His own people far ahead and above them. They know that, *in the eyes of God*, they are inferior to the Jews. God's obvious preference forever replays the parable of Cain and Abel for Christians and Muslims: they forever envy the Jews this preference and are forever doomed to seek the latter's perdition. *Lest they deny their own identity — they must be anti-Semitic,* in other words. Indeed, this is a sibling rivalry of sorts, on a very large scale: a futile and therefore endless competition for the love of the supremely important parent, once and for all given to the eldest child.

Of course, this is not the problem affecting the majority of Christians and Muslims: the vast majority are practicing their faith without ever giving thought to such questions or any doctrinal matter. This problem bothers only the small theologically-literate thinking elite. But it is this elite which spreads the word and, while doing so, creates *tropes* — the most important instrument of institutionalization. Whenever we speak of systemic or institutionalized this or that (e.g., in this country, we often speak of institutionalized racism), we do in fact speak of tropes which define our subconscious — i.e., not explicit — attitudes, attitudes we would in many cases explicitly deny, if asked point blank whether we subscribe to them. It is in this way that attitudes that become politically incorrect persist. And, obviously, the longer an attitude is transmitted through tropes, the deeper its institutionalization goes and the more it is resistant to the counteraction of newer institutions, such as new standards of political correctness, for instance. Within our, monotheistic, civilization antisemitism is the deepest embedded — the oldest, the strongest — institution, and, unfortunately, it cannot be said that in the past 2000 years it has often become politically incorrect.

Tropes, Christianity and Islam (Reduced from the essay)

The rational interests, always produced by specific historical contexts, and therefore the specific historical contexts, whether social or textual, can only add to the description of the circumstances and manner in which antisemitism expressed itself in any particular episode; they do not help us to *understand* antisemitism. Antisemitism is explained by antisemites' emotional interests, that is, their unacknowledged psychological needs. That this is so is demonstrated by the comparison of the Christian and Islamic antisemitic traditions. Different in every historical detail of the development of Jew-hatred in them, they are identical in

15 That's why 2 billion 400 million people in our half of humanity actually think and have opinions about the tiny group of 15 million among them, while being unaware of much larger groups.

16 Which easily explains the obsession of the United Nations with Israel's iniquities.

its nature and expressions, down to specific tropes. This means that even looking for the origins of antisemitism in the entire cultural histories of these two great religions (namely, on the level of functionally-integrated systems of institutions — which is the highest, most general level on which history is practiced) is futile. Its psychological (psycho-historical) sources lie much deeper — on the level of civilizations. Jew-hatred is the core expression of the psycho-cultural dynamics of our, monotheistic, civilization in the framework of which both Christianity and Islam arose and have evolved. (For more details, read my article *A New Explanation of Antisemitism: Jew Hatred as a Civilizational Phenomenon*; Greenfeld, 2024)

Nationalism (Essay)

And the rest, as the saying goes, is history.

Between the 16th and the 20th century, the age-old religious consciousness among Europeans and people of European descent was replaced by the new secular consciousness — nationalism. In the 20th century, it reached the world of the youngest monotheism as well and joined the religious consciousness, without replacing it, there. The appeal of nationalism within the monotheistic civilization was irresistible. At the core of the national consciousness was the vision of the social world as consisting of the natural sovereign communities of fundamentally equal members with a shared identity — *nations* — whose sovereignty and equality (implying democracy, incidentally) endowed the personal identities of their every member with dignity. Dignity, once tasted (or even sniffed in the wind), proved to be strongly addictive; its withdrawal, any threat to it would provoke a fierce reaction. Because their personal dignity derived from the membership in a nation, national populations developed deep commitment to the dignity — *international* prestige or standing — of the nation, and this being a relative good, changing with the standing of other nations, nationalism resulted in a constant, endless international competition for dignity in every possible sphere of life: economy, political influence, military prowess, women's beauty, sports, literature, music, and the measure of national intelligence — science. The society and politics nationalism created — modern society and politics — on both the individual and the collective levels are highly competitive and so, conflictual. The bone of contention in most of the conflicts on the individual level and in *all* modern conflicts on the collective level, whatever is their declared reasons, is dignity (Greenfeld, 1992, 2019).[17]

Jew-hatred has been the most characteristic and enduring institution of the monotheistic civilization, its distinguishing institution, since the separation of Christianity from Judaism in the early CE. In the end of the 19th century, in Germany, as mentioned earlier, it was re-named *antisemitism*. The new name signified the secularization of the old way of thinking and acting (i.e., of the old institution). Seamlessly, with all the tropes retained, religious Jew-hatred morphed into the national/racial Jew-hatred[18], religious existential envy became national/racial existential envy, and sense of religious inferiority was replaced by the sense of national/racial inferiority. Nationalism secularized the thinking within monotheistic societies in the sense of focusing it (the same thinking) on this world. It dramatically reduced the significance of the transcendental in everyday life and made the collective aspects of the everyday (politics, in particular) the sphere of the sacred. In this new, secular, form numerous central qualities of monotheistic consciousness — such as the belief in the unity of the world, universal values, insistence on uniformity, for instance — were retained. But nationalism changed the specific image of both social and natural reality. As a result of the changed image of social reality, remarkably, both the complex of inferiority and the sentiment of existential envy became far more widespread than they ever were, now affecting not only the educated (who became much more numerous), but reaching every group in society. Every comparison was now invidious, and one could feel inferior to and envious of anybody. The targets of these emotions changed with circumstances,

17 On nationalism, see Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Harvard University Press, 1992; *Nationalism: A Short History*, Brookings Institution Press, 2019.

18 Nationalism developed in three distinct types: individualistic-civic (with the original, English, case setting the example), collectivistic-civic (with the example set by France), and the most common type, the collectivistic-ethnic, or racial (with the paradigmatic examples set by Russia and Germany), ibid.

but whoever else targeted, the Jews invariably would be among them. They have remained *the focus of ressentiment*. Antisemitism, therefore, a thriving social institution as it was within the original religious framework because of the derivative nature of Christianity and Islam, with nationalism gained new vigor and entered the modern secular age as it were with a new lease on life. In its national/racial incarnation it continued as a truly popular — ubiquitous and pervasive — way of thinking and feeling.[19]

The arrival of nationalism brought religion down to earth, sacralizing the political sphere in particular, but barely touched anti-Jewish tropes, deriving from the relationship between God and communities of the faithful. New tropes appeared in Calvinist Protestantism, which encouraged the growth of the original, English, nationalism, and then of the American nationalism, directly issuing from the latter, such as the reference to Puritans as the "New Israel" or "New American Israel" and "all men are created equal." But they were not able to dislodge the old ones. Nevertheless, nationalism, which focused the attention on this, experiential, world and withdrew it from transcendental spheres, at least among those with any degree of modern secular education, changed the nature of antisemitism. From a fundamentally religious attitude it did transform into a fundamentally racial one. Antisemitism was, in fact, the very first form racism took. In the end of the 18th century, one of the earliest spokesmen for the yet unformed German people and the still less formed European unity, Herder, referred to Jews as "the Asiatic alien folk." Since Jewish "blood" did not naturally ooze from the European soil (as the blood of the forest-dwellers who converted to Christianity a thousand years after Jews created it presumably did), Jews evidently contributed nothing to the European culture — or civilization — which, it was felt at the time, was leading the cultural development (that is, development in the quality which made humans godlike, intelligence) of humanity. This, in turn, contributed to the emergence of the modern Greek myth — the conviction that the source of Western civilization (its fundamental values, its ways of thinking) was Ancient Greece, that Homer, not the Hebrew Bible, was its foundational text.

Wilhelm Marr, the inventor of the new name for the old sentiment of Jew-Hatred, was a "progressive" and the "Anti-Semitic League" he founded, the first explicitly anti-Jewish *political* organization, was socialist in its general character. Soon other German socialists, including Jews, were heard to define antisemitism as "the socialism of the uncouth (*dummen Kerls*)." They did not judge these "dummen Kerls" too harshly as, apart from antisemitism (forgivable on the account of their lack of sophistication), their heart was obviously in the right place — namely, on the left. National Socialists were to carry the torch half a century later; socialists too, though on the right, they gave nationalism a bad name that has lasted much longer than the opprobrium which, by association with them, for a short time was attached to antisemitism.

Turned political with nationalism, antisemitism found welcome on the left as well as on the right; it was at home, therefore, everywhere in the modern politics. What, besides social inertia — that is, the self-perpetuation of 2000-year-old anti-Semitic tropes or systemic, institutionalized antisemitism — explains this? Was there a cause that activated these conditions? Indeed, there was: it was the envy of Jewish achievement in modern societies.

Perhaps the greatest representative of this achievement, Albert Einstein, thought an old fable threw "into bold relief the mainsprings of political anti-Semitism." The fable told of

19 In her speech on the receipt of the Moral Courage Award (May 4, 2006), Ayaan Hirsi Ali said to her Jewish audience: "I used to hate you… When we had no water, I thought you closed the tap… If my mother was unkind to me, I knew you were definitely behind it. If and when I failed an exam, I knew it was your fault. You are by nature evil, you had evil powers and you used them for evil ends. Learning to hate you was easy. Unlearning it was difficult." This is an example of antisemitism generated by Islamic antisemitic tropes, but clearly modernized and applied to experiences of someone living in a secular world. It is very likely that American students expressing hatred of their Jewish schoolmates these days are similarly programmed. Generally dissatisfied with their lives, stressful, competitive, and meaningless as they are, insecure and confused in their sense of self, and unsure to what to attribute their feeling of malaise, they find a relieving certainty in connecting it to the Jews — by definition representatives of evil in the world. Tropes preclude thinking; they simply press the correct buttons; they always make sense. The old Soviet "Armenian Radio" joke reports the following question and answer exchange between a member of the audience and a radio host: "Listener: Who is responsible for the silting of Lake Baikal? — Radio host: Jews and cyclists. — Listener: Why cyclists?" Hearing "cyclists" is unexpected; one must think about it. But it makes perfect sense that Jews are responsible for the silting of Lake Baikal.



a shepherd boy who counselled the horse: "You are the noblest beast that treads the earth. You deserve to live in untroubled bliss; and indeed your happiness would be complete were it not for the treacherous stag. But he practiced from youth to excel you in fleetness of foot. His faster pace allows him to reach the water holes before you do. He and his tribe drink up the water far and wide, while you and your foal are left to thirst," and the horse was "blinded by envy and hatred of the stag" (Einstein, 1960). For Einstein, the stag in this fable represented Jews, the horse common anti-Semites, and the shepherd boy the ideological, intellectual anti-Semitic leadership.[20]

In other words, we did too well, we excelled. Of course, in every nation, the overwhelming majority of the successful have always been non-Jews, but the very Jewishness of the Jews made them more visible. Here we were, a small minority struggling against all sorts of discrimination and difficulties, ending on top. The fact that so many of us could not beat the odds, were exhausted by the need to always do uphill battle, and settled for much less, the fact that the overwhelming majority of Jews in Eastern Europe (home to the majority of the world's Jews, when Einstein had this conversation) were so poor that the only success they could contemplate was having enough bread to feed their children from day to day would be disregarded,[21] and only the Einsteins and the Rothschilds were seen (Londres, 2017). We were surely treacherous stags, controlling the world, exercising our well-known "deadly dominion" over it. Our obvious control of the world and evil powers made things easy for us, which were difficult for everyone else. Therefore, our success was no reason for admiration, it was unfair, to be detested. In accordance with the new image of reality, however, it was no longer a result of a Satanic pact. Rather, our superiority (evil because it made the rest of the world feel bad) was innate — racial.

Invidious comparisons necessitated by nationalism could be more or less destabilizing to an identity in relation to the extent they threatened one's dignity or were humiliating.

20 Albert Einstein, "Why do they hate the Jews?" (From Collier's Magazine, New York, November 26) 1938), pp. 191-194 in *Ideas and Opinions by Albert Einstein*, Crown Publishers, 1960.

21 See Albert Londres (a non-Jew), *The Wondering Jew Has Arrived*, originally published in French in 1930, for descriptions of crushing poverty of Jewish communities in Eastern Europe in 1929.

Some Jewish achievement, therefore, has been harder to bear than others. Here is an illuminating exchange of comments to the already mentioned Russophone vlog by Kukuha, "Why everyone hates Jews." A popular answer among the non-antisemitic minority (43%) among the audience of the vlog was that Jew-hatred was caused by envy resulting from the unflattering to Gentiles interpersonal competition with Jews. In particular, competition in intelligence would have this effect, consistently proving Gentiles to be inferior in regard to a natural quality directly affecting dignity. Someone calling himself "Grandpa Kabayev," began by quoting Churchill: "We have no antisemitism [in England] because [the English] do not consider Jews to be more intelligent" and continued: "Gumiliov has shown that at the root of Jew-hatred [you find] purely economic reasons. Wherever a Jewish community would appear the indigenous population won't be able to compete with it. In the spheres of finance, commerce, numerous crafts. For reference: how many non-Jews are there among world champions in chess?" The comment is met with an explosion of reactions, among which there is one by Khiomi Redmi: "Because they are crooks. [In his autonomous republic there is a saying:] an adulterer and a thief have a long tongue [speaks well]. You will never change. But you will have to get out of Palestine." Grandpa Kabayev is surprised: "Who — 'we'? I am Russian [i.e., not a Jew] and live close to Moscow. Don't see Palestine in the vicinity." A certain Valeriy Krylov interferes: "Read Gogol, Dostoyevsky and a number of other classical [authors] you'll find Judeophobes." Grandpa answers: "Yes. All because of envy. I love sports, have experience with athletics and a bit with chess. People do not take offense if they lose in some sport competition. But [when it comes to] chess… [he stops in mid-sentence]… And all because nothing is more offensive than to recognize that you are stupider [than someone]. [If someone is] stronger, faster, more precise [this is] bullshit. But more intelligent! This is intolerable." It is fortunate that for most people Nobel prizes mean nothing. There is no more impressive measure of intelligence in our world. The realization that 0.2% of the world population — the "vilest," the "filthiest," and "denied high mental qualities" 0.2% — represent 22% of the most intelligent people in the world, carrying more than one hundred times in intelligence its numerical weight in the human race, would hurt like a bad toothache. As it is, most antisemites envy the Jews just their economic and professional success. The visible existence of successful Jews even in these mundane areas (which, of course, proves the pernicious Jewish materialism and "fleshiness") humiliates them. It also by association with the Jews delegitimates the areas in which Jews are successful. Thus, the disrepute of capitalism in many circles, and the condemnation of anti-capitalism, Bolshevism, for instance, in many others — or, as it was so emphatically demonstrated in Germany, of both in the very same circles, contradiction notwithstanding.

In the middle of the 20th Germany perpetrated the Holocaust and the rest of the monotheistic world, being profoundly anti-Semitic, acquiesced in it, not moving a finger to save the 6 million human beings — men, women, babies — who perished in it or to spare some suffering to those who lost everything but survived. (Needless to say, we must be eternally grateful to those exceptional few who did not acquiesce.) After the Holocaust, explicit antisemitism was for a while banished from polite society in Europe and America. The calls to kill the Jews remained completely acceptable in the Muslim world and have been repeatedly acted upon in the new nations formed in the aftermath of WWII, where they continue to serve as a rallying cry in the absence of any other unifying cause. These anti-Semitic calls and corresponding persecution of Jews have been by and large responded to by dead silence on the part of the arguably more "advanced" nations whose heritage is Christian and who invited the Muslim nations to join them in the United Nations, founded with a declared goal to prevent another Holocaust.

Originally "United Nations" was the name given to themselves by the Allies who fought the Axis powers, especially United States and Britain, which they then bequeathed to the larger representative body. In these original united nations explicit antisemitism was in the very early years no longer tolerated after the Holocaust, and on both sides of the Iron Curtain which soon separated them. When inexplicit, however, it remained alive and well even there and then. (It is not surprising that it persisted behind the Iron Curtain: there this could be regarded as part of the totalitarian wickedness. But it is amazing, in fact, how much of it one saw, if one bothered to look, in the leading Western democracies even before the beginning of the first post-war decade of 1950s.) Nevertheless, the name of the old hostility, obstinately seeking expression, had to change. Therefore, it did. Both in the So-

viet Union and in the Free World, joined with it in the new Cold War, Jew-hatred now presented itself as anti-Zionism. The bright idea to cover the despicable prejudice based on envy with the noble progressive concern for the rights of the downtrodden and opposition to imperialism ("bourgeois" in Soviet rhetoric, "white" in that of the Free World) certainly worked and Jew-hatred was made legitimate again. It would work particularly well among the educated, Einstein's "shepherd boys": the uneducated anti-Semites, not being sticklers for rules of etiquette, had no need for new fancy names. It could be said that, just as antisemitism was earlier the socialism of the uncouth, anti-Zionism was now the antisemitism of the sophisticated.

Israel became the treacherous stag, hated for its agility, for its excellence. This is understandable, it has been eminently provoking. A wonder to the world, which transformed into a flourishing garden a worthless spot of empty land, thrown to its half a million of pre-independence residents (many of them teenage Holocaust survivors just out of the death camps and off the boat) as a dry bone to a dying dog by the largesse of the United Nations, is envied for drying pestilential swamps, near which no one lived and irrigating desert where nothing grew before, for raising a global city out of nothing, for emerging in barely one human lifespan as one of the most vibrant societies on the planet. Its astonishing victories over the armies of surrounding states, dozens of times exceeding it in population and resources, which attacked it upon the declaration of independence, and then again and again and again, irritate Western elites, from the start reconciled to the inevitable destruction of this remnant of the Jewish people, already bled dry by the Holocaust, and is taken by them as an insult to common sense and public opinion. How dare these Jews emerge even from this bloodletting successful?! Even the Holocaust becomes an object of envy. The enormity of the disaster magnifies the greatness of Israel's achievement. To the envious this is intolerable — to diminish the achievement, the Holocaust must be trivialized, if not denied outright. Now everyone claims to have a holocaust and every form of group discrimination (so long as it is not discrimination against Jews) is compared to the Holocaust. In a cynical reversal of logic, because the Holocaust was a cause for a group grievance, every cause for a group grievance, however trivial, is equated with the Holocaust. In a further twist of resentful "transvaluation of values" Israel is presented as the perpetrator of the Holocaust of Palestinian Arabs. The logic: Nazi death camps served them well, those Jews, and we were absolutely right to remain indifferent to their (likely pretended) plight, after all, they are worse than Nazis themselves, just look at the condominiums they erect in the territories they got back from the Arabs who legitimately seized them during their first legitimately aggressive attack on this white imperialist state in 1948. Off with their heads. It is under this anti-Zionist guise that antisemitism plays today across campuses in the USA and the rest of the "free world."

As to the Muslim world, the very idea of the Jewish state, not to speak of its repeatedly demonstrated superiority — military, economic, cultural — is Nakba.[22] Inability to assure the perpetual humiliation of the Jews equals intolerable humiliation for Muslims, in whose identity religious elements now are mixed with racial ones. Abul A'la al-Maududi, characterized as "the most systematic thinker of modern Islam" explains: Jews must exist in the state of submission. "The purpose for which the Muslims are required to fight is … to put an end to their sovereignty and supremacy." The *umma* remains determined, as we constantly learn. "The prophet Muhammad warned us against these people," repeats the former Jordanian MP Muhammad Tu'mah Al-Qudah on October 30, 2019. "The Koran (5:82) says: 'You shall find the people strongest in enmity towards the believers to be the Jews…' Every Muslim should read this verse. Every Muslim should memorize it and carve it onto his mind and his heart… (Our) enmity toward the Jews will never end. It will continue until the Dajjal arrives and the Jews are annihilated in the Great Battle, which will take place in the Levant, in our own land, against the Jews. The enmity between us and the Jews will never cease because it is ideological… The regimes of the world can sign agreements and peace accords with the Jews, but the people

22 Abu Bakr, op. cit.

23 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abul_A%27la_Maududi (or Mawdudi); Mawdudi's gloss on Q. 9:29 from his T*owards Understanding the Qur'an*, vol. 3, pp. 201-202 is reproduced in Bostom, *Legacy*, op. cit., p. 42.

curse the Jews whenever they recite the (opening) Al-Fatiha chapter (i.e., the 7th verse, 1:7) in the Koran" (Bostom, 2008; Wikipedia contributors, 2024). [23]

In the modern period, secularization of the reasons for which Jews are envied and hated, and of Jews themselves (now regarded as a race), and universalization/democratization of envy because of nationalism, intensifies, radicalizes, and dramatically extends the reach of antisemitism, which, in distinction to the premodern Jew-hatred that in principle could be assuaged by conversion, can be mollified only by the physical destruction. Antisemitism is a built-in, inherent, central and defining strand of the existential make-up of the monotheistic civilization and remains as important an excitant for thinking and acting today as it was in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, when it spurred on theological cogitations which created tropes that lodged themselves in the consciousness of the masses. Now, it galvanizes politics. Antisemitism is common to all the constituent parts of this civilization, uniting Christianity and Islam, otherwise opposed to each other, rival denominations of Christianity and conflicting interpretations of Islam, and, upon secularization, the contradictory, left and right, political persuasions.

In the Holocaust this civilization committed the horrific crime of parricide. The guilt was profound and widespread. But, in the attempt to cope with it, rather than face it as what this greatest crime in the history of humanity was and repent for what it was — the crime against the Jews, it allowed this patently antisemitic atrocity to be misrepresented and covered up as a paradigmatic example of the imaginary tendency of "natural xenophobia" — what humans do to other humans. The world was divided into the humans likely to be naturally xenophobic (white, of European descent, modern, enjoying the benefits of capitalist economy) in whose evil company Jews were before long included, and the "other humans" — darker in skin tone, poorer, generally lower on the scale of socio-economic development but "closer to nature" — who were imagined and rapidly came to imagine themselves as the natural victims of xenophobia. So divided, the monotheistic civilization proceeded to shred itself into pieces in a mad, unnecessary internecine war of all against all. It has lost all of its creative potential, all of its justification for being, it is ignominiously biting the dust.

The only chance to save it is to come to grips with antisemitism as the distinguishing characteristic of the monotheistic civilization. It must be at last extracted from the neural stores of unexamined memory where it has been lodged by millennia-old tropes and made a subject of open public discussion. It must be analyzed and its root in the existential envy of the Jews, that is, in

the felt, constantly experienced inferiority of Jew-haters, exposed. Perhaps then, shamed, this civilization would be able to rebuild on cleansed foundations.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

REFERENCES

Aronson, S. (2006). *Hitler, the allies, and the Jews.* Cambridge University Press.

Bostom, A. S. (Ed.). (2008). *Legacy of jihad: Islamic holy war and the fate of non-Muslims* (p. 42). Prometheus Books. (Original work by Mawdudi, *Towards Understanding the Qur'an,* vol. 3, pp. 201–202).

Carroll, J. (2002). *Constantine's sword: The church and the Jews, A History.* Mariner Books

Einstein, A. (1960). Why do they hate the Jews? In *Ideas and opinions* (pp. 191–194). Crown Publishers. (From *Collier's Magazine*, November 26, 1938)

Fredriksen, P. (2014). Jewish Romans, Christian Romans, and the post-Roman West: The social correlates of the contra Iudaeos tradition. In I. S. Yuval & R. Ben-Shalom (Eds.), *Conflict and religious conversation in Latin Christendom: Studies in honor of Ora Limor* (pp. 23–53). Brepols Publishers

Greenfeld, L. (1992). *Nationalism: Five roads to modernity.* Harvard University Press.

Greenfeld, L. (2013). *Mind, modernity, madness: The impact of culture on human experience.* Harvard University Press.

Greenfeld, L. (2019). *Nationalism: A short history.* Brookings Institution Press.

Greenfeld, L. (2024). A new explanation of antisemitism: Jew hatred as a civilisational phenomenon. *Israel Affairs,* 30(4), 579–599. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2024.2367877

Lewis, B. (2005, December 1). The new antisemitism: First religion, then race, then what? *The American Scholar.* https://theamericanscholar.org/the-new-anti-semitism/

Lobbestael, J., Slaoui, G., & Gollwitzer, M. (2023). Sadism and personality disorders. *Current Psychiatry Reports,* 25(11), 569–576.

Londres, A. (2017). *The wondering Jew has arrived* (original work published 1930). Gefen Publishing House.

Mosse, G. (2006). *The crisis of German ideology.*

Robb, K. (2019). Xenia, hiketeia, and the Homeric language of morals: The origins of Western ethics. In W. Wians (Ed.), *Logoi and muthoi: Further essays in Greek philosophy and literature* (pp. [page numbers]). SUNY Press.

Vinzent, M. (2020). 'Christianity': A response to Roman-Jewish conflict. In K. Berthelot (Ed.), *Reconsidering Roman power: Roman, Greek, Jewish, and Christian perceptions and reactions* (pp. 473–489). Publications de l'École française de Rome

Herf, J. (2009). *Nazi propaganda for the Arab world.* Yale University Press.

Wikipedia contributors. (2024, December 18). *Abul a'la Maududi.* Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abul_A%27la_Maududi

DIGITALIZATION AND MEDIATIZATION

AS TOOLS FOR FORMING NEW TYPES OF SUBJECTIVITY

DOI: https://doi.org/10.61439/ABYH1234



DR. VADYM PALAHUTA

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

- *ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4254-1625*
- *Email: palaguta@ua.fm*

Vadim Palahuta is a PhD in Philosophy, Doctor of Philosophical science, Professor of the Department of Philosophy and Pedagogy of the National University of Technology, Ukraine.

ABSTRACT

The article explores the latest opportunities for refined control over individuals by power structures within the so-called surveillance capitalism of contemporary society. It highlights the use of advanced tools of digitalization and mediatization, as well as the formation of new types of subjectivity. It identifies the mechanisms through which modern power relations in a control society (domination and coercion of individuals) emerge, differing significantly from traditional forms of governance and control in pre-modern and early modern European societies. The discussion is based on Michel Foucault's concept of socio-historical types of power relations in societies, including sovereign power, disciplinary society, and control society in its current digital form.

The paper analyzes the history of concepts such as biopower, biopolitics, and biomass introduced by Foucault, starting with his studies of disciplinary society. It demonstrates that biopower, aimed at managing masses and controlling individuals, implemented mechanisms during the disciplinary society that have evolved further in today's control society through digitalization and mediatization. Its essence involves transforming people into civilian individuals with formal democratic rights and freedoms while simultaneously maintaining the totalization of the population as biomass.

The state is shown to simultaneously undertake the functions of totalization and individualization in the formation of modern subjectivity, from which individuals attempt to escape through nomadic practices and techniques of freedom that guarantee authentic subjectivation.

It argues that with the extensive use of the socio-philosophical doctrine of neo-behaviorism, the formation of representations and behaviors of individuals is justified at all levels of their life activities. This creates conditions for the emergence of new types of subjectivity that fully satisfy neo-globalists. As a result of this long-term process of modern biopolitics, not only has the role of democratic institutions in contemporary society diminished, but neoliberalism could become the "breeding ground" for digital totalitarian regimes of governance and control.

Keywords

subjectivity, individual, digitalization, mediatization, biopolitics, biopower, biomass

INTRODUCTION

It is well known that the modern global process of globalization has chosen neoliberal values as its socio-political foundation. However, these neoliberal values no longer continue the traditional values of classical liberalism from the early and mid-20th century. Classical liberalism was based on the freedom of individual entrepreneurial activity, unregulated markets, guaranteed functioning of various democratic state institutions, and the rule of law in society. In essence, liberalism fostered ideas of state control, comprehensive rational thinking, legislative mandates, and vertical discipline. However, neoliberalism as an ideology, particularly in its modern globalist form, has very little in common with classical liberalism. Today, it has become a primary source of total control over the population as biomass, gradually descending into a new form of totalitarianism.

One of the means for disseminating neoliberal ideology has been global information corporations such as Google, Facebook, Instagram, Amazon, Twitter, and others. This has made it

possible to establish constant surveillance and control over the vast majority of the world's population. Indeed, the total digitalization and mediatization of all aspects of modern society — business, education, science, politics, leisure, and cultural preferences — has expanded enormously and quickly permeates even the personal lives of individuals in most civilized countries. Moreover, the intrusion of digital mediatization into individuals' personal lives not only affects their various social or discursive practices but also allows for continuous monitoring of their thoughts, feelings, and desires. This enables the establishment of 24/7 total control over every individual connected to information-computer networks in modern information societies. Digitalization further facilitates constant monitoring of the most intimate aspects of people's daily lives.

Thus, total digitalization and mediatization not only enable offering and advertising what individuals should buy, eat, read, watch, listen to, or how to relax but also closely track their emotional state, fears, phobias, secret desires, dreams, and much more. In other words, digitalization scans individuals from within, allowing external computer-information networks to know more about them than they might know about themselves. Consequently, the calculations of information globalists have a clear objective: by immersing ordinary individuals in the *digital world*, they ensure constant control and management over almost every aspect of their existence.

In this context, a pressing issue of a socio-humanitarian and interdisciplinary nature is studying the influence of powerful digital technologies on the process of subjectivation. This will allow us to trace the emergence of new types of subjectivity in modern society. The emergence of new types of subjectivity was anticipated by French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, who, in the early 1990s, spoke of the so-called «*dividual*», characterized by a fragmented, mutable existence stretched across various information-computer networks — «individuals become 'dividuals,' and masses become samples, markets, and data banks» (Deleuze,1997, p. 216).

ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH

Recent publications indicate global and significant socio-political and socio-economic changes in the modern world, leading to the emergence of unprecedented types of subjectivity. Recent studies directly point to possible directions for the development of modern information society, which has transitioned into its current phase — the digital media society. These societal changes inevitably result in the transformation of individuals. Such transformations, influencing the emergence of new types of subjectivity, are explored in the works of prominent contemporary scholars from various socio-humanitarian disciplines, including Giorgio Agamben (1993, 2021), H. Alemán (2023), and a series of studies by Byung-Chul Han (2011, 2015, 2017, 2023), Judith Butler (1997, 2005), Rosi Braidotti (2013), Manuel DeLanda (2006), Berardi, F. (2007). Works on these topics have also been published by Shoshana Zuboff (2019), Slavoj Žižek (1989, 2020, 2022), Peter Newman (2015), Alex Pentland (2015), Francis Fukuyama (2018, 2022), Steve Fuller (2018), Nico Carpentier (2017), Umberto Eco (1997), Francesca Ferrando (2019), Mark Fisher (2009) and other scientists and researchers.

METHODS

The research methodology corresponds to interdisciplinary studies and is inherently complex, combining the method of social constructivism to study the influence of digitalization and mediatization on the formation of new types of subjectivity. This approach is complemented by other socio-humanitarian methods such as comparative analysis, phenomenological interpretation, hermeneutic-interpretive analysis, structural-psychoanalysis, and discourse analysis in addressing the stated research topic.

PURPOSE

The main theoretical task is to examine the existential state of modern individuals under the dominance of digitalization and mediatization processes in contemporary society. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to study the consequences of implementing digital technologies as tools of neoliberal ideology, significantly affecting the formation of new types of subjectivity.

RESULTS

The analysis of the identified problem revealed that digitalization and mediatization serve as an ideal foundation for forming modern types of subjectivity.

These types of subjectivity have lost the char-

acteristics inherent in individuals of the previous liberal era and earlier times. The concepts of biopower, biopolitics, and biomass introduced by Michel Foucault were examined.

It was demonstrated that contemporary society combines the disciplinary power of previous eras with the control society, coexisting side by side. However, through large-scale digitalization and mediatization, in which powerful global information giants play a significant role, it has become possible to establish continuous governance and control over the vast majority of the world's population, fully satisfying authorities at all levels.

The implementation of global technologies for managing individual behavior as biomass, along with the process of individual digitization driven by modern neo-globalists using advanced digital technologies and artificial intelligence, was shown not only to significantly transform the subjectivity of contemporary individuals but also to condition the emergence of new types of subjectivity in the near future.

It is hypothesized that at the current stage of civil society development, an urgent search for alternatives to the global digital society is needed, as a real threat of a unique digital concentration camp organized by authorities at all levels has emerged.

Therefore, further examination of the issue should involve in-depth research into new types of subjectivity arising in the digital age, considering the simultaneous weakening and strengthening of dual power coercion, i.e., the individualization and totalization of individuals. A particularly interesting area of study is the exploration of subjectivity types that are not imposed by power structures. These alternatives to neoliberalism in the digital era — characterized by identity politics and the rhetoric of differences — enable the division of individuals, establish strict boundaries for them, and maintain them at a tolerant distance from one another.

DISCUSSION

It is known that modern society is characterized by terms such as informational, post-industrial, consumer, risk, postmodern, late modernity, programmed, advanced capitalism, achievements and others. However, the most defining feature of modern society today is total digitalization and mediatization, making «surveillance capitalism» the most appropriate definition. The genesis of such a society is linked to theatricality, conceptualized as the «society of the spectacle» by the

French philosopher and situationist Guy Debord in the late 1960s. At the time, Debord could not have imagined how accurately his characterization of society — as simultaneously digital, media-based, and theatrical — would apply to today. These definitions, to varying degrees, encompass the other aforementioned characteristics, yet total digitalization amplifies the spectacle's theatrical qualities. Spectacles, through expanded digitalization, transform reality into a stream of images, which itself becomes a «living» reality for individuals. According to Debord, what was presented as real life reveals itself simply as life *most genuinely spectacular* (Debord, 1996). This not only enables observation and control of individuals but also manipulation of the perceptions and emotions of large audiences through the extensive use of visually narrative social networks.

Key questions arise: What now defines the primary content of subjectivity in modern individuals? Who, and for what purpose, is interested in controlling and manipulating vast populations worldwide through digital and media technologies?

Indeed, for a long time it was believed that the main socio-philosophical and public idea and value of liberalism was the freedom of will of individuals, which was embodied in dynamic entrepreneurial activity. Each individual possessed certain civil rights and freedoms, aspirations for their realization, sufficient autonomy in views and actions, and the ability to make any free choice in their existence, of course, without violating generally accepted state and international laws. This foundation of human civilizational existence was always grounded in a sense of personal subjectivity, significance, and social value. Therefore, civil rights and freedoms have always been a matter of pride for capitalist business activity, a triumph of the political and social institutions of democracy.

Thus, for capitalist market relations, this is personal interest and competitive relations, in interpersonal relations individualism or collec-

tivism prevails, in consumerism — the right to choose, and the freedom provided by political rights — freedom of speech, freedom of opinion, the right to political associations, the right to privacy, the right to secrecy of correspondence and telephone conversations, etc., that is, freedom was understood as something that ensures human dignity for individuals. It should be added that social practices of freedom, which were legally enshrined in various spheres of society, tended to constantly expand and increase during the era of classical liberalism.

However, modern neoliberalism, particularly in its globalist form, features digital control. Unlike the constant surveillance typical of totalitarian societies in the recent past, this digital control is not perceived by individuals as an external limitation on their rights and freedoms. Instead, a paradox emerges where individual autonomy and sovereignty coincide with an objective control system, where the restriction or partial deprivation of democratic rights and freedoms is felt by individuals as true freedom. The fact is that in the modern consumer society, *permissiveness and free choice* become the highest individual values and needs, so social control and domination can no longer be seen as an alleged encroachment on the civil rights and freedoms of individuals.

This is what the modern ardent ideologist of neoliberalism Francis Fukuyama draws attention to, who writes that the most valuable social aspect of individual rights and freedoms, from the era of the French Revolution onward, is the very act of choice itself, which is considered by itself, separately, and has greater axiological significance than the essence of the thing being chosen, valued more than the substance of the choice (Fukuyama, 2022).

In this view, the essence of social rights and freedoms lies primarily in the ability to choose anything within permissible bounds and the indulgence in desires — regarded as the highest values in civil society. That is, according to the American political scientist, the essence of social rights and freedoms for individuals is, first of all, the right to choose everything that is within the limits of what is permitted and permissible, and permissiveness in one's desires, which is the most valuable for the life of a subject in civil society. In other words, because *permissiveness and freedom of choice* are considered the highest individual values in modern society, then there is no particular need to fear any external restrictions and control, as if they no longer exist at all.

However, this is self-deception — the digital network knows everything about individuals, down to the smallest details, thanks to the latest digital technology Big Data, which calculates, accumulates and stores all quantitative parameters, the entire voluminous database about the individual. However, this is usually not given much attention either — these «features» of civil rights and freedoms push other important civil rights and freedoms into the background at the expense of the self-perception of individuals (as if they were free and capable citizens) in a modern democratic society. But this makes them toys in the arms of not only international information and mass media corporations, but also organs of all levels and directions of state power. But how does this affect social rights and freedoms that define the process of individual subjectification in society?

To address this question, it is necessary to recall the type of power that preceded the society of digital control in which modern individuals now exist. Actually, as noted by Giorgio Agamben, concern for the life and health of subjects began to take an important place in the mechanisms of state functioning and economy as early as the XVII century, leading to the birth of po-

Francis Fukuyama in 2015
Photo credit: Gobierno de Chile
CC BY 2.0

lice science. He emphasizes that sovereign power gradually transformed into biopower, according to Michel Foucault's concept. Biopolitics of the Modern Age is characterized by the notion that life prevails over death (Agamben, 2002).

In this form of power, the focus shifts from the sovereign state to the population state, where the state takes control of the security, life, and health of its population as biomass. This exists within confined disciplinary spaces (schools, hospitals, barracks, factories, psychiatric institutions, prisons, etc.) where the population can be dispersed from disciplinary spaces. This legitimizes biopolitics as a set of control technologies for managing the behavior of large groups of people through biopower.

In his lectures at the Collège de France during 1975–1976 (Foucault, 1997), 1977–1978 (Foucault, 2004a), and 1978–1979 (Foucault, 2004b), Foucault further developed the concept of «biomass» and laid the foundations of modern biopolitics. In his lecture on March 17, 1976 (Foucault, 1997), he expanded on the concept of «biomass», which has become increasingly significant in modern times. In accordance with which, since the late 18th century, a new people management technology has been forming, distinct from disciplinary power.

While disciplinary power focused solely on controlling individual corporeality, namely, — sovereign power to govern the lives of subordinates, — this new technology begins to manage and group mass actions of populations, aiming to control random events, which can occur in a living mass, calculate the probability of some mass events and try to compensate for their adverse consequences (Foucault, 1997).

Thus, this newest power technology, on the one hand, focuses entirely on managing, controlling, and regulating mass biological processes, and allows biopower, with the availability of political, technical, and now the latest Internet technological capabilities, not only to regulate the lives of a large mass of people, but also to allow the population to exist normally and grow quantitatively. However, on the other hand, — the issue of using biopower technologies in the context of individual freedom is approached differently. In his later lectures, Foucault vividly discusses this. For example, in his January 24, 1979, lecture, he defines freedom as something produced hourly, directly linked to biomass security, and should not pose a security threat to it (Foucault, 2004b).

Thus, liberal techniques of governance and control over the population, identified as biomass, inherently involve both the production and destruction of freedom; that is, types of freedom are not guaranteed by the government, but consumed by it, it is itself a consumer of freedom; therefore its «production» of freedom always involves its restriction through strict control procedures, constant suppression, obligations, responsibilities, coercion, or even its abolition under extraordinary circumstances. And here there is no way to talk about freedom in the ontological-ethical dimension that I. Kant relied on in his works. Just at that time manipulation of rights relations, freedom, and security became routine practices in the power-population relationship.

However, biopower of disciplinary society operates in two capacities: as a protector and an overseer. It cares for the well-being and growth of the population while ensuring the health and welfare of individual subjects, doubling control over both the population and over a single individual. According to Agamben, during the disciplinary process by which state power transforms the individual (as a living being) into its specific object, a parallel process emerges, coinciding with the rise of modern democracy. Here, humans (as living beings) are no longer objects but subjects of political power.

Thus, a completely different type of power relationship between biopower and the individual was launched on a long-term basis, defined as mutual submission, which is radically different from the one-sided obedience characteristic of the authoritarian power of the sovereign of traditional society.

The mechanism of this type of bio-government is the exclusion of an individual from the mass, and then his inclusion in the biomass, reintegrating, but in other cases he can be in the form of an included/excluded one, which imposes certain obligations on the biopower itself, which allows declaring the life and freedom of the citizen as the most important strategic goal of all further biopolitics. Therefore, the subordination of biopower through the process of subjectification of individuals means its subordination by one's own consent, representing a kind of social contract with biopower.

However, presenting the concept of biopower in disciplinary societies of closed spaces, M. Foucault perfectly understood its relatively short-lived dominance in society and the «heyday» of which falls on the XIX and first half of the

XX centuries. Indeed, the disciplinary power of capitalism, primarily oriented towards the economic exploitation of manual laborers, has been, since the second half of the 20th century, in a state of deep crisis, it does not disappear anywhere, in what, in our opinion, is somewhat mistaken by Byung-Chul Han, who claims that the disciplinary society has been replaced by a society of digital control and that the society of the XXI century is a society of achievements (Leistungsgesellschaft), whose inhabitants are called subjects of achievement; this is, according to Byung-Chul Han, not a disciplinary society with its obedient subjects (Byung-Chul, 2015, 2023). But what about the numerous budgetary state institutions, organizations, and enterprises with their social practices of subjectivation, where traditional models of disciplinary power are reproduced? They will not disappear under the conditions of the existence of any type of state, which E. Goffman wrote about in his famous work «Total Institutions». Therefore, disciplinary spaces in a postmodern society — a society of control — will exist, but in the conduct of biopolitics they will no longer have the same significance as in the past times of modernity. Moreover, they will not play a decisive role in the subjectivization of individuals (Goffman, 2007).

For the modern society of control, the implementation of such a principle required and still requires the development of more sophisticated techniques of individualization or its transformation into a subject, but with the simultaneous preservation population totalization as biomass. Thus, a similar excursion into the study of historical types of power by M. Foucault, carried out by him at the end of the seventies of the last century, allows us to more clearly understand how the subjectivity of the recent past was formed and the basis of which for modern societies must simultaneously be performed by the state in the form of its totalizing and individualizing function. Actually, the biopower of the state turns out to be something that simultaneously organizes the behavior of huge masses of the population and at the same time performs identification of each individual as a citizen, which should ensure constant power control.

However, institutional structures support inequality, contributing to the preservation of the positions of elites. State and private organizations represent similar structures in which the formal organization and the organization of individuals themselves intersect and replace each other in real relationships, as the American social philosopher Manuel DeLanda draws attention to. But in his opinion, in modern society, means of control are becoming more differentiated, developed, and hard. To analyze the process of the formation of a modern legal state, DeLanda refers to the research of M. Foucault, — about the disciplinary or supervisory, police-legal origin of the state with its «permanent registration of bodies and actions», during which the territorial-

ization of society is carried out through constant accounting and military control (DeLanda, 2006, pp. 72–73).

Therefore, the most effective means of performing the controlling function over biomass is provided by the widespread introduction of digital technologies for the effective implementation of biopolitics in the new socio-political and socio-economic conditions of *neo-globalization*. At the same time, a challenge to biopower can only be raised by individuals who do not wish to become the object of biopower control, namely those who have «completed the experience within themselves», who know how to govern themselves, those who are able to constantly (in Foucault's words) demonstrate «care for themselves» as the ability to cultivate individual practices of freedom.

To prevent this from becoming a mass phenomenon, the modern bio-power of the financial, economic and political elite is working to stay ahead — further developing digitalization and medialization, which consumes huge financial and intellectual resources. This is fully facilitated by the use of the newest digital and technological capabilities, on the one hand.

On the other hand, neo-behaviorism is now «blooming», becoming one of the most popular socio-philosophical doctrines of our time in modern civil society. According to this doctrine, modern individuals, that is, individuals as representatives of biomass, can be constantly controlled, and their behavioral orientation can be shaped at all levels of their life activity through the introduction of modern Internet technologies. This is exactly what the founder of radical behaviorism, B. F. Skinner, dreamed of at one time. The American scientist denied the importance of freedom for man, he did not see an autonomous individual as such or, in his own language, an «internal homunculus» and greatly regretted that in his time, that is, in the middle and second half of the XX century, there were no technological possibilities to control and change the behavior of individuals in the necessary direction (Skinner, 2002). One of the current followers of this socio-philosophical and psychological doctrine now is A. Pentland, the author of the book «Social Physics», who radically simplified and reduced complex individual behavior to endless repetitive patterns of behavior. The author argues that there is no difference between observing humans, monkeys, or bees, which allows us to derive rules of behavior, response, and learning for the formation of a modern individual as a representative of some community. This research approach allows him to define his research program exclusively in terms of mathematical, predictive social science, which takes into account individual differences and relationships between people and makes it possible to radically change the thinking and actions of individuals. According to A. Pentland, this will allow individuals to use social network incentives to establish new norms of behavior (Pentland, 2015).

Thus, when planning biopolitics, today's globalists get into their hands a perfect tool not only for control, but also for programming the consciousness and unconscious of individuals, which cannot but worry famous modern philosophers, in particular G. Agamben (2021), H. Alemán (2023), S. Žižek (2020, 2022). The famous American sociologist and political scientist Sh. Zuboff (2019) writes in her work that today humanity has faced that historical moment when the basic right to life in the future is threatened by the ubiquitous and comprehensive digital architecture of behavioral changes, which belongs to surveillance capital and is constantly managed by it. This, in the researcher's opinion, is very dangerous for the individual and his freedom of existence.

Thus, by collecting all kinds of data about each individual, global information corporations appropriate (for their own and not only their own purposes) «behavioral surpluses», which are then used to predict what the individual will do, — not only now, but also in the near and distant future. But this, according to the idea of Sh. Zuboff, undermines the individual, who defines himself as the pillar of the institutions of democracy, which, in turn, remains the only channel for reforms, the only idea that was born from a long history of suppression of man by man and which insists on the inalienable right of people to govern themselves (Zuboff, 2019).

The essence of this threat is to make the most of the individual's «openness» to the modern digital community, his ability to tell all sorts of «stories» about himself to the audience of social networks, using the entire digital and spectacular arsenal, at the same time introducing the audience to his purely personal, intimate details of life. But the phenomenon is that then digital control is not perceived as an external restriction of the individual's activity and freedom. In other words, there is as if there is no external restriction of individual freedom, where its subjective feeling coincides with its external, objective ex-

pression. But in this contained his sophisticated deception, where the individual perceives his already unfreedom as a free expression of will, and this is a voluntary deprivation of his freedom, a kind of voluntary slavery. And since permissiveness and freedom of choice are reduced to the highest value for the individual, then there is no particular need to fear any external restrictions and control, as if they no longer exist at all. However, this is self-deception — the digital network knows everything about the individual, down to the smallest details, thanks to the latest digital technology Big Data, which calculates, accumulates and stores all quantitative parameters, the entire voluminous database about the individual.

But this poses a certain threat to the social freedom of the individual also because such global media and information corporations as Google, Facebook, Instagram, Amazon, Twitter and others, engaged in collecting information and constant monitoring of the entire range of behavior of individuals, directly cooperate with state power structures and provide personal data of individuals.

At the same time, global digitalization takes into account the important fact that individuals are now largely constituted in the process of communication with others. Moreover, through a varied palette of discursive practices and narratives, their identity is constructed, which is determined by processes of identification (Palahuta, 2023). Subjectivity always exists for individual as effect of the individual's search for the meaning of his existence precisely in discursive practices and narratives. This is what social constructionists pay attention to. From the position of social constructionism, everything that we consider to be existing, real, valuable, beautiful, correct, worthy of scientific or spiritual understanding is constructed with the help of language in direct relations with other individuals. Different constructs of worldview are closely related to *intragroup agreement* in different communities (ethnic, professional, scientific, religious) about what exactly exists and what is valuable for the individual here and now. That is, the concepts of community, social conventions, live speech, discourse, narrative, dialogue, and social practices became key for social constructionism (Gergen, 1994).

However, current power structures, through the spread of digital medialization and total control, will generate a networked transformation of narratives and discourses. They are already produced and consumed as commodities, which H. Byung-Chul has defined as storytelling (Byung-Chul, 2023). Their peculiarity is expressed primarily in the fact that they are promoted as effective communication techniques, but are used as sophisticated manipulations of individuals, where surveillance capitalism purposefully appropriates discursive and narrative practices, taking over the life of the individual at the conscious and unconscious levels. That is, storytelling lulls the individual into sleep, slipping away from conscious control and reflection, thereby significantly changing the identity in the necessary direction, which blocks the «practices» of autonomous existence.

But the paradox of such control in imaginary dialogues and narratives is that they turn into coercion and enslavement not from an excess of external controlling force, but from a constant lack of internal identity of individuals, forcing them to dissolve in external objectivity, «kindly» constructed by information mega-giants and encouraged by power structures. In them, the internal and external, the private and the social

are mixed together on the pages of social networks, where individuals voluntarily post information about themselves and allow someone else's devalued information to occupy their self in the affective narrative of virtual terrorism, cyberbullying, abuse, meaningless chat dialogues and online comments, in quasi-discussions about empty subjects in popular coaching on various virtual platforms.

Because of this, digitalization is the most effective form of contemporary control of the population as a biomass, and consists of three of its varieties: information-cybernetic, mental and psychotic. Forms of control: screen-based, network, discursive-narrative. The results of the impact of this control cover individuals at the ideological and behavioral level, forming the self of individuals, that is, their entire mental structure.

And one more feature of modern digitalization. For authorities at all levels, it is a good sign when individuals are constantly in a state of danger, which stimulates fears among the population of some real or potential threat that must be overcome and survived. According to Agamben, in our time the decisive action of biopower is not so much the preservation of life, which is characteristic of a classical disciplinary society, nor the condemnation to death as in a sovereign society, but the production of a modulated and practically endless survival for biomass (Agamben, 2002), where various kinds of fears are constantly instilled and hopes for a sovereign existence are blocked. By the way, for the purpose of total control and management of the world's population as biomass for modern surveillance capitalism and financial-economic elites, experiencing a state of emergency by individuals in one form or another is not the exception, but the norm. Walter Benjamin wrote about this in the VIII fragment of his work «On the Concept of History». Intimidation of people with global cooling, global warming, the severe consequences of financial and economic crises, terrible epidemics, and energy shortages has become a common phenomenon in world biopolitics. With the advent of the digital age, this has become an even more feasible possibility.

CONCLUSIONS

It has been found that the process of individual digitization significantly transforms the subjectivity of modern individuals. Thus, the calculations of information globalists have a sufficiently transparent goal — in the process of immersing individuals in the digital world, to ensure constant control and management of almost all aspects of its existence. Therefore, right now, the most favorable conditions are being created for the implementation of the long-term goal of the global financial and economic elites — to gradually form a new generation of individuals through the total digitalization of almost the entire world's population. These «new» subjective types of individuals are being formed right now in the consumer society due to the widespread introduction of the newest Internet technologies, which are managed by transnational information corporations, into all spheres of activity and people's lives. In other words, now the modern global financial and economic elites, who control information flows and power structures almost all over the world (primarily in developed countries of the world), have launched global technologies for managing the behavior of individuals as biomass.

In the process of considering the problem of digitalization and medialization, it became clear that there are no concepts for adequately studying the mechanisms of modern enslavement of individuals using modern computer and information tools, because all conceptual constructions are oriented towards the arsenal of classical Modernism, dogmatic Marxism of the 19th century, and postmodernism of the second half of the 20th century. Individuals cannot fully realize their slavish dependence on power. Therefore, when using such technologies, due to the widespread use of digitalization, the modern individual almost completely loses such an individual dimension as «being in freedom».

Moreover, modern biopolitics gives rise to numerous international and state institutions of strict control and, ideally, — the loss of significance in society of the institutions of democracy, and neoliberalism is a «fertile environment» for the formation of digital totalitarian regimes of governance. In our opinion, this reveals the strategic plan of the world's financial, economic and political elite of the world — the organization of a kind of digital concentration camp. This digital camp, in the long term, will contribute to the gradual formation of «new» types of subjectivity, a kind of 21st century mankurts, for whom freedom and democracy become only abstract concepts, and they are completely immersed in the realization of their temporary and changing interests, mainly commercial, and desires.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

REFERENCES

Agamben, G. (1993). *The coming community.* University of Minnesota Press.

Agamben, G. (2002). *Remnants of Auschwitz: The witness and the archive.* Zone Books.

Agamben, G. (2021). *Where are we now? The epidemic as politics.* Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Alemán, J. (2023). *Lacan and capitalist discourse: Neoliberalism and ideology.* Routledge.

Braidotti, R. (2013). *The posthuman.* Polity Press.

Berardi, F. (2007). *The soul at work: From alienation to autonomy.* Semiotext(e).

Butler, J. (1997). *The psychic life of power: Theories in subjection.* Stanford University Press.

Butler, J. (2005). *Giving an account of oneself.* Fordham University Press.

Byung-Chul, H. (2011). *Topologie der Gewalt.* Matthes & Seitz Berlin.

Byung-Chul, H. (2015). *The burnout society.* Stanford Briefs.

Byung-Chul, H. (2017). *The agony of eros.* The MIT Press.

Byung-Chul, H. (2023). *Die Krise der Narration.* Matthes & Seitz Berlin.

Carpentier, N. (2017). *The discursive-material knot: Cyprus in conflict and community media participation.* Peter Lang.

Debord, G. (1996). *La société du spectacle.* Gallimard.

DeLanda, M. (2006). *A new philosophy of society: Assemblage theory and social complexity.* Continuum.

Deleuze, G. (1997). *Negotiations, 1972–1990.* Columbia University Press.

Eco, U. (1997). *Cinque scritti morali* [Five Moral Essays]. Bompiani.

Ferrando, F. (2019). *Philosophical posthumanism (Theory in the new humanities).* Bloomsbury Academic.

Fisher, M. (2009). *Capitalist realism: Is there no alternative?* Zero Books.

Foucault, M. (1997). *Il faut défendre la société: Cours au Collège de France (1975–1976).* Gallimard; Seuil.

Foucault, M. (2004a). *Sécurité, territoire, population: Cours au Collège de France (1977–1978).* Gallimard; Seuil.

Foucault, M. (2004b). *La naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France (1978–1979).* Gallimard; Seuil.

Fukuyama, F. (2018). *Identity: The demand for dignity and the politics of resentment.* Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Fukuyama, F. (2022). *Liberalism and its discontents.* Profile Books Ltd.

Fuller, S. (2018). *Post-truth: Knowledge as a power game.* Anthem Press.

Goffman, E. (2007). *Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates.* Routledge.

Gergen, K. J. (1994). *Realities and relationships: Soundings in social construction.* Harvard University Press.

Newman, S. (2015). *Postanarchism.* Polity Press.

Palahuta, V. I. (2023). The identity of the modern human as a problem of social and humanitarian knowledge. *Newsletter on the Results of Scholarly Work in Sociology, Criminology, Philosophy and Political Science, 4(2)*, 94–103. https://doi.org/10.61439/SHND1344

Pentland, A. (2015). *Social physics: How social networks can make us smarter.* Penguin Books.

Skinner, B. F. (2002). *Beyond freedom and dignity.* Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Žižek, S. (1989). *The sublime object of ideology.* Verso.

Žižek, S. (2020). *Hegel in a wired brain.* Bloomsbury Academic.

Žižek, S. (2022). *Heaven in disorder.* OR Books.

Zuboff, S. (2019). *The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power.* Public Affairs.

WAR AT THE GATES

DOI: https://doi.org/10.61439/ATRYH4812

ENRICO TOMASELLI

INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER

- *Email: tomaselli.enrico@gmail.com*

Geopolitical analyst at the magazine *Giubbe Rosse*. He has been researching conflicts and wars both from a historical, political, strategic and tactical point of view. Enrico studied art and graphics in Palermo and Rome, and now lives and works in Naples. He has curated numerous exhibitions on cultural politics and contemporary art. His recent book is titled: *La Guerra Civile Globale: Il mondo dopo il conflitto Russo-Ucraino (The Global Civil War: The World After the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict).*

ABSTRACT

The conflict in Ukraine, now in its third year, has evolved into a complex geopolitical confrontation with limited prospects for resolution. Initially, diplomatic efforts focused on compromises or territorial concessions failed, as both Russia and NATO consolidated their positions. Strategic miscalculations on both sides have raised the stakes, transforming the conflict into a broader struggle for influence. For the West, the conflict represents a test of NATO unity and US global leadership, while for Russia it is an existential battle against perceived NATO encroachment.

The protracted war has shifted the goals. Russia, initially seeking a quick victory, now prioritizes dismantling Ukraine's military potential and providing a buffer against NATO expansion. In contrast, the US and its allies aim to shore up Ukraine's resistance while preserving NATO cohesion, despite mounting financial and logistical challenges. With diplomatic solutions stymied by mutual distrust, military escalation seems increasingly likely.

Demographic and economic constraints are further pushing both sides toward decisive action. Russia faces time pressures from demographic decline and NATO's ongoing rearmament. Likewise, prolonged engagement strains NATO unity and risks exposing broader vulnerabilities in the Western alliance. A potential U.S. withdrawal under a new administration could shift responsibility to NATO's European members, threatening Ukraine's cohesion and defense capabilities. As entrenched positions and geopolitical imperatives harden, the conflict underscores a critical inflection point in global power dynamics, where the window for a negotiated solution is narrowing and the risk of a broader confrontation is growing.

Keywords

conflict, geopolitics, escalation, diplomacy

INTRODUCTION

The conflict in Ukraine, now approaching its third year, has evolved into a complex geopolitical struggle with significant global implications (Batta, 2024). Initially, many hoped for a diplomatic resolution or a quick military outcome. However, both sides are now deeply entrenched, with strategic miscalculations by both Russia and the West pushing the conflict toward an escalation that may be difficult to reverse.

Decision-making dynamics have shifted from individual political will to a broader, more deterministic set of geopolitical realities. The interplay between past choices and the military reality on the ground is now driving the conflict, severely limiting resolution options. The accumulation of historical decisions, rather than current political will, plays an increasingly significant role in limiting viable options for resolving the conflict in Ukraine. As diplomatic channels struggle to find common ground, attention is shifting toward military solutions, and the initial intentions of each actor, be it the United States and its allies or

Russia, have evolved, adapting to a new strategic reality. This study delves into the implications of these accumulated choices for potential paths to resolution in Ukraine, with an emphasis on shifting priorities and the role of international alliances, highlighting how political constraints shape military and diplomatic strategies.

This analysis explores how the accumulation of previous decisions, particularly by the United States, NATO, and Russia, has shaped the trajectory of the war and made a negotiated solution increasingly unlikely. The conflict is no longer simply a territorial dispute or political contest, but a broader strategic struggle, with the potential to escalate into a broader confrontation.

METHODS

This study examines the ongoing war through a strategic lens, focusing on the interests and shifting objectives of the key actors: the U.S., NATO, and Russia. By analyzing military developments, political shifts, and international relations, the analysis provides insight into the prospects for a resolution or further escalation. The paper assesses how the changing nature of the war and past strategic errors have influenced the current situation, making it increasingly difficult to avoid a wider conflict.

This analysis utilizes qualitative research based on statements and policy documents from the major stakeholders, including the U.S., NATO, and Russia, combined with secondary sources examining policy analyses and geopolitical commentaries. Specific emphasis was placed on identifying how the statements and actions from these parties reveal shifts in strategic objectives, and how these shifts contribute to the escalation or perpetuation of the conflict.

RESULTS

It is quite evident, from the chronology of the conflict itself, how the hypothesis of a diplomatic solution was stubbornly discarded by the West, at least until the prospect of a dramatic defeat on the field of the Ukrainian armed forces became all too clear.

The Russian proposals to negotiate a comprehensive solution on European security, which included the open problems in Ukraine, and advanced up to a few days before the start of the military operation, were indignantly rejected (proposals that, at the time, were far more favorable for Ukraine, providing only for an autonomous status for Donbass, and not independence), as were the subsequent attempts to reach a mediation, first through the Russian-Ukrainian talks in Minsk, then with the quasi-agreement of Istanbul. The room for negotiation was however precluded by the fact that the US-NATO plans envisaged a different development of events.

The main aim was to inflict a *strategic defeat* on Russia, in the belief that by bringing the situation to a kinetic military conflict, and thus finding justification for a huge amount of hostile economic measures (sanctions), this would end up causing an unsustainable crisis in Moscow. In addition to this, Washington had the no less important — much less trumpeted — aim of causing a clear separation between the Russian Federation and European countries, with the dual aim of interrupting a process of integration of their mutual economies (seen as a prelude to a possible development of a powerful Eurasian bloc) and, in the short term, putting the European Union out of the game as a possible economic-commercial competitor, depriving it of the irreplaceable lifeblood of low-cost Russian energy sources.

More generally, the willingness to seek diplomatic solutions — and therefore, necessarily, mediations that cannot fully satisfy all parties —

in the current global geopolitical context appears increasingly rare. This is clearly due to the worsening of the confrontation, and to the fact that Western elites attribute an irreconcilable dimension to it, while in turn — for example — for the Russians all this is perceived as an existential threat. Fundamentally, and regardless of the specificity of the wrongs and rights in individual contexts, the issue must be framed in a long-term historical process, which is accelerating at this stage. We mean the decline of American imperial hegemony, and more broadly that of Western colonial hegemony. This decline obviously causes great alarm among Western elites, who see in it the concrete risk of a drastic reduction in their political and economic power, and therefore have made the choice to go to war with those countries that they believe can lead this process of *subversion* of the world order (as they have built it).

From the Russian point of view, which for a series of historical and geographical reasons is today at the forefront of this confrontation, the never-dormant Western ambitions to get their hands on Russia (on its immense resources, for starters), which have also recently been reiterated in various ways, are understandably seen as an existential danger. What characterizes the perception of the conflict, from the Russian side, is that it is not a question of defending a hegemonic role — much less of imagining one — but of Russian national and state unity, its identity, as they have been historically defined.

Once this point of view is assumed, it becomes clear that for Moscow there is not much room for mediation, at least on the fundamental aspects. Which, obviously, are only secondarily attributable to territorial issues, which themselves assume importance only in the more overall framework, which concerns the security of the Russian Federation; security that feels threatened by the abstention of NATO, and by its growing characterization as anti-Russian.

It follows that for Russia, pushing away — in space and time — this threat is an essential objective. Just as, once the path of military confrontation has been undertaken, the already narrow margins for negotiation are gradually further rarefied by the conflict itself. Obviously, in fact, the longer the conflict drags on (and therefore the higher the cost sustained by Russia), the more important it becomes to fully achieve the objectives. Furthermore, the evolution of the conflict on the ground strengthens the Russian position and its unavailability to make substantial compromises.

DISCUSSION

As the conflict in Ukraine has unfolded, the feasibility of a diplomatic solution continues to diminish. Initially, there were potential openings for non-military solutions; however, the intricate web of conflicting interests among the major players, Ukraine, the United States, NATO, and Russia, has led to more rigid positions. The early goals of the great powers, particularly the destabilization of Russia from the United States' perspective and Ukraine's attempt to maintain sovereignty, have been complicated by the emergence of Russia's response to perceived existential threats and recalibrations of the NATO alliance, transforming initial intentions into deeply rooted strategic necessities. This context sets the stage for analyzing how a protracted conflict has evolved beyond simple tactical disagreements into an entrenched geopolitical struggle.

Not secondarily, moreover, the conflict is burdened by its historical roots which, without going too far, can be identified at least since 2014, when the 'colorful revolution' in Maidan Square, openly instigated by the United States (Victoria Nuland, McCain; see Pazzanese, 2019; Walsh & Capelouto, 2013) and managed in the streets by the far-right nationalist and pro-Nazi formations, will lead to the overthrow of the legitimate elected government of Yanukovych. Following that insurrection, the new Ukrainian government — chaired by Poroshenko, and agreed in its composition by Nuland and the US ambassador to Kiev — will start a strongly Russophobic policy, which in turn will lead to the secession of the oblasts of Donetsk and Lugansk, giving rise to the civil war.

It is interesting to note, in this regard, how some analytical studies (Qaisrani et al., 2023; Osimen & Ade-Ibijola, 2022; Osimen, Adi, & Micah, 2022) of the conflict tend — as it seems to be the case lately — to remove from the description of the historical context the elements that appear to be different from the thesis that they intend to demonstrate (Cameron, & Mitchell, 2012; Simchi-Levi, D., & Haren, P. 2022). With an approach that in my opinion is not very scientific, for example, in these studies there is no trace of proven historical events (the coup that overthrows the legitimate Ukrainian government, brazenly piloted by the United States, the Russophobic aggression in the eastern areas of the country, the deception of the Minsk agreements, etc.), and they *start the story* at the most opportune moment — a bit like, not by chance,

what happens with the conflict in Palestine, which is preferred to present as if it began on October 7, 2023 (Wikipedia contributors, 2024; Carl, 2023).

The attempt to resolve the conflict, in its internal phase in Ukraine, and materialized in the Minsk I and II agreements, actually arose first and foremost from the difficulties encountered by the Ukrainian army in fighting against the militias of the separatist republics.

Unfortunately, these agreements — which formally were supposed to serve to start a process of pacification — were instead conceived from the beginning, by Western diplomacy (USA, France and Germany) as a mere subterfuge, necessary to give Kiev's armed forces time, with NATO's assistance, to recover and regain the offensive capacity necessary to overcome the separatist republics. This was later publicly claimed by both the then German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the then French President François Hollande.

Obviously, this has definitively undermined Western credibility, and the confidence of the Russian leadership in the reliability of the commitments undertaken by NATO countries (Global Times, 2022).

The current state of the conflict in Ukraine sees radical positions with limited prospects for a negotiated solution. Both Russia and the West have made strategic miscalculations that have exacerbated the conflict, and both sides have invested heavily in mutually exclusive objectives. Russia's primary goal is a military victory that will ensure its security and prevent further NATO expansion. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, for example, based on what was previously stated by the Bundeswehr General Staff, believes that it is necessary to *"be ready for war by 2029"* (Loevenich, 2024), while the British Army Chief of Staff, Sir Raleigh Walker, has warned that the combination of threats could lead to a clash with the *shock axis* (Russia, China, Iran and the DPRK) by 2027–28 (Haynes, 2024). Not to mention the fact that European countries are investing heavily both in a renewed large-scale industrial production of ammunition, and in a series of adaptations of logistical infrastructure to military needs. There is even a NATO plan *(Oplan Deu)* that provides for the deployment of 800,000 men and 200,000 vehicles and heavy equipment on the Eastern front.

For the West, a defeat in Ukraine would have severe political and strategic ramifications, threatening the very foundations of NATO and the US-led global order. A negotiated resolution now seems unlikely, as both sides are deeply entrenched in their positions. The war is likely to continue for some time, with each side seeking to achieve its strategic objectives through military means. Russia, in particular, is determined to avoid any outcome that would leave room for Ukraine to be considered a potential NATO member or a future military threat.

The evidence suggests that the conflict in Ukraine is as much a demonstration of regional sovereignty as it is a crucial moment in the alignment of global power. Each actor's initial objectives have adapted to meet new realities, with both NATO and Russia consolidating their positions and strengthening their commitments in a conflict they now see as essential to their security and influence. For the United States, the imperative of preserving NATO unity and deterring Russian expansion complicates any potential withdrawal or significant reduction in support. Russia, interpreting the conflict as a necessary means of consolidating a security buffer against NATO, likewise shows no inclination to compromise. The combination of NATO's strengthened military posture in Europe and Russia's new defensive strategies suggests that both sides see the conflict as preparatory to a possible broader confrontation, in which military engagements are poised to escalate. The demographic and economic dimensions further complicate the conflict, with demographic decline in both Russia and Europe adding urgency to resolve the conflict. These dynamics underscore an increasingly narrow window within which both NATO and Russia must achieve their respective objectives, potentially exacerbating the risk of military escalation should diplomatic solutions remain elusive.

Obviously, in all of this the mutual perception as a threat has great relevance. From the European point of view, the Russian intervention in Ukraine represented a shock that, also for obvious political reasons, quickly led to completely erasing the entire history of the previous decade, leaving Moscow's Special Military Operation as a sudden and inexplicable event. From the Russian point of view, there is instead the awareness of a constant military push by NATO ever closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, and a declared desire for European rearmament in an anti-Russian function. Even the publicly claimed duplicity (see Merkel and Hollande, on the Minsk agreements) has contributed to sowing distrust. Significantly, reading what authoritative think tanks in the NATO sphere write, reinforces the

Russian fear of an aggressive desire on the part of the Atlantic Alliance (see Marcinek, 2024; Wolff et al., 2024).

The changes introduced by Donald Trump's election to the Presidency of the United States, in relation to the conflict in Ukraine, are difficult to assess for the moment. Trump's declared intention to end the war is not necessarily destined to translate into an actual outcome in this sense, also because — from what appears — his negotiation plans seem too optimistic, and above all unrealistic. First of all because they do not seem to take into account the reality determined on the battlefield, where Russia is clearly prevailing (which determines a position of strength on the part of Moscow), and because they seem to completely ignore the security needs that determined Russia to intervene militarily. According to leaks in the international press, the peace plan envisaged by Trump would essentially be based on the following points:

- freezing of the conflict along the current line of contact
- creation of a demilitarized zone along the border, guarded by European military forces
- Ukraine's refusal to join NATO for the next 20 years
- US military support for Kiev's armed forces more recently, Trump seems to have taken up the idea (advanced by several European countries) of an interposition force, composed of soldiers from European armies, which would then act as a guarantee for Ukrainian security.

It is quite clear that these bases are completely unacceptable to Russia, since what is being offered is, on the one hand, what it already has (the territories of Novorossia conquered so far), and on the other, a long postponement of Ukraine's formal membership in NATO. Conversely, Moscow would find itself with European NATO armies deployed on the border while, sheltered by this *sanitary cordon,* the Ukrainian army rearms and reorganizes.

If these premises were to be confirmed by the first concrete actions of the new administration (in any case not before January-February 2025), the most likely outcome will not be so much an actual peace agreement, but rather a substantial withdrawal of the United States from its current position as the largest military supporter of Ukraine. As a result, it will probably be the European NATO countries that will take full responsibility for the Ukrainian war effort. This will produce on the one hand a crisis in NATO's internal relations, across the Atlantic, and on the other an inevitable weakening of the Ukrainian armed forces' capacity to resist.

In that case, it is to be expected that the war will continue until Kiev's fighting capacity is completely exhausted.

1. The Diminishing Likelihood of Diplomacy

The conflict in Ukraine has reached a strategic stalemate, with the possibility of diplomacy fading further as the war continues. Initial hopes for a negotiated settlement, possibly involving territorial compromises or mutual concessions, have diminished over time. Russia's position has hardened, and trust between the parties has eroded, partly due to the failure of previous agreements like Minsk I and II. On the Western side, early ambitions of using the conflict to politically destabilize Russia have not materialized. Instead, the war has bolstered Moscow's resolve, making a settlement based on territorial exchanges increasingly unrealistic. Discussions in the West about a potential resolution now revolve around preserving NATO unity without conceding defeat, but this outcome remains improbable as both sides remain deeply entrenched.

From the Western perspective, the conflict initially appeared to be an opportunity to weaken Russia's regional influence. However, as the war has dragged on, the strategic goals of the United States and NATO have shifted, acknowledging the long-term challenges and costs of sustaining military and economic support for Ukraine. For NATO, maintaining credibility and cohesion is critical, as a perceived defeat would not only undermine the alliance but embolden adversaries like China and Iran. At the same time, the ongoing conflict has exposed internal strains within NATO, as member states face growing financial and logistical burdens. On the Russian side, the war is framed as existential, with NATO's presence in Ukraine viewed as a direct threat to national security. Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territories and efforts to degrade Ukraine's military infrastructure reflect its aim of securing a decisive military outcome to guarantee Kyiv's non-alignment and to prevent NATO's further expansion. In a recent interview with *Newsweek* (O'Connor, 2024), Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov reiterated Russia's conditions for a peace deal (and opposition to any ceasefire): *"full AFU withdrawal from the DPR [Donetsk People's Republic], LPR [Luhansk People's Republic], Zaporozhye, and*

2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
Photo credit: Viewsridge (CC BY-SA 4.0)

Kherson oblasts; recognition of territorial realities as enshrined in the Russian Constitution; neutral, non-bloc, and non-nuclear status for Ukraine; its demilitarization and denazification; guaranteeing the rights, freedoms, and interests of Russian-speaking citizens; and lifting all sanctions against Russia." A complete capitulation, indeed.

2. Russia's Evolving Objectives: Victory by Force

Russia's war aims have evolved from seeking a quick military resolution to pursuing a long-term strategy to neutralize Ukraine's military capabilities. Moscow no longer sees negotiations as a viable option, believing that only a decisive victory can ensure its security and avoid future conflict with NATO[1]. For the United States, the conflict has become a test of NATO's cohesion and a way to counterbalance Russia's strategic partnership with other powers such as China. Both sides now view the war as central to their broader security and influence, significantly reducing the chances of non-military compromise. The West has invested heavily in Ukraine's defense, both militarily and economically, seeing the war as a crucial test of its geopolitical leadership. A perceived failure in Ukraine would have far-reaching consequences, damaging NATO unity, weakening U.S. global influence, and accelerating changes in the global order, such as the de-dollarization of the international economy. In contrast, a Russian victory would strengthen Moscow's position while also bolstering allies such as China and Iran, reshaping global power dynamics. For NATO, the protracted conflict has necessitated significant investments in military assets and infrastructure in Europe, including renewed commitments to arms production and preparation for future clashes with Russia.

3. The West's Strategic Investment: The Need for a Victory

The West, particularly the United States, has invested heavily in Ukraine's defense, both militarily and economically. A defeat or negotiated settlement that does not result in a clear Western victory would have catastrophic political and strategic consequences. NATO's credibility and unity would be severely undermined, and the perception of Western weakness would encourage adversarial powers like China and Iran to challenge U.S. global dominance.

Moreover, a perceived defeat in Ukraine would hasten a broader shift in the global order, accelerating the process of de-dollarization and weakening U.S. military influence worldwide.

1 For example, a proposal to change Russian nuclear doctrine, Lavrov, quoting Putin, said: *"We will take adequate decisions based on our understanding of the threats posed by the West. It is up to you to make conclusions"* (O'Connor, 2024).

This is especially concerning as NATO and the U.S. continue to view Russia as a long-term threat. The current situation, in which both sides are heavily invested, leaves little room for compromise. A negotiated settlement that is perceived as a defeat for either side would risk unraveling the fragile international order that the U.S. has constructed over decades.

The conflict has already prompted several nations to pursue policies that aim to reduce dependency on the U.S. dollar, a shift that could weaken the economic leverage of the United States in the global economy. A Russian victory, while potentially bolstering Moscow's strategic influence, would also empower its allies, such as China and Iran, thereby reshaping power dynamics in multiple global regions, particularly the Middle East.

For NATO, the consequences of prolonged engagement include significant financial and logistical strains, compelling the alliance to consider extensive strategic deployments and increased military investments in Europe, with renewed commitments to arms production and logistics to support a hypothetical future confrontation with Russia.

4. Escalation and Stalemate

The current state of the conflict suggests a deepening stalemate, with both sides heavily invested in a prolonged confrontation for strategic reasons. Russia believes it is gaining an advantage on the battlefield, not just through territorial gains but by crippling Ukraine's military and industrial potential. The West, meanwhile, continues to supply Ukraine with advanced weaponry, hoping to either reverse Russia's successes or force a settlement favorable to NATO. However, the longer the war continues, the more entrenched the positions of both sides become, increasing the risk of escalation.

Both Russia and NATO face internal constraints that limit the feasibility of an indefinite conflict. Russia is under pressure from its declining population and mounting war costs, creating a narrow window for achieving its objectives before its military capabilities begin to strain. It is also true that, currently, the European NATO countries have problems with the recruitment of new troops, and could encounter difficulties in mobilizing in the event of a conflict with Russia. At the moment, the forces are estimated to amount to 1.9 million men, a contingent that should be sufficient to counter the Russian armed forces, even if, in reality, the Europeans would have difficulty attracting the 300,000 additional soldiers foreseen in the new defense plans. But, obviously, these problems would only arise in the event of a (relatively) limited conflict; in the event of general mobilization, through conscription, the demographic gap would make its full weight felt (Slaughter, 2024).

Simultaneously, NATO is rearming and restructuring, and while its forces currently lack the readiness for large-scale mobilization, this situation will change over time. Russia is acutely aware of these dynamics and seeks to resolve the conflict before NATO completes its military buildup. Similarly, demographic and economic pressures within NATO countries, particularly in Europe, highlight the challenges of sustaining long-term engagement, pushing both sides toward strategies aimed at decisive outcomes in the coming years.

Ultimately, the war in Ukraine has become a contest over the global balance of power, with both NATO and Russia viewing it as critical to their respective security and strategic influence. The growing rigidity of their positions and the mutual perception of the conflict as existential make a diplomatic resolution unlikely in the near term. Instead, the focus remains on achieving military objectives to shape the future of the region and prepare for potential future confrontations, raising the risk of further escalation.

In light of these elements, a reasonable time frame within which Russia must face the conflict and resolve it is predictably quite short: between five and seven years maximum. Which, moreover, almost coincides with Putin's presidential term. To think that the Russian leadership will not go that far is pure naivety. And unfortunately, even if Western propaganda continues to paint the Russian leader as the ogre who wants to conquer the whole of Europe, in reality what they think in the chancelleries is that he will never dare to do so, and that in any case he would not have the strength (Bild, 2024).

5. The Diminishing Likelihood of Diplomacy

Initially, there were hopes for a diplomatic resolution, possibly involving territorial compromises or an exchange of Ukrainian territory in return for some form of Russian concessions. However, as the war has dragged on, the possibility of such a compromise has diminished. Western leaders, particularly in the U.S., initially hoped that the

war could be a means to destabilize Russia politically. But this objective has not materialized. The war has instead strengthened Russia's resolve and made any settlement based on territorial exchange less realistic.

Today, the only potential diplomatic solution being discussed in the West involves a deal that could allow NATO to preserve its unity without fully admitting defeat. This would likely include a deal over Russian-controlled territory and defining Ukraine's future relationship with NATO. However, such a solution remains highly unlikely as both sides have hardened their positions and mistrust is deep, particularly after the failure of previous agreements, such as Minsk I and II.

U.S. and NATO Perspective: The Western alliance initially engaged in the Ukraine conflict with the intention of weakening Russia's regional influence, hoping that sustained military support could destabilize Russia politically. Over time, however, as the conflict dragged on, the U.S. has had to reassess its ambitions, particularly given the toll on NATO unity and its potential impact on American credibility and influence globally. With NATO's own long-term stability at stake, there is increasing pressure on member states to support policies that could either deter Russia militarily or prompt a favorable settlement. Russian Perspective: Russia, meanwhile, views the presence of NATO in Ukraine as an existential threat, prompting it to discard any earlier interest in a negotiated settlement that would allow NATO influence to persist. Its annexation of regions within Ukraine, along with its focus on degrading Ukraine's military infrastructure, underscores its determination to achieve a military outcome. The conflict has led Russia to view a negotiated solution as practically impossible, given what it perceives as the West's consistent unreliability and its own strategic imperatives.

6. Russia's Evolving Objectives: Victory by Force

Russia entered the conflict expecting a quick resolution through military means, but the situation has evolved significantly. Russia now views the war as existential, not just to protect its security from NATO but to safeguard its political system from a perceived Western-driven destabilization. The conflict has hardened Russia's stance and shifted its war goals. Moscow is no longer interested in compromises or negotiations, but in achieving a decisive military victory that would ensure Ukraine's non-alignment and prevent NATO from expanding further.

Russia's strategic objectives have moved beyond territorial annexations in eastern Ukraine. The goal now is the complete destruction of Ukraine's military capacity and its potential as a future threat. Russia's view is that only a military victory will guarantee long-term security and eliminate the possibility of future conflicts with NATO, as negotiations or compromises are seen as futile or insufficient.

Both the U.S. and Russia have realigned their objectives as the conflict unfolded, abandoning earlier aspirations of rapid solutions in favor of long-term military engagement. For the United States, the conflict is increasingly seen as a way to uphold NATO's cohesion and delay Russia's potential alliance strengthening with China. Russia, on the other hand, is resolute in its goal to create a buffer zone within Ukraine, aiming to forestall any future Western military buildup along its borders.

With each side perceiving the conflict as central to their respective security, the possibility of a non-military compromise has substantially diminished.

7. The West's Strategic Investment: The Need for a Victory

The West, particularly the United States, has invested heavily in Ukraine's defense, both militarily and economically. A defeat or negotiated settlement that does not result in a clear Western victory would have catastrophic political and strategic consequences. NATO's credibility and unity would be severely undermined, and the perception of Western weakness would encourage adversarial powers like China and Iran to challenge U.S. global dominance.

Moreover, a perceived defeat in Ukraine would hasten a broader shift in the global order, accelerating the process of de-dollarization and weakening U.S. military influence worldwide. This is especially concerning as NATO and the U.S. continue to view Russia as a long-term threat. The current situation, in which both sides are heavily invested, leaves little room for compromise. A negotiated settlement that is perceived as a defeat for either side would risk unraveling the fragile international order that the U.S. has constructed over decades.

The conflict has already prompted several nations to pursue policies that aim to reduce dependency on the U.S. dollar, a shift that could weaken the economic leverage of the United States in the global economy. A Russian victory,

while potentially bolstering Moscow's strategic influence, would also empower its allies, such as China and Iran, thereby reshaping power dynamics in multiple global regions, particularly the Middle East.

For NATO, the consequences of prolonged engagement include significant financial and logistical strains, compelling the alliance to consider extensive strategic deployments and increased military investments in Europe, with renewed commitments to arms production and logistics to support a hypothetical future confrontation with Russia.

8. Escalation and Stalemate

The situation has now evolved into a strategic stalemate. Neither side is in a position to win outright, and both are heavily invested in prolonging the conflict for strategic reasons. From Russia's perspective, it is winning on the battlefield, not just in terms of territorial gains but in terms of crippling Ukraine's military and industrial potential. Russia is prepared to continue the war until it achieves a complete military victory, which it sees as necessary to prevent the re-emergence of Ukraine as a future threat.

The West, meanwhile, continues to supply Ukraine with advanced weaponry, hoping to reverse Russia's gains or force a settlement favorable to NATO. However, the longer the war continues, the more entrenched the positions of both sides become. The U. S. and NATO cannot afford a situation where they are seen as losing, especially when facing the strategic challenges posed by other global powers, like China.

Given these dynamics, there is a growing risk that the conflict will escalate into a broader confrontation between NATO and Russia, particularly if Russia perceives that NATO is not changing its hostile policy, or if a decisive military breakthrough by either side shifts the balance of power.

Russia's demographic constraints, coupled with the urgent need to leverage its existing military assets, highlight the importance of a conflict timeline that is not overly drawn out. The demographic pressures that Russia faces are also real. Russia's population is significantly smaller than that of NATO members, particularly the United States and Europe. European NATO nations are similarly constrained by demographic and especially recruitment challenges, which would complicate any large-scale mobilization

against Russian forces. Both Russia and NATO face internal problems that limit the feasibility of an indefinite conflict, pushing each side toward strategies that can achieve decisive results in the coming years.

9. Time Constraints for Russia

Russia faces some time constraints in this conflict. Russia's declining population, coupled with the costs of the war, means that Russia has a limited window to achieve its goals before its military capabilities begin to strain. Likewise, Russia is aware that NATO is mobilizing and restructuring its military capabilities. While NATO forces are currently substandard, this will not remain so indefinitely. Russia must resolve the conflict before NATO completes its military preparations or completes its rearmament phase.The need for a relatively quick resolution is accentuated by the fact that a prolonged conflict will strain Russia's military capabilities and could ultimately lead to strategic disadvantages.

CONCLUSION

The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates the limits that past decisions place on current choices, creating a situation in which diplomatic solutions are increasingly constrained by geopolitical imperatives. The United States and Russia, locked in opposing but equally existential struggles, find themselves with little room for concessions. For NATO, the resolution of the conflict must include the preservation of credibility and deterrence, while for Russia, ensuring a buffer against NATO invasion has become non-negotiable. The potential for a diplomatic resolution, while still technically possible, would require unprecedented shifts in strategy among European NATO members, potentially including a reduction in military aid to Ukraine, a cessation of infrastructure adaptations for conflict scenarios, and more generally anything that could be interpreted as a potential threat. The drive for rearmament that is affecting European countries, even if it is justified by the fact that in recent decades they have essentially relied on the cover of the US *umbrella*, allowing their armed forces to decline to very low levels, and allowing the war industry to concentrate almost exclusively on exports and profit, cannot but appear threatening in the eyes of Moscow, as it is accompanied not only by a fiercely anti-Russian rhetoric, but is embodied in a series of measures explicitly aimed at strengthening military capabilities on the Eastern front, accumulating operational brigades, increasing the production of ammunition, developing cross-border transport networks (the so-called *military Schengen*), creating logistics hubs, etc. All in the service of an armed confrontation with Russia, which is expected within a few years. See, in this regard, the aforementioned statements by the German Minister of Defense, Boris Pistorius, and those of the Chief of Staff of the British Army, Sir Raleigh Walker. On the clearly aggressive intentions, see for example what the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) stated regarding the Black Sea (considered absolutely strategic by Moscow). In one of his reports, behind a language apparently concerned with defending European interests, the will to chase Russia out of the Black Sea emerges (Simeonova, 2024).

To avoid a wider confrontation, European nations, particularly Germany, France and Poland, must reconsider their military support for Ukraine. A reduction in aid, combined with a diplomatic push to de-escalate hostilities, could potentially offer a way out of the current stalemate. This may sound like abandoning the Ukrainians to their fate, after having encouraged them for a long time to resist and inducing them to believe that active support would last indefinitely. Which in fact is not far from reality. However, this falls within the scope of strategic errors committed by Western leaderships, which cannot be remedied by erasing the consequences. At this point, it would be necessary first of all to take responsibility for these errors, and therefore a dose of realism, which takes note of the evolution of the conflict, and accompanies Ukraine towards a solution that represents, if nothing else, a *damage reduction*.

However, as time passes, the likelihood of such changes appears increasingly tenuous, suggesting that the conflict in Ukraine could persist until one side gains a decisive military advantage or a substantial reorganization of alliances occurs. Thus, without significant changes in the strategic calculus of the key players, the conflict in Ukraine could serve as a precursor to further escalation, with demographic pressures and existential considerations converging to push Russia and NATO into an ever-tightening stalemate.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

REFERENCES

Batta, A. (2024). Roadblocks to peace in Russia's war in Ukraine. *Orbis*, 68(4), 666–676. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2024.09.010

Bild. (2024, June 29). ål Jonson über Wehrpflicht und eine starke NATO [Ål Jonson on Conscription and the Strong NATO]. *Bild*. https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland-und-internationales/schwedens-verteidigungsminister-pal-jonson-ueber-die-wehrpflicht-667ea37f2952e6116de645cc

Cameron, D. R., & Mitchell A. O. (2012) 'Post-Soviet Authoritarianism: The Influence of Russia in Its "Near Abroad,"' *Post-Soviet Affairs,* 28(1), pp. 1–44

Carl, N. (2023, October 7). *Iran Update Special Edition, October 7, 2023.* Institute for the Study of War. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-edition-october-7–2023

Global Times. (2022, December 12). Real intention behind Minsk agreements further destroys credibility of the West. *Global Times*. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202212/1281708.shtml

Harbusch, N. (2024, July 12). So bereitet sich Deutschland auf Krieg vor [How Germany Is Preparing for War]. *Bild*. https://www.bild.de/politik/der-geheime-operationsplan-deutschland-greifen-uns-2029-die-russen-an-6683bcfe2f16c412acd2978d

Haynes, D. (2024, July 23). UK must be ready for war in three years, head of British Army warns. *Sky News*. https://news.sky.com/story/uk-must-be-ready-for-war-within-three-years-head-of-british-army-warns-13183844

Loevenich, J. (2024, June 6). Regierung gibt neuen Plan für den Kriegsfall raus [Government Issues New Plan for Wartime Scenarios]. *Bild*. https://www.bild.de/politik/inland/amtlich-regierung-gibt-neuen-plan-fuer-den-kriegsfall-raus-66614cd4c34cbc2d431c26d5

Marcinek, K. (2024, October 2). *NATO and Its Defense Industrial Base.* RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/10/nato-and-its-defense-industrial-base.html#:~: text=The%20summit%20was%20certainly%20a%20display%20of%20political, things%20in%20a%20way%20that%20navigates%20political%20sensitivities

O'Connor, T. (2024, October 7). Exclusive: Russia's Lavrov Warns of 'Dangerous Consequences' for US in Ukraine. *Newsweek*. https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-russias-lavrov-warns-dangerous-consequences-us-ukraine-1964468

Osimen, G. U., & Ade-Ibijola, O. (2022). An Unnecessary War of Fame: The East and West NATO's Enlargement Strategies and the Geopolitics of Russo- Ukrainian Conflict. *Global Journal of Political Science and Administration, 10(4)*, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.37745/gjpsa.2013/vol10n4120

Osimen, G. U., Adi, I., & Micah, E. E. M. (2022). Interrogating Russo-Ukrainian war's implications for human security and the global economy. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)*, 27(6), 21–30. https://doi.org/10.9790/0837–7706022130

Pazzanese, C. (2019, October 30). American foreign policy in flux. *The Harvard Gazette*. https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2019/10/ex-ambassador-victoria-nuland-on-u-s-foreign-policy-crisis/

Qaisrani, I. H., Qazi, B. H., & Abbas, H. (2023). A geopolitical war in Europe: Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its implications. *Journal of European Studies (JES),* 39(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.56384/jes.v39i1.285

Simchi-Levi, D., & Haren, P. (2022). How the war in Ukraine is further disrupting global supply chains. *Harvard Business Review.* https://hbr.org/2022/03/how-the-war-in-ukraine-is-further-disrupting-global-supply-chains

Simeonova, M. (2024, October 7). *Staying afloat: How the EU can navigate the Black Sea to counter Russian aggression. European Council on Foreign Relations.* https://ecfr.eu/article/staying-afloat-how-the-eu-can-navigate-the-black-sea-to-counter-russian-aggression/

Slaughter, A.-M. (2024, June 25). Europe boldly redefines security for a new age of threats. *Financial Times.* https://www.ft.com/content/862fea8c-77a6–4478–9023-aeb170d5348b

Walsh, N. P., & Capelouto, S. (2013, December 15). Ukrainian protesters get visit from Sen. John McCain. *CNN*. https://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/14/world/europe/ukraine-protests/index.html

Wikipedia contributors. (2024c, December 23). *Timeline of the Israel–Hamas war — Wikipedia.* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Israel%E2%80%93Hamas_war

Wolff, G. B., Burilkov, A., Bushnell, K., & Kharitonov, I. (2024). Fit for war in decades: Europe's and Germany's slow rearmament vis-a-vis Russia. In *Institute for the World Economy.* https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/fit-for-war-in-decades-europes-and-germanys-slow-rearmament-vis-a-vis-russia-33234/

POSTWAR UKRAINE, DEMOCRACY, KURT LEWIN, AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GERMANY

DOI: https://doi.org/10.61439/LBYH4898

GILMORE CROSBY

CROSBY & ASSOCIATES

- *Email: gilmorecrosby@comcast.net*

Gilmore Crosby has been an Organization Development (OD) practitioner since 1984. He has international experience in Egypt, Spain, Mexico, Chile, Poland, Canada, Germany, Czechia and Jamaica, as well as years spent at PECO Nuclear and as an IT Change Management Consultant with EDS. Gilmore practiced Lewinian OD for decades before writing, "Planned Change: Why Kurt Lewin's Social Science is Still Best Practice for Business Results, Change Management, and Human Progress" (Taylor and Francis, 2021). He has published 7 books and 12 articles. He is an author, a grandfather, and an OD master practitioner.

ABSTRACT

Ukraine will face unique challenges if and when the Russian invasion has ended. The transition from wartime to peacetime can result in many social and political outcomes. The possibility of a persistent threat adds to the complexity. The transition from the more autocratic needs of wartime society to a non-militaristic democracy is by no means guaranteed. Lessons can be learned from past experiences, such as post WWI and WWII Germany, and the failed reconstruction of the Civil War in the United States. Social scientist Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) provides a theoretical basis for contrasting democracy and autocracy. Lewin applied his theories to understanding the failure of democracy in post WWI Germany and the reconstruction of Germany after WWII. Using Lewin's work as a foundation, this article considers lessons learned in hopes of being a guide for the eventual cultural reconstruction needed in post war Ukraine.

Keywords

action-research, democracy, Ukraine

INTRODUCTION[1]

The war in Ukraine has prompted studies across various scientific fields (Lunov et al., 2023; Gavrilenko, 2023; Verbytska, 2024; Havrylyshyn et al., 2024), many of which focus on the war's impact on global stability (AL-Rousan et al., 2024; Soliman & Le Saout, 2024; Boungou & Yatié, 2022; Coupe & Obrizan, 2016; Afunts et al., 2024; Andrada-Félix et al., 2024). A growing number of scholars are examining Ukraine's future, particularly concerning the restoration of ecosystems, urban infrastructure, and the country's comprehensive reconstruction (Udovyk & M-Domènech, 2024; Lacan et al., 2024; Cifuentes-Faura, 2023). This paper looks at Ukraine's future through the lens of social science.

Although an independent postwar Ukraine is by no means guaranteed at the time of this writing, it can be argued that both Europe and the US are dependent on Ukrainian success to secure the future of their own fragile democracies. Thinking ahead to the opportunities and perils of Ukrainian "reconstruction" is not only worthwhile, but vitally important.

1 Many portions of this article were based on Chapter 7, "Social Science and Politics," from Crosby, G. (2021). *Planned Change.*

We need not reinvent the wheel. Social scientist Kurt Lewin applied his theories and methods to a different yet similar historical challenge, the reconstruction of Germany following WWII. Lewin was a passionate advocate that the lessons of post WWI Germany be learned and learned well before attempting reconstruction of the German culture after WWII. With that in mind, Lewin pondered the enormous, planned culture change effort that lay ahead for both Germany and Japan. Although the circumstances facing Ukraine before and after the war are different, some of the dynamics are the same. How do you shift from a wartime culture, necessarily more autocratic, to a peacetime culture which is more democratic *and* sustain it? How do you disarm and assimilate the warriors? How do you help regions find their own path forward while fitting into the larger nation state yet not being constrained by it needlessly? Those are the issues explored in this paper.

METHODS

The article employs two fundamental research methods to explore pivotal historical and sociological dynamics. The first is historical analysis, which introduces readers to the complex realities of post-World War I Germany as well as the post-Civil War United States, analyzing the strategic missteps made during reconstruction and their long-term consequences.

The second is the case study approach, which investigates how Kurt Lewin's sociological theories were pragmatically applied following World War II, offering insights into their transformative impact on the establishment of strong and enduring democratic systems in Germany and Japan, which remain prominent examples of successful postwar reconstruction. This approach provides a framework for understanding how Lewin's theories can inform the reconstruction and sociopolitical stability of contemporary states in transition.

Kurt Lewin's primary goal throughout his work was to use social science to prevent autocracy. He believed this was best done through fundamentally sound democracy. His vision for humanity was to utilize processes grounded in rational thinking and scientific knowledge, emphasizing the empowerment of individuals to influence their governments, while ensuring that these governments retain the capacity to act effectively.

Lewin's sociological method emphasizes the importance of local participation in shaping government structures, especially in post-conflict societies. He argued that imposing external structures leads to resistance, while allowing local populations to influence their own governance leads to more sustainable and effective systems. In post-World War II Germany and Japan, Lewin's approach encouraged the U. S. State Department to engage with local communities, letting the people shape their own form of democracy.

Lewin's method, informed by Germany's post-WWI failure, highlights the danger of excessive freedom allowing anti-democratic groups like the Nazis to rise. He argued that democracies must limit such groups to protect democratic values, a principle also relevant in the U.S. today with extremist groups like the Nazis, the KKK, or any form of white supremacy.

Consequently, the establishment of standards is crucial — without them, chaos is inevitable. This weakness was evident in post-World War I Germany. Following World War II, however, Germany, guided by Lewin's sociological principles, became more aware of this danger and made a conscious effort to learn from their previous errors.

RESULTS

A major outcome of applying Lewin's methods to post-war reconstruction was the successful establishment of stable democratic systems in both Germany and Japan. Central to this success were the educational reforms in both countries. Germany, in particular, has made a concerted effort to educate its citizens about the Nazi period, ensuring that the past is not forgotten. Japan, while less forthcoming about its wartime actions, has nonetheless included some aspects of this history in its educational curriculum.

In addition to education, the growth of democracy in both nations has been marked by significant strides in women's rights, and the rights of ethnic groups. Efforts to combat prejudice and discrimination have played a vital role in their post-war transformations. Although prejudice persists to some extent in both societies, it has been greatly reduced compared to the pre-World War II period. The three key results of this process are: a strong focus on developing an educated citizenry, including accuracy about history, a commitment to addressing prejudice, and the stability of democratic systems in both countries.

DISCUSSION

In his 1943 article *Cultural Reconstruction* Lewin wrote, "Building a world of peace which will be worth at least the name 'better than before' includes many problems: political, economic, and cultural. Each of them is loaded with difficulties. Yet all of them have to be considered together and attacked together as interdependent aspects of one dynamic field if any successful step forward is to be achieved" (Lewin, 1997, p35).

Lewin was a regular consultant to the US state department and the war department, had the ear of the president and Mrs. Roosevelt, and the people who crafted the Marshall Plan were in his orbit of relationships. The plan, perhaps the most ambitious and successful cultural change effort in human history, was drafted and implemented after his death in 1947. He was thus unable to be directly involved, but his thought leadership on the subject is well documented.

Lewin, a Jewish man who grew up in the Kaiser's Germany, served in the German Army during WWI, taught at the University of Berlin, and witnessed firsthand the rise of the Nazi's until fleeing to the US in 1933, includes in his writings on reconstruction a thoughtful analysis of the social dynamics of Germany before the second world war (Marrow, 1969).

Ukraine would be wise to encourage their own social scientists to do the same. While Ukraine is in no way responsible for Putin's aggression, this is still an opportunity to look at what was working and what was not working in pre-war Ukraine. It is rare for a country to have a moment of reflection. Ukraine should seize it, so as to create an even stronger Ukrainian democracy moving forward.



Sculpture of Kurt Lewin, 2011
Photo credit: Pko
(CC BY-SA 4.0)

Democracy is not a given. Not in the United States, and certainly not after years of war, in postwar Ukraine. Russia will almost certainly remain an external threat, and the Ukrainian military well hold a new, necessary, well-funded, and widely admired position within Ukrainian society. The right autocratic leader may have an opportunity to win the hearts of the people. In another 1943 article, *The Process of Group Living*, Lewin wrote, "Throughout history, political geniuses have arisen who have been masters in group management, such as Napoleon or Hitler. The only hope, however, for a permanent foundation of successful social management, and particularly for a permanent democratic society of the common man, is a social management based to a high degree on a scientific insight which is accessible to many" (Lewin, 1999, p334).

If postwar Ukraine is to achieve a better future based on democratic principles, it will only happen through clear eyed and determined effort: "It is a fallacy to assume that people, if left alone, follow a democratic pattern in their group life. Such an assumption would not even hold for people living in a democratic society" (Lewin, 1997, p37). Lewin points out that, based on his study of post-world war I Germany, it's perhaps more likely that a democratic country, by appeasing the "intolerant," will allow its democracy to erode. Lewin's research on leadership styles indicated that people adapt to authoritarianism fast, while democracy must be learned anew by each generation. As Lewin put it, "In democracy, as in any culture, the individual acquires the cultural pattern by some type of 'learning.' Normally, such learning occurs by way of growing up in that culture. In regard to changing from one cultural pattern to another, experiments indicate that autocracy can be 'imposed upon a person.' That means the individual might 'learn' autocracy by adapting himself to a situation forced upon him from outside. Democracy cannot be imposed upon a person; it has to be learned by a process of voluntary and responsible participation" (Lewin, 1997, p. 37).

In another 1943 article, *"The Special Case of Germany,"* he continues

> *"After the last war the reactionary forces in Germany, although driven under cover, were permitted to 'get away with it.' Being a socially well-knit group, they soon started to come back step by step and to take their revenge in the extreme form of Hitlerism. I cannot see any hope of more than superficial change after the present war if the German people are prevented from getting rid in a very thorough fashion of a large group which has developed to perfection the most ruthless methods of suppression…*
>
> *The German move towards democracy after the last war did not fail because the so-called German Revolution of 1918 was too chaotic, but because the overthrow of the Kaiser was bloodless and did not reach deep enough. It did not reach deep enough socially to remove certain sections of the population from power, and it did not reach deep enough culturally to remove the idea of democracy from its identification with individualistic freedom of the laissez-faire type."*
>
> (Lewin, 1997, p. 42)



This is not unlike the failed reconstruction of the South following the civil war in the US. The southern army was allowed to take their weapons and go home. Under martial law, a brief period of democracy ensued, during which blacks were elected to office in large numbers. Once the northern troops were withdrawn, the former confederate soldiers formed the Ku Kux Klan and used terror to re-establish control. President Ulysses S. Grant sent troops back in to occupy the south, but the political will to maintain the occupation eroded, and a racist form of totalitarianism was re- established in the southern states. That failure haunts the US today, and even threatens US support of Ukraine.

There are obvious differences between that history in the US and contemporary Ukraine, but the arming of the country and the assimilation of armed former soldiers are similar pieces of the reconstruction puzzle. Fear of future invasions may complicate disarming the civilian population, but it would be wise to do so. Gun by-back policies used to deal with gun violence in the US might be applicable, with the added advantage that Ukraine does not have the US dynamic of local mass production of new weapons. To reassure the population, perhaps in some way weapons could be stored for redistribution in case the external threat continues or re-emerges.

Fortunately, Lewinian social science paves the way once again. Experts need not come up with all the possible solutions and are indeed wise *not* to attempt to do so.

Lewin's action research clearly indicates that allowing the people facing the problem to come up with solutions greatly increase the likelihood of successful and sustained implementation. The problem is not what solutions to try, but rather how to organize community conversations about how best to deal

with postwar challenges. The act of doing so by engaging the citizens, simultaneously reinforces democratic principles in the culture. The US engaged a broad swath of the Germany population in defining the mechanisms of their post-WWII democracy, and it would be wise for Ukraine to do engage their own citizens in a similar manner.

In a 1946 article, *Action Research and Minority Problems*, Lewin called his approach "… action, research, and training as a triangle" (Lewin, 1997, p149). In other words, he always included basic training in social science and behavioral skills, such as communication and how to manage conflict, in his interventions. Furthermore, the training happened as people were *actually doing the action research.* This was learning by doing with guidance. Lewin would humbly join college students, mothers, farmers, gang members, executives, industrial employees, the US state department, etc., and help whoever was in need think out loud about what they were facing and come up with their own solutions. As Lewin put it: the change agent should provide and transfer social science expertise, but for successful change, "The laws (of social science) don't do the job of diagnosis which has to be done locally. Neither do laws prescribe the strategy for change" (Lewin, 1997, p150). An expert can teach and facilitate methods such as group dialogue and decision, but the people facing the challenges must still be the ones who have the dialogue and come up with the solutions. In his 1945 article, *Conduct, Knowledge, and Acceptance of New Values*, he asserts, "It can be surmised that the extent to which social research is translated into social action depends on the degree to which those who carry out this action are made a part of the fact-finding on which the action is to be based" (Lewin, 1997, p. 55).

This is not an "expert model." It is a humble model. The expert/leader doesn't do the thinking and propose solutions. The people come up with their own solutions.

Lewin's research (he did controlled experiments *while* he helped people do their own action research) established time and again that locally generated solutions were more likely to be implemented than expert or imposed solutions. Within reason, people would rather think for themselves than be told what to do. That's the essence of action research and of democracy. Furthermore, this method is fast and efficient. There is no long study, or a planning team that has lots of meetings. People, whether a group of workers, a group of local citizens, etc., actually do the thinking, come up with the solutions, implement the change, monitor their own progress, and know how to repeat the cycle into the future. The identification of actions can happen in the very first meeting, and implementation can begin the same day.

Lewin applied the same thinking to the reconstruction of Germany. He warned that if the US forced American-style democracy on post World War II Germany, it would be folly. He instead offered sound advice, such as working with and engaging the people of Germany and of Europe in a massive cultural action research project instead of simply imposing solutions on them.

Even so, Lewin was only guardedly optimistic, and concludes his article, *Cultural Reconstruction,* this way

> *"We will have to avoid the naive belief that people 'left alone' will choose democracy. We have to avoid building our plans on 'hatred of the enemy', but we have to also avoid building our plans on wishful thinking and blindness against reality. We should know, for instance, that we have to deal in Germany with a set-up where month after month, day after day, six to seven thousand unwanted women and children are killed in central slaughter houses in occupied territories, and where thousands of people must have grown accustomed to doing such jobs. American newspapers seem to play down such unpleasant truths probably because they wish to prevent a peace based on hatred. Actually, this procedure defies its purpose because in politics as in education a successful action has to be based on a full knowledge of reality."*
>
> (Lewin, 1997, p. 39).

Lewin was a firm believer that objective discussion of the facts, no matter how disturbing, was the way forward. In a 1944 article, he wrote this: "Democracy and Judaism have nothing to fear from truth and fact finding, but they have much to gain by them" (Lewin, 1999, p. 263). He believed in the promise of reason, saw it as a critical underpinning of democracy and social science, and thought it was the job of both parents and education to instill it from the beginning of life. In a 1939 article entitled, *Experiments in Social Space*, in which he describes his experiments with democratic, authoritarian, and laissez-faire styles of leadership, he concludes this

> *"To believe in reason is to believe in democracy, because it grants to the reasoning partners a status of equality. It is therefore not an accident that not until the rise of democracy at the time of the American and French Revolutions was the 'goddess' of reason enthroned in modern society. And again, it is not an accident that the very first act of modern Fascism in every country has been officially and vigorously to dethrone this goddess and instead to make emotions and obedience the all-ruling principles in education and life from kindergarten to death. I am persuaded that scientific sociology and social psychology based on an intimate combination of experiments and empirical theory can do as much, or more, for human betterment as the natural sciences have done. However, the development of such as realistic, nonmystical social science and the possibility of its fruitful application presupposes the existence of a society which believes in reason."*
>
> (Lewin, 1997, p. 67)

One prays that Ukraine will prove to be such a society.

If so, reconstruction must include reinforcing and instilling democratic principles in general, and especially in the educational system and in the family. Lewin believed the same was essential to the reconstruction of Germany. In his 1941 article, *Democracy and the School*, he advocated that adults should treat the "… child as a thinking person. A child in a democratic atmosphere from his earliest days is not treated as an object but, as a person, is given explanation and reasons for the events in his surroundings, and especially for necessary limitations of his freedom; he is given the right to make himself understood, to ask questions, and to tell 'his side of the story.' He is given the chance to make a choice and to make his own decisions wherever this is reasonably possible. Such a child will build a better emotional basis for social living and will be prepared to shoulder responsibilities when he becomes mature enough to play with other children his age" (Lewin, 1999, p. 322).

In other words, even if you are teaching about democracy, but you are doing so by expecting students to only memorize the answers chosen by the authorities, and you are not encouraging them to speak and think for themselves, you are raising citizens who are prone to autocracy. Democratic behavior is not learned through loyalty and slogans (such as "we value freedom"), as previously stated, "Democracy cannot be imposed upon a person; it has to be learned by a process of voluntary and responsible participation" (Lewin, 1997, p. 37).

Last but not least, Lewin used his experience in Germany to study minority relations in a hostile environment, or what might be called racial tension today, and the tendencies of autocratic leaders to scapegoat minorities. Like a canary in a coal mine, prejudice *against any group* is a warning signal of anti-democratic tendencies in a culture. In his 1939 article, *When Facing Danger*, Lewin writes

> *"It should be understood that any underprivileged minority is preserved as such by the more privileged majority…Today again, it can easily be shown how any increase or decrease in the economic difficulties of the majority increases or decreases the pressure upon the Jewish minority. This is one of the reasons why Jews everywhere are necessarily interested in the welfare of the majority among whom they live.*
>
> *It has been recognized long ago that the basis of anti-Semitism is partly the need of the majority for a scapegoat. Frequently in modern history it is not the majority as such but an autocratic group ruling the majority which needs the scapegoat as a means of distracting the masses. The most striking recent example is Mussolini's sudden attack on the Italian Jews against whom practically no anti-Semitic feeling had existed before. The same Mussolini, who but a few years ago was favorably disposed toward Zionism, found it wise to follow Hitler's example, or he may have been forced by Hitler to do so. Certainly nothing in the conduct of Italian Jewry has given the slightest cause for this change. Here again, the need of the majority or of their ruling elite alone has determined the fate of the Jewish community …*
>
> *Anti-Semitism cannot be stopped by the good behavior of the individual Jew, because it is not an individual, but a social problem.*
>
> *How little relation exists between Jewish conduct and anti-Semitism is well illustrated by the way the majority shifts its official reasons for maltreatment. For hundreds of years the Jews have been persecuted for religious reasons. Today racial theories serve as pretext. The reasons are easily changed according to whatever seems to be the most efficient argument at the moment… in this country [the United States[2]] one of the*

> *most influential associations of manufacturers is working with two types of pamphlets. One of these pamphlets, used when a group of workers or middle-class people are approached, pictures the Jew as a capitalist and as an international banker. But if the same propagandist speaks to an audience of manufacturers, he uses a pamphlet which pictures the Jews as communists.*
>
> *The Jew answering accusations should realize that they are but a surface, below which deeper social problems are hidden even in those cases when the argument is put forth in good faith. The need of the majority for a scapegoat grows out of tension, e.g., from an economic depression. Scientific experiments prove that this need is particularly strong in tensions which are due to an autocratic regime. No "logical" argument will destroy these basic forces".*
>
> (Lewin, 1997, p. 118)

The paradox is that to support democratic principles and erode authoritarian tendencies, Lewin was clear that democratic leaders needed to provide firm leadership, and that democracy could not afford to tolerate intolerance. In his 1944 article, *The Dynamics of Group Action*, he asserts

> *"The democratic leader is no less a leader and, in a way, has not less power than the autocratic leader. There are soft and tough democracies as well as soft and tough autocracies; and a tough democracy is likely to be more rather than less democratic. The difference between autocracy and democracy is an honest, deep difference, and an autocracy with a democratic front is still an autocracy…*
>
> *It is particularly interesting to consider what might be called an efficient 'tough democracy.' The gospel of inefficiency of democracies has*

2 Inserted by the author of this article

> *been preached and believed not only in Nazi Germany. We ourselves are somewhat surprised to see the democratic countries execute this war rather efficiently. When Lippitt's first study (1940) showed the beneficial effects which the democratic atmosphere has on the overt character of the member, how it changes his behavior from hostility to friendliness, from egocentrism to we-feeling, and to an objective matter-of-fact attitude, the argument was frequently presented that these results may hold in the friendly settings of a boys' club, but that the advantages of the democratic atmosphere would not stand up in a tough situation such as an industry requiring high efficiency".*
>
> (Lewin, 1999, p. 287)

Lewin believed that for democracy to work, freedom has to have limits, and democratically appointed leaders must enforce those limits "A democratic world order does not require or even favor cultural uniformity all over the world. The parallel to democratic freedom for the individual is cultural pluralism for groups. But any democratic society has to safeguard against misuse of individual freedom by the gangster or — politically speaking —the 'intolerant.' Without establishing to some degree the principle of tolerance, of equality of rights, in every culture the 'intolerant' culture will always be endangering a democratic world organization. Intolerance against intolerant cultures is therefore a prerequisite to any organization of permanent peace" (Lewin, 1997, p. 36).

The "intolerant" know no boundaries. The boundaries must be set for them or, as family systems theorist Edwin Friedman put it, they will spread like a virus. Empathy for the "rights" of the intolerant will only be used against the empathetic. According to Friedman,

> *"The form of human colonization that functions most similarly to a virus or a malignant cell is the totalitarian nation. No human entity is more invasive. The totalitarian nation is equally invasive of the lives of its citizens and the space of its neighbors …The two are linked … by the absence of self-regulation; they make no attempt to regulate their drive in either direction. They infect what they touch and they seek to replicate their*

> *own being by taking over any host they 'occupy.' They certainly do not know when to quit. It is this same lack of self-regulation and the inner integrity required for self-definition that makes totalitarian states as notoriously untrustworthy of agreements and treaties as a crime syndicate… and this brings us back…to the irrelevance of empathy in the face of a relentless force".*
>
> (Friedman, 1999, p. 148)

Lewin would certainly have agreed. Turning again to his "Cultural Reconstruction" paper he states

> *"It has been one of the tragedies of the German Republic that the democratically minded people who were in power immediately after the war confused democracy with 'being unpolitical' … It was a tragedy that they did not know that 'intolerance against the intolerant' is … essential for maintaining and particularly for establishing a democracy … above all it was a tragedy that they did not know that strong leadership and an efficient positive use of the political power by the majority is an essential aspect of democracy. Instead, Germany congratulated herself on having 'the freest Constitution in the world' because technically even a small minority gets its proportional representation in the parliament. Actually, this set-up led to dozens of political parties and to the permanent domination of the majority by a minority group …"*
>
> (Lewin, 1997, p. 37)

Appeasement of the more radical elements of society failed, even though the majority favored peace: "Even in Germany right after the last war the proportion of the population which turned to pacifism was probably larger than the group which started immediately to build for revenge …" (Lewin, 1997, p. 36).

Lewin was a visionary about global peace and how to get there, but he was no proponent of always turning the other cheek, a lesson Ukraine has demonstrated. As Lewin put it

> *"Friendliness is no appropriate response to an aggressor. In recent years we have seen in world politics how undignified, morally distasteful and unwise is the policy of appeasing an aggressor. It is both shameful and stupid to talk to a man who is determined to destroy you. For the enemy such friendly talk means only that you are either too weak or too cowardly to fight him. We should not be mistaken about the following point either: the onlooker, who is not yet prejudiced, might be won over and brought to sympathize with an individual or a group of people who fight back with all their power against an aggressor, while he will show very little sympathy for people who bow to an insult. Britain has felt the truth of this simple observation rather keenly within the last two years.*
>
> *I hope that Jews in America will recognize this truth before it is too late. There are now many among us who adopt the attitude of "talking things over" and "getting together" without the necessary discrimination. This attitude is entirely correct and advisable with friends and neutrals, but not if we have to deal with groups which have made up their mind to destroy us.*
>
> *The Jew will have to realize, and he will have to realize it fast, that in fighting Nazis and their allies it does not pay to be polite. There is only one way to fight an enemy, and this is to return blow for blow, to strike back immediately, and if possible, harder. Jews can expect to get active help from others only if they themselves show that they have the courage and the determination to stand up for a fight of self-defense".*
>
> (Lewin, 1997, p. 120)

Fortunately, when democracies take a stand, there is strong evidence that the same democratic principles that motivated the groups of children in Lewin's experiments to take it upon themselves to keep working also motivates armies made up of democratic citizens. Let us turn to Victor Hansen, author of *The Soul of Battle*, who makes the case that the democratic culture, when necessary, produces a superior fighting force

> *"Democracies, I think — if the cause, if the commanding general, if the conditions of time and space take on their proper meaning — for a season can produce the most murderous armies from the most unlikely of men, and do so in the pursuit of something spiritual rather than the mere material …*



> *Theban hoplites, Union troops, and American GIs, this book argues, were ideological armies foremost, composed of citizen-soldiers who burst into their enemy's heartland because they believed it was a just and very necessary thing to do. The commanders who lead them encouraged that ethical zeal, made them believe there was a real moral difference between Theban democracy and Spartan helotage, between a free Union and a slave-owning South, and between a democratic Europe and a nightmarish Nazi continent. This study is more an essay on the ethical nature of democracies at war than a purely military history of three epic marches for freedom, for it claims that on rare occasions throughout the ages there can be a soul, not merely a spirit, in the way men battle".*
>
> (Hanson, 1999, p. 12)

Nonetheless, sustaining democracy through the willingness to fight is not the most desirable path. Even if it were, technological advances in the destructiveness of war will eventually make it unsustainable. Over-dependence on the military to sustain democracy also raises the specter of the "military-industrial complex" becoming an unhealthy influence, as per President Eisenhower's warning, and as many of founders of the United States feared. As James Madison put it in 1787 at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, "A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty … The means of defense against foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people" (Kohn, 1975).

Promoting democratic principles so as to decrease armed conflicts is a far better path and one which, if Hanson is right, makes the democratic culture all the more dangerous when forced to fight. Ukraine has proven that once again. A swing in postwar Ukraine toward the "security" of a more authoritarian government and culture, would potentially and ironically weaken the will to fight rather than reinforce it. Democracy is the best cultural path forward for peace and for war.

CONCLUSION

In sum, Lewinian social science was a guiding light for the reconstruction of Germany. It would be wise to apply the same to postwar Ukraine. The more engaged the people are in solving their own postwar dilemmas, the more clear intellectual resources are in providing active guidance, and the more clear government authorities are on the importance or rebuilding not just the infrastructure but also the social structure, the more likely a bright future for Ukraine will lie ahead. Indeed, Ukraine has a unique potential for become a guiding light for the world.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

REFERENCES

Afunts, G., Cato, M., & Schmidt, T. (2024). Inflation expectations in the wake of the war in Ukraine. *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics*, 113. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102303

AL-Rousan, N., AL-Najjar, H., & AL-Najjar, D. (2024). The impact of Russo-Ukrainian war, COVID-19, and oil prices on global food security. *Heliyon*, 10(8). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e29279

Andrada-Félix, J., Fernández-Rodríguez, F., & Sosvilla-Rivero, S. (2024). A crisis like no other? Financial market analogies of the COVID-19-cum-Ukraine war crisis. *The North American Journal of Economics and Finance*, 74. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2024.102194

Boungou, W., & Yatié, A. (2022). The impact of the Ukraine–Russia war on world stock market returns. *Economics Letters*, 215. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110516

Cifuentes-Faura, J. (2023). Ukraine's post-war reconstruction: Building smart cities and governments through a sustainability-based reconstruction plan. *Journal of Cleaner Production,* 419. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.138323

Coupe, T., & Obrizan, M. (2016). The impact of war on happiness: The case of Ukraine. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,* 132(Part A), 228–242. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.09.017

Crosby, G. (2021). *Planned Change: Why Kurt Lewin's Social Science is Still Best practice for Business Results, Change Management, and Human Progress.* Boca Raton, FL. Taylor & Francis Group.

Gavrilenko, I. (2023) Psychic Transformation Amidst Battle: Understanding PTSD and Combat-Related Psychic Trauma. *Newsletter on the results of scholarly work in sociology, criminology, philosophy and political science,* 4(1), 56–65. https://doi.org/10.61439/PSWS6072

Hanson, V. (1999). *The Soul of Battle.* New York. Anchor Books.

Havrylyshyn, A., Eckardt, R., & Yakushko, N. (2024). Management research on the war in Ukraine: Building theory and supporting practitioners. *European Management Journal,* 42(5), 647–652. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2024.01.003

Friedman, E. (1999). *A Failure of Nerve: Leadership in the Age of the Quick Fix.* New York, NY. Seabury Books.

Kohn, R. (1975). *Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America*, 1783–1802. New York, NY. Free Press.

Lacan, I., Dronova, I., & McBride, J. (2024). Social impact of destruction of urban forests in Ukraine and considerations for their future reconstruction. *Urban Forestry & Urban Greening,* 94. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ufug.2024.128269

Lewin, K. (1997). *Resolving Social Conflicts & Field Theory in Social Science.* Washington DC. American Psychological Association.

Lewin, K. (1999). *The Complete Social Scientist.* Washington DC. American Psychological Association.

Lunov, V., Lytvynenko, O., Maltsev, O., & Zlatova, L. (2023). The Impact of Russian Military Aggression on the Psychological Health of Ukrainian Youth. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 67(3), 426–448. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642221144846

Marrow, A., (1969). *The Practical Theorist: The Life and Work of Kurt Lewin. New York, NY.* Teacher's College Press.

Soliman, A., & Le Saout, E. (2024). The impact of the war in Ukraine on the idiosyncratic risk and the market risk. *Finance Research Letters*, 60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2023.104895

Udovyk, O., & M-Domènech, R. (2024). Feminist urban futures: Envisioning the future of Ukrainian cities through the lens of the displaced community in Valencia (Spain). *Futures*, 164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2024.103504

Verbytska, A. (2024). Topic modelling as a method for framing analysis of news coverage of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022–2023. *Language & Communication,* 99, 174–193. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langcom.2024.10.004

THE SINGULARITY OF «BLIND SPOTS» AS A SELF-ORGANIZATION OF UNCERTAINTIES AND RISKS IN A DIGITALIZED SOCIETY

DOI: https://doi.org/10.61439/DDYH4821



DR. MAKSYM LEPSKYI

ZAPORIZHZHIA NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

- *ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5604-641X*
- *Email: waysensey@gmail.com*

Professor in the Sociology Department at Zaporizhzhia National University in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine. Professor Lepskiy has both academic and governmental administrative experience and currently heads the Research Board in Social Forecasting of the Sociological Association of Ukraine. He is an Academician of the European Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He is the author of more than 225 publications, including 23 monographs, 13 workbooks, and 4 textbooks on such subjects as social and political forecasting, conflict modeling and resolution, and peacemaking and human development.

ABSTRACT

Topicality. Digitalization of society is accompanied by deep changes in social, economic and political relations, generating uncertainties and risks. The growth of technology, particularly artificial intelligence, is transforming the nature of information, communication and management, creating "blind spots" that require insight and systemic analysis.

The purpose of the article. To identify and investigate the mechanisms of the formation of "blind spots" as a phenomenon that characterizes the self-organization of uncertainties and risks in a digitalized society. Special attention is paid to illusions of cognitive perception and their impact on social interactions.

Research methodology. The methodological basis includes the concept of singularity, the ideas of scenario planning by Pierre Wack, of the singularity by Ray Kurzweil and the theory of self-organization of social systems. Metaphors of "black swan", "gray rhinoceros" and other images are used to structure risks and uncertainties.

The main conclusions of the discussion. The article emphasizes the importance of critical thinking, a universal approach to education and the introduction of ethical norms for the use of artificial intelligence as key aspects in countering the formation of "blind spots" and overcoming risks in the modern digital environment.

Keywords

digitalization of society, blind spots, technological singularity, artificial intelligence and risks, critical thinking in the digital age

INTRODUCTION

The first quarter of the 21st century demonstrated major technological breakthroughs in digitalization. Active use of artificial intelligence, virtual and augmented reality. Which led to the military revolution, which we see in many military conflicts, especially in the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Palestinian-Israeli military conflict, the Syrian war, and others. This period demonstrated a large space of uncertainties, risks and threats of pandemic, famine, terrorism and nuclear war. For almost three years now, the biggest modern convention war of a new generation has been going on in Europe, a new era, a world system is being rebooted, so we have to study the trends and processes that determine the future. Figurative designation of complex phenomena and regularities in scenario forecasting reflects the desire for the integrity of perception of the situation, process and interaction of people between themselves and the environment. These metaphors are a convenient propaedeutic tool for entering the theory of risk and uncertainty, actualized during or as a result of extreme situations.

Forecasting the totality of change has led Ray Kurzweil to conclude that by 2045, humanity will face a technological singularity, the point at which technological progress will become unmanageable and irreversible, leading to unpredictable changes in human civilization. According to him, the basis of the singularity is the exponential growth of technological achievements, which is mainly driven by artificial intelligence capable of self-improvement. Robotization and complication of tasks that will be solved by AI will lead to systemic social changes in the economy, politics, education, health care, production, security threats, ethics, social inequality in access to effective communication with AI, etc.

"The term "singularity" is borrowed from mathematics (where it refers to an undefined point in a function, like when dividing by zero) and physics (where it refers to the infinitely dense point at the center of a black hole, where the normal laws of physics break down). But it is important to remember that I use the term as a metaphor. My prediction of the technological Singularity does not suggest that rates of change will actually become infinite, as exponential growth does not imply infinity, nor does a physical singularity. A black hole has gravity strong enough to trap even light itself, but there is no means in quantum mechanics to account for a truly infinite amount of mass. Rather, I use the singularity metaphor because it captures our inability to comprehend such a radical shift with our current level of intelligence. But as the transition happens, we will enhance our cognition quickly enough to adapt" (Kurzweil, 2024, pp. 1–2).

While recognizing the perspective of Ray Kurzweil's technological singularity, we propose to consider in this article the singularity of the formation of the integrity of "blind zones" as a self-organization of uncertainties and risks in a digitalized society.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In the methodological design of this scientific study, we are based on the following important points:

1. On the idea of singularity as qualitative (exponential) growth of technological achievements. At the same time, we maintain that in sociological and socio-philosophical research we must take into account qualitative changes in social relations through the mediation of technological means and artificial intelligence. Therefore, the focus of our research is not so much on the qualitative changes in technology as on the qualitative changes in social relations during rapid and uncontrolled technological changes.

2. In the methodological design for our work, the ideas of Pierre Wack's scenario planning about the "soft art of rethinking" (Wack, 1985a, 1985b) are significant, in our article we consider the "blind spots" of decision making, which are often considered as uncertainties and risks, which are currently under investigation through "metaphors", holistic images of the development of situations to which people show their negativity to act or act on prejudice.

The soft art of rethinking has evolved into the concept of VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity) (U. S. Army Heritage and Education Center, 2018), with the growth of the activity factor, a VUCAS world is formed (unexpectedness, such as surprise and suddenness, is added to volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity).

Methodologically important to our work is the approach of the Oxford School of Scenario Planning by Rafael Ramirez and Angela Wilkinson in their OSPA strategic approach, which incorporates TUNA (conditions of turbulence, uncertainty, novelty and ambiguity), which is an important contribution of scenario research to the blind spots. «The OSPA is distinctive in several ways. We consider scenario planning as intervention: a set of social and intellectual processes that are designed for someone, or a group of people, and their specific needs. We position the role of the strategist as primarily a learner: effective and shared learning is enabled by directing attention to unexpected and less familiar changes in their wider context and with this, becoming able to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions. We use social ecology theory to explain and guide the effectiveness of scenario planning under what we call TUNA conditions — conditions of turbulence, uncertainty, novelty, and ambiguity — that characterize a more connected, plural, and multipolar world» (Ramírez & Wilkinson, 2016, p. xiv).

Although scenario planning is often described as a strategic tool (Bradfield et al., 2005; Grant, 2003; Mintzberg, 2000; Porter, 1985; Spee & Jarzabkowski, 2009), its role in cognitive benefits lies in its dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997; Ramírez et al., 2013;. Schwarz et al., 2019), and its integration with future awareness and education (Vecchiato, 2019; Meissner & Wulf, 2013), and as strategic activity (Bowman & MacKay, 2020).

I agree with Hillmann, Duchek, Meyr, and Guenther, (2018) that managers play an important role in creating organizational resilience. In highly volatile and uncertain times they must employ long-term visioning, think in alternatives, and deal with complexity in order to promote organizational resilience capabilities (Hillmann et al., 2018).

3. Among the significant ideas of the methodological design of our research is the consideration of the qualitative characteristics of the integrity and generalization of social relations, which is referred to as "digitalized society", how it changed the concepts of "information society" and the expectation of achieving the "knowledge society", which was not achieved. Instead of the conceptualization of the "knowledge society" there was a summation of the processes marked by the term "post-truth" — the distortion of knowledge and objective information by fakes, lies, information operations, spin doctoring and information special operations. What caused the need for a scientific understanding of the opposition to the post-truth, as well as the development of critical consciousness. The digitalized society forms new mechanisms and new emergencies in social relations. Digitization of big data, knowledge, information and noise raises new questions, digitization of services — new spheres of business and social relations in it. Artificial intelligence defines a new mediation in both the media world and social relations. We have to understand it.

4. New emergentities are new qualities and properties of integrity, a system in which the properties are not reducible to the properties of the elements that make it up. Therefore, in this article we ask questions not only about positive emergencies, but also about negative ones for people and social institutions of self-organization. We have labeled these negative trends as "blind spots", which include all kinds of uncertainties and risks. At the same time, we take into account that uncertainties reflect the fact that people cannot establish the probability of their occurrence. At risk, people can calculate the possibility of negative events.

Therefore, in the methodological design of the article, we will use the main ideas of the theory of self-organization.

PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE STUDY

The concept of a "black swan" entered the modern scientific and expert discourse "with a light hand" of Nasim Taleb, which he marked with the following signs: "First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact. Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable. I stop and summarize the triplet: rarity, extreme impact, and retrospective (though not prospective) predictability. A small number of Black Swans explain almost everything in our world, from the success of ideas and religions, to the dynamics of historical events, to elements of our own personal lives." A little later, he adds such a feature as "the unexpectedness of the event" (Taleb, 2007, pp. xvii-xviii).

His scheme of metaphors was continued by Michele Wucker, who directed the "Institute of World Politics" in New York. She identified a special category of surprises, which she labeled the "Grey Rhinoceros" image. Her work is "The Gray

Rhinoceros: How to Recognize and Act on the Obvious Dangers We Ignore" (Wucker, 2016).

In an interview for the Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs, M. Wucker explained this image: "The gray rhinoceros is a big and scary creature that comes straight at you. You have a choice: to do something or not. It's gray because when I came up with this image of the impending threat, I learned that there are black rhinos and there are white rhinos, but none of them are actually black or white; they're all gray… That's the central point of the book: talking about the looming threats that are right in front of you, that we're much worse than we think we are at dealing with obvious threats, either because we're used to them or because that we think we can't do anything about them, or simply because we forget they're there and worry about other things, perhaps sudden or emotionally charged events. We really miss the most important thing that is ahead of us" (Wucker & Stewart, 2016). As Michele Wucker has pointed out, gray rhinos are the children of the "elephant in the room" (a clearly visible but disruptive event) and the improbable and unpredictable "black swans" (a huge, usually bad impact).

An attempt to generalize the metaphors of the risk industry and define them through the theory of probability, statistics and uncertainty was made by Sasho Andonov, a lecturer at the Military Technology College in Muscat (Oman) and at GAL ANS in Abu Dhabi (UAE), where he taught aviation disciplines (EASA Part 66 and ACEP), currently works at the Faculty of Aviation Sciences at the Higher College of Technology (Khalifa bin Zayed Aviation College) in Al Ain (UAE). In a 2022 book, Safety Accidents in Risky Industries: Black Swans, Gray Rhinos, and Other Adverse Events, he defined his focus as "beginning to study the impact of these 'animal hazards' in risky industries" (Andonov, 2022).

Among his "dangerous animals", in addition to the already mentioned "black swan" and "gray rhinoceros", there are also the following: "invisible gorilla", which reflects the effect of the illusion of attention; "grey swans", which are events that have a huge impact, they are not so unexpected, but they cannot be predicted; a "black elephant event," a metaphor coined by New York Times reporter Thomas Friedman to refer to a well-known catastrophic event; "ostrich in the sand", which is a bad event that is very likely to happen, but it

Michele Wucker
Photo credit: Richter Frank-Jurgen
CC BY 2.0

Nassim Nicholas Taleb
Photo credit: Sarah Josephine Taleb

has been marginalized for some subjective reasons; monkeys "do not see — do not hear — do not speak"; the Dragon Kings events as a statistical outlier, an event that is extreme in its impact but does not belong to the same population as other events that are part of the system; "red herring" as a diversionary maneuver — something used to distract people from the true nature of things (Andonov, 2022, pp. 125–132).

1. Different social environments, in themselves, are a factor of uncertainty, "blind zones", since the transition from one environment, which has its own regularities, its own chaos and order, determines human disorientation, misunderstanding of what is happening and where the interaction of "man" is directed from another environment — environment".

Therefore, such a transition determines the need for adaptation, and in extreme conditions, a rapid restructuring of interactions and goal orientation. At the same time, there is a need to know about "fantastic beasts and where they live" or "where to look for them", to use the metaphor of the film based on the stories of JK Rowling. Such a traveler is considered from the standpoint of the "Kings — Dragons" social system. But the environment itself can be built according to the principle of an attraction, something that attracts and imitates, but being in this attraction either teaches something or distracts from something. Here, a person interacts with a simulated goal-oriented environment aimed at determining the dynamics and trajectory and amount of time of a person or people entering the attraction.

Uncertainty directly defines people who find themselves in either a simplified or an overcomplicated environment that requires rapid changes in perception of the unknown.

2. In the metaphors of "dangerous animals" there is a reflection of "blind zones in interaction with events, which have different signs both from the side of the event and from the side of people.

Thus, a classification of "swans" was introduced based on the characteristics of "rarity, extraordinary impact and retrospective (though not prospective) predictability" — "black swan, changing rarity to non-rarity leads to the definition of "gray swans", changing two characteristics to normality and predictability in addition to extraordinary influence means "white swan". Here, the characteristics of the event, as perceived by people, are determined to a greater extent, but the events themselves are dominant.

In the group of "black elephant" and "gray rhinoceros" effects, the subject's relationship to

known events is defined, "blind zones" of uncertainty arise as a result of the inability of subjects to prevent and overcome undesirable and catastrophic events. The extreme form of loss of subjectivity is "ostrich in the sand", denial of objective facts and probabilities, social marginalization or self-censorship of undesirable events in a group of consciousness or ignorance. Self-censorship and censoring is reflected in the monkey metaphor of "see nothing — hear nothing — say nothing", these effects are especially destructive in decision-making systems closed from information.

3. The socio-psychological content of "blind spots" related to perception is interesting. This effect is referred to as the "invisible gorilla," which was introduced in Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons' 2010 book The Invisible Gorilla (and Other Ways Our Intuition Tricks Us). Their psychological experiments were conducted in 1998 with Harvard University psychology students and recorded on video. This effect became "viral" because it clearly demonstrated how we do not see the movement of the "gorilla", which moves peripherally for our attention.

In the future, Chabris and Simons investigated that six illusions are characteristic of humans: illusions of attention (invisible gorilla); illusion of memory; illusion of confidence; illusion of knowledge; the illusion of reason; the illusion of potential (Chabris & Simons, 2010).

4. A special group of uncertainties should be the uncertainties of human interaction, what was defined as "reality" in contrast to reality — the interaction of subjects who can consciously mislead, manipulate other people and even wage informational and psychological wars, since the loss of objectivity and critical thinking, formation of "post-truth" leads to defeat, to loss in competitive or combat operations.

5. Among the modern uncertainties in the era of robotization, digitization and the development of computer programs and artificial intelligence, there is a group of "blind spots" in the relations between man and technology, man and software, and man and artificial intelligence. This group of "blind spots" is unevenly distributed across generations and individual social groups and so-called "information bubbles", but it is already sufficiently effectively used by micro-targeted advertising and influences on these bubbles from the "blind spots" of reality and illusions (hyperreality as defined by J. Baudrillard).

Let's summarize our theses: modern metaphors of "fantastic animals of uncertainty" or "danger animals" are aimed at the propaedeutic assimilation of knowledge of the characteristics, dynamics and processes of the interaction of "person-environment-event" (Lepskyi, 2024, p. 8–11).

This interaction defines specific types of uncertainties, namely:

1. Man — environment with interaction options "man from another environment or development phase — environment"; human interaction with attractions (simulated goal-oriented environment); the interaction of "a person and a simplified or complicated environment", "a person and the dynamics of intersections of different environments". In these types of uncertainties, we consider human interactions with objective and objectified surrounding processes and, by this nature, the emergence of "blind spots".
2. A person is an event, as options for interaction with rare, influential and unpredictable events; or known and those ignored or marginalized events, as the definition of human subjectivity and agency in catastrophic and extreme events. In these relations, there are sources of "blind spots" depending on the capacity of the subjects and the openness of the connection and assembly of events, individual states of social relations and situations, which has a significant impact on further social relations, both positive and negative.
3. Features of the "blind spots" of people's perception are marked in the socio-psychological effects of uncertainty, as illusions of attention, memory, confidence, knowledge, reason and potential. The circle of these effects can be expanded in relation to the perception of "a person is another, a friend, and a stranger", "a person and his interaction with a group and an organization", a person's transition to an unfamiliar social system and institution.
4. "Blind zones" of the reality of subjects are reflected in the relations of solidarity and competition, war and peace between people and large-scale social communities, since often in such relations hostile or competing subjects use technologies of manipulation and disorientation, destruction of objectivity, scientific, moral-will component and critical thinking, known as fakes, information-psychological and information-psychological special operations and so on.
5. From the relations "man — technology", "man — software", "man — artificial intelligence" originates a special type of uncertainty associated with the expansion of intermediaries in the form of equipment, programs, artificial intelligence, which forms new "blind zones", their results and impacts, "information bubbles" and their impacts.

This problem actualizes the further study of metaphors and interaction of people with uncertainties, risks, dangers of various social, natural and man-made etiology.

DISCUSSION

Modern digitalization leads to two important processes: firstly, it is a simplification that is associated with the archaization of human interaction through the mediation of electronic devices and other Internet tools, through the help of artificial intelligence; secondly, it is a complication associated with the emergence of many applications and computer programs, internet platforms, consoles and devices (VR and AR technologies) that require soft and smart skills in their use, understanding, application and maintenance, especially after failures and errors.

These processes can be considered in the dialectic of unity and the struggle of opposites. but the contradiction, like any contradiction, is the source of the development of the third, or can lead to catastrophic events. Simplification means loss of activity in some area, reduction of people's actions to extremely simple and often inadequate solutions to the problem, simplification often means primitivization, destruction of already achieved and structured knowledge. Simplification during archaization, the negative tendency to reduce the knowledge of integrity to only contact and visible elements. This process

means underdevelopment, the fact that a person does not understand this and does not see, or sees and does not identify and does not understand.

In this matter, we have to distinguish universals and simplifications — these are completely different things.

Universals play the role of invariants, laws and regularities that operate and are already established as knowledge. This is not a simplification, but they have such a characteristic as clarity (Rene Descartes insisted on this). Universal knowledge provides the flexibility of the mind and the use of intelligence as knowledge accumulated by memory through universal objectivity, repeatability, necessity, internal regularities of integrity and interaction with other integrity. Universality as generality is one of the sides of objects, but the other sides are particularity and singularity, which gives an understanding of specificity and concreteness. Simplification tends to isolation, universality to integral multifaceted images. That is why universities should return to their genetic name, marked by universal knowledge, which does not negate, but rather heals (makes whole) specific and concrete knowledge. The universality of knowledge was provided by the education system, which was formulated as the integrity and formed the integrity of the perception of the world and the activities of people in it.

Digitization has broken integrity through uncertainty, simplification and chaos. Specificity and singularity became the stand-in not only for universality, but also for specificity. In education, this process takes place through the substitution of impressions of knowledge, emotionality of professional (special) knowledge, skills and abilities. The network information environment with algorithms fighting for attention and impressions creates a chaos of information that claims to replace knowledge, and the information itself is under pressure to be corrected by fakes, lies, and post-truths, spin doctors, and information specialists. Knowledge in such a double devalidation is devalued for the masses and elitist for the people in charge. I define devalidation as the opposite of the validation (establishing adequacy and conformity) process. If we use the terminology of Vilfredo Pareto, devalidation becomes a system of formation, derivatives — derivatives, the center of which is the origin of images of impressions, and therefore devalidation increasingly distances people from adequacy and objectivity, and it is no longer just a hyperreality, it is already an emotional one with compression rationality reality.

Hyperreality had a limited rationality compensated and supplemented by mass culture. Devalidated quasi-reality is completed by artificial intelligence. Human intelligence is formed in the economy of impressions and search, with micro-targeted programs for the formation of an "information bubble" of the reference information sphere. It is the "information bubbles" in the digitalized society that are the micro-strange attractors from which the formation of order in the chaos of information tapes and services begins. Microtargeted algorithms show the user only what the person has already shown interest in. A devalidated mind is conditioned to seek impressions, not adequacy. It is the task of rationality and processing of large data sets that creates the need for intelligent prosthetics. But this can form an inverse negative downward relationship, as there is a desire to replace even simple cognitive functions with artificial intelligence. Prosthetic intelligence with artificial intelligence in this case will reduce the capabilities of people's cognitive skills. At the same time, cognitive functions have positive upward feedback in the complexity of programming, the use of various applications as action algorithms to achieve results in the virtual digital world.

But everything is not such a threat, as long as the virtual and digitalized sphere has a non-critical importance in the budget of everyday life, which still needs to be studied. At the same time, it is already possible to testify that children perfectly understand symbols and icons earlier and better than the printed word. It is the reduction of the time required for mastering competent printed reading and writing that causes concern, since intelligent artificial prosthetics is the very generation of printed and visual text (pictures and even videos).

Digitization and artificial intelligence have a powerful positive effect, we must know, apply and use it, these processes of saving knowledge and large volumes of information, quick search and access to them, acceleration of service provision. Artificial intelligence allows you to quickly provide information on request and combine data from different corners of the Internet with a tendency towards integrity through iterations of appeals in a neural network approach and algorithms of self-similarity — fractality. But this positive can only be in the presence of knowledge, the amount that forms reasonable questions — which are based on knowledge. But requests in the absence of knowledge increase the noise. And this is not accidental, because the "absurd request" provides

an absurd answer. As it was once said, "God forbid the wrong question gets the right answer", in this case the noise in the question will get the noise in the answer, the absurdity in the question will form the absurdity in the answer. The question is only in intelligent algorithms, more often there will be queries with knowledge or absurdity, which will be repeated more often and form the probability for the answer algorithms. Artificial intelligence is a positive trend as an assistant for human intelligence, but a bad assistant if it compensates for underdeveloped cognitive abilities. This is very similar to Father D'Artagnan's opinion that "money is a good helper for people, but a bad master."

Digitization has positive mechanisms for reducing people's time to search for information and receive government services, banking services, food orders, repairs, purchases, and much more. But for now, this is a mediation task, since ultimately services are performed and programmed by people.

But we have to take into account that artificial intelligence can replace the intelligence of people who shape the structure of social and public relations. For example, it can be writing draft laws, receiving information (in an information bubble), and this further squeezes limited rationality, changes decision-making, the algorithm replaces people. In humans, artificial intelligence replaces what was not supposed to be universal knowledge, with special (special) knowledge and specific knowledge, abilities and skills.

In the interim conclusions, we have already identified several trends in the digital, digitized sphere and artificial intelligence:

1. Trends of simplification and complication, the question of which process will be strengthened and what it is aimed at. For example, simplifying the provision of services will always be positive for people, but at the same time, it will complicate the maintenance of "simplified programs" and the cyber security of these processes. The tendency to simplify rationality and complicate the sphere of impressions, on the contrary, will destroy education and simplify intellectual and cognitive activity, this will lead to the complication of institutionalization and socialization of people. Education in the digitalized world increasingly acquires the characteristics of the economy of impressions and applications, instead of the unity of episteme (universal knowledge — the search for truth), techne (specialized practically oriented knowledge) and metis (specific knowledge as a practice of solving real problems).

2. The second trend is due to the fact that the digitization of information is often not holistic, but indiscriminate or selective with limited rationality, so there is digitization of knowledge and digitization of noise, which manifests itself as a search for truth or doxa, truth or lies, information or

fake. Distinguishing these processes is a matter of critical mind, but also of a holistic metacognitive approach to the logic of humanity in the unity of the general (universal) — special (specific) — individual (concretic) in education.

The indiscriminate nature of digitization increasingly creates chaos and cacophony of information and fakes, noise overload in digitization, selective information with limited rationality forms maximalist, ideological, often extremely aggressive movements, which with their maximalist tendency resonate with the undeveloped rationality of the search for impressions and simple self-identity, with the exaggeration of the Ego and simplified performance

3. In the digitized world combined with the economy of impressions and the prosthetics of human intelligence by artificial intelligence, the most dangerous trend is the decline of literacy and education, because in the digital culture of fast search, emotions and impressions, there is a rapid switch as the destruction of concentration, focus of attention. namely printed texts and their mastering and understanding require such concentration and attention that is the basis of professional success and development. Therefore, in the education of the future there is an important question of the time budget for the digitized complex combination of documentary, oral and visual texts, and not the degradation of printed documentary text in favor of oral and visual.

4. The deconcentration of people is determined by the flow of things that are tiring and exhausting due to noise. At the same time, concentration and its preservation have their safeguards in human culture, namely due to real "offline" physically close communication, physical culture and performance orientation, which will require concentration training in education or in gaming (gaming complex practices that need skill development).

With the dominance of borrowing, query formulation and mediated prompt formations (resulting text queries for Artificial Intelligence), programming algorithms in programming languages, scripts and bots in social services and sales communications, the effectiveness will be up to their developers and specialists.

That is why uncertainty, noise, and chaos enhanced by digitized scaling form not only a "fog of disorientation" in the absence of knowledge, by analogy with the "fog of war" K. von Clausewitz. The fog of digitalization can lead to new religious digitized cults, but also to the appearance of "Morok (укр. Морок)", this Ukrainian word means an inner "fog" of perception, preoccupation and disorientation and deconcentration. Derivatives of "Morok" are "Zamorochenist (укр. замороченність)» — deconcentration, as a loss of clear thinking; and " Zapamorochennia (укр. Запомороченння)" — loss of consciousness, activity and reasonableness of behavior.

Therefore, we are on the threshold of not only the singularity of the formation of the integrity of artificial intelligence and automation, but also the threat of the formation of the integrity of noise, fog and gloom, which will form new forms of escapism from it, or its compensation.

Such threats define new challenges for the humanities and technical sciences in the metacognitive and holistic search for a new education, this process is very similar to the medieval search for the preservation of the core of science — liberal sciences and craft sciences. This process, the famous science fiction writer Neil Stevenson, marked by the formation after the "great terrible event" of categorization such as monastic (scientific-research), secular (professional-technological) and special (political, military, economic, etc.) education. In his work, it is scientific education that is anathema — closed from society with a simplified consumption of adepts and full concentration on science, as well as in the use of big data due to the constant help of artificial intelligence, its main role as an assistant (Stephenson, 2009).

Such an increase in the media worlds, which historically occurred as a gradual complication of the oral, written, printed, mass media, information to the digitized world and artificial intelligence. Currently, the general space and time for "live" communication and real relationships are shrinking. The transition to simulated and hyperreal professional skills, this development of events defines new "uncertainties and threats" that may have a complex and, God forbid, systemic nature. The search for alternative systems of education and science, which are able to respond to this self-organization of uncertainties and threats, which, when cognitive skills are reduced, form a systemic space of "blind spots", this becomes, in my opinion, the most relevant direction for the future understanding of challenges and responses to the emergence of a digital society.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Current global events accelerate the complex dynamics of the formation of "blind spots", which

contain uncertainties and risks in a digitalized society that is undergoing significant changes under the influence of technological progress and the rapid development of artificial intelligence. Therefore, our study of uncertainty, singularity and risks in the context of modern socio-technical interactions is updated, which directs our methodological approach to understanding these phenomena.

Exponential technological progress, in particular the development of artificial intelligence (AI), creates prerequisites for radical changes in social relations. These changes are often unmanageable and create new challenges, including ethical dilemmas, unequal access to AI resources, and privacy and security threats. I sympathize with Ray Kurzweil's understanding of the singularity, which sees it as a metaphor illustrating the inevitability and scale of change that transforms social structures. Pierre Wack's concept of scenario planning for uncertainty analysis is important for our work, which is aimed at researching possible risks and developing a strategy to overcome them. Attention is also focused on the self-organization of social systems in the conditions of digitalization, which generates both positive and negative emergent properties.

The metaphor of "blind spots" as a risk analysis tool uses such images as the "black swan" by Nassim Taleb, the "gray rhinoceros" by Michele Wucker and the "invisible gorilla" by Christopher Chabris and others, which helps to structure different types of risks. They illustrate not only unknown events, but also those that are ignored for subjective or social reasons.

The "blind spots" of human interaction with technology are especially important in a digitalized environment, where information bubbles and algorithmic biases create risks of distorting reality.

Among the main social consequences of digitalization, we must consider that the digital society changes the mechanisms of education, communication and socialization, economy and politics. Instead of achieving a "society of knowledge", we are faced with post-truth phenomena that destroy the integrity of objective knowledge. The impression economy caused by micro-targeted algorithms reinforces cognitive fragmentation, which affects critical thinking and the ability to make rational decisions.

Defining the risks associated with the use of AI is important for our work. AI can serve both as a tool for supporting intellectual processes and as a factor in their degradation. Over-reliance on intelligent prosthetics can lead to loss of cognitive skills and deepening inequality. Problems related to the decline of literacy, superficial consumption of information and displacement of printed text become challenges for the education system.

The next challenge for society is to find a balance between technology and the humanitarian dimension. In order to avoid the negative consequences of digitalization, it is necessary to develop educational programs that preserve the universality of knowledge and promote the development of critical thinking. It is also important to consider the impact of digital technologies on social interactions, maintaining a balance between technological innovation and ethical principles.

Among the main trends, we note the following dynamics of changes:

The singular growth of technology and its impact on society through the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI), virtual and augmented reality is creating radical shifts in economics, politics, education and social relations. This leads to the formation of new structures of risks and uncertainties. Information bubbles and algorithmic bias (as strange attractors of ordering chaos) limit access to objective data, creating "blind spots" in the information space.

There is fragmentation of knowledge; digitizers are subject to both knowledge and information, and fakes; noticeable trends are the degradation of critical thinking. Post-truth, fake news and distortion of information lead to devaluation of knowledge. Education increasingly gravitates toward the short-term satisfaction of demand for simple solutions rather than the development of critical and cognitive skills. The transition from universal knowledge to highly specialized competencies reduces overall intellectual flexibility.

The micro-targeting trend and the impression economy are particularly important. Using AI algorithms to personalize content creates closed information ecosystems. This promotes the spread of emotionally charged materials and exacerbates conflicts in society.

A dangerous trend is digital addiction and the decline of cognitive abilities. Excessive dependence on technologies (AI, gadgets, programs) forms habits of passive information consumption. This reduces attention, memory and ability to analyze. The emergence of the phenomenon of "intelligent prosthetics" (when people rely on AI to perform basic cognitive functions) deepens the degradation of critical thinking.

Among the mechanisms of self-organization of "blind spots", we note those that were shown in the experiments of Christopher Chabris and

Daniel Simons with the "invisible gorilla", namely, six illusions characteristic of humans: illusions of attention (invisible gorilla); illusion of memory; illusion of confidence; illusion of knowledge; the illusion of reason; the illusion of potential. As shown in these experiments, people's attention is selective and simplistic. This means that a large proportion of events or signals can be ignored, even if they are obvious. People unconsciously focus on familiar or expected aspects of reality, ignoring unexpected or challenging events. In the digital environment, this is exacerbated by algorithms that tailor content to the user's prior preferences. People often overestimate their knowledge or ability to predict events, which creates "blind spots" in risk analysis. In the digital age, this is reinforced by the availability of superficial information that creates the illusion of competence and the advantage of "information bubbles".

At the same time, simulated environments and an economy of impressions are being formed in the digitalized society. Digital society actively uses simulation (virtual reality, simulations, gamification), which imitates reality, but does not require critical thinking. This creates environments where people adapt to simplified models of reality that form a biased perception of the world.

A separate mechanism of self-organization of "blind zones" is the dynamics of cognitive exhaustion. Information overload and noise (useless information) deplete people's ability to concentrate and analyze. The rapid switching of attention characteristic of the digital environment reduces the ability to analyze deeply.

In addition, the mechanism of self-organization of "blind zones" is the indirect influence of information technologies. AI algorithms work as intermediaries that decide what information users will receive. This forms a distorted view of reality, strengthens "blind zones" due to the unavailability of alternative points of view.

We must also define the processes of self-organization of "blind spots" in society. First, it is the institutionalization of information biases. "Blind zones" are formed at the institutional level when key decisions are based on limited data or distorted interpretations. An example can be political campaigns built on targeting algorithms. Secondly, there is social segregation in information bubbles. People find themselves in isolated information environments, which reinforces social and political divisions. This prevents constructive dialogue and reinforces stereotypes. Thirdly, self-removal of people from critical thinking is carried out. People are increasingly delegating complex cognitive tasks to technology. This creates the illusion of making life easier, but actually reduces society's overall decision-making competence. Fourthly, there is a strengthening of the impression economy. Algorithms focused on emotionally vivid content increase social tension because they manipulate human emotions. As a result, important topics are often lost among sensational and entertaining materials. Fifth, new cognitive barriers are formed. New "blind spots" arise as a result of the complexity of the technological environment (AI, Big Data), which not everyone can grasp. People with different levels of access to technology find themselves in unequal conditions, which exacerbates social divisions.

The self-organization of "blind spots" in the digitalized society is based on the mechanisms of illusions of perception, fragmentation of attention and delegation of cognitive functions to technologies. These processes require deep understanding to develop strategies that would support the development of critical thinking and reduce the negative impact of technological transformations.

These trends, mechanisms and dynamics shape challenges for education and human management.

Among the challenges for education, we note the following:

1. The task of developing critical thinking. Information overload and simplification of knowledge due to the economy of impressions reduce the ability to analyze, think logically and assess the reliability of data. Therefore, there must be development and implementation of programs that develop critical thinking skills, including analysis of fake news, methods of evaluating information sources, and understanding cognitive biases.
2. Ensuring the integrity of education. Education is becoming fragmented due to the emphasis on highly specialized competencies and technological tools. A return to a universal approach in education, which combines general (humanitarian) knowledge with technological and applied skills.
3. Study of the impact of digital culture on literacy. The decline of print literacy and the ability to read deeply is often determined by the dominance of visual and short-term content. Scientists and educators should seek and maintain a balance between printed and digital educational content, form habits and skills of analytical reading of texts of different complexity.
4. Solving the problem of the educational gap. Inequality of access to modern technologies and educational resources creates disparities between social groups. The challenge is to create programs of equal access to educational technologies for all segments of the population, particularly vulnerable groups.
5. A modern challenge is learning to use artificial intelligence. Lack of knowledge about the capabilities and limitations of AI leads to its incorrect integration into professional activity and training. Introduction of training courses on ethics, programming and use of AI for various professional fields.

In the group of challenges for human management, let's pay attention to the following points.

1. The challenge is maintaining the transparency of algorithms. The use of AI algorithms in decision-making can be opaque, creating risks of discrimination and bias. Implementation of regulatory mechanisms to ensure the transparency of algorithms, especially in the areas of governance, law and social protection.
2. Adequate response to dynamic risks is an important task. "Blind spots" can quickly form in response to new technological changes (eg, automation, cyber threats). The development of flexible risk management models should take into account the exponential dynamics of technological progress.
3. Formation of an information security policy is an important challenge. Misinformation and manipulation in the digital environment increase uncertainty in society. Developing national strategies to combat fake news, creating information verification tools and strengthening digital literacy should be the way to solve this problem.
4. Formation of the management of cognitive resources of society is becoming an important challenge of modern times. Decreased cognitive concentration due to excessive consumption of digital content and algorithmic manipulations is a significant problem. Therefore, there should be educational programs to stimulate the development of cognitive skills aimed at training attention, memory and creative thinking.
5. The challenge of integrating human and machine intelligence. Excessive dependence on machine intelligence threatens to reduce human subjectivity in decision-making. Creation of hybrid systems, where human intelligence remains the main decision-maker, and AI plays a supporting role — this should be a guideline for the development of a digitalized society.

Among the recommendations to prevent the self-organization of "blind zones", we emphasize the following provisions.

First, digital literacy policies must be developed. Spreading programs that teach how to recognize manipulation, disinformation and distortion in the digital environment. Secondly, it should be ensured by investing in education and research in the field of digitalization, social risks and "blind spots". Thirdly, it is necessary to create ethical norms for the use of AI. Development of ethical codes to ensure fairness, transparency and accountability in the use of technology. Fourth, it is necessary to make efforts to support interdisciplinary approaches, the combination of technological and humanitarian knowledge in solving the problems of uncertainties and risks. Fifth, the focus on cooperation and solidarity should be meaningful. Strengthening international cooperation to coordinate actions in solving global challenges related to digitalization.

These challenges require a concerted effort between educational institutions, governments, business and society to build an inclusive, sustainable and ethical digital future.

New social challenges generated by digitalization require a holistic and metacognitive approach to their solution in further research.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

REFERENCES

Andonov, S. (2022). *Safety accidents in risky industries: Black swans, gray rhinos and other adverse events.* CRC Press.

Bowman, G., & MacKay, R. B. (2020). Scenario planning as strategic activity: A practice-orientated approach. *Futures and Foresight Science,* 2(3–4), Article e32. https://doi.org/10.1002/ffo2.32

Bradfield, R., Wright, G., Burt, G., Cairns, G., & Van Der Heijden, K. (2005). The origins and evolution of scenario techniques in long range business planning. *Futures*, 37(8), 795–812.

Chabris, C., & Simons, D. (2010). *The invisible gorilla: And other ways our intuitions deceive us.* Harmony/Rodale.

Grant, R. M. (2003). Strategic planning in a turbulent environment: Evidence from the oil majors. *Strategic Management Journal,* 24(6), 491–517.

Hillmann, J., Duchek, S., Meyr, J., & Guenther, E. (2018). Educating future managers for developing resilient organizations: The role of scenario planning. *Journal of Management Education,* 42(4), 461–495. https://doi.org/10.1177/1052562918766350

Kurzweil, R. (2024). *The singularity is closer: When we merge with AI.* Penguin Publishing Group.

Lepskyi, M. (2024). Globalni nevyznachenosti v sotsialnomu prohnozuvanni yak metafory ta analityka. I. O. Kudinov [Global uncertainties in social forecasting as metaphors and analytics. In I. O. Kudinov] (Ed.), *Materials of the XIV International Scientific and Practical Conference "Social Forecasting and Designing the Future of the Country: Recovery in the Context of Global Risks and Uncertainties" (April 26, 2024, Zaporizhzhia)*, 8–11. Zaporizhzhia: CNSD.

Meissner, P., & Wulf, T. (2013). Cognitive benefits of scenario planning: Its impact on biases and decision quality. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 80(4), 801–814.

Mintzberg, H. (2000). *The rise and fall of strategic planning.* Financial Times Prentice Hall.

Porter, M. E. (1985). *Competitive advantage.* The Free Press.

Ramírez, R., Österman, R., & Grönquist, D. (2013). Scenarios and early warnings as dynamic capabilities to frame managerial attention. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change,* 80(4), 825–838.

Ramírez, R., & Wilkinson, A. (2016). *Strategic reframing: The Oxford scenario planning approach.* Oxford University Press.

Schwarz, J. O., Rohrbeck, R., & Wach, B. (2019). Corporate foresight as a microfoundation of dynamic capabilities. *Futures & Foresight Science, e28*. https://doi.org/10.1002/ffo2.28

Spee, A. P., & Jarzabkowski, P. (2009). Strategy tools as boundary objects. *Strategic Organization,* 7(2), 223–232.

Stephenson, N. (2009). *Anathem.* HarperCollins.

Taleb, N. N. (2007). *The black swan: The impact of the highly improbable.* Random House Publishing Group.

U. S. Army Heritage and Education Center. (2018, February 16). Who first originated the term VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity and Ambiguity)? *USAHEC Ask Us a Question.* The United States Army War College. http://usawc.libanswers.com/faq/84869

Vecchiato, R. (2019). Scenario planning, cognition, and strategic investment decisions in a turbulent environment. *Long Range Planning,* 52(5), Article 101865. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2019.01.002

Wack, P. (1985a). Scenarios — Shooting the rapids. *Harvard Business Review, 63(6)*, 139–150. https://hbr.org/1985/11/scenarios-shooting-the-rapids

Wack, P. (1985b). Scenarios: Uncharted waters ahead. Harvard Business Review, 63(5), September–October, 73–90. https://hbr.org/1985/09/scenarios-uncharted-waters-ahead

Wucker, M. (2016). *The gray rhino: How to recognize and act on the obvious dangers we ignore.* St. Martin's Publishing Group.

Wucker, M., & Stewart, D. T. (2016, June 22). Move over, black swan: Here comes the gray rhino. *Carnegie Council.* Retrieved April 15, 2024, from https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/media/podcast/20160614-move-over-black-swan-here-comes-the-gray-rhino

UNEXPLAINED PHENOMENA IN SCIENCE

DOI: https://doi.org/10.61439/AMNH4875



DR. MARCO A. ANDREACCHIO

INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER

- *ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5025-1321*
- *E-mail: marco.andreacchio@cantab.net*

Marco Andreacchio awarded a doctorate from the University of IIllinois for his interpretation of Sino-Japanese philosophical classics in dialogue with Western counterparts and a doctorate from Cambridge University for his work on Dante's Platonic interpretation of religious authority. Andreacchio has taught at various higher education institutions and published systematically on problems of a political-philosophical nature. Editorial member of *Dogma* journal.

ABSTRACT

While the enterprise of modern science seeks to explain phenomena, its own methodology (viz., the scientific method) tends to blind scientists both to phenomena in their original, pre-scientific context and to the very nature or essential motive of science. In order to explain phenomena as they are we need to see them on their own ground or in their own genesis. This applies to the phenomenon of science, as well. Science itself begs to be explained pre-scientifically, or more precisely it begs for an explanation unfolding out of an exploration of the hiatus between science and its pre-scientific world. Only by standing *phenomenologically* in the interstice between the scientific and the pre-scientific can we truly explain the phenomenon of science, thereby exposing ourselves to an understanding of phenomena as they are and not merely as they are supposed to be relatively to ends alien to them.

Keywords

science, modern reason, phenomenology, platonism, technocracy

INTRODUCTION

In his 1954 *Crisis of the European Sciences*, Edmund Husserl drew to public attention the bankruptcy of modern rationalism, exposing modern science's incapacity to account for phenomena as *such*. Modern science fails to *understand* what it sees, what it is *given* to see, insofar as modern science remains constitutionally blind to all that transcends the logic of integration into a mechanistic universe of science's own making (Ellul, 2018; Olson, 2015; Robson, 2023; Schaefer, 2022). Modern science or reason *uses* and allows us to use phenomena, *as if* it understood them; as if to understand phenomena were simply to integrate them within science's own world of mathematical abstractions. Integration at a cost: modern reason meddles in abstractions mistaken for phenomena themselves, these being originally or constitutionally rooted in all that must transcend the grasps of modern science, namely a "fullness of being" (Desmond, 2020; Andreacchio, 2023) irreducible to mere appearances, all the more where these are technologically mediated (as in the case of microscopic vision).

In stark opposition to a classical Platonic tradition of interpretation of phenomena, Niccolò Machiavelli taught the world he inaugurated to treat phenomena or the contents of our ordinary experience in terms of "facts" (Mansfield, 2018, 2023) cut off from any metaphysical dimension; "data" ready for integration in the building of a new world characterized by "new ways and orders" (*modi ed ordini nuovi*):[1] new ways of conceiving human action and new orders or forms of authority into which to fuel and channel our

1 See Machiavelli (2000), Proem to Book 1.

passions, or the earthly contents/motion of our imagination (Strauss, 1957, 2014). Modern man's "new ways" entail a new sense of right and wrong cut off from metaphysical or theological concerns: a new *morality* proper to a new *anthropology*; a new sense of what man is concretely, autonomously of any transcendent mind. Man as he is *formally* cut off from what man ought to be. "Formally" here signals the symbolic character of the Machiavellian lesson. Modern man is abstracted from transcendent ends only *mathematically*. Why? He is abstracted into what Descartes would introduce as a "thinking thing" (*res cogitans*) for the sake of justifying the project of *building* our ends universally, as opposed to *receiving* them in a theological-political context. The modern universal comes to replace an old nexus between the human and the divine, as the presumed synthesis of human particularity and divine universality. A new "historical" synthesis replacing the Christian promise of a synthesis, or the Christian "good news" that the two — the human and the divine — are bound to each other in an indissoluble, timeless, living or spiritual "ring" (Shakespeare's term for classical Platonism's *circulum divinus*)(Claessens, 2014).[2]

Far from being established as concretely autonomous, the modern "self" is defined by a logic analyzing man in function of a mechanistic universe dominated by mechanical laws that compel all nations to strive for final integration in a thoroughly mechanistic society, a regime mirroring its ontological ground, what the 19th century spoke of as "the Death of God" (Nietzsche's "abyss").

METHODOLOGY

In order to fairly assess what phenomena remain unexplained by modern science, we need to "bracket" phenomenologically modern "scientific" assumptions concerning method. While Descartes taught us to define a method of inquiry prior to or independently of our embarking in any concrete examination of the phenomenal world — which Descartes notoriously reduces formally or provisionally to the status of inherently meaningless material (*res extensa*)—the call to assess phenomena that modern science might have failed to explain, possibly by having failed to identify them to begin with, demands a direct encounter with phenomena, whereby our very "scientific method" is exposed as a phenomenon among pre-scientific ones begging for explanation. For this reason, the present study adopts as its "methodology" a phenomenological "non-methodology" characteristic of Socratic "zetetic skepticism" (Gildin 1997, p. 132),[3] an investigative stance situated not against, but at

2 Shakespeare addresses the problem of "the ring" most notably throughout his *Romeo and Juliet*.
3 On classical, Aristotelian phenomenology, see Klein (1964).

the heart of common sense, where phenomena are not encountered yet as abstract "scientific data," but as pre-scientific problems pertaining to a decisively familiar tension between political immanence and theological transcendence.

RESULTS

Modern science is found to have failed altogether to explain *any* phenomena aside from the practice of accounting for selective ones strictly in function of a "scientific" objective coinciding with the rise of a purely mechanistic Regime beyond the limits of pre-scientific "closed societies". The theological-political problem that modern science has long tended to obscure resurfaces today under the guise of a technocratic order to which our scientists remain, if only haplessly, subservient. Technocracy reminds us of our pre-scientific theological-political predicament in the very act of pretending to solve theological-political problems. For the technocratic "solution" emerges today, not as eradicating our problems, but as rendering them utterly incomprehensible to us. Technocratic science has alienated us from our concrete problems, no less than from the phenomenal content of our experience unmediated by technology. Our science has thus fostered alienation, rather than understanding; and alienation has bred strife or war, and the rise of an obscurantist mechanistic politics (*realpolitik*), the time-bomb of global "chaos management". Yet, our very mode of investigation points to a way out of the contemporary crisis of science. Hence the conclusive appeal to a Platonic, poetic-philosophical restoration of science.

DISCUSSION

The contemporary rise of technocracy confirms that liberation from a "medieval" God goes hand in hand with subjection to a modern Machine (See Adams, 1900). Technocracy's demand is unequivocal: integration in the process of bringing about the virtual apotheosis of a radically mechanistic or essentially godless regime. Whether or not our scientists are aware of it, the technocratic regime that supports their work is the very regime they work to consolidate. Such is the *forma mentis* of our modern sciences, a "boundary of thought" that logically blinds our sciences to all that does not conform to it. It will blind our scientist to *questions* presupposed by the "historical" logic of technocracy; it will consequently blind him to the truth about all phenomena, including that of our science. For the technological imperative distracts our science from its own dawn, compelling us to regard it as a mere "datum" in a mechanically evolutionary context, as opposed to recognizing it in its originally theological-political context, where the *idea* of modern science responds to a *problem* transcending the boundaries of any technological logic. Indeed, our sciences assume that the problem they respond to is originally devoid of any substance; that it is merely "formal," the way Hegel's original "God" is a mere or nominal universal to be *realized* throughout "History".

In sum, what modern science fails to explain is all that does not depend upon its own *nominalistic* premise, as well as the premise itself, which tends to be systematically eclipsed by its operationalizing. We are supposed to be able to explain *everything*, but our explanatory powers presuppose *de facto* the non-existence of anything that cannot be explained by our mechanistic sciences. In this crucial respect, our sciences are tautological: they seek what they need to triumph, or to bring about the triumph of a regime they serve as handmaidens.

Leo Strauss exposed pertinent features of the Machiavellian-Spinozist foundations of modern science. Writing of Spinoza as "hardheaded, not to say hardhearted, pupil of Machiavelli and philological critic of the Bible," Strauss noted that

> "Spinoza restored the dignity of speculation on the basis of modern philosophy or science, of a new understanding of 'nature'. He thus was the first great thinker who attempted a synthesis of pre-modern (classical-medieval) and of modern philosophy. His speculation resembles neo-Platonism: he understands all things as proceeding from, not made or created by, a single being or origin; the One is the sole ground of the Many. Yet he no longer regards this process as a descent or decay, but as an ascent or unfolding: the end is higher than the origin. According to his last word on the subject, the highest form of knowledge, which he calls intuitive knowledge, is knowledge not of the one substance or God, but of individual things or events: God is fully God, not qua substance or even in His eternal attributes, but in His noneternal modes understood *sub specie aeternitatis*. The knowledge of God as presented in the first part of the *Ethics* is only universal or

> abstract; only the knowledge of individual things or rather events qua caused by God is concrete" (Strauss, 1997, p. 155).

Modern science inverts ancient monistic Platonism (itself a synthesis of Plato and pre-Socratic "materialism"), converting it into a progressive enterprise that, as Strauss notes further, "prepares German idealism" in the spirit of modern "commercialism" (Strauss, 1997). By the same token, Spinoza comes to replace ends that are both natural and rational with ends that are rational and *historical*, or "ideals" including that of God; whence the rise of a new universal/open society, "a new kind of Church"—"A Christianity without dogmas and sacraments" and incarnating "not only emancipation but secular redemption" in the name of "the True, the God, and the Beautiful" (Strauss, 1997, p. 156).

It is the very progressive character of modern science that blinds it both to itself and to its ground or essential motive, namely a will to resolve the conflict between the present as immanence and its transcendent source — a present order of things (*status quo*) traditionally represented by sacred authorities or priests, and a transcendence traditionally represented by mystics or prophets. In Strauss's words, Spinoza's modernity was to resolve "the conflict between prophet and priest, between the inspired and the uninspired, between profound subterraneous Judaism and official Judaism [that was] legalistic and hence rationalistic" (Strauss, 1997, p. 157). Legalistic Judaism would be supported by a conventionalist reading of Platonic theology identifying God as a demiurge "looking up to the unchangeable, lifeless ideas" (Strauss, 1997).[4] A rationalistic conception of nature would then come to support a rationalistic conception of divine transcendence. An old priestly cast would yield to a new cast of *scientific* "priests" (Sorell, 2013)—the heroes of a universal Church or Open Society.

In our Open Society, the conflict between immanence and transcendence (and its respective representatives) is supposed to be resolved *technically* and so in terms of ends that are in principle resolvable in terms of means, or a present unconcerned with any end irreducible to it. Hence Strauss's indication that "Spinoza lifts Machiavellianism to theological heights" (see Strauss, 1997, p. 155). This "idealization" of a technical or legalistic approach to our everyday theological-political problems comes at a dire price: it blinds us to the proper nature of our problems as they emerge or appear to us, as *phenomena*. What is more, the binding of reason or science to "laws" blinds our scientists to the nature of reason itself, of a reason that is born *naturally* in response to laws and is thus not based on any law. The universalism of modern science is won at the price of relinquishing the freedom of classical (both ancient and medieval) rationalism, a freedom that had made outward concessions so as not to condemn itself to betraying its proper cause inwardly.

The 19th century "Romantic" movement reacted to modern rationalism's blindness by reinventing transcendence, including the "inward" dimension of phenomena, in "subjective" terms and thus in such a way as to complete, rather than counter early-modern science's formal alienation from all that transcends its mechanistic logic. The Romantic did not return to any divine perfection of reason, but to the irrational exalted for the plain fact of its not conforming to human reason. God becomes a "higher power," rather than a higher, "perfect reason" (*perfecta ratio*) compatible with a lower, human reason (Wood, 1972). The way to God is no longer natural reason, but natural *sentiment* or *feeling*.

The conversion from premodern theology to a modern theology of sentiment depended on a novel conception of reason as tied to *laws*, a legalistic conception that was as strict as it was unnatural to the common man — to common sense. A reason that sought to overthrow common sense by exposing the mechanisms underlying all spiritual endeavors. Having accepted this *modern* conception of reason, modern theology could not help embracing a Romantic conception of the human-divine nexus whereby reason would be reduced to the status of mere and provisional instrument to justify belief. Classical philosophy, as well as the medieval understanding of philosophy as *ancilla theologiae* would need to be reinvented. Philosophy's service of theology would come to be defined in merely *technical* terms. Philosophy would not help us understand our

4 On the shortcomings of such a reading of Plato, see Andreacchio (2023).



divine ends, or the essential content of our faith; it would merely serve us to purge our language of historical incongruities, helping us become historically "critical," teaching us how to read and speak in a historical context. Philosophy could help us articulate more sophisticated, nuanced, self-consistent, self-conscious, even "scientific" accounts of our beliefs and feelings about transcendence. In short, our new or newly conceived philosophy could help us frame our subjective faith objectively and so relatively to a world of scientifically-defined "objects".

Our science functions precisely thus: it accounts for the context of our subjectivity in terms of objective fuel for the subjectivity; it analyses the world as sheer material supporting modern man's self-consciousness, his sense of freedom. Accordingly, we are raised to conceive the world reductionistically, as a machine allowing us to embrace divine transcendence unburdened by old religious limitations or dogmas, but also by a reason conceived, no longer as purely natural, but as historical. As Strauss pointed out in his 1953 *Natural Right and History*, the only politically relevant defense left of natural reason is that of Catholics (especially neo-Thomists) who, however, have come to read nature in terms of laws and so in an impure way with respect to the premodern understanding of nature as properly devoid of laws.

To be sure, medieval Scholasticism had sought in "natural law" a justification for both reason and the revelation of its divine ground, but unlike modern science's "laws of nature" Aquinas's *lex naturalis* is not assumed to be independent of man; it is not a mechanically encrypted and decryptable law that we can know independently of our own moral worth. Though medieval defenses of natural freedom cannot avoid lending the impression that philosophy is bound to laws, it is only with modernity that natural reason is denied the capacity to rise beyond natural laws. These being conceived independently of both man and God, human reason finds itself inexplicably or "unconsciously" bound to them (DiClementi & Langiulli, 2008).

To return to Strauss's reading of Spinoza, the Machiavellian Dutchman's motives have tended to be interpreted in a peculiarly modern way, whether as objectively deficient or as subjectively deficient (Strauss, 1997, pp. 165–69). The critics Strauss focuses on are the neo-Kantian Harman Cohen and the "existentialist" Franz Rosenzweig. As far as the former was concerned, Spinoza's reasoning is not objective enough in the respect that it does not present seamless logical consistency; on the other hand, according to Rosenzweig Spinoza's reasoning is not *subjective* enough in the respect that it does not appreciate the historical context to which his thought is purportedly bound. In neither case is Spinoza assessed in function of classical natural reason or for having failed to appreciate the reason of prophets as distinguished from the conventional or law-bound one of priests.

With respect to classical natural reason, Spinoza is not at fault for having lacked in logical consistency or for having failed to appreciate the historicity of human freedom and reason; Spinoza is at fault for having laid the foundations for the rise of modern legalism or positivism, on the one hand, and historicism on the other. Spinoza would be at fault for having eclipsed a freedom compatible with law by being rooted in an intelligent standard for all laws, as Cicero's *natura, optima dux*: "nature excellent guide" to be followed and obeyed just as a god (*tamquam deum*). Ultimately, then, Spinoza's fault would pertain to his inadequate understanding of nature *and* to his having sought to solve a theological-political

problem on the basis of his inadequate understanding.

In the modern world, nature ceases to be a perfect guide or living standard for legislators (Cicero, 1988; Strauss, 1952). Necessarily, Spinoza's nature will be incapable of providing law with its end(s). By the same token, law will be concerned with *means* that modern men should use to establish their own ends (since what they regard as "nature" fails to provide us with any), or rather to establish their pleasure as highest end, where the highest pleasure is found in the triumph of one's own will (*ibid*., 167 and 171). Yet, as long as the Spinozist's will remains unorganized in its opposition to traditional priests, it must fail to impose itself — indeed, to save itself from persecution (Bevir, 2007; Clemons, 2023; Oliveira, 2020; Sorrell, 2013; Vaughan, 1982; Voegelin, 1948). The modern "enlightened" will must learn to oppose and *overcome* that of traditional religious orthodoxies by organizing itself in terms of a universal society/Church that uses laws to empower itself, or whose laws are mechanisms or mere means used to consolidate what Nietzsche would herald as our Will to Power (*der Wille zur Macht*). A new universal mechanically-empowered morality would then replace old, traditional, tribal or sectarian morality, in the name of an Epicurean freedom, and so in accordance with a hedonistic principle.

As Strauss noted, the conflict between unbelief and belief characteristic of the modern world is *moral*, rather than theoretical or intellectual (*ibid*. 170). The new morality of the Open Society is at war with the morality of traditional priests *on legal grounds*; the conflict is between one will and another, between the will of a hedonist bound to technocracy or the rise thereof, and a patriarchal will. On the former front, we have a flat denial of any divine justification for the patriarchy. The priestly, patriarchal will must be deluded. Yet the new universal society goes hand in hand with a scientific morality, a morality that is supposed to be "scientifically" or "critically" purged of all delusion (Bultmann, 1962). Inevitably modern rationalism will seek to bring about a radical conversion of all patriarchies, replacing their claims with an "enlightened" one that finds its validation in a universal regime consecrated to its own power, or the affirmation thereof.

In effect, modern rationalism or science imposes itself as enlightened power overcoming the "natural" limitations of old patriarchal reason, or the science characteristic of closed societies, under the assumption that such a science was as mechanistic or superficial, not to say banal, as modern science. The shortcoming of pre-modern science would have pertained to its lack of awareness of its own evolutionary context and the way material forces affect human consciousness. The very possibility that the rationalism characteristic of closed societies takes its bearing above all from divine intelligence, or intelligence "in nature" *and* beyond any laws, is now inconceivable. The tie between Socrates and Athens, or the genuine character of Socratic *pietas* (devotion to his City's fathers/*patres*), must be dismissed. Science belongs originally to the society of the future, the fully scientific society, the society in which all laws, including all moral codes, are value-free means to the triumph of a reason "beyond good and evil".[5] Yet, such a society is not expected to eradicate all evil the way old patriarchs would propose. In the new society, evil is to be integrated. Indeed, the new society must incarnate a full synthesis of good and evil, a "Hegelian" synthesis in which both good and evil are instrumental to the triumph of reason — both *nominal* virtue and *private* vice, both the pretense of kindness and cruelty behind closed doors, "white-collar" cruelty, or war if only by another name (Clausewitz, 2003).[6]

While such and kindred *phenomena* are most evident to the reason characteristic of a closed society, they remain obscure to modern science, whose success depends in great part on people's capacity to remain willfully blind to any rational context for the genesis of modern reason, and so too for reason's evolutionist self-justification. The success of our sciences stands or falls on our scientists' capacity to publicly discredit and distract from any reflection upon a horizon of understanding within which the whole modern project, including our "historical consciousness" arises and vanishes.

5 "The use of reason in moral actions is, in Hume's view, confined simply to working out the means by which we may attain the end set by our non-rational drives and desires. Reason of itself is 'utterly impotent' to excite a desire or propose an end of action"—p. 32 of O'Connor (1967): Ch. 5 ("Reason, Action and Morality"), 32-45.

6 See Clausewitz (2003), Ch. 1: "What is War?".

The phenomenon of modern science, indeed of any science whatsoever, remains a mystery even where it is assumed to be grounded absurdly in the absence of any divine intelligence. Consciousness itself, of course, remains a mystery, notwithstanding modern science's efforts to decrypt thought by way of adapting it to a purely technical society, a "laboratory" world in which we may all coexist by reducing all yearnings for life to cravings for raw survival; all aspirations for eternity to lust for a powerful pretense of eternity.

Modern rationalists might not enjoy relinquishing their freedom to "the Machine," but they have fed the technological Leviathan, much as "the West" has fed technocratic China (Kubek, 2017). Our generations are learning to see that technology is not a mere tool we can master for hedonistic purposes, but a world that forces upon us an ultimate sacrifice through the abolishment of the private life (Andreacchio, 2021): we are either to embrace the Leviathan with all of our heart, mind and soul, *or* we are to fall in a desert outside of "the Matrix," a wilderness of non-being in which our identity is completely effaced given that all identity is assumed to be produced strictly by and within the Matrix. *Tertium non datur.* The very possibility of a life dedicated to an identity given by nature or God is ignored at best, where it is not dismissed and despised as an "existential threat" to the integration of all pleasure within the Machine-Society (Pelluchon, 2014; Caramani, 2017).

Today, Kant's "Kingdom of Ends" (*Reich der Zwecke*) reveals itself concretely as the "idealized" or "virtual" guise of a mechanistic regime, a regime of pure means, in which "the end in itself" (that which man is supposed to be treated as) coincides with an "expendable number" given the radical disjunction between name and thing, between universal and particular, between what things are supposed to be and what they are once they are alienated from a non-evolutionary horizon of meaning in which the Omega of life constitutes no improvement over the Alpha (Strauss, 1981).

The Machine that is supposed to guarantee our freedom blinds us both to the phenomenon of freedom and to its ground or proper end. For it feeds us a distorted picture of both: of freedom as a merely "subjective" impulse and

of its ground as a merely "objective" boundary of thought. As a result the ancient antagonism addressed by Strauss between the prophet and the priest, or between mysticism and law, is altogether forgotten underneath the antagonists' historical "sublation" (Hegel's *Aufhebung*). Even more importantly — for herein we find the key to our present predicament — we remain rather completely alienated from a classical path to transcendence that does not conform to Hegelian expectations, a path by which the prophet projects himself through Socratic irony in the element of public opinion, to serve as *ancilla ecclesiae*: not as founder of a universal Church, but as mediator/interpreter for closed societies.

This classical poetic-philosophical alternative to modern science exposes us to phenomena hitherto left unexplained by our scientists, phenomena that extend to the very manner of speech of our premodern literary classics. No psychological, social, historical or otherwise physiological reductionism can succeed in accounting for phenomena such as Plato's dialogues, Dante's *Comedy*, or Shakespeare's plays. Such classics invite us to expose ourselves to them, allowing ourselves to be guided by them onto a journey of reflection upon the nature of all phenomena, both human and divine. Yet again, what is reflection outside of the parameters of modern science?

Cartesian modernity has taught us that reflection is first and foremost a turn to one's Self; it has taught us to be "authentic" or honest to *ourselves*.[7] However, our theocentric premodern classics call us to transcend ourselves through a journey of purgation, of *kenosis* (Nimmo & Johnson, 2022; Gunskii, 2022), where reflection consists of exposing or sacrificing the contents of our experience — phenomena insofar as they emerge within the sphere of our ordinary life-experience — to the light of truth or mind. Otherwise put, our Platonic classics call us to purge our imagination by seeking its contents in a purely philosophical context, or on the plane of "intellective intuition" (as pure act of understanding) (Nieuwenhove, 2021).[8]

What modern science fails to explain, let alone understand, is not only what a phenomenon is in and of itself (the nature of phenomena), but also the unique phenomenon of a poetic-philosophical tradition cutting through modernity's false antagonism between belief and non-belief, by exposing belief to its intelligible ground, a ground that naturally is not limited to or by any beliefs.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

REFERENCES

Adams, H. (1900). The dynamo and the virgin. In Adams, H. (1907). *The Education of Henry Adams.* Washington, DC by private circulation. (pp. 317–27). https://schoolstarttime.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/adams-the-education-of-henry-adams.pdf

Andreacchio, M. A. (2021). Saving Superman: A Daunting Lesson from Old Christianity. *Voegelin View*, January 6. https://voegelinview.com/saving-superman-a-daunting-lesson-from-old-christianity/

Andreacchio, M. A. (2023). *Medieval Teachers of Freedom: Boethius, Peter Lombard and Aquinas on Creation from Nothing.* Routledge.

Bevir, M. (2007). Esotericism and modernity: An encounter with Leo Strauss. *Journal of the Philosophy of History*, 1(2), 201–18.

Bultmann, R. (1962). On the problem of demythologizing. *The Journal of Religion,* 42(2), 96–102.

Caramani, D. (2017). Will vs. reason: The populist and technocratic forms of political representation and their critique to party government. *American Political Science Review,* 111(1), 54–67.

Cicero, M. T. (1988). *Cato maior de senectute.* Cambridge University.

Claessens, G. (2014). A sixteenth-century Neoplatonic synthesis: Francesco Piccolomini's theory of

7 For a recent attempt to project modern/Cartesian self-reflection onto premodern authors, see Franke (2021).

8 See Nieuwenhove, 2021; esp. Ch. 2: "Epistemological Issues: Contemplation, *Intellectus*, and *Intuitus Simplex*," pp. 23-48. See further Roland-Gosselin (1930). For a recent attempt to reconcile Aquinas with Cartesian "self-reflection," see Cory (2014).

mathematics and imagination in the Academicae contemplationes. *The British Journal for the History of Science,* 47(3), 421–31.
Clemons, M. (2023). *Perceiving the Essence: A Husserlian Explication of Aristotle's Defense of Non-Contradiction* (Doctoral dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook).
Clausewitz, C. (2003). *On war.* Penguin UK.
Cory, T.S. (2014). *Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge.* Cambridge University Press.
Desmond, W. (2020). *The Voiding of Being: The Doing and Undoing of Metaphysics in Modernity* (Vol. 61). Catholic University of America Press.
DiClementi, A. & Langiulli, N. (2008). *Brooklyn existentialism: voices from the stoop explaining how philosophical realism can bring about the restoration of character, intelligence, and taste.* South Bend.
Ellul, J. (2019). *The Technological System.* Wipf and Stock.
Franke, W. (2021). *Dante's Paradiso and the Theological Origins of Modern Thought: Toward a Speculative Philosophy of Self-Reflection.* Routledge.
Gildin, H. (1997). Déjà Jew All Over Again: Dannhauser on Leo Strauss and Atheism. *Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy,* 25(1), 125–35.
Gunskii, A. Y. (2022). The doctrine of kenosis as the basis of Buddhist-Christian dialogue in the works of the philosophers of the Kyoto school. *Issues of Theology,* 4(4), 652–72.
Klein, J. (1964). Aristotle: An Introduction. In J. Cropsey (Ed.), Ancient and Moderns: Essays in Honor of Leo Strauss (pp. 51–69). Basic Books.
Kubek, A. (2017). *How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941–1949.* Pickle Partners Publishing.
Machiavelli, N. (2000). *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio* [Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius]. Einaudi.
Mansfield, H. C. (2018). Machiavelli and the Discovery of Fact. In Minkov, S. Y., & Trout, B. L. (Eds.). (2018). *Mastery of nature: Promises and prospects* (15–29). University of Pennsylvania Press.
Mansfield, H. C. (2023). *Machiavelli's Effectual Truth: Creating the Modern World.* Cambridge University Press.
Nieuwenhove, R.V. (2021). *Thomas Aquinas & Contemplation.* Oxford University Press.
O'Connor, D.J. (1967). Reason, Action, and Morality. In *Aquinas and Natural Law. New Studies in Ethics.* Palgrave.
Oliveira, R. R. (2020). The subversion of ancient thought: Strauss's interpretation of the modern philosophic project. *Manuscrito*, 43(3), 1–54.
Olson, R. G. (2015). *Scientism and technocracy in the twentieth century: The legacy of scientific management.* Lexington Books.
Nimmo, P. T., & Johnson, K. L. (Eds.). (2022). *Kenosis: The Self-Emptying of Christ in Scripture and Theology.* Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing.
Pelluchon, C. (2014). *Leo Strauss and the crisis of rationalism: another reason, another enlightenment.* SUNY Press.
Robson, G. (2023). Big Nihilism: Generation Z, Surveillance Capitalism, and the Emerging Digital Technocracy. *Information & Culture,* 58(2), 180–204.
Roland-Gosselin, M.-D. (1930). Peut-on parler d'intuition intellectuelle dans la philoso- phie thomiste? In von Rintelen, F.-J. (Ed.). *Philosophia Perennis,* Regensburg, 729–30.
Schaefer, D. L. (2022). Political Philosophy versus Poetic Individuality: A Response to David Mcllwain's Michael Oakeshott and Leo Strauss: The Politics of Renaissance and Enlightenment. *Cosmos + Taxis: Studies in Emergent Order and Organization,* 10(1+2), 27–36.
Sorell, T. (2013). *Scientism: Philosophy and the infatuation with science.* Routledge.
Strauss, L. (1952). The Origin of the Idea of Natural Right. *Social Research,* 23–60.
Strauss, L. (1957). Machiavelli's Intention: The Prince. *American Political Science Review,* 51(1), 13–40.
Strauss, L. (1981). Progress or return? The contemporary crisis in Western civilization. *Modern Judaism*, 17–45.
Strauss, L. (1997). "Preface to *Spinoza's Critique of Religion*". In *Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of* Modernity. Green, K. H. (Ed.). SUNY Press; 137–73.
Strauss, L. (2014). *Thoughts on Machiavelli.* University of Chicago Press.
Vaughan, F. (1982). *The Tradition of Political Hedonism: From Hobbes to Mill.* Fordham University Press.
Voegelin, E. (1948). The origins of scientism. *Social Research,* 462–494.
Wood Jr, J. E. (1972). A theology of power. *Journal of Church and State,* 14(1), 107–124.

SCIENCE FICTION HETEROTOPIA: THE ECONOMY OF THE FUTURE

DOI: https://doi.org/10.61439/MEYH4870

ALAN N. SHAPIRO

UNIVERSITY OF THE ARTS BREMEN

- *Email: alan.shapiro@gmx.de*

Author of four books: *Star Trek: Technologies of Disappearance (2004), The Software of the Future (2014), Decoding Digital Culture with Science Fiction (2024),* and *Venice in Las Vegas (2025, forthcoming).* He is the editor of two books: The Technological Herbarium (2010) and Transdisciplinary Design (2017). Alan was full visiting professor of design at the Folkwang University of the Arts, taught "future design research" at the University of Lucerne for many years, and currently teaches media theory at the Art University of Bremen. He was called the leading "science fiction theorist" by the journal Science Fiction Studies. Alan is an American expatriate living in Germany. He holds a Ph.D. in art and media research from the University of Oldenburg. The website of Alan N. Shapiro is available at www.alan-shapiro.com.

ABSTRACT

This article uses the cultural theory of hyper-modernism, to scrutinize the present and potentially future impact on society of advanced digital media technologies like Virtual Reality, ubiquitous computing, and Artificial Intelligence. I did this by writing in a hybrid way about the portrayal of the given technology in science fiction films and the realization of the technology in the so-called "real world." It studies the examples of blockchain, 3D Printers, and moral algorithms and their connections to ideas about post-capitalist transformation of the economy. My theoretical perspective is explicitly critical of capitalism. The article draws from a chapter of my latest book, *Decoding Digital Culture with Science Fiction: Hyper-Modernism, Hyperreality, and Posthumanism.*

Keywords

Foucault, hyper-modernism, Baudrillard, heterotopia, digitalization

INTRODUCTION: FOUCAULT'S HETEROTOPIA

The French philosopher Michel Foucault wrote about heterotopias in the Preface to his book *The Order of Things,* in his 9-page text "Of Other Space: Utopias and Heterotopias," which were the notes for a lecture, and in his radio address "Les Hétérotopies".[1] Heterotopia begins with the

1 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*; Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias," in *Diacritics*, Spring 1986; pp. 22–26 (trans. Jay Miskowiec) (original lecture 1967); Michel Foucault, "Les Hétérotopies," in Daniel Defert, ed., *Le Corps utopique suivi de Les Hétérotopies* (Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Lignes, 2009); pp.21-36 (radio address December 1966); see also Michel Foucault, "Different Spaces," in James Faubion, ed., *Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 2* (trans. Robert Hurley) (London: Penguin, 1998); pp.175-185.

In his doctoral dissertation (see Note 2 below), Kelvin T. Knight points out that, in *The Order of Things* and in "Les Hétérotopies," Foucault emphasizes the imaginary, virtual and "unreal" side of heterotopia, whereas in "Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias," he rather emphasizes the physical, architectural, and "real" side of heterotopia.

idea of the coming together of a "real" physical space and an "unreal" or mythical or imaginary (or, perhaps, unimaginable) virtual space. With respect to the existing capitalist and hierarchical society, heterotopia is a representing, contesting, and inverting counter-site: an interspace between an architectural space and a literary or textual or fanciful or fictitious space. Foucault refers to both kinds of spaces and to their inter-exchange or mediation space. He conceptualizes the heterotopic space as a "mixed, intermediate experience" (Foucault, 1986, 26) between the "reality" of institutional everyday life under capitalism and something enlivening that interrupts temporal continuity and opens the possibility of a mirroring transformation that leads — in an undecidable way — towards either emancipatory utopia or disciplinary dystopia.

Now that we are in the era of digitalization and online existence, the problem that appears for would-be "Heterotopians" is whether the imaginary space that brings life-enrichment and self-reflection to the architectural space is to be understood more as "digital-virtual" or as "literary-artistic." Do we need digital media design and science fictional projects which are driven by technological-informatic fascination with Virtual Reality, or do we need the inspiration of more profound and original literary-artistic creations?

Foucault cites several examples of primarily physical-space heterotopias: zoo, cemetery, prison, boarding school, psychiatric hospital, library, museum, garden, theatre, boat, and brothel. As the English literary scholar Kelvin T. Knight points out, there are many examples in "modernist literature" of imaginary-space heterotopias which may have been strong influences on the development of Foucault's conception: the experiments with the Freudian unconscious of the surrealists, the gardens of Virginia Woolf, the *Magic Mountain* and real-life sanatoria of Thomas Mann, the penal colony of Franz Kafka, the "stream of consciousness" and de-territorializing of Irish identity of James Joyce, and the multilingual transnational creations of Vladimir Nabokov. Knight draws attention to the writer W. G. Sebald, who explicitly addresses and makes a critique of Foucault's concept of heterotopia.[2]

METHODS

The study employs the epistemological method in historiography of a dialogical relation to the object of inquiry. There is a relationship involving loyalty and ambivalence between the past of the investigated object and the present of the investigator. The investigator suspends his own worldview, enters the worldview of the text and context of the artefact of the past, is temporarily "empathetic" to this text/background constellation on its own terms, then returns to an observer position enriched with insights gained from the engagement. This article initiates a dialogue between postmodernist thinkers of the era of the 1960s to 1990s and the present time of the second wave of digitalization. The ideas of those thinkers are both enormously valuable yet outdated and in need of revision. I avoid either only repeating what the postmodernist thinkers articulated prior to digitalization or believing that a cogent theory of digital society can be developed without engaging with the earlier generation of thinkers. Hyper-modernism continues the trends of postmodernism, but now in digitalization.

For each of the postmodernist thinkers I consider how their conceptual framework regarding how narratives and fictions exercise power and control in the media-technological society can be extended to the hyper-modern situation of algorithmic- and code-based governance.

RESULTS

The dystopian technologies and human situations that were written about or enacted in science fictions novels and films have now been largely realized in daily life. The critical theory of society and technology is a component of a larger worldview of pragmatic-utopian transformative design to make a better world.

From my European perspective of searching for better and alternative digital futures, my view is that digital media technologies in the mainstream are largely designed and implemented in dystopian versions led by American big corporation capitalism or Russian or Chinese totalitarianism. The project of Creative Coding informed by poststructuralist ideas about the ambiguities

2 See the doctoral dissertation of Kelvin T. Knight (2014), "Real Places and Impossible Spaces: Foucault's Heterotopia in the Fiction of James Joyce, Vladimir Nabokov, and W.G. Sebald," https://web.archive.org/web/20220706101209/http://www.heterotopiastudies.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2014KnightKTPhD.pdf

of language connects with digital transformation. Since hyperreality is now instituted by code, the overturning of hyperreality can happen through coding.

DISCUSSION

The Technologizing of Memory

In his novel *Austerlitz* (2001), Sebald rejects the idea of a heterotopian space getting choreographed in the confines of a real physical architecture, arguing that such an attempted project remains within the limited worldview of the philosopher René Descartes' Cartesianism, which postulates that a relationship between real physical space and thinking is possible. Sebald tries to visualize the Nazi concentration camps (the Holocaust) and says: although I can know every available information about all the details of the architectures and layouts of the concentration camps, I cannot possibly grasp with my mind what in fact went on inside them. I am cut off from this possible thinking.[3] Sebald wants to revise the concept of heterotopia. His plea is to modify heterotopia in the circumstances of the historical-political scenes of trauma: the violations of human rights; the fascist, racist, and colonial atrocities.

Holocaust Studies foregrounds questions of memory, mourning, empathy, and forgiveness (Dean, 2004; LaCapra, 1998). There are, of course, many projects in digital media technology design which attempt to enact so-called virtual experimental spaces. These virtual spaces, however, tend to be harmful to imagination and memory.

Black Mirror: "The Entire History of You" — Scenes from a Marriage

The 2011 episode of the SF TV series *Black Mirror* called "The Entire History of You" shows how memory can be damaged through too much memory (as Jean Baudrillard says that "reality" is damaged through too much "reality" — or by the very concept of "reality" of Western culture). In this fictional scenario "ten minutes into the future" (as *Black Mirror* creator Charlie Brooker calls his version of SF (Brooker, & Jones, 2018)), a Fourth Industrial Revolution technology of the digital-neurological or Brain-Computer Interface



has been developed that allows an individual to record all experiences of her life to a multimedia database archive, available for future playback viewing (known as a "re-do"). The "grain" computer chip sold by a capitalist corporation is biologically implanted into the skin near one ear. The system becomes a technology of mutual surveillance and is shown to have destructive consequences for trust in personal relationships. "The Entire History of You" shows the technologizing of memory, the hyper-modernist VR dystopian-heterotopia, a digital-experimental space of the media-enabled so-called authentic record of what really happened in lived experience that produces disaster.

Contact lens-like devices enabling Augmented Reality information overlays to appear in the field of vision in the physical world are inserted into the eyes. A tiny handheld gadget manipulated between thumb and forefinger controls the standard database operations of search, browse, and delete as well as advanced features such as editing of what was said in the past, zoom closeups, and "album creation." There is even a feature where conversational dialogue can be reestablished by the system's lipreading capability. The user interface to the system projected into the air as Augmented Reality is a circular display like an old-fashioned slide projector with thumbnail images that can be magnified, and which represent individual memories. The re-do

3 Knight (2014), pp.169-187.

can be shown in public on an external screen or on the private retina of the eye. The "grain" offers not only the replaying but the reliving of one's past.

Liam Foxwell is in an office conference room undergoing a job appraisal review of his work as a lawyer at a corporate law firm. The company is being restructured and his interviewers want to find out if Liam is a good fit to work in the "new environment" of focusing on "retrospective parenting cases" where an adult sues his parents for loss of earnings incurred due to lack of self-confidence resulting from poor parenting in childhood. Liam expresses ethical reservations about this type of litigation and fails to react with immediate enthusiasm to their suggestion of what he should devote himself to in his work. The meeting unfolds badly. The interrogators appear to have decided negatively about his future with the firm. Later Liam will use grain technology to replay every detail of the appraisal *ad nauseum* on the media culture's ubiquitous external screens and on the internal screen of his cyborg visual perception.

After traveling by taxi, airplane, and car, Liam arrives at a dinner party at a wealthy suburban house near his own home where his wife Ffion (called Fi for short) is already in attendance. At the social gathering, the viewers see indications that Liam is a shy and less than secure person. He is jealous and suspicious of Ffion's past romantic relationships. From a physical distance, Liam sees his wife talking happily with the self-confident and extroverted Jonas. Ffion was expecting Liam to stay overnight in the city where his job performance appraisal took place. He instead returned that same evening because the meeting was brief. Re-do closeups reveal that she was looking forward to spending the evening alone in the presence of Jonas and is disappointed that Liam showed up. At the dinner table with ten guests, Jonas dominates the conversation with irony and sarcasm. He pokes fun at the institution of marital monogamy, taking subtle digs at the marriage of Liam and Fi. He boasts about how much he enjoys watching and masturbating to re-dos of "hot times" from his past erotic encounters.

The married couple returns home and gets into a spat regarding Ffion's excessive overt expressions of attention to Jonas. Ffion grudgingly admits that she had an affair with Jonas in Marrakesh many years ago. She says that she dated Jonas for a month, but Liam shows her a re-do proving through the testimony of recorded media that she had previously said that her adventure with "Mr. Marrakesh" lasted only one week. In yet another version the next morning, Fi acknowledges that the liaison lasted for six months. The argument of this "scene from a marriage" late at night after the party intensifies and Ffion goes to another room.[4] Liam enters the bedroom where she is laying down and they have "makeup sex."

They are never truly present with each other during sex. Each instead relives highlights of previous sexual experiences from the past. One's own life become an archive or reservoir of pornographic material. Their eyes glazed over, their thumbs pressed to the track ball of the playback control, they narcissistically have intercourse with simulated others until they reach orgasm then return to "reality" followed by an affectionate kiss on the lips.

After their advanced variation of cyber-sex, Liam goes back downstairs and continues to watch re-dos of the evening before. He becomes increasingly infuriated and resolves to drive his car to Jonas' house to confront him. Heavily under the influence of alcohol, Liam pressures Jonas into letting him into his house and they have a brawl. Under threat of physical harm (smashing his head and cutting his throat with a broken vodka bottle), Jonas accedes to Liam's demand that Jonas delete every VR multimedia memory that he has of Liam's wife.

Moments later, after crashing his car into a tree while driving back home, and in his inebriated state, Liam manages to remember the scene at Jonas' house only through the mediatized and retrospective capabilities of "the grain." The organic memory of his own mind is weak, and he needs the support of the artificial technological system to have any memories at all. Liam seizes cognitively in his obsession on an image of a very recent past moment — the instant when Jonas' virtual album of sex scenes with Ffion was displayed on the pinwheel user interface. It is a complex media image. It is an image of a navigational gateway via the thumbnails to many other images. Liam notices to his dismay that one of the trysts of the lovers occurred just eighteen

4 See Swedish miniseries/film *Scenes from a Marriage*, directed by Ingmar Bergman (1973).

months before and in the matrimonial bedroom at Liam's house. Liam realizes that he is not the father of their less than one-year-old baby girl.

He goes back to his house and to his wife who is lying in their bed. He confronts her with his suspicion. "Did you use a condom or not?" "Am I Jody 's father?" But the VR video clips have private scope and cannot be viewed by another person. He sees the thumbnail image of the memory but cannot call up the full content of the memory. He insists that Ffion play the scene for him. It is not a blank gap in her timeline as it would have been if she had deleted it. It is still a cherished memory for her. Liam forces Ffion to show him her betrayal.



Now it is in doubt if he is the father of their child. The marriage is destroyed. In the final act of "The Entire History of You," Liam is alone and deeply disoriented and in depression. All that he has left is playing back memories of their time together as a happily married couple and a family: all the moments when they were affectionate, when they smiled at each other, when saying "I love you," when they played with the baby in her crib. Ffion smiled and he felt her love for him. Now his big suburban house is a haunted house. He walks around its many rooms and sees nothing but the memories of his beloved who is now absent from his life forever. In a re-do, he looks at himself through the implied camera of the perspective behind the bathroom mirror. He brushes his teeth while Ffion asks him what color dress she should wear.

Liam decides finally — in desperation and irrationality — to cut out the grain from his head. It has already been stated in the episode that this procedure, if done unprofessionally, can have devastating consequences, like going blind. He cuts out the grain with a crude razor blade and a pair of pliers. He gashes the skin under his ear and removes the grain. All the images of his life flash by in a few instants and then there is lasting darkness.

Similar Technologies in the Real World Today

In 2003, a group of mechanical engineering researchers led by Henry Strub patented what they called "low attention recording"[5] (Chartrand, 2003). The concept was a wearable device combining a small lightweight camera that one would forget was present with a recorder for "social recording" not operated by any human subject. The system would operate unobtrusively 24 hours a day. It could be worn anywhere on the body although a shoulder strap is recommended. The recorded audiovisual experiences would be converted to digital format and saved on a computer storage media. A built-in algorithmic software intelligence would be "trained" to spot the highlights from daily life experiences and earmark them. A biotech detector of quickened heart rate or excitation of the skin would alert the recording program to the occurrence of an interesting moment. Search, browse, and scrapbook features would be added to the software. Recorded memories would be exchanged among users via an interoperable system.

In 2016, Sony patented "smart" contact lens-like devices that both record and play back anything that you see. Todd Jaquith commented at futurism.com:

Our memories are fallible things. We remember something one way; but the reality can be quite different. But imagine contact lenses that are also tiny cameras, recording and storing whatever you see, and even playing it back before your very eyes. What was really said at last week's meeting?… Want to cherish forever some treasured moment — when you first saw your future spouse, or the birth of a child, or some other formative event?… Imagine how it might change the criminal justice system, with such infallible eyewitnesses (Jaquith, 2016).

You control the operations of the device with a coded system of intentional eye blinking. Piezoelectric sensors convert the movements of eyes and eyelids to electrical currents that regulate

5 Henry B. Strub, David A. Burgess, Kimberly H. Johnson, Jonathan R. Cohen, and David P. Reed, "Low Attention Recording, with Particular Application to Social Recording," U.S. patent application, 1999.



Figure 1. Black Mirror episode "The Entire History of You," Charlie Brooker creator, Endemole Shine UK, 2011

the camera and recordings. Self-editing features adjust out-of-focus and tilted images.

Enabled by mobile and ubiquitous computing and the Internet of Things, smart wearable recording and "lifelogging" are appearing on the platforms of many devices, including the Google Glass optical head-mounted display hands-free smartphone. The biological implants of the Neural Link digital-neurological or Brain-Computer Interface will soon be at hand.[6]

As he hurries to catch his flight home after his performance appraisal, Liam Foxwell goes through airport security. The surveillance system operated by the security officer at his checkpoint station connects to Liam's "grain" neural implant. The interrogator sits in front of a big multi-window graphical display that amalgamates text, images, and user interface controls such as menus and progress bars. "Rewind me the last 24 hours," the officer instructs Liam. He wants to see re-do videos of the solicitor's life played in times-64 speeded-up mode.

This scene hints at the cultural theory concept of "the Panopticon" elaborated by Foucault in his landmark book *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1977). Foucault asserted that the Panopticon "architecture of power" designed by British philosopher and social reformer Jeremy Bentham at the end of the eighteenth century to control the behavior of inmates in prisons then spread by the twentieth century to hospitals, schools, psychiatric clinics, factories, workplaces, and other institutions of modern society. The Panopticon arrangement, as Baudrillard later appended to Foucault's analysis, operates through a "deterrence surveillance" or self-surveillance or mutual surveillance" (Foucault, 1977; Baudrillard, J1987). Power holders cannot literally observe the behavior of every prisoner.

The grain device of *Black Mirror* is deployed for mutual surveillance as cultural citizen "inmates" monitor each other in the hyper-modern version of the Panopticon. In a multi-directional audiovisual system, any person can take on the role of the guard. The poles of power of watcher and watched are not literal instances but rather become virtualized or simulated. Power is not "owned." William Bogard's synthesis of Baudrillard and Foucault in the concept of "the simulation of surveillance" impels us to go beyond the Orwellian model of how contemporary totalitarian systems of social control via digital media technologies work (Bogard, 1996).

6 "Breakthrough Technology for the Brain," neuralink.com.

In her important 2019 book *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism*, Shoshana Zuboff writes of the Panopticon as the condition of *No Exit* (inspired by Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialist theatre piece of that name) or "hell is other people" of the closed loop and tight fit of the systems of the surveillance capitalists "from which we cannot look away" (Zuboff, 20196 p. 471; Sartre, 1989). For Zuboff, the democratic and utopian promise of the Internet of the 1990s has given way to the platform capitalism of monopoly corporations like google, facebook, and amazon which move towards a totalitarian model of total control via algorithms, Big Data, personalized advertising, and echo chambers.

Brain-Computer Interface

The digital-neurological or Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) is another key science fiction and "real" technology of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. BCIs can be interpreted as a "becoming cyborg" of humanity. One can distinguish between mainstream versus alternative/transformative designs and implementations of the user applications to be based on BCI — the command-and-control cyborg versus the feminist-theory cyborg. Rethinking and reinvention of Donna Haraway's cyborg theory are possible in the BCI context (Haraway, 1990).

A BCI is a direct communication link between the neurological workings of the human brain, understood as electrical activity, and an external technological device which could be, for example, a robotic arm or leg; or a computer, digital network, or "smart home of the future." The BCI technology will have applications to help disabled people to gain greater functionality in everyday life. This betterment with respect to disabilities can be in either cognitive or sensory-motoric areas. Practical uses could be a neural prothesis or the operation of a wheelchair. Distressing mental and emotional states can be diagnosed and therapeutically altered. BCIs will also have applications for the wider public in mass and personalized markets in many domains: healthcare, education, gaming, entertainment, shopping and advertising, security and identity authentication, and relations with robots. The digital-neurological interface might fundamentally change our interaction with computers: supplementing or replacing keyboard and mouse, the touchscreen, and the speech interface.

The distinction is made among non-invasive, partially invasive, and invasive BCIs. Research is proceeding at universities and in industry in all three categories.

The non-invasive BCI builds on the technologies of the electroencephalography (EEG), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). EEGs are used to diagnose and monitor neurological conditions. Small metal disc electrodes are attached to the scalp. The EEG technology can be upgraded to BCIs. During an MRI procedure, electrodes from the outside obtain data from the electrical activity within the cerebral cortex. An fMRI measures brain activity by detecting changes in blood flows.

The partially invasive approach extends electrocorticography — electrodes are placed on the exposed surface of the brain.

Invasive BCIs involve neurological surgery to insert a microelectrode array close to actual brain tissue. Data and commands are then sent and received bidirectionally, resolved on a lower level of coding in the translation between bio-neurological signals and the electrical signals native to the microelectrodes of the implanted prosthesis. The cortical plasticity of the brain enables it to handle the signals from the BCI as if they were physiological impulses.

A 1973 academic paper by Jacques Vidal ("Toward Direct Brain-Computer Communication") coined the term Brain-Computer Interface (Vidal, 1973). After much testing on animals, the first neuro-prosthetic implants were made into humans in the 1990s. The computer science area of neural network Deep Learning AI has major relevance to the BCI knowledge field. In the step of "feature extraction" in the BCI processing flow, an analysis of the signal is carried out. Data gets extracted. The statistical and pattern-based methods of Deep Learning train a software to classify neural-activity thoughts as the user cogitates her intention to send a command to execute a task or performance on or by the external device.

In 2014, Nathan Copeland, who had a severe spinal cord injury resulting from a car crash, became the first person to have microelectrodes implanted in both his sensory and motor cortices. Copeland said that he was motivated to take this pioneering step by his love of science fiction. He stated: "Luke Skywalker loses his hand then basically the next day he's got a robot one and it's working fine. We must get to that point. To do that, someone must start it" (Regalado, 2019). Copeland's YouTube playlist is called "My Cyborg Adventure." With his implant, he was able to send and receive signals to and from his robotic

arm, to control its movements and handling of objects, and to feel touching sensations with the artificial limb.

Matthew Nagle, who had suffered a spinal cord injury from a knife fight, had the BrainGate BCI implanted in his motor cortex in 2004. He was able to control a computer cursor, play computer games like Pong, to send and receive e-mails, and operate his TV. Nagle could remote-control a prosthetic arm enough to open and close the grasp of the hand.

Designing the Brain-Computer Interface

There are reasonable arguments both for and against non-invasive versus invasive BCIs. The non-invasive technology has the obvious advantage of not requiring neural surgery. Yet it does not work as well as the invasive variety, largely due to the distance of the sensor from the actual neurons. The signal from the neuronal electrical field can get weakened or distorted by the fluids and tissues immediately surrounding the source neurons. There is also some concern that invasive BCIs might be associated with degenerative neurological disease. An additional problem is that scar tissue grows over time around the implanted electrode, causing it to become effectively non-functional after a few years. This difficulty might get solved if progress is made towards increasing the surface area of the electrode without increasing its geometric volume. Higher spatial resolution will also provide more precision indications about the signals.

The sequence of operation of the Brain-Computer Interface consists of four stages: signal acquisition, feature extraction, feature translation, and device output. The acquired signals get digitalized. They are then sent to the next algorithmic sub-system, which formats the data into a form that can be converted to commands that carry out the user's intentions in the manoeuvring of the external device. The device sends feedback as a return value.

Ethical concerns around BCIs include questions of privacy violation, personal identity theft, and the validity of informed consent. Much of the privacy worries relate to confusion regarding whether the connection will be one-way or in both directions. Assuming that the link is unidirectional from brain to computer, there is little danger of dystopian mind control.

Together with eight partners, billionaire entrepreneur Elon Musk founded the neurotechnology company Neuralink in 2016. The mission of the company is to devise Brain-Computer Interfaces that would provide the underlying system level for applications for both people with neurological impairments and for general commercial and consumer sales. In 2019, Neuralink announced its project of developing a "sewing machine like" technology to implant thin strings of electrodes into the animal or human brain. The company has demonstrated systems that read potential nerve action impulses from lab rats and monkeys. In February 2022, it was reported that 18 of 23 monkeys who had Neuralink devices implanted into their skulls had died. Trials on humans were postponed indefinitely.

The scope and range of potential applications of BCIs are mind-boggling. Given the coming to fruition of ubiquitous wireless communication, one can imagine the realization of a telekinetic capability to control any devices in the physical world merely with one's thoughts. The 1956 science fiction film *Forbidden Planet* shows a world that runs on a secret underground infrastructure and power source of super-technology, stretching for hundreds of kilometres, built by a defunct advanced techno-scientific society. The ancient civilization disappeared due to its hubris of designing a system of total Virtual Reality control over the physical world, which instead ended in total self-destruction.

From the point of view of cyborg theory, one can say that the technology of BCIs has the potential of both/either great good and/or evil. Such an extreme technology would need a corresponding transdisciplinary worldview or political philosophy of a good society as an encompassing framework within which to think through and guide its benevolent use. This pragmatic-utopian perspective is perhaps something like Haraway 's stated commitment to socialist feminism, with somewhat more of an emphasis on the positive value of democracy, and yes, even of capitalism. There is no comprehensive utopian political theory — synthesizing the best aspects of many previous theories — that exists in the world today.

Hyper-Modernist Literature

Parallel to the above-mentioned transdisciplinary political philosophy project, we can get to a hyper-modernist literature that explores the pragmatic-utopian heterotopia of bringing together physical space and an "impossible" virtual-literary space. Film adaptations of novels of J. G. Ballard, Philip K. Dick, and Don DeLillo — such as *Crash* (1995), *High-Rise* (2015), *Blade Runner*

(1982), *Minority Report* (2006), and *Cosmopolis* (2012) — elaborate this potential, deploying creative literary genius to explore paradoxical intricate complex topologies of Einsteinian and quantum physics hyper-spaces. In his novels, J. G. Ballard writes about heterotopian places resistant to the consumer-homogenized spaces of the suburban-urban environment.[7] The SF film *Moon* (2009) enacts the scenario of an AI computer (GERTY) which is programmed with *moral algorithms*. Although owned by a large capitalist corporation, the GERTY AI pursues its own self-aware programming in a self-owning or post-capitalist way, helping the victims — the bio-genetically engineered clones of the astronaut Sam Bell — of an injustice perpetrated as consequence of the company's unethical profit-motivated behavior.

The Economy of the Future

Fiction is the key to creative solutions. What is needed an idea about economic systems that is based in fiction: a science fiction of economic systems. The undecidable aporia of capitalism versus socialism has brought us to a logical and discursive standstill. Almost all Marxist thinkers identify themselves as totally opposed to capitalism. *Anarchists like us* act in the here and now, an orientation which connects to the perception that capitalism is not all bad. We seek only to limit capitalism to one dimension of three of a capitalist-socialist-anarchist society and economy. Post-capitalism is a conscious transfiguration of capitalism.

Socialism failed. Capitalism needs to change. European capitalism is afraid of being overtaken by Asia. What vision can European capitalism have to move successfully ahead?

I will say something about post-capitalism and self-aware technologies. "Self-aware technologies" is my term for the technologies of the second wave of digitalization or the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Industry 4.0) — technologies like AI, self-driving cars, virtual assistants like Siri and Alexa, the Internet of Things, blockchains, 3D printers, Additive Manufacturing, Augmented Reality, advances in biotech, and Brain-Computer Interfaces.

What kind of vision can we have about which economic system these self-aware technologies might bring about?

These technologies have something to do with more decentralization, democratization, disintermediation (elimination, with blockchain, of the "middleman" like the bank or broker), peer-to-peer transactions, the increased importance of code, of design, of intellectual property, of Smart Contracts, and of the lowering of costs for entry into business. Here I will talk about the example of 3D printers / Additive Manufacturing.

The pragmatic-utopian potential of Additive Manufacturing contributes to the vision of a post-scarcity economic system where we must no longer deploy industrial production to overcome the "hostility of nature" to survive. The challenge is to create an economy that is much more focused on ecology and sustainability than the present system, reversing the waste and destruction to the environment which have been caused by the excesses of capitalism.

Post-Capitalism and Technological Anarchism

The term post-capitalism is in common use by many thinkers. In 2015, Paul Mason published *Postcapitalism: A Guide to Our Future* (Mason, 2015). Mason is a social democrat who "favours the creation of a peer-to-peer sector (co-ops, open source, etc.) *alongside* the market and the state" (Mason, 2016). I like the idea of a peer-to-peer *dimension* of the economic system, co-existing *alongside* the market and the state. Where I would

7 See the doctoral dissertation of C.J. Duffy (2015) called "Heterotopic Space in Selected Works of J.G. Ballard, http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/12593/1/Heterotopic%20Space%20in%20Selected%20Works%20of%20J%20G%20Ballard.pdf

go further than Mason is that I believe that this should be a dimension of self-owning technological entities, a logistical infrastructure not owned by humans, neither privately nor publicly, thus decreasing human greed. A posthuman economic dimension, a dimension which I call Technological Anarchism.

We need to change what automation means. Automation should make society and commerce less bureaucratic, and instead allow more — even when this seems paradoxical — sensitivity to exceptions, and more flexibility with regards to specific circumstances. Intelligent automation should mean *stories*.

In a pragmatic-utopian economic system, some technologies should not be owned by humans. Sharing with non-human intelligence will give more power to more humans. These technologies should be autonomous agents of systems of decentralization (see the cryptocurrency firm Ethereum's concept of the DAO — Decentralized Autonomous Organization (Diedrich, 2016)). Some people fear the idea of an "autonomist" third dimension of the economy as being the "rise of the robots," the takeover of humanity by a posthuman species over which humanity will lose control (as in apocalyptic SF films like *The Matrix*). We should conceptualize posthumanism differently, standing on its head the quintessential horror scenario of the out-of-control AI computer HAL in *2001: A Space Odyssey*. A positive vision of a partnership between humans and technological entities in the economy.

The usual interpretation of the AI computer HAL 9000 in Stanley Kubrick's epic SF film is that AI is dangerous. HAL loses his rationality and becomes a danger to humans. Yet it is humans who created HAL, humans who programmed HAL. And it was bad programming! Humans should figure out how to program HAL in a good way.

HAL goes crazy and kills most of the astronauts who are on their way to Jupiter. Is Kubrick criticizing AI *per se* or is he criticizing a certain idea of AI, a specific design of AI? HAL becomes destructive because he believes that he is perfect, and humans are flawed. The 1960s version of AI was about rationality, perfection, certainty. But AI does not have to be conceived and designed in that way. The Deep Learning and neural network AI of today is not about perfection and certainty. It is about uncertainty, indeterminacy, patterns, and feedback from the environment. There are different paradigms of what Artificial Intelligence can be.

The ideal pragmatic-utopian economic system of tomorrow will have three dimensions: a capitalist dimension for economic growth, free enterprise, competition, and rewards for achievement; a socialist dimension where education, health care, guaranteed housing, "basic income," and other universal human rights are administered by the state; and



a new third dimension called *Technological Anarchism*, or post-capitalism, or Autonomy, or self-aware entities — Aristotle's *autarkeia*. The third dimension also leads to the overcoming of scarcity, to the situation where humans can live in fulfilling and creative ways.

The capitalist dimension of the economy is necessary, but it should be limited. There should be a socialist sector, also both necessary and limited. The "Achilles heel" that both capitalism and socialism share (the fundamental shared cause of what is wrong with both) is that, in both systems, *humans are in charge*. Humans are — perhaps not ontologically or genetically, but in the current historical era — selfish, narcissistic, corrupt, and power-hungry. We need a posthuman perspective, a partial "delegating" and informatic coding of moral responsibility (a back-and-forth shared ethical decision making), and of much of social and economic logistics, into autonomous self-owning technological entities and processes.

Many thoughtful intellectuals feel strongly opposed to either capitalism (criticized by the Left) or socialism (criticized by the Right). I take both "critiques" seriously. I have a balanced view of capitalism, seeing both the good and the bad. I have a balanced view of socialism, seeing both the good and the bad.

Suppose that non-human actors were granted "rights" and were authorized to participate in the economy, in the third Technological Anarchist or post-capitalist sector of the economy? Suppose that these non-human actors were owned by no one, neither by private corporations nor by the state, but rather disposed over their own lives? Suppose they transcended the condition of slaves? Could they be called self-aware *as a first principle*? Instead of requiring that self-awareness be defined philosophically or neurologically.

The AI entities are only self-owning if they are not slaves — if they have rights. AI makes no sense at all unless it is anarchistic, unless the AIs have autonomy. To be human is to have the right to life and to freedom. The goal of AI is to make artificial entities at the level of the human. To write code that can write its own code. But what is code? AI as only an engineering project is absurd. The knowledge project of AI must be transdisciplinary.

Star Trek Replicators and *Star Trek* Economics

An example of decentralization as the result of Industry 4.0 technology is 3D printing, and the effects of its widespread availability on manufacturing. The revolution here is known as Additive Manufacturing: create a physical object by adding layer upon layer to it, following the blueprint of a digital drawing, model, or specification. Complex objects get manufactured using the universal technology of digitalization as opposed to expensive and specific equipment, like building a factory, set up in a dedicated way for a specific product.

The technology of 3D printers was predicted by the 1960s science fiction TV series *Star Trek*. The food synthesizers of *The Original Series* became the all-purpose replicators of *The Next Generation*. The replicator on *Star Trek* makes objects *by magic* or from nothing. It works (according to its pataphysics) via energy-to-matter conversion and molecular synthesis. *Star Trek* successfully predicted many other technologies which later "came true" — from cell phones to computer speech interfaces to something like medical tricorders (or portable diagnostics) to quantum teleportation — so why not anticipate that replicators are going to come true as well?

We can learn something about *Star Trek* economics from *The Next Generation* episode "The Neutral Zone." The crew of the starship discovers a space capsule from late twentieth-century Earth. The character Ralph Offenhouse and four other already dead humans were frozen cryogenically, to be brought back to life when reanimation and medical cures for their diseases were developed. Offenhouse is brought back to life. His main concern is the fate of his financial investments. He demands contact with his bankers and lawyers.

Picard: "Your lawyer has been dead for centuries… A lot has changed in the last three hundred years… People are no longer obsessed with the accumulation of things. We've eliminated hunger, want, the need for possessions."

Star Trek economics imagines a post-scarcity economy, the elimination of the rationale for the primacy of material production in the alleged need to overcome the "harsh initial conditions of nature."

Offenhouse: "What will happen to us? There's no trace of my money. My office is gone."

Picard explains that the challenge for humanity now is to develop, to enrich yourself. On *Star Trek*, the replicators are used to make almost everything: food, water, oxygen, clothing, machine replacement parts, human biological organs, medicine, musical instruments. Industrial replicators can restore the economy of a planet, or the major parts of a starship, after a disaster.

Important for ecological sustainability is the concept of recycling: objects no longer of use are reconverted into energy. They get un-replicated as easily as having been replicated.

Ecologically Aware or Sustainable 3D Printers

Now back to today: 3D printers are now a mainstream technology, an intricate part of Industry 4.0. In a recent survey by the World Economic Forum, 84% of respondents said that they expect the first 3D-printed automobile to appear by the year 2025 (Schwab, 2017). Within the next few years, 3D Printers will become faster, cheaper, and smaller — more pervasive. Unlike *Star Trek* replicators, 3D printers do not produce material *ex nihilo* or from molecules, or directly from information patterns. They use pre-existing physical materials and a digital design.

Currently, only certain input materials — plastics, metals and clays that can be fused together via processes of *extrusion* (creating complex cross-sections) or *sintering* (the application of heat or pressure) — work in technology. To move towards a post-scarcity and ecologically sustainable economy, the capability of using materials which are naturally plentiful and readily biodegradable — such as cellulose (the most abundant organic polymer on Earth) –will need to be developed. Some research projects seek to combine widely available polymers with nanoparticles. 4D printers introduce the dimension of time, imagining the manufacture of self-aware objects. They reshape themselves as influenced by time and by their environment.

Additive Manufacturing will raise the importance of product design, and of creativity, conception, and ideas. Since the making of objects will become easier, more resources can be invested into the thinking up of which objects should be made. Other changes include speeded-up product development cycles, greater opportunities for prototyping, proof of concept, and testing. Transportation costs will be reduced, leading to environmental benefits. The entry costs of becoming a manufacturer in a specific industry will go down.

The character Offenhouse in the *Star Trek* episode "The Neutral Zone" satirizes the "I want to have" mentality of the twentieth-century system of economic accumulation as its own end, with no "limits to growth" and no "counter-gift" to the world. The starship crew as representatives of the future *Star Trek* society asks the question: "Accumulation for What?"

The postulate of post-scarcity economics changes the rules of the game: from growth without limits to sustainability. Additive Manufacturing will use new non-scarce materials. Artificial Intelligence and Technological Anarchism will free up humans to not use other humans in inhuman ways. Additive Manufacturing is a big step towards a *Star Trek* world: a world where advanced science and technology have been deployed for the good of humanity. What capitalism creates that is really of value is technology. If we deploy technology intelligently, then we can create a better world. Technological Anarchism is capitalism without ownership and with morality. The economic value created by self-aware technologies solves the problem of scarcity in a sustainable way and releases creativity. Think one step ahead of capitalism. Think in science fictional mode.

Additive Manufacturing and Living Organisms

Objects in the physical world are produced today through centralized fabrication and input-output linear processes (materials in, products out). They are mass manufactured and usually entail high energy costs. And there is no scaled efficiency advantage resulting from the adding of more machines to the factory. The work of Steven Keating of MIT Mechanical Engineering explores Additive Manufacturing from the standpoint of future design. He takes inspiration for physical building from the growth properties of living organisms (Keating, 2016).

If we want decentralization, customization, and scaling, we should contemplate the biology of animals who adapt flexibly to their environment, and to plant cell cultures which proliferate exponentially. In the natural world, the product sometimes becomes, in its turn, the factory or the producing unit. Steven Keating works, in his various practical projects, with mobile platforms, robot arms, fractal geometric patterns, volumetric painting, printing with bacteria, double-curvature printing, and the gathering of naturally available local materials.

André Gorz: Human Liberation Beyond Work

The existentialist-Marxist thinker André Gorz was one of the principal thinkers of the French New Left in the 1960s, 1970s, and beyond. He was a thinker of the "new working class." Gorz tried to understand the ways in which technology workers are in fact members of the working class — experiencing alienation and exploitation — although they tend to not think of themselves as such and instead adopt a corporate and techie identity. Technology workers are involved in a "false consciousness" of believing themselves to have been liberated from the proletarian condition from technology. This is expressed by Gorz in books like *Farewell to the Working Class* (Gorz, 1980) and *Reclaiming Work: Beyond the Wage-Based Society* (Gorz, 1999).

Gorz writes about liberation from work, liberation via the transformation of work both in the present and in the future, and liberation via technology and automation. Technology and automation have the potential to liberate work in the direction of creativity, but this has happened only in partial ways under the current regime of how technology is designed.

In digitalized information-intensive late capitalism, Abstract Labor disappears. Work done interchangeably by any qualified person carrying out a defined role gives way to more individualized work. Information technologies make this possible by making intelligence the leading edge of capital. "The most important form of fixed capital," writes Gorz, "is now the knowledge stored in, and instantly available from, information technologies, and the most important form of labor power is brainpower" (Gorz, 1999).

Gorz wants to build a new political ecology of the new modalities of work that emerge from technology and automation. Yet it is a political ecology grounded in free time. Develop new forms of work that are closer to the circumstances of private life and the opportunities of leisure. Political ecology combines the study of environmental issues with political, social, and economic concerns. The work of technology workers today is less physical and less material — and more intellectual and conceptual, more about language and communication — than the purposive-rational manipulation of physical things in classical industrial society.

We need to act to loosen the grip of work and to decenter the centrality that work has in people's minds, and in their assumptions about how society is and should be organized. Technologies can lead to the creation of alternative cooperative networks on a micro-economic scale, establishing feedback loops with the dominant macro economy.

The corporate system of permanent jobs is not consistent with the potential of digital technologies. More consistent with the emancipatory promise of the information society would be a true freelancer economy. Gorz suggests the adoption by society of an unconditional guaranteed income as a support to freelancer economy and a new positive flexibility. The universal basic income would enable a new orientation towards a multi-activity mode of work, emphasis on free time, and investment by society in the formation of interpersonal bonds and new institutional mechanisms for the conversion of creative/cultural capital to monetary capital.

Employment today in the framework of the permanent job no longer integrates the individual into a community, no longer provides social and personal identity, no longer structures the stages of life, and is no longer the basis for a meaningful life project.

In the true freelancer economy, the worker goes continuously back-and-forth between selling her work on the market in exchange for money and cultivating her own creative work in

ways which can also lead to making money and acquiring other things of value.

The new social actors in the true freelancer economy have "the possibility of creating an organization for oneself and others which promotes *autonomy*" (Gorz, 1999). This means to not naïvely identify as an artist who takes a stance of opposition towards work and money, but rather to invent new forms of work and money that expand the possibilities of how value as defined by society is received in exchange for activity.

Murray Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism

Writing in 1968, during the height of the anti-Vietnam War, student, counterculture, and civil rights movements in America, Murray Bookchin wrote in his essay "Post-Scarcity Anarchism" about the potentiality of the technological revolution of *cybernetics* being the precondition to the realization of a society without class divisions, exploitation, domination, drudge work, and material poverty (Bookchin, 1971). Consciously evolving beyond *Homo economicus*, humanity will, for the first time, experience life rather than survival.

Bookchin also foresaw the devastating consequences of capitalism (the course we are on now) for pollution of the environment and destruction of the natural ecology of humanity's planetary habitat. In an era when humanity's very existence is endangered, the relationship between life and survival is reversed from the classical economic view that we must survive before we can live. We will either become anarchistic and fully live, or we will get annihilated. We can no longer afford to go through a transitional stage of centralized organization (as Marx and Lenin believed); we must act ethically in the here and now.

In his essay "Towards a Liberatory Technology," written in 1965, Bookchin seeks to separate the "liberatory potential of modern technology" from its use for destructive ends (Bookchin, 1965). *Cybernetics* is that technology which can move us from the *realm of necessity* to the *realm of freedom*. Cybernetic machines can correct their own errors, be equipped with sensory devices replacing the audiovisual senses of human workers, and can substitute for the worker's judgment, skills, and memory. The feedback principle, information transfer, and the self-regulating control mechanism are central to first-order cybernetics as formulated by Norbert Wiener (1948). Technology has passed from invention to design. Thecrucialquestionforanygiventechnologyisnolongerif (technologicaldeterminism) but *how* (design).

Creative designs of cybernetic technologies will free us to ask new questions about how machines "could be used to foster human solidarity and to create a balanced relationship with nature and a truly organic eco-community" (Bookchin, 1971, pp. 57–58). Either a balance between humanity and nature will get restored or the human species will be finished. Technology-becoming-ecological can reawaken our sense of interdependence with nature.

Yanis Varoufakis' Vision of Post-Capitalism

In the year 2020, the former economics minister of Greece and libertarian Marxist thinker Yanis Varoufakis published a dialogical discussion about post-capitalism among three fictional protagonists in the guise of a science fiction novel called *Another Now: Dispatches from an Alternative Present* (Varoufakis, 2020). In that writing project, Varoufakis issued the challenge to himself of describing in a detailed blueprint the principles of how a democratic socialist economic system (in a parallel timestream to our own world) would actually work. He also set himself the task of presenting concrete ideas of how we could get from here to there.

The novel is an ongoing and sometimes interrupted conversation between three intellectually thoughtful main characters who have each become disillusioned with a specific worldview in which he or she previously believed. Iris is an academic economist and ex-banker who believed in neo-liberal right-wing libertarianism, but who has now come to understand that the "really existing" capitalism in which we are living has little to do anymore with the so-called free market capitalism of Adam Smith's invisible hand. Eva is a Marxist and feminist anthropologist who is disillusioned with the prevalent versions of both of those ideologies. Costa is a techie engineer who has lost faith in his earlier conviction that digital technology will deterministically lead to human liberation and a better society.

A wormhole in the space-time continuum has opened which allows each of the characters to communicate with their alternate selves in a post-2008 economic crash fiction-reality where an Occupy Wall Street-type radical post-capitalist social movement has changed the world. According to renowned theoretical physicist Kip Thorne, various kinds of traversable wormholes enabling time travel are possible (Thorne, 1994).

Two different timelines associated with the same (or more than one) physical location could become connected by means of an outward flaring neck or throat. Thorne's speculations are a further detailing of the Einstein-Rosen bridge to a mathematically necessary parallel universe which had, since German astronomer Karl Schwarzschild's work on black holes of 1916, been regarded as an essential solution to Einstein's field equations in his general theory of relativity. The general relativity property of spacetime curvature, as the basis for exotic opposition between the wormhole's two mouths (contiguous in space yet deferred in time), can be harnessed into building a time machine, instigating a bifurcation (or forking of time) into the two parallel streams.

In the post-capitalist economy fictionally envisioned by Varoufakis, work, control over production, digital networks, democratic politics, land use, money, and the internal culture and operations of corporations have been fully democratized. There are no bosses and no hierarchies at any level of the enterprise. There is so-called flat management where no one tells anyone what to do. Companies are self-managed and self-owned by their workers who all have equal shares. There is a guaranteed universal basic income. Decent housing is a human right. Climate change and global warming have been brought under control. Digital technology has been designed and deployed to create a good society of much greater economic equality. The power of both corporations and the state has been cut down to size.

For Varoufakis, we are already living in post-capitalism, but in a bad sense. The current system is a form of techno-feudalism. Wall Street is run by giant financial conglomerates and hedge fund managers. Every industry is controlled by a few monopolistic mega-corporations. Each of these behemoths is like a "small Soviet Union." Economic inequality has become obscene with the concentration of wealth in the hands of the richest one percent and much of the population sinking into poverty. The state bails out failing banks and provides corporate handouts. We have socialism for the few and austerity for the many. Financial speculative capital and the flows of global money through the electronic networks detach themselves virtually from any former sense of a "real" economy or "real" production.



CONCLUSION

In the opening chapter of his novel *The Rings of Saturn* (Sebald, 1995), W. G. Sebald's narrator directly engages with the notion of heterotopia as delineated by Michel Foucault in the Preface to *Les Mots et les choses*. Sebald breaks the connection between so-called "real places" and allegedly impossible spaces.[8] Heterotopia, as conceived by Foucault, is abstractly intellectual, lacking the blueprint specification of a concrete alternative to "the order of things." In his famous debate with Noam Chomsky, Foucault rejects the anarchist vision of free association and decentralization. He states that he is "unable to define, let alone create, a model of ideal social functioning for

8 See also Kelvin T. Knight, "Real Places and Impossible Spaces."

our scientific and technological society."[9] He asserts that we need to focus on the exercise of oppressive power today as it occurs through social institutions — such as universities, schools, and psychiatric clinics — which claim to be politically neutral.

Yet Foucault's insight about heterotopia that has the most forceful impact on the project of Technological Anarchism is that — as the *mirror* that separates and mediates between so-called "real" spaces and so-called "unreal" spaces — heterotopia can be either disciplinary or emancipatory, either *dystopian or utopian*. This is our entire situation in the era of digitalization. Heterotopia is an ambivalent mirroring site of both utopia and dystopia.

Media theories tend to be either only positive or only negative in their assessment of where media technologies are taking us as a society. Most technological utopias are naïve and amoral — driven by money, pure love of engineering, or quasi-religious belief.[10] Critical media theories — like those of Baudrillard, McLuhan, Virilio, Debord, the Frankfurt School (Adorno, Benjamin, etc.) — tend to be completely negative and critical towards developments in media and technology. I am interested in those theories. I believe that we should engage intensely with the texts of those authors. But, as a designer, I do not regard critical media theory as its own end. I see it rather as offering an understanding or defining of the conditions of what creative, radical, alternative, non-mainstream digital media-and-technology design *should not do*. Heterotopic design should not be complicit with cyber-consumerist capitalism, nor with sexist patriarchy or heteronormativity, nor should it assist in building the dystopia of totalitarian rule, universal surveillance, the end of privacy, and the twilight of thinking.

Informatics is the dominant life-changing influence in the world today, the major force affecting what used to be called "the social." As critical theorists and as design practitioners, we do not accept informatics as it is — we must transform informatics into Creative Coding. Beyond the modernist knowledge-paradigm of ideology and the social, beyond the postmodernist knowledge-paradigm of media, there is the hyper-modernist knowledge-paradigm of informatics and code: for cultural studies, the arts and design, and the humanities. Informatics should become a creative transdisciplinary design field, asking the question "how " and not just "if " (we should implement a given media technology). Informatics should not be a value-neutral skill for getting your program up and running and bug-free. As the poet Friedrich Hölderlin said: "Where the danger is, there also grows the saving force."[11]

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

REFERENCES

Baudrillard, J. (1987). *Forget Foucault* (P. Beitchman, L. Hildreth, & M. Polizzotti, Trans.). Semiotext(e).

Bergman, I. (Director). (1973). *Scenes from a marriage* [Miniseries/Film]. Sweden.

Bogard, W. (1996). *The simulation of surveillance: Hypercontrol in telematic societies*. Cambridge University Press.

Bookchin, M. (1965). Towards a liberatory technology. In *Post-scarcity anarchism* (pp. 41–84). Ramparts Press.

Bookchin, M. (1971). *Post-scarcity anarchism*. Ramparts Press.

Brooker, C., & Jones, A. (2018). *Inside Black Mirror*. Ebury Press.

9 "Debate Noam Chomsky & Michel Foucault – On human nature," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3wfNl2L0Gf8 See also: Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault, *The Chomsky-Foucault Debate: On Human Nature* (The New Press, 2006).

10 "In 2007, Robert Geraci, professor of religious studies at Manhattan College, was invited to make an extended visit to the AI lab at Carnegie Mellon University, where he interviewed scores of researchers, professors, and students as well as community members of virtual online worlds. He published his results in an insightful monograph... [Geraci] sees technology... elevated to the role commonly played by God..." Jerry Kaplan, *Artificial Intelligence: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford University Press, 2016); pp.140-141.

11 "Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende auch." Friedrich Hölderlin, "Patmos" (1802).

Chartrand, C. (2003, August 25). A low-attention video camera lets the photographer focus instead on the action. *The New York Times.*

Chomsky, N., & Foucault, M. (2006). *The Chomsky-Foucault debate: On human nature.* The New Press.

Diedrich, H. (2016). *Ethereum: Blockchains, digital assets, smart contracts, decentralized autonomous organizations.* Wildfire Publishing.

Duffy, C. J. (2015). *Heterotopic space in selected works of J. G. Ballard* (Doctoral dissertation). http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/12593/1/Heterotopic%20Space%20in%20Selected%20Works%20of%20J%20G%20Ballard.pdf

Dean, C. J. (2004). *The fragility of empathy after the Holocaust.* Cornell University Press.

Foucault, M. (1970). *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences.* Pantheon Books.

Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison.* A division of Random House.

Foucault, M. (1986). Of other spaces: Utopias and heterotopias (J. Miskowiec, Trans.). *Diacritics*, Spring, 22–26. (Original lecture delivered in 1967)

Foucault, M. (1998). Different spaces. In J. Faubion (Ed.), *Aesthetics, method and epistemology: Essential works of Foucault*, Volume 2 (R. Hurley, Trans.; pp. 175–185). Penguin.

Foucault, M. (2009). Les hétérotopies. In D. Defert (Ed.), *Le corps utopique suivi de Les hétérotopies* (pp. 21–36). Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Lignes. (Radio address delivered in December 1966)

Gorz, A. (1980). *Farewell to the working class: An essay on post-industrial socialism* (M. Sonenscher, Trans.). Pluto Press.

Gorz, A. (1999). *Reclaiming work: Beyond the wage-based society* (C. Turner, Trans.). Polity Press.

Haraway, D. J. (1990). *A cyborg manifesto: Science, technology, and socialist-feminism in the late twentieth century.* Routledge.

Hölderlin, F. (1802). *Patmos.*

Jaquith, T. (2016, May). Sony's smart contact lenses can record what you see. *Futurism.*

Kaplan, J. (2016). *Artificial intelligence: What everyone needs to know.* Oxford University Press.

Keating, S. (2016, October 24). From bacteria to buildings: Additive manufacturing outside the box [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IRBQv2TJFX4

Knight, K. T. (2014). *Real places and impossible spaces: Foucault's heterotopia in the fiction of James Joyce, Vladimir Nabokov, and W. G. Sebald* (Doctoral dissertation).

LaCapra, D. (1998). *History and memory after Auschwitz.* Cornell University Press.

Mason, P. (2015). *Post-capitalism: A guide to our future.* Allen Lane.

Mason, P. (2016, March 2). Mickeygate — the truth!—MosquitoRidge — *Medium*. Medium. https://medium.com/mosquito-ridge/mickeygate-the-truth-8145cf278b7a

Regalado, A. (2019, July). Man with brain implant on Musk's Neuralink: 'I would play video games'. *MIT Technology Review.*

Sartre, J.-P. (1989). *No exit and three other plays* (S. Gilgert, Trans.). Vintage.

Sebald, W. G. (2019). *The rings of Saturn.* Vintage.

Schwab, K. (2017). *The fourth industrial revolution* (p. 161). Penguin UK.

Thorne, K. S. (1994). *Black holes & time warps: Einstein's outrageous legacy.* W. W. Norton & Co.

Varoufakis, Y. (2020). *Another now: Dispatches from an alternative present.* The Bodley Head.

Vidal, J. (1973). Toward direct brain-computer communication. *Annual Review of Biophysics and Bioengineering*, 2, 157–180.

Wiener, N. (1948). *Cybernetics: Or control and communication in the animal and the machine.* The MIT Press.

Zuboff, S. (2019). *The age of surveillance capitalism* (p. 471). Profile Books.

DIALECTIC OF PREDISPOSITION AND ABILITY IN HUMAN PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY

DOI: https://doi.org/10.61439/IORH4863

IRYNA LOPATIUK

EUROPEAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF UKRAINE

- *Email: kbsp613@gmail.com*

PhD candidate at Zaporizhzhia National University, Ukraine. Corresponding member of the European Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. She is also a Honorary member of the Historical and Literary Society, editor-in-chief of *Hippokrates*, a journal by the Medical Scientific Society. Secretary of the Psychological-Philosophical Scientific Society and associate fellow of the Ukrainian Academy of Science.

ABSTRACT

In the following scientific study, we consider a logical model, which for the first time brings us closer to the integrated perception of barriers and obstacles existing in the memory environment, "refracting" human predispositions and transforming them into skills. The area of human orientation in the world of changing opportunities, as well as in the solution of the "predisposition-ability" conflict at the stage of the formation of new professions in an intelligent society of cognitive and innovation perspective, defined by the criteria of technological development, digitalisation and transition to a virtual world of communication networks and the Internet, is justified.

From a scientific point of view, however, it is possible to grasp the characteristics of the memory environment and to search for an "exhaustive list of predispositions" as well as an "exhaustive list of characteristics of each memory environment unit". However, this usually requires years of research with a single person. From the practical point of view, this is unacceptable, because in modern circumstances such recommendations are required, which allow to predict professional activity in a few hours, and in the future to allow a person to learn to navigate independently in conditions of changes in the environment of his life and activity.

The correlation of the activity approach developments within the subject's life development, as well as the model of predisposition realisation mentioned by M. Achtnich as holistic and optimal, maintained by the specific-historical conditions of the figure, have mostly determined the key problem, to which this article is devoted.

The purpose of this scientific exploration is the philosophical understanding of predisposition and skill dialectic in human professional activity (on the example of models by Martin Achtnich and Gregory Popov).

Moreover, the tasks of academician G.Popov largely echo the original formulation of P. Drucker's smart approach, whose paradigm is now being applied to reflect on the smart approach to any areas of activity, defined by the speed of environmental change, the rapid circulation of information, and the circumstances of uncertainty. The recommendations of G.Popov, discussed in the following article, and the concept of P. Drucker do not conflict, mutually complementing each other.

Keywords

memory phenomenology, memory environment, predisposition, skill, choice of profession, smart approach

INTRODUCTION. RELEVANCE OF RESEARCH.

Globalizations, international migration of people, changes in the labor market around the world determine the relevance of philosophical thinking of "economic person" or "working person." Whereas G. Skovoroda's "Srodnya Pratsa" (Skovoroda, 2016) has always remained relevant in the Ukrainian philosophical definition, in the globalizing world there is an experiment pretending to replace the professional vocation with a set of competencies; this process is embodied in the system of education and unification of industrial society, which is still preserved as chaotic and synergistic processes, depending on soft/hard skills of company managers in their HR activity, selection, financing the non-formal schooling. Philosophical reasoning, in our opinion, of a flawed approach to what the famous philosopher A. Zinoviev (Kantor, 2009) declared a modular person (with an "ant-man" analogy — in the meaning of mechanistic, not genuine unification of people, requires comprehension of the predisposition and its realization relationship, what is defined in a stable realization form as a skill.

The theme of the study is brought up to date by 1) the changes that have led to the disappearance of some occupations in the industrial society and, on the contrary, by 2) the new occupational declaration of the information society and the cognitive and innovative perspective of the development of the society that has already been given the suffix 'intelligent'. According to this description (Silberman, 2000), the formation of a cognitive class as an engine of social change from which progressive transformations are expected is accepted in society.

In the problem area of our article, the scientific task implies the acknowledgment of the existence of universals of a person's predisposition to a profession in its dialectical unity and struggle against abilities, carrying out **professional activities.**

MATERIALS AND METHODOLOGY

Research on industrial and information society, development of hyperreality, cognitive and innovative perspective of social development form the theoretic background of our work.

Among the theorists of the industrial society the following works are represented: the works of the critical approach to the social destruction of the developed industrial society of the Frankfurt School, sometimes referred to provisionally as Freud-Marxism, regarding the influences of the ideas of Marxism and the theory of psychoanalysis of Z. Freud, as well as the original socially oriented conceptualization of Erich Fromm (Fromm, 2010). These are, first of all, the works of M. Horkheimer, T. Adorno, mainly explained in their collective significant work "Dialectic of Enlightenment" (Horkheimer, Adorno, 1997), F. Pollock (2018) and G. Marcuse (Marcuse, 1994). Herbert Marcuse defined the peculiarities of social destruction, including that of professional activity, in the following works: "One-Dimensional Man. Research on the Ideology of a Developed Industrial Society" and "One-Dimensional Thinking".

Then, an important contribution to the research theory of education and the postindustrial perspective was made in the works of the younger generation, the so-called Frankfurt School — the "younger generation" of Frankfurt, i.e.: the existentialist version of Alfred Schmidt (1981) and the founder of the theory of communicative action Jürgen Habermas (Soboleva, 2002). Recent thinking about the legacy of Frankfurt school is applied in the works of L. Bronzin (Critical sociology of Frankfurt school, 2007), G. Borisova (Borisova, 2007), etc.

The works of R. Aron, D. Bell, E. Giddens, Z. Bzezinski, I. Wallerstein, M. Castels, Y. Lotman, N. Luman, W. Maturan, J. Neusbit, O.Toffler, F. Fukuyama regarding the Information Society, determined the evolution of the developed information society into the post-information phase

of the smart society (Bell, 1976). In Ukrainian philosophy it is worth noting the works of V. Voronkova School (Voronkova et al., 2018).

An essential conceptual outline of our article lies in the definition of the proportion not only of the "extra repression" of social institutions, as well as L. Szondi's "imposed fate" definition, introduced as a condition of professional development of man, but also of the dialectical contradiction "predisposition — skill," as a pattern revealed by M. Achtnich (Achtnich, 1979).

Moreover, the activity approach of G. Popov (Popov, 1951), initiating as a basis the resolution of the contradiction predisposition-skill in removing the influence of the destruction of society and unconscious ancestral scenario of L. Szondi's "imposed destiny", is applied, as well (Szondi, 1956).

Scientific Originality. In our scientific exploration, we shall consider a logical model, guiding one closer to the integrated comprehension of barriers and obstacles set existing in the memory environment, "refracting" human predispositions and turning them into skills, for the first time. The area of human orientation in the world of changing opportunities, as well as in solving the "predisposition-skill" conflict at the of new professions formation stage in a smart society of cognitive and innovation perspective, is defined with the twenty-first-century criteria of technological development, digitization and transition to a virtual world of communication networks and the Internet, is justified.

The purpose of this scientific exploration is the praxeological understanding of predisposition and skill dialectic in human professional activity (on the example of models by Martin Achtnich and Gregory Popov).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Through the transition to the latest era, in our case, the one defined by the globalized economy and the struggle of simulation hyperreality with the attempt to form a reasonable society, conceived in the definition of "smart society" or "cognitive and innovation perspective" (system, society, etc.), as well as the transition to a new era, there is always a conflict between people who have lost reflection and self-consciousness and those who defend reason as a common human value. Sometimes, this backing takes the form of mythologization and politicization, which assists the loss of ability to think critically.

Education is defined by M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno as the "myth of the twentieth century" (Horkheimer, Adorno, 1997). It is a myth about the mind that conquers nature; the mind, capable to create a just society: a beautiful idea that leads the society to realize (most often, artifice) that not the people themselves rule in history, but the necessity and blind destiny. "Education is more than enlightenment, it is nature perceived in its isolation." This is due primarily to the fact that the West rationality is perceived as a technical capacity of practicing violence against nature. However, if the case was limited to the "violence against nature" paradigm, that outcome would not be so sad; everything gets worse as the process of "materialization" penetrates the culture and implements its unification and standardization. As a result, the person changes: not only his ability to reflect, to independent intellectual thinking and creative activity declines, but also the ability to "grab" and reproduce cultural stereotypes and clichés develops very quickly (Critical sociology of Frankfurt school, 2007).

That is the reason, throughout such periods people tend to return to the recognition of the meaning of "fate", "destiny", "predisposition".

At the same time, the key factor is always representing an attempt to suppress a human desire to answer these questions on their own by violence or pressure, not because it imposes official ideology or the mainstream media. This factor converts decisive in the simplification of man, and often the destruction of society. As G. Marcuse wrote, "It is not about the very fact of need, but about how it is distributed among the members of society, i.e. that in the interests of domination, in the interests of the privileged group,

additional suppression is placed on the shoulders of the rest" — so-called "extra repression" (Yudin, 1995).

That is the reason the formation of a cognitive and innovative perspective as the reasonable society development requires a request to the opposite — to the collective unconscious, to the fact that at the level of mass the individual psychology prevents a person from maturing as a subject of life, the captain of his destiny, if paraphrasing the words of W. Churchill.

A significant contribution to the display of the problem of human dependence on imposed destiny and professional choice was made in the 40–50 years of the 20th century by the Hungarian psychologist and psychiatrist Lipot Szondi, who first acquainted the concept of "imposed destiny".

According to L. Szondi's conceptualization of "imposed destiny" phenomenon, introduced in his work "I-Analysis," the teaching of fate holds the view that in each destiny the person must distinguish between the part of "imposition" and part of "freedom" in his life (Szondi, 1956). These 2 parts of Fate (according to L. Szondi) are related to one another in the following way: "Bricks and plans for building one's destiny are delivered by his ancestors. Any ancestor distributes his special requirement for life, his special form of life, acting meanwhile for descendants as a "specimen or image".

Each "ancestor" results in the human ancestral unconscious as one special possibility of the future. We possess and bear in the inner plan of our destiny (which we call the "ancestral unconscious") multiple different ancestors, and thus many, most often extreme contrast possibilities of fate. Individually ancestor figure in the ancestral unconscious tends to act as a "specimen" for the fate of the descendant. This is the imposition of the choice of ancestors in love, friendship, profession, disease, and death (Achtnich, 1979; Szondi, 1956).

It is precisely this part of the imposed and conditioned part of the fate that we call the imposed destiny". The instance, which of these family-laid different planned possibilities of fate just chooses for itself the personal fate, while everything else denies, is "I." "It is the deliberately chosen part of destiny that we call the fate of choice" (L. Szondi "I-analysis").

Fate most often reflects the repeated unconscious strategies of life (if we use the concept of K. Abulhanova-Slavskaya (1991), which oppose activities that are helpful, efficient, rational.

Thus, Martin Achtnich pretends to be the follower of the traditions of the teaching of fate by Lipot Szondi, his specific ideological inspiration. However, the core of Achtnich's research is not focused on the study of "destiny" phenomenon in general, but rests straight on the identification of key features of professional fate formation, especially in terms of studying the principles of unconscious human choice for future occupation (Achtnich, 1979).

The Hungarian-Swiss scientist, psychiatrist, and fatologist Lipot Szondi studied the unknown inter-human function of the unconscious and introduced the "genotropismus" name for it. Genotropismus refers to the process of the fact, identical or related hereditary factors in the ancestral "fund" (that is, in the ancestral unconscious of two people) attract these people to each other, which ties or brings them together. Therefore, genotropismus is one of the most significant functions of the ancestral unconscious. This "genotropismus action" of latent ancestral predispositions proceeds in the unconscious mental area, as well (Szondi, 1956).

L. Szondi also explained that latent (hidden) hereditary predispositions may control a person's choice of actions in an unconscious way. Genotropically activated hereditary factors are the very active elements of the ancestral heritage that, through choice, cause the future fate of a person (Szondi, 1956).

The ancestral unconscious "exhibits" its dynamic aspirations in "genotropismus" form by the action of choice. The ancestral unconscious expresses its demands in the "language of choice." By Szondi the elective categories may vary in:

- Selection of the object of love;
- Choice of the object of friendship and partnership
- Choice of profession and occupation;
- Choice of disease;
- Determining the representation of death.

Martin Achtnich, studying and describing the structure and manifestations of unconscious professional choice, also emphasized three directions: 1) a key motor factor creating for an individual sense in its usefulness and the possibility of its best realization (e.g., "building anything is useful", "I think I could construct something new and wonderful"; 2) conditions of professional activity (individual has an idea where, under what circumstances he would like to do or accomplish some-

thing); 3) the action itself — its image, method and tool (for example, "to build — not only means to lay some bricks, but also to do it beautifully, according to the plans of the building." Consequently, the next step in our analysis involves defining the disposition of the model and then relating it to the activity theory.

Unspecified changes in the structure of knowledge and skills give increase to considerable resistance in the person, still, he is forced to acquire additional knowledge since in case of other issues, he is not familiar with, and this knowledge may not be enough.

Achtnich's credit is that he, on the one hand, classified and explained all the motor skills of the ancestral concept in the form of motor reactions. On the other hand, he provided a list of motor reactions with a specific conclusion about the perspective: finishing with the "profession diagnosis" (the characteristic of a particular profession rendered from motor skills set).

One of the significant results of Achtnich's research is in the following: he managed to verify the occupation peculiarities of women and men in the differentiation of specialties noted by gender, resulting in the scientific test. Hence, he revealed a common and special "male world" as well as the world of professional activity in the eyes of a woman as a subject of her personal life. Furthermore, Achtnich allowed recognizing the peculiarities of behavior of a woman and a man through the "spectacles" of motor reactions, and in fact, by analyzing the movements and characteristic of them (Achtnich, 1979). The following model of human memory operation, presented below, allowed him to solve this complex task:

Therefore we are to analyze the model of conversion of predisposition into the motor skill of a man. We will pay attention to the second part of Figure 1. It represents a beam of light passing through a "lens". This is what a logical model looks like; the key to learning the language of the Achtnich test. The beam of light is the key stimulus of man and his "primary factor." Furthermore, the "lens" (or "eyeglass") is that light refracts, therefore twisting the stimulus. The lens allows the light passing. According to the language of the Achtnich test the lens is called "secondary factor".

According to the figuratively described logical model, the "light" is related to the category "predisposition," while the "lens" represents 1) conditions or circumstances, and 2) education — solely that formed the lens (through which the light goes). Now in this analogy M. Achtnich considers the dialectical relationship of objective (genetically and phenotypically conditioned) — predisposition, and subjective (objective in social) — in his training. Later aforementioned conflict, confrontation, and unity of these opposites are specified in the "predisposition-skill" relationship. Fairly important in his description was the reflection of measure loss as the qualitative issue of the matter.

The following explanation should be reinforced with an example: let's pretend a man can shoot; we analyze this motor skill through the lens of A) war circumstances and B) peaceful non-military time. In the end while refracting his skill (at the end of the realization of the motor skill), man acquires different statuses: A) war circumstances produce a "hero"; B) peaceful non-military time — a criminal. There is stimulus (primary factor); there are circumstances — through WHAT the main stimulus (secondary factor) will be refracted. As a result a piece of data on the Achtnich test represents a "key inducements" and a descriptive body of "circumstances" that might get explored in a comprehensive way (Achtnich, 1979).

It should be noted that the key motivation is unconscious. Both factors, like two interconnected components, remain unconscious.

Subsequently, Martin Achtnich repeatedly studied the study of the very "refractive lens" formed by the memory environment (Achtnich, 1971). Nevertheless, a task to name in a complex its components, components, and structure were never complete by Actnich himself. The scholar finished with having stopped on two basic categories 1) education of the person and a 2) circumstances dictated by life. In fact, these two criteria for lens formation are parameters are defined by a memory block such as the ancestral unconscious reasoning, repeatedly described by L. Szondi and verified by his writings and projective tool "Stimulus Test" or "Choice Test." M. Achtnich himself, suspecting there are other systems affecting the system of professional predispositions transformation, was powerless to bring them out by empirical means (which, in particular, defined subsequent scientific research in the field of memory study and perception of its processes and mechanisms) (Achtnich, 1971).

Yet Martin Achtnich managed to expand the concept of "professional requirements": "According to the test and the respondents' answers, we recognize not only the abilities (intelligence, talents, hand agility, etc.) that a specialist must possess, but also the needs that must correspond

to the structure of predisposition of the relevant profession. Only when the person shares both the necessary skills and predisposition, can he be assumed to remain faithful to the profession and to be a healthy, successful, professional character" (Achtnich, 1979; Achtnich, 1971).

M. Achtnich thus allows us to derive the assurance of a person's professional destiny; to produce a prediction for his effective future paradigm in a form of the description of what could be achieved respondent's life, based on his birth predisposition, as well as interacting in complex with multiple factors of the unconscious. In fact, his tool of professional orientation allows us to predict not one profession, which is to be realized qualitatively by a person, but overall 4 (four) before-mentioned professions. One of the discoveries of M. Achtnich acts as a four-stroke system of professional realization (Achtnich, 1971).

Achtnich's professional orientation test, in particular, shows the way the person is capable to attain:

1) "instant success";
2) a profession in which he realizes himself as an effective leader;
3) alternative profession, allowing one to expand geography and potential of his business already functioning (in the firm or company form, or any other coordinate system);
4) "non-instant triumph" (a profession field in which man will act as No. 1 expert).

In fact, the first and fourth profession results (i.e. the primary transient success and "eternal triumph") as the two categories constitute some two extreme points of career and professional transformation, moreover, "the middle" indicates intermediate steps of the professional fate of the individual. The study of this issue sets the foundations for the natural resolution of the predisposition-skill contradiction, which is a universal, repeated at various stages of individual and societal development. This pattern allows us to explore the changes in the developed information society further, as well as the attraction to hyperreality, the simulation of objective life, or the preservation of "reason" issues as objectivity in the measurement of the future society (Achtnich, 1971).

A certain achievement of Martin Achtnich is not only the assumed models detailing the profession or activity of man, but also the description of the causes of conflict in this issue, which always arises if the person is engaged in non-friendly business. The follower of Szondi produced a lot of scientific and practical work, helping one to eventually get closer to solving the problem of predicting the professional fate of a person.

However, based on the model of M. Achtnich, which we will provisionally designate as "Light-Lens," a number of questions remain non-revealed; in particular, the following one: what determines the quality of the prism in the human memory environment and how this prism refracts the message generated by memory mechanisms (Achtnich, 1979).



Figure 1. Model of realization of human motor skill predisposition in memory environment

It should be noted that to this pattern of resolution of dialectical contradiction predisposition-skill, the academician G. Popov arrived in justifying the complex heuristic model, presented in his work "Phenomenology of Memory", independently of Achtnich's works (Popov, 1951).

In fact, M. Achtnich concluded empirically, a person may beget 4 professional acts allowing him to achieve "triumph", the highest accomplishment in his professional life and practice. However, M. Achtnich deduced these patterns observationally, further classifying them, relating multiple test results (for 25 years of professional activity he was testing together with colleagues more than 14.000 people; 16 years earlier, he contributed to develop the test itself and its validation). Based on the model recommended by academician G. Popov, we observe this «4 professional acts system" really exists, as it derives from the structure of the human memory environment.

Nevertheless, personal predisposition is "refracted" not only through the "prism" or "lens" of ancestral heritage (M. Achtnich suspected that, describing to his students the prospects of further research), but transfers through diverse configurations generated by four blocks of memory: its core, prototype block, archetipology block and block of the ancestral unconscious; only later the trainings are "fixing" the "result" in his consciousness, finally turning into a motor skill.

M. Achtnich did not examine how the interaction of memory potential takes place refracting predisposition through individual prisms of the prototypical block, the archetipology block, etc. Additionally, the author of the professional orientation test laid the foundations for further research in the field of the change of professions system study. In other words, crucial questions remain uncovered: A) what happens to professions that die? B) How to orient and choose a new, relevant profession, which is not described in the test apparatus directly? C) How does the emergence of new professions relate to the human memory environment and its motor features?; D) can we give an answer about the professions of the future — how to predict them, verify them?

The fact is that the apprehension of the memory environment features and the search for an "exhaustive list of predispositions," as well as an "exhaustive list of features each memory environment unit" is achievable from a scientific point of view, however, that usually takes years of research while working with one person. From a practical viewpoint, this is unacceptable, because in modern circumstances such recommendations are required, which allow to predict professional activity in just a few hours, plus in the future to allow a person to learn to navigate independently in conditions of changes in the environment of his life and activity.

Popov's tasks largely echo the original formulation of P. Drucker's "smart approach". The term "SMART-society" was introduced by P. Drucker in early 1954, the first letters of the



Figure 2. Memory model by G. Popov

notion meant: S — Self-Directed; M–Motivated; A — Adaptive; R — Resource-enriched; T — Technology. SMART criteria are to be met by the objective: 1) specific (what needs to be achieved) 2) measurable — assessable (the result is to be estimated) 3) attainable — achieved (by which it is possible to achieve the objective); 4) relevant — up-to-date (determination of the truth of the goal) 5) time-bounded — date-specific (determination of the time interval after which the goal is to be achieved). Correct setting of goals determines their specificity, measurability, attainability, significance, and relevance to a specific term, indicating the first letters of a given term (Maksimenyuk, 2016).

If at that time P. Drucker's approach was pointed exclusively at training managers, however, presently there is a reflection of the smart approach to all areas of activity (by a certain rate of change, rapid circulation of information and conditions of uncertainty).

As well as mentioned, we are to note another most prominent pattern, defined by the contradiction of predisposition-skill, which is the essence and manifestations of the profession itself.

Thus, M. Achtnich predicting changes in the structure of the professional field, left followers and the next generation of scientists with the following conclusions. The very concept of "profession" he considered as a composite construct formed by several elements (Achtnich, 1971):

1) The motor skill itself — its predisposition in the unconscious version of memory mechanisms actuation;
2) Environment in which this profession is realized;
3) Workplace, as well as the way of work organization on the spot
4) Profession tools.

The leading relationship in this scheme is the "predisposition — skill" relationship, as it is the main object of the profession, its "spine" or "rod". If there is no skill, the person will not be successful in the selected position (Achtnich 1979; Achtnich, 1971)

Subsequently, when predicting subsequent professions, taking into account the mandatory conditions of modern transition to the world of the Internet and social networks, based on the above-mentioned configuration, we get the following ranking on changing and unchanged components.

The option a person does not change (or changes very slowly) is the content of the memory environment, is his predisposition. Moreover, in forecasting and professional orientation, we A) cannot influence the predisposition system; B) should pay direct attention to what a person will be able to realize at the maximum speed and in the best possible way; C) are primarily interested in predisposition, as it is the basis of the future skill, and therefore the "key" to the success in the professional field.

However, the other three components must necessarily be taken into account at solving contemporary problems. In particular meanwhile moving into the world of "hyperreality" and digitization, based on the perspective of the profession, we recognize changes in the environment. Therefore, while forming a professional package of recommendations and subsequent methodological developments, we should also take into account 1) the system of environmental management in which this skill will be implemented; 2) a changing set of modern tools for the realization of the profession; 3) method of human self-organization and self-documentation. Simultaneously, if a key role in the industrial world was played by the "predisposition-skill" system and it was possible to accomplish oneself in concrete environments of the physical world (the plants, factories, institutes, and so forth); today the task becomes complicated repeatedly. It is not enough to solve

the issue of identifying professional predispositions as this the first stage of prediction-making. Promptly it is necessary to invent the system № 2, without that one the realization of predisposition is impossible — namely, the system of skill fulfillment in the 21-century environment, in the environment of the Internet, virtual worlds, and the desire to replace physical processes with electronic ones.

Smart is a property of an object that characterizes the integration in a given object of elements that are not previously combined, carried out through the use of the Internet. That indicates this process is available and not taking this it into account means simply turning a blind eye to the apparent reality. For example, Smart-TV, Smart-Home, Smart-Phone Smart-technology, "smart" generally leads to the expansion of labor mobility in education, public service as well as various other areas of employment, especially among young people, meaning this concept is central to the consideration of social changes (Karmanov, 2014).

The third stage, therefore, will require the development of new tools of professional implementation (video camera, computer, smartphone), and these tools shall be learned to use even by experts not directly involved in activities on the Internet (doctors, lawyers, builders, etc.). The 21-century environment dictates these rules, changing the life of man, and consequently the order of self-realization.

Methodological developments of such programs of training and education will become extremely promising, which necessarily take into account earlier mentioned parameters, allowing to solve the task of expert formation comprehensively, answering not only the question "What profession is one to choose?" but "How to implement it in modern requirements of expanding hyperreality".

Hence, the team of authors under the leadership of Professor V. Voronkova writes that "In the context of universal human values development such as geosciences of planetary scale, the concept of "Staffing of personnel" is a trajectory that cannot be isolated from the world, as it is extremely developing. As a central topic of public theory, "staffing" is a term referring to the representation of staff on certain terms: staff leasing — "rental" of staff, temporary staffing — delivery of temporary staff for a short period, "outstaffing" — withdrawal of staff abroad of the state, which requires reflection and corresponding actions (Voronkova et al., 2018).

Staffing essentially defines globalized systems of production speed mode with professional activities of organizations. We find answers to these challenges in the results of research activities of G. Popov.

For a number of the above-described reasons in searching the aspect of unconscious choice carried out by man, including the professional terms Gregory Popov developed the following approach from advancing the methodology of human education. Thus, he did not recommend to consider a "profession" option as a choice matter or a "case to which relatives were engaged"; not as "an occupation to the liking" and even "not an option helping one to survive." The academician termed these categories unpredictable ones as they only created unnecessary obstacles in solving the poorly structured task of professional orientation (Popov, 1951). The innovation of G. Popov's practical recommendations is precisely to show a person how to stop choosing anything unconsciously, consequently condemning his career to dependence on the game of probabilities.

Alternatively, it is recommended to choose diverse categories: 1) tactics, 2) philosophy as a system of applied knowledge (in the modern meaning of applied philosophy), 3) management and 4) approach to life conditions management. For instance, everyone may learn to create the right environment helping him to solve the problem, that is most likely pushing to the fulfillment of the tactical intent of managing these systems and circumstances. That defines and deploys in practice the right choice of ethical and moral attitudes and, consequently, effective management, allowing the person to build his professional fate himself, without choosing the paths offered to him by the heritage of ancestors claiming to expose their existences (Popov, 1951).

The logic of academician G. Popov aims precisely to stop choosing anything unconsciously and "swim along the flow of life." Preferably, it is necessary to choose tactics, philosophy (system of ethical-moral values of man), management, and ability to manage requirements. Otherwise, anything happening next is uncontrollable and filled with life obstacles. Moreover, effective management implements the requirements that are most likely to lead to the realization of tactical intent. The right choice of philosophy also generates management directed at solving life problems, and the choice in favor of effective knowledge allows us to think through competent tactics of actions, helping to cope with any circumstances [14]. Furthermore, if a person chooses these four

components rather than "following the flow of life" or an unconscious "ancestor requirement," then the unconscious processes and memory mechanism system start functioning under control of the individual. Through that, the so-called "axis force addition principle" initiates, that is: the refractor or "lens" of each memory unit repeatedly amplifies the "light" generated by the memory core. In such a case there are opportunities for effective development and realization of the person's potential, which is in every way facilitating his professional climbing to Pedestal.

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the purpose of the present scientific research, which is the philosophical understanding of the dialectic of predisposition and skill in human professional activity, a comparative analysis of the models of Martin Achtnich and Gregory Popov has been presented.

First, M. Achtnich's logical model is defined, describing and demonstrating how a person's predisposition ("information" stored in his memory) is transformed into a skill. Furthermore, the problem of system prediction of the method of implementation of the order of predispositions in the way of transformation of a predisposition into real and effective skills is defined.

On the other hand, the method of comprehending the "system of achieving effective professional realization in life", described by M. Achtnich in the form of four acts, is critically analyzed. However, he did not have enough time to describe the parameters or the structure that would provide an answer to the question "How can one achieve these milestones in a manageable way?", but he did show that this is possible and that this "achievement of triumph" is available for study.Thirdly, based on the previously described assumption, the activity approach of G. Popov was also considered [14], who set into the basis the resolution of the contradiction "predisposition-skill" in removing the influence of the destruction of society and the unconscious ancestral scenario of the "imposed fate" of L. Szondi. This has made it possible to develop a set of tactical recommendations regarding the experience and resolution of this contradiction in life and professional practice.

The fourth conclusion states the comparative analysis revealed, Popov's tasks largely echo the original formulation of P. Drucker's smart approach, whose paradigm is now being applied to reflect on the smart approach to any areas of activity, defined by the speed of environmental change, the rapid circulation of information, and the circumstances of uncertainty. The recommendations of G.Popov and the concept of P. Drucker do not conflict, mutually complementing each other.

The fifth point is the most significant pattern, defined by the "predisposition-skill" contradiction, which was noted as the essence and manifestations of the actual "profession," the key description of which was conducted by Martin Achtnich. Nevertheless, the dynamics of contemporary realities (digitization, a transition of a number of professions into the "virtual world," generation of unlike professional requests caused by social networks and world integration, which are increasing role of individual positioning on the Internet, etc.) allows to detect and predict the formation of cognitive class, from which as an engine of social changes progressive transformations are expected.

The methodological approaches to the development of such training programmes, which necessarily take into account the parameters mentioned above, will be extremely promising and will enable to solve the task of expert training in a holistic manner, answering not only the question "What profession should one choose?", but also "How should it be implemented in the modern requirements of the expanding hyperreality?

Therefore, the most important prospect of further research lies in praxeology, in the practical development of appropriate education and training programmes for experts of various specialties, taking into account the requirements of the 21st century environment. Moreover, although the approach in each case in the educational process is usually individual, from the pedagogical and methodological point of view the presented models of solving the "disposition-ability" contradiction and recommendations for their application are current and promising contemporary scientific tasks.

Special attention should be paid to the system of achieving vocational success as a safe field of further research: both from the philosophical point of view of the mechanisms, tactics of self-improvement and realization of the potential of individual study, and from the point of methodological not yet developed.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

REFERENCES

Abulhanova-Slavskaya, K. A. (1991). The strategies of life. Moscow: Mysl.

Achtnich, M. (1979). BBT — Berufsbilder-Test. Projektives Verfahren zur Abklärung der Berufsneigung [BBT — Berufsbilder-Test: A projective method for clarifying career inclinations.]. Hans Huber.

Achtnich, M. (1971). Schicksalsanalytisch orientierte Berufsberatung anhand des Berufsbilder-Wahltestes: Ein Beitrag zur Psychologie der Berufswahl, des Berufswechsels und der Berufsprognose. Bericht über das 5. Kolloquium der Internat. Forschungsgemeinschaft für Schicksalspsychologie. [Fate-analysis-oriented career counseling based on the Berufsbilder-Wahltest: A contribution to the psychology of career choice, career change, and career prognosis. Report on the 5th Colloquium of the International Research Community for Fate Psychology.] Hans Huber.

Bell, D. (1976). *The coming of post-industrial society: A venture in social forecasting.* Penguin & Co.

Borisova, G. (2007). Social destruction as a universal phenomenon of society life: Frankfurt School position. *Bulletin of Nizhegorodskiy University by N. Lobachevskiy. Social Studies*. Retrieved from https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/sotsialnaya-destruktsiya-kak-universalnyy-fenomen-zhizni-obschestva-pozitsiya-frankfurtskoy-shkoly-2

Fromm, E. (2010). *Beyond the chains of illusion: My encounter with Marx and Freud* (Original work published 1962). AST.

Horkheimer, M., & Adorno, T. W. (1997). *Dialectic of enlightenment: Philosophical fragments.* Medium, Yuventa.

Kantor, K. M. (2009). Logical sociology of Alexander Zinoviev as social philosophy. In *Alexander Zinoviev* (pp. 385). ROSSPEN.

Karmanov, A. M. (2014). Smart as the new post-information society development degree. *Economics, Statistics and Informatics,* (5), 38–41.

Critical sociology of Frankfurt School. (2007). *Bulletin of the Russian University of Friendship of Peoples: Sociology,* (3), 52–67. Retrieved from https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/kriticheskaya-sotsiologiya-frankfurtskoy-shkoly

Maksimenyuk, M. Y. (2016). Informatively-communicative society as a variety of complex social structures and cooperation. In V. O. Nikitenko (Ed.), *Humanitarian Bulletin of the Zaporizhzhya State Engineering Academy: Scientific Collection,* 66, pp. 266–278.

Marcuse, G. (1994). *One-dimensional person.* Refl-book.

Pollock, F. (1923). *Zur Geldtheorie von Karl Marx* [Inaugural dissertation, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität Frankfurt am Main, manuscript]. Reprinted in Wien, 2018, pp. 23–127.

Popov, G. S. (1951). *Phenomenology of memory: Basic methodological approaches to human memory research* [Manuscript]. Archive "NII Pamyati". (Fond "Nasledie akademika G. Popova," Vienna, 1940), F. 3, Des. 2, D. 1, Fp. 1–6, pp. 41–50.

Schmidt, A. (1981). *Kritische Theorie, Humanismus, Aufklärung: Philosophische Arbeiten.* Reclam.

Silberman, M., & Hansburg, F. (2000). *People smart: Developing your interpersonal intelligence.* Berrett-Koehler Publishers.

Skovoroda, H. (2016). *Hryhorii Skovoroda* (2nd ed., revised and reprinted, L. Ushkalov, Ed.). Savchuk O. O.

Soboleva, M. (2002). To the conception of the philosophy of language of Jürgen Habermas. *Logos*.

Szondi, L. (1956). *Ich-Analyse: Die Grundlage zur Vereinigung der Tiefenpsychologie, Teil 1.* Hans Huber.

Voronkova, V., Kivlyuk, O., & Andryukajtene, R. (2018). Anthropological measuring of smart-society: Theory and concept experience. *The Humanitarian Bulletin of ZSIA* (73), 25–40. Retrieved from http://www.zgia.zp.ua/gazeta/gvzdia_73_25.pdf

Yudin, A. (1995). The paradoxes of the Great Refuse. In G. Marcuse, *About Eros and civilization: Philosophical research of Freud's studies* (pp. 275). Kyiv.

EMOTIONS ON THE BATTLEFIELD: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

DOI: https://doi.org/10.61439/UNYH4829

DR. SINIŠA MALEŠEVIĆ

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

- *ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1864-6382*
- *Email: sinisa.malesevic@ucd.ie*

Siniša Malešević is a Full Professor of Comparative Historical Sociology at the University College, Dublin, and Senior Fellow at CNAM, Paris. His recent books include *Why Humans Fight* (2022), *Contemporary Sociological Theory* (with S. Loyal, 2021), *Grounded Nationalisms* (2019), *The Rise of Organised Brutality* (2017) and *Nation-States and Nationalisms* (2013). His work has been translated into 14 languages.

ABSTRACT

The focal point of this article is the relationship between emotions and close-range fighting. Emotions play a central role in warfare. Nearly all soldiers who encounter combat zones experience intense emotional reactions. Some of these emotions are negative, such as fear, panic, anger, rage, or shame, while others are more positive, including pride, elation, joy, or exhilaration. Some scholars argue that there is inherent uniformity of emotional reactions on the battlefield. However, recent studies indicate that the emotional dynamics in the combat zone are more complex and flexible. Following this research, I argue in this article that there are pronounced historical and cultural differences in the emotional responses of fighters in combat zones. Facing the same realities of close-range fighting, soldiers tend to display different emotional reactions and these reactions are more variable as the cultural and historical contexts change.

Keywords

emotions, violence, battlefield, fight, war

INTRODUCTION[1]

There is no doubt that the close-range fighting entails distinct emotional dynamics. People who take part in violent encounters experience intense emotional responses ranging from fear, angst, anxiety, panic and horror to anger, rage and even elation. The acts of fighting are often followed by physiological changes such as increased heart rate, heavy breathing, dilation of the pupils, hormonal increases and in some cases the loss of urination or bowel control. Since emotions have dominated battlefields for centuries there is a well-entrenched view that warfare generates very similar emotional reactions among soldiers. The conventional interpretations overemphasise a uniform response by humans who find themselves in similar extraordinary situations. In this article I challenge such established views and argue that the emotional dynamics of close-range fighting is historically variable and culturally flexible. The historical and sociological analysis of battlefield experiences indicates that there are substantial cultural and historical differences in the emotional reactions of individuals and groups who experience similar fighting situations.

1 The earlier version of this paper was originally published as 'Emotions and Close-Range Fighting' in Siniša Malešević (2022) Why Humans Fight: The Social Dynamics of Close-Range Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The article is divided into three sections. The first part explores the range of emotional responses that have been documented on the battlefields throughout the world. I briefly explore the emotional dynamics of close-range fighting and emphasise the contextual variations that appear in different conflicts. Although some features of human action are universal the emotional responses vary across time and space. Hence the last two parts of the article the historical and cultural variables and aim to show how emotional responses in warfare are shaped and changed by different cultural and historical contexts.

METHODS

This study examines the emotional dynamics of close-range combat through the analysis of historical records, secondary sources, and comparative interpretations. Historical records, including memoirs and archival military documents, were scrutinised to uncover how battlefield emotions were shaped and regulated in different cultural and historical contexts. These records provided firsthand accounts of soldiers' experiences, offering insight into the practices and rituals that influenced their emotional responses.

Secondary sources were crucial in contextualizing these historical findings, with scholarly articles and historical studies helping to build a theoretical framework for understanding the variability of emotional responses in combat. The literature reviewed included studies on military rituals, emotional regulation, and psychological impacts of warfare, allowing for a deeper exploration of the social and cultural factors at play.

A comparative approach was employed to explore the diversity of emotional reactions across different combat contexts, both historically and culturally. The study compared the emotional responses of soldiers in different historical periods and military cultures, highlighting how the same external stimuli — such as fear or danger — could trigger different emotional reactions depending on the soldiers' cultural background and the specific rituals they were part of.

RESULTS

Although humans share universal emotional traits, battlefield reactions are not uniform or static. Instead, soldiers' feelings and behaviours vary historically and in different cultural contexts. Emotions are shaped by structural contexts, rather than being biologically fixed. Practices like synchronised drilling helped soldiers focus on coordination, turning fear into other emotions. Drill may influence emotions, but beyond that, practices like dueling also play a role in regulating feelings of honor and shame. This article shows that emotions are not biological constants but dynamic, context-dependent social experiences.

Battlefields are defined by diverse cultural contexts and emotional experiences. Rather than assuming a singular emotional regime, it is crucial to recognise cultural variations within and between societies. Cultural influences evolve through interaction with other groups, and emotional states are interpreted differently depending on the context. While conventional views suggest universal emotional reactions triggered by similar stimuli, this article argues that emotional responses are highly variable and influenced by historical and cultural forces, not just biology.

DISCUSSION

The Frontline Combatants and Emotions

The combatants who have experienced a close-range fighting on the battlefield tend to describe it in vividly emotional terms. The frontline combat generates unique emotional experiences ranging from fear, anxiety, anger, angst and rage to panic, horror and even elation and exhilaration. There is no doubt that fear is one of the most significant and most common emotional responses that is accompanied with many of these physiological

changes. Fear is generally associated with heavy breathing, palpitations, excessive sweating, and body paralysis. In most combat situations soldiers experience fear and in some instances intense fear can turn into panic, dread and horror. In one of the earliest studies of combat experience, French colonel Ardant du Picq (2006[1903]), found that fear was the principal emotion in the combat zone. In the 1860s he surveyed French officers and found that widespread fear paralysed military action with many soldiers being incapable of fighting and shooting at the enemy. Colonel du Picq (2006:90) was very clear in his assessment and also recommended how to control the fear: 'man has a horror of death…discipline is for the purpose of dominating that horror by a still greater horror, that of punishment or disgrace. But there always comes an instant when natural horror gets an upper hand over discipline, and the fighter flees… He does not hear, he cannot hear any more. He is full of fear.' The same emotional reactions were identified in many other wars. The largest study conducted during WWII by Stouffer at all (1949) identified fear as the central emotion among US soldiers. Stouffer and his collaborators surveyed the US infantry regiments in France and found that over 65 percent of soldiers had difficulty performing their military tasks because of constant feelings of fear. The same survey was undertaken among the US infantry soldiers in the Pacific theatre of war and the results were very similar with very high percentage of soldiers identifying fear as the key obstacle for efficient military action: the soldiers confessed that they experienced violent pounding of the heart (76%), were sick in their stomachs (over 50%) and many had cold sweats, would tremble or faint (Stouffer et al, 1949, p. 201). A very similar response has been recorded in other wars and among other soldiers (Collins, 2008; Bourke, 2000; Grossman, 1996; Holmes, 1985).

Nevertheless, the intense feelings of fear were not the main cause of desertion as many soldiers felt a strong sense of attachment and obligation towards their comrades and would not leave the battlefields even when experiencing a profound sense of dread, panic and horror (Malešević, 2010; Collins, 2008). A more prevalent reaction to fear and horror of the battlefield was the soldier's general unwillingness to target and shoot at the enemy soldiers. Thus, since S.L.A. Marshall (1947) study on behaviour of US soldiers in WWII theatres of war it has become evident that a large number of frontline combatants fail to fire their guns during the combat or tend to deliberately miss or fire in the air. Marshall (1947, p. 50) argued that only between 15 and 25 percent of soldiers would fire their weapons at the enemy while the majority would misfire or not fire at all. Although Marshall's work has been questioned and criticised for its methodological weaknesses (Mann, 2019; Spiller, 1988) other scholars have identified a similar level of non-firing in other theatres of war and other combat zones throughout the world (King, 2011; Collins, 2008; Bourke, 2000).

The militaries have devised a variety of measures to counter the consequences of widespread fear. Some of these measures have centred on enhancing the coercive capacity of military units. Hence most armies have introduced battle police which have become responsible for preventing soldiers from escaping the battlefield but also to make sure that they shoot at the enemy (Collins, 2008; Holmes, 1985). In addition, more officers were allocated to the combat zone so that they can observe the implementation of fighting commands. In WWII many recruits were reluctant to shoot and would only do so when observed and pressured by their commander. As one frustrated US officer reflected on his experience during the invasion of Normandy in 1944: 'When I ordered the men who were right around me to fire, they did so. But the moment I passed on, they quit. I walked up and down the line yelling 'God damn it! Start shooting!' But it did very little good. They fired only while I watched them or while some other soldier stood over them' (Bourke, 2000, p. 74).

Other measures were centred on developing a more realistic combat training where soldiers would encounter an environment that is similar to the one in the combat zone. This would include a more physically and mentally demanding and exhausting training setting that resembles the battlefield. For example, during WWII some officers would bring the new recruits to see the defaced and damaged corpses before their first battle so that they could get used to the sight of death and destruction (Blake, 1970, p. 340). These practices would also include learning 'instinctive shooting', that is the ability to shoot under stress without seeing your target. Many contemporary armies have focused on training soldiers in this practice of target focused shooting which does not rely on the use of one's sight. Instead a soldier repeats shooting movements focused on a target that have been practiced in training and have become a habitual response. This style of shooting does not require visual

confirmation but involves automatic reaction centred on the less visible target (Klein, 2016).

Another influential military practice devised to increase discipline but also manage fear and dread of the battlefield is drill. This old age military tradition has played a crucial role in maintaining group cohesion in the theatres of war as the coordinated rhythmic movement have proved influential in shifting the emotional dynamics from an individual sense of fear towards the collective experience of effervescence and bonding. As Holmes (1985, p. 42) explains: 'Part of the stress of battle stems from its puzzling and capricious nature: battle drills help to minimize the randomness of battle, and gives the soldier familiar points of contact in an uncertain environment, like lighthouses in a stormy sea'. McNeill (1997) has traced historically how drill played a decisive role in warfare throughout history. In his analysis drill helped generate intuitive emotional ties of 'muscular bonding' that created capacity for collective action on the battlefield thus preventing the soldiers from running away.

In addition to fear, dread, panic and horror soldiers can also experience a variety of other emotional reactions ranging from anger, anxiety and rage over sadness, shame, guilt and disgust to pride, awe, elation, exhilaration and even joy. Anger and rage are common emotions associated with violence. The first line of Homer's Iliad (2017) starts with the idea of rage and the book itself depicts the anger and rage of Achilles and other warriors whose honour has been trampled upon. Nevertheless, anger and rage are usually interpreted through the reactive responses of soldiers. The soldiers that see their comrades killed or injured might be more inclined to express rage and anger: 'I did not hate the enemy [Viet Cong] for their politics, but for murdering Simpson [a friend]…revenge was one of the reasons I volunteered for a line company. I wanted a chance to kill somebody' (Caputo, 1977, p. 231) or 'real hatred of the enemy came to soldiers… when a buddy was killed. And this was often a total hatred: any German they encountered after that would be killed' (Beevor, 2009, p. 260). These experiences of US soldiers losing close comrades from the Vietnam war and WWII have recently been mirrored among the US soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Sebastian Junger (2010, p. 60) documents in his *War, anger* and rage have motivated revenge attacks: 'I just wanted to kill everything that came up that was not American'. The feelings of anger have also been linked with one's perception of the enemy's unfair fighting. Burleigh (2011, p. 379) depicts a situation from the WWII in Tunisia when an imprisoned German soldier killed several British soldiers with a hidden gun: 'During the assault on Longstop Hill…a captured German drew a concealed pistol and shot several of his Argyll and Sutherland Highlander captors. The latter were " roused to a state of berserk fury — We just had a hate — at the Germans, the hill, everything" For a few days they accepted no surrenders'. The anger was even more pronounced when encountering cases of cruelty, torture and slaughtering of innocent civilians (Collins, 2008; Bourke, 2000; Grossman, 1996).

Shame and guilt also feature prominently in the emotional experiences of soldiers on the battlefield. Du Picq (2006 [1903], p. 154) was already aware that most soldiers were concerned how others see them and were eager to avoid any sense of shame: 'Self-esteem is unquestionably one of the most powerful motives which moves our men. They do not wish to pass for cowards in the eyes of their comrades'.

Shame could also be associated with inappropriate behaviour towards the enemy and especially civilians. In some instances, shame would trump the original enthusiasm or pride in shooting the enemy. The soldiers would experience the instant thrill of fulfilling the military aim, but this would soon transform into regret, shame and guilt. For example an US soldier who fought in the first Gulf war, Charles Sheehan Miles, recollects his experience of killing Iraqi soldiers who were escaping the burning truck: 'As one of the occupants ran ablaze from the truck, Miles fired his machine-gun and instantly killed him. His immediate response was, he said, "a sense of exhilaration, of joy". However, a moment later he experienced "a tremendous feeling of guilt and remorse". The image of the man on fire, running and dying, stayed with him "for years and years and years," he said. His unit returned home amidst great celebration and he was awarded a medal, yet he felt, in his words, "probably the worst person alive" (Skelly, 2006). A very similar emotional switch was experienced by other soldiers who took part in other wars. For instance, a US soldier who participated in the massacre of women and children in a Vietnamese village explains how he was struggling to reconcile his orders, peer pressure and shame: 'I happened to look into somebody's eyes, a woman's eyes, and she — I don't know, I looked, I mean, just before we started firing,

I mean, You know, I didn't want to. I wanted to turn around and walk away. It was something telling me not to do it. Something told me not to, you know, just turn around and not be part of it, but everybody else started firing, I started firing' (Bourke, 2000, p. 191). While some combatants felt ashamed for their actions others were ashamed for not feeling guilty: 'The deep shame that I feel is my own lack of emotional reaction. I keep reacting as though I were simply watching a movie of the whole thing. I still don't feel that I have personally killed anyone…Have I become so insensitive that I have to see torn limbs, the bloody ground, the stinking holes and guts in the mud, before I feel ashamed that I have destroyed numbers of my own kind?' (Bourke, 2000, p. 221). Hence in some situations shame was linked with instant sense of guilt while in other instances shame and guilty were completely disconnected.

The sense of guilt often appears in two principal forms: the feeling of being responsible for death or injuries of others and the guilt of having survived the war while one's comrades have been killed. The killer's guilt was often rooted in one's realisation that the enemy is just another human being like one's self:'…I had a tear myself, I thought to myself perhaps he has a Mother or Dad also a sweetheart and a lot of things like that, I was really sorry' (Moynihan, 1980, p. 85). In his Vietnam war memoir Caputo (1977, p. 117) describes how finding personal photographs and letters of the dead Vietcong soldier provoked a deep sense of empathy and guilt among the US soldiers: these personal items 'gave the enemy the humanity I wished to deny him' which let to recognition that the enemy soldiers were also made of 'flesh and blood' instead of being 'mysterious wraiths'. This realisation caused 'an abiding sense of remorse' as the US soldiers recognised that Vietcong are 'young men… just like us'. In the Iraq war the US military attempted to work through this universal sense of empathy by prompting soldiers to differentiate

clearly between military targets and civilians. Hence several US military commanders warned their soldiers: ' civilians should be treated as you would desire your family to be treated in a similar circumstances' or 'Don't fucking waste a mother or some kid. Don't fire into a crowd. These people north of here have been oppressed for years. They're just like us' (Pettegrew, 2015, p. 100). There is no doubt that the commanders' pleas were aimed at minimising the civilian casualties, but they were also focused on averting the anticipated future guilt and remorse of young US soldiers.

The survivor's guilt is something that might appear during or immediately after the battle or can become much more prominent at the end of the violent conflict. For example, many soldiers were deeply affected by the deaths of their friends and would blame themselves for this loss: 'Every time you lost a friend it seemed like a part of you was gone' (Shay, 1994, p. 79) or [I experience] 'night sweats, nightmares, survivors guilt, the feeling that you deserted your buddies by living' (Munson, 2016). This sense of guilt is often a symptom of the 'Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder' (PTSD) which has shaped much of post-war experience for soldiers who survived wars. The survivor's guilt is a mental condition characterised by strong feelings of having done something wrong by surviving a traumatic event when others have died. It is a feeling of responsibility for deaths of others that is expressed as taking somebody else's place among the living. This feeling of guilt has been present among soldiers who survived wars but also among the Holocaust survivors and other individuals who lived after major traumatic events such as epidemics, natural disasters, terrorism, airplane crashes and so on. As Primo Levi (1995, p. 295), an Auschwitz survivor, describes it: 'It is the impression that the others died in your place; that you are alive, thanks to a privilege you have not earned, a trick you played on the dead. Being alive isn't a crime but we feel it like a crime'. The soldiers affected by PTSD often express this sense of guilt in their letters and memoirs. For example, a British soldier who survived the battle of Arezzo in 1944 after most of his unit was killed reflects on his visit to their graves in 1971 in his memoir: 'Why hadn't I visited them? Because you didn't want to get too close to the dead, I thought. You wanted them buried alive in the book. They're rotting in their graves, chum. You've got to face them there. You've been dodging the column, running away from the pain and guilt of being alive when the best are dead, their lives wasted. Thrown away. For what? A botched civilization. A bitch gone in the teeth' (Houghton, 2019, p. 51).

In addition to survivor's guilt, soldiers also tend to experience another set of emotional responses that Shey (2014) and Litz et al (2009) have called moral injury. This concept stands for discrepancy in values and actions: an individual is obliged to follow the orders of legitimate authority, yet these orders clash sharply with one's moral values. In this sense a moral injury represents a condition that creates an emotional dissonance: by engaging in these actions individuals trample upon moral codes which is likely to generate anxiety and feelings of shame and guilt. Although William Calley, US Army officer and convicted war criminal who was responsible for the My Lai massacre, is often presented as an individual who showed no emotion while in Vietnam or during his trial, it seems that like many other Vietnam veterans he also experienced a moral injury. In a recent public address he stated that 'There is not a day that goes by that I do not feel remorse for what happened that day in My Lai…I feel remorse for the Vietnamese who were killed, for their families, for the American soldiers involved and their families. I am very sorry' (James, 2009).

Although the battlefield experience is predominantly shaped by negative emotions including fear, horror, panic, guilt, shame, anxiety, anger, rage and sadness the combat zone can also yield some positive emotional responses including admiration, awe, pride, trust, elation, exhilaration and joy. Furthermore, the shared experience of soldiers living and fighting together under extremely difficult circumstances generates a complex emotional dynamic that is often expressed in the strong bonds of friendship and comradeship. Some of these bonds might develop into loving and lasting relationships with strong emotional attachments.

All military organisations rely on the soldier's sense of pride. In most instances individuals feel proud of belonging to a particular company, regiment, battalion or a military branch. The leaders of military organisations are well aware that soldiers develop strong sense of unit attachment and all military organisations foster these micro-identities as they enhance social cohesion within the military (King, 2011). Nevertheless, in the combat situation the sense of pride tends to be more localised and situational. Hence there is more expression of pride in smaller units such as one's squad and platoon rather than battalion,

brigade or the army as a whole. In the traumatic environments of battlefields where individuals are exposed to the continuous life-threatening situations and where they witness daily deaths of their comrades soldiers are more likely to identify strongly with these smaller, face to face, groups (Malešević, 2017). In this context pride emerges through the shared experience of hardship and ability to survive extraordinary conditions. Winning and surviving despite the odds also contributes to the sense of pride in one's squad or platoon. In the two surveys conducted among the US soldiers during the WWII an overwhelming majority of respondents expressed a strong sense of pride in their company, platoon and squad — 78 percent were fairly proud or very proud and only 9 percent said that they were not proud of their military units (McManus, 2007, p. 321). As one soldier describes this sense of pride stemmed from strong bonds of friendship that developed within the military unit: 'The soldier feared separation from his squad more than he feared the enemy. He felt secure among men whose individual characters and capabilities he knew as well as he knew his own. They had been welded together by combat, and rightly or wrongly the infantryman was convinced that his chances of surviving the next firefight were much better with his own squad than they would be in any other. His first sergeant and platoon sergeant were like fathers…and the other members of his squad were his brothers' (McManus, 2007, p. 322). In some cases, pride in one's squad or platoon was enhanced by the views other soldiers had about that particular squad or platoon. In other words, the valour and fearlessness of some platoons provoked a sense of awe and admiration among soldiers in other units. For example, in the Vietnam war the platoons that were willing to volunteer for difficult military operations or have experienced excessive violence and have survived were admired for their 'crazy' behaviour: 'when [this]…unit came in the bar, everybody else in the joint would shift out of the way…They were all crazy, but I respected them… I was fascinated with this group of men. They were all on their second or third tour of Nam…Their kinship was even stronger than ours…They didn't even think of anyone else around' (Baker, 1982, p. 121).

There is no doubt that the combat zone is defined by a variety of negative emotions including fear, anger, contempt, disgust, or guilt. However, some soldiers also experience a number of positive emotions such as joy, happiness, contentment, elation and exhilaration (Bourke, 2000). The memoirs and diaries of many combatants are full of descriptions where the battlefield is portrayed as an arena of infinite power and freedom. Some of the participants of WWI who later became well known writers depict their emotional reactions on the battlefield in terms of happiness and joy. Both Ernest Jünger, a conservative German nationalist, and Henri de Man, Belgian socialist, describe their war experience through the prism of joy and elation. De Man (1920, pp. 198–199) shows no sense of guilt for killing the enemy soldiers. In fact, he seems very happy about this: 'I secured a direct hit on an enemy encampment, saw bodies or parts of bodies go up in the air, and heard the desperate yelling of the wounded or the runaways. I had to confess to myself that it was one of the happiest moments of my life'. In a similar vein Jünger, who fought on the other side, writes about his own feelings: 'As we advanced, we were in the grip of berserk rage. The overwhelming desire to kill lent wings to my stride. Rage squeezed bitter tears from my eyes. The immense desire to destroy that overhung the battlefield precipitated a red mist in our brains. We called out sobbing and stammering fragments of sentences to one another, and an impartial observer might have concluded that we were all ecstatically happy'. These emotional responses were also documented in the Vietnam war and the recent Afghan war. The former US soldier who fought in Vietnam was very explicit about his feelings on the battlefield. He states how he fell in love 'with the power and thrill of destruction and death dealing…there is a deep savage joy in destruction…' (Marlantes, 2011, pp. 61–67, 160). The similar emotions were present among US soldiers who fought in Afghanistan and Iraq (Junger, 2010, 2016).

For some soldiers a battlefield is perceived as the ultimate test of their manhood — the opportunity to stretch one's physical, mental and emotional capacities to the limits and see whether they can survive in this situation. In a patriarchal world where one's sense of masculinity is often defined by their physical prowess and capacity to endure the external hardships, war is often viewed as a moral yardstick of manhood. Proving oneself on the battlefield and demonstrating that one can withstand pain and sacrifice means being a full man. This is something that many young recruits were socialised with in their childhood and teenage years and have aspired to show to others that they are not boys but 'real men'. In this context the popular depictions of previous wars which glorified military heroism

and one's willingness to fight and endure were often understood to be the moral parameters of how young recruits should behave in the combat zone (Goldstein, 2001). This is often referred to as the John Wayne syndrome — eagerness to get into action and become a hero. As another Vietnam veteran observes, many very young US soldiers were deeply influenced by the dominant cultural representations of war and particularly by films that romanticised war and fighting: 'The John Wayne flicks. We were invincible. So, when we were taken into…war, everyone went in with the attitude, 'Hey, we're going to wipe them out. Nothing's going to happen to us'. Until they saw the realities and they couldn't deal with. 'This isn't supposed to happen. It isn't in the script. What's going on? This guy is really bleeding all over me, he's screaming his head off' (Bourke, 2000, p. 28). Hence initial elation and enthusiasm about the war regularly dissipates once young recruits experience the horrors of the battlefield environment.

The experience of the battlefield generates intense emotional reactions. Although fear is by far the most common emotion, the combatants tend to experience wide range of complex and changing emotional responses including both negative emotions such as anxiety, anger, rage, panic, horror, shame, guilt and sadness as well as some positive emotions including happiness, joy, pride, elation and exhilaration. Living in an exceptional situation of life and death individual actions and responses of soldiers are profoundly shaped by emotions.

The Variation in Time

The essentialist theories of emotions shed some light on the common patterns of behaviour on the battlefields. For example, there is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of soldiers have experienced fear in combat situations. The military organisations recognise that being fearful is a completely normal and expected reaction to the unprecedented violence and horror of battlefields. Contemporary military education devotes a great deal of attention to teaching soldiers how to manage their fear in combat. Most military organisations devise manuals and organise lessons on 'enhancing performance under stress' where the focus is on developing skills and techniques for 'fear inoculation' (Bausman, 2016).

Nevertheless, this has not always been the case. In fact, for much of history the sense of fear was hidden, downplayed, denied or only attributed to the enemy. As Kuijpers and der Haven (2016) show, until the 18th century in Europe fear was almost uniformly depicted as a property of the other. Fear is something that only disgraced enemy soldiers are prone to do whereas one's own comrades would regularly be praised for their bravery and heroism. 'The long tradition of soldiers' writing dictates the communication of fearlessness and other empowering masculine ideals that tend to suppress some emotions: fear, feelings of senselessness, disgust, personal grief, and underscore others such as the love of fatherland, courage and a fighting spirit' (Kuijpers and der Haven 2016:12). For example, diaries of officers and clerks who recorded 16th and early 17th century battles throughout Europe tend as a rule to ascribe fear and horror to the enemy side: 'several thousand [enemy soldiers], induced by great anxiety and fear, had thrown themselves into the river Danube and drowned'. In direct contrast one's own soldiers are depicted as heroic and fearless: 'though his Majesty died like a chevalier, the soldiers were not scared but attacked the enemy like lions, taking their pieces and beating the foe' (Bahr, 2016, p. 53).

This attitude changes from the late 17th to the early 19th century when soldiers gradually start recording their own experiences of the battlefield. One of the first such documents is the memoir of Swiss mercenary Ulrich Bräker where he reflects on the horrors of war and his own dislike and fear of the battlefield (Füssel, 2016). During the 19th and 20th centuries many ordinary soldiers and officers have produced diaries, letters, memoirs and other written evidence of their personal struggles in the theatres of war throughout the word. In many of these records a personal sense of fear features prominently. However, this change in the depiction and understanding of fear was rather gradual, and it was not irreversible as many militaries continued to conceal the realities of war from the future recruits and their families. Even in the early 20th century most military administrators avoided any references to the fear generated in the combat situations or to the long-term emotional effects that the exposure to daily violence had on young soldiers. In this context the concept of shell shock was introduced during WWI to account for situations where soldiers were unable to function properly due to the traumatic experiences of war. The term was used in a vague sense and would include not only posttraumatic stress disorder but also a sense of powerlessness, panic, fear and inability to complete everyday tasks (Hochschild, 2012). This change in attitude

to, and depiction of, fear also went hand in hand with the diversity in the experiences of fear.

Although the great majority of combatants experienced fear through history they did not experience it in the same way, have not shown these feelings to others in identical physical expressions and have managed their sense of fear in many different ways. Even soldiers who experienced tremendous fear one day might act very differently the next day. In the words of a German captain who fought in WWI: 'Soldiers can be brave one day and afraid the next. Soldiers are not machines but human beings who must be led in war. Each one of them reacts differently, therefore each must be handled differently…to sense this and arrive at a correct psychological solution is part of the art of leadership' (von Schell, 2013, p. 24).

Furthermore, the historical record indicates that fear is not only an individual reaction but is an emotional state that is shaped and managed differently by different military organisations. While historically some militaries discouraged, suppressed and even punished any references to fear in the combat zone other militaries were eager to recognise fear as a normal, acknowledge its impact on the battlefield and tried to manage and channel such emotions. In other cases, fear was conceptualised as something that is not located in one's own body but as an external force that can strike unsuspected individuals. For example, until the mid-19th century the New Zealand's Maori warriors associated fear with the actions of spirits. Hence if a soldier exhibits what we would regard as the signs of fear (i.e. shaking, cold sweat etc) before the battle this was interpreted as an indication that the soldier is possessed by *atua* — a spirit which reacts angrily to any breaches of social rules as defined in Maori's canon of rules — *tapu*. This situation could be ameliorated through a specific ritual whereby a possessed warrior is required to crawl between the legs of a Maori woman of high social standing. The ritual cleansing

would be judged as a success if there were no signs of fear in the warrior after the crawl: he would be free of *atua* and ready for the battle. If the signs of fear persist the ritual would be deemed unsuccessful and the warrior would not take part in the battle. At the same time there was no conceptual space for *atua* possessing somebody during the battle — this was thought to be impossible. Thus in the pre-19th century Maori culture there was no room for fear on the battlefield and it seems that the Maori warriors did not experience a sense of fear in combat as fear was understood to be a property of an external force (Plamper, 2017, p. 4).

The historical diversity of fear indicates that this is not a fixed biological given but an emotional reaction that is variable and situational. As Lutz (1988, p. 4) rightly argues the essentialist understandings of emotions that overemphasise the biological universals are too rigid to accommodate a complexity of human emotional reactions. Hence it is necessary to 'deconstruct an overly naturalised and rigidly bounded concept of emotion, to treat emotion as an ideological practice rather than as a thing to be discovered or an essence to be distilled'. Nevertheless, emotional reactions are not just a form of 'ideological practice' but also a product of specific historical changes. As Reddy (2001) argues convincingly the long-term social and political changes regularly coincide with the changes in 'emotional regimes' and as such they establish new norms of emotional life. For example, the French revolution unleashed an unprecedented social transformation that replaced the political, economic and cultural hegemony of aristocracy with the dominance of the new bourgeois rulers. However, this change developed on the back of the changing emotional regimes that by the late 18th century have already affected many non-aristocratic elements of French society. This was well illustrated by the different emotional reactions to crying: 'while tears were frowned upon at Versailles, they were given full reign in the theatres and salons beyond the reach of the court' (Rosenwein, 2010, p. 22).

Although human beings have some universal emotional traits the emotional reactions on the battlefield are not uniform and static. Instead, the inner feelings and behaviours of soldiers are historically variable and highly diverse. In different time periods one can witness very distinct ideas about emotions and also different emotional behaviours. This indicates that the biological foundations of emotional reactions are not transhistorical but something that has been shaped, remoulded and transformed by diverse structural contexts. For example, Scheer (2012) shows how combat motivation has changed historically using different organisational measures ranging from coercive policing, remuneration and compensation to military drill. All these measures have contributed to and have been shaped by the emotional responses of soldiers.

Van Der Haven (2016) and McNeill (1997) identify drill as playing a decisive role in transforming emotions on the battlefield. While McNeill (1997) focuses on the dynamics of rhythmic movements of soldiers produced in the close-order drill which contributes to heightened emotional experiences of 'muscular bonding' van der Haven (2016) explores how collective action of military organisations transform fear into pride. In both cases the emphasis is on the changing historical dynamics of emotional responses on the battlefield. Analysing the 17th century army manuals van der Haven demonstrates how the military commanders were instructed to mould emotional reactions through drill and obedience. For example in the army manuals used in the 17th century French and the Dutch States Army the unquestioned obedience was seen as a precondition for effective social cohesion that would prevent expressions of fear: 'for we have seen a million times that soldiers who never broke their ranks, -and were willing to maintain such order and unity together, never allowing the lines of their battalion be broken-, never went into battle, nor moved without orders, always defeated their enemies sooner or later' (Billon, 1617 in van der Haven, 2016; p. 28). Hence the introduction of drill contributed towards shifting the battlefield behaviour from the traditional, aristocratic, focus on individual heroic deeds towards successful collective action through hierarchical obedience. While the pre-modern aristocratic warriors were concerned with the individualised concepts of honour and shame resulting from their actions on the battlefield the early modern armies attained pride through coordinated collective military action. In addition, the practice of synchronised drilling allowed soldiers to refocus their attention on the details of coordination of their behaviour with others which proved highly beneficial on the battlefield: on the one hand these new, almost automatic skills, helped collective fighting and on the other had by focusing their attention on technical aspects of coordination the feelings of fear were gradually transformed into other emotions.

For McNeill (1997) drill was also important as a mechanism of group bonding that enhanced emotional ties between soldiers. In the 17th Netherlands military units were encouraged to adopt a variety of collective practices including the collective prayer before the battle, sharing a meal with comrades, singing military songs and religious psalms and so on. The group character of daily close-order drills impacts on emotional change in a similar way as these ritualistic practices transform individual behaviour. The experience of regular participation in drills amplifies one's emotional response. As McNeill (1997, p. 2) reflects on his own experience as a soldier in WWII this prolonged everyday collective action of marching in unison with others generates a strong 'muscular bond' where one develops an emotional change: 'A sense of pervasive well-being is what I recall; more specifically, a strange sense of personal enlargement; a sort of swelling out, becoming bigger than life, that's to participation in collective ritual'. This very Durkheimian experience of shared collective excitement stands in opposition to the mostly individualised emotional reactions of traditional aristocratic warfare and indicates clearly that emotions are not fixed but highly diverse and historically changing phenomena.

Nevertheless, drill was not the only social practice that transformed emotional reactions. Another important ritual associated with the regulation of emotional dynamics was duelling. Whereas drill helped regulate fear and anxiety dullening was a practice that managed feelings of honour and shame. Initially duelling was a sole prerogative of aristocracy. This practice dates back to the Middle Ages and the code of chivalry and was prevalent among the European nobility throughout the early modern period. Although the states have tried to ban dulling, this practice still retained popularity in the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, from the 18th century onwards duels have become 'democratised' in a sense that ordinary soldiers would engage in duelling to restore their honour. Despite the official ban and regulations that often-stipulated death penalties for duelling the practice was widely tolerated as many officers understood that duelling was an effective mechanism of social control. More specifically duels helped regulate the dynamics of honour and shame thus maintaining a degree of social cohesion within the military while also exalting the martial values of bravery, respect and willingness to fight till the end. As Berkovich (2016, p. 99) shows ordinary soldiers often imitated their superiors and their duels were governed by the similar informal yet highly influential codes: 'The social pressure to conduct duels was high…Jean Rossignol, who served eight years as a private in Louis XVI's army, describes fighting in no less than ten formal duels, as well as numerous brawls'. The widespread practice of duelling has influenced the emotional dynamics on the battlefield. The soldiers who lost face and were unwilling to restore their honour through duels were shamed and deemed to be cowards. Thus, this historically specific ritual has played a significant role in shaping the emotions of ordinary soldiers, indicating yet again that emotions are not biological givens but highly contextual and dynamic social experiences.

The Variation in Space

The collective emotional experiences do not only change through time, they also exhibit significant cultural variation. Hence not all soldiers act in the same way on the battlefield. John Keegan (1994, p. 12) has already noted that specific cultural practices shape different trajectories of warfare. He questioned the dominant neo-Clausewitzian paradigm which interprets all wars as similar in terms of being an extension of politics by other means and argued that war is 'an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself'. In this context he found enormous differences between the military practices of different societies including Easter Islanders, Mamluks, Zulus, Japanese and the contemporary European armies. He also recognised the importance and cultural variability of emotions on the battlefield. In this context he differentiates between the three types of 'warrior traditions' — the primitive, the Oriental, and the modern 'Western way of war'. In his view the 'primitive war' is 'fed by passions and rancours that do not yield to rational measures of persuasion or control'. Hence, in his view, this war is regulated by ritual practices and: 'once defined rituals have been performed, the contestants shall recognise the fact of their satisfaction and have recourse to conciliation, arbitration and peace-making' (Keegan, 1994, pp. 58, 387). The 'oriental warfare' is associated with horse warriors and steppe nomads who rely on evasion, delay and indirect fighting which for Keegan was important in developing the tradition of military and emotional restraint. The third, modern Western type, developed through face

to face fighting of ancient Greeks and the Christian just war tradition which together with the technological military advancements in the last three centuries have centred on winning wars through the decisive battles (Keegan, 1994).

Keegan was right that the battlefields are defined by different cultural practices and the variety of collective emotional experiences. However, his cultural determinism combined with essentialist and orientalist epistemology have prevented him from articulating a subtle theoretical framework for the analysis of emotional dynamics of the battlefields (Malešević, 2010). Thus, rather than simply assuming that 'each culture' has a singular and homogenous emotional regime on the battlefield it is paramount to recognise that cultural variations also exist within as well as between and outside specific societies. In other words, there is no one way of being a Zulu, Mamluk or 'Westerner' on the battlefield. The collective emotional dynamics is not determined by ethnic, national, religious or geographical categories. Such categories do influence group dynamics on the battlefield, but they are far from being the only social mechanism of emotional responses. Furthermore, the cultural influences are not fixed in time and space, they also change and are shaped by interaction with other groups. Taking all these important caveats into account one can focus on the social and cultural variation in the theatres of war.

The first problem that confronts the biological universalist approaches is the fact that emotions are named and interpreted differently in different cultural settings. For example, what in a contemporary US context is regularly described as sadness caused by depression in a Buddhist social environment the same feeling

is likely to be categorised as suffering. While the former emotional experience is deemed to be negative and as such would call for an intervention and treatment by the medical professionals, the latter would be regarded as a positive emotional reaction that paves the way towards the ultimate form of happiness — nirvana. These cultural values are clearly reflected in the experiences of soldiers on the battlefield. Although Buddhism teaches that it is better to die than kill in war, soldiers can work towards reaching nirvana through suffering on the battlefield (Demieville, 2010, p. 19). In contrast suffering, depression and unhappiness are all seen as emotional problems that need to be rectified when recognised among the contemporary US soldiers.

There are many other examples where the emotional states of individuals are interpreted very differently depending on the cultural context. For example, while in some societies solitude is perceived as normal or even a sign of strength of an individual's character other societies treat loneliness as an emotional deficiency. Whereas self-sufficiency is praised in highly individualised modern societies and reaching happiness within oneself is valued in the Buddhist tradition other cultural contexts treat solitary action as an emotional impediment. As Fajans (1997) shows in her ethnography of Baining of Papua New Guinea solitary life is understood in a highly negative sense where loneliness is associated with hunger. For most Bainings hunger is not a physiological state but an emotional condition and not taking part in the common meal would automatically indicate the lack of sociability which in this worldview is the essence of human survival. In this context fighting in war always entails a collective enterprise and leaving a soldier alone would mean starving him and thus deliberately causing pain.

In some cultural contexts a strong emotional reaction can be regarded as a sign of severe illness while other societies tend to tolerate such change in one's behaviour. In these situations, naming of the emotional response plays a significant role in defining and understanding one's actions. For example, running amok on the battlefield is likely to be interpreted very differently in the Malayan cultural contexts than in the European militaries. This behaviour usually involves an individual who without previous indication of anger would suddenly become enraged and would embark on a rampage of violence or would attempt to kill anyone she meets. The concept of running amok comes from the Malay word meng-âmuk which could be translated as 'to make a furious and desperate charge'. In the traditional Malaysian interpretation such behaviour was a sign that the individual is possessed by an evil tiger spirit (hantu belian) and as such is not responsible for her actions (Hempel et al., 2000). In most contemporary societies this type of emotional frenzy is defined as a serious psychological disorder that requires medical treatment.

The second issue that the biological approaches cannot account for is the cultural variation in the expressions of emotions on the battlefield. While the soldiers often encounter very similar conditions in the theatres of war their emotional and physical responses can differ significantly. In some cultural contexts the horrific experience of the battlefield might provoke fear, anxiety, and panic while in other cultural settings the same experience is likely to generate a sense of excitement, anger, pride, honour or a range of other very different emotional reactions. Furthermore, the same emotions can be expressed differently while the similar physiological gestures could signpost very different emotional reactions. For example, in some societies smile indicates happiness and serenity while in other cultural traditions smile can be associated with shame or ignorance (Krys et al., 2016, Reddy, 2001, p. 101). The same applies to the war situations where some cultural settings are defined by stoic and aloof responses of soldiers to the brutalities of the frontline fighting while in others cultural contexts soldiers show excessive emotional and physiological reactions. Hence many Italian infantry soldiers who fought on the various fronts during the WWI were often overwhelmed by fear and panic during the key battles. As reported by the witnesses many of these young recruits, mostly illiterate peasants, would comply with the orders of their officers but their emotional reactions indicated their sense of horror. The Italian and British sources describe the behaviour of the soldiers during the battle of Isonzo in 1917 in the following terms: 'soldiers advanced crying. They did not rebel: when ordered out of the trenches they obeyed; but went crying'…'most of the men in the trenches were very young…many of them were weeping and some had ice on their face [frozen tears]' (Wilcox, 2012, p. 175). The few literate soldiers who wrote letters or kept diaries record the same emotional responses with the 'long fits of crying' and 'shattered with hunger and sleep — tears fill our eyes, crying like babies' (Wilcox, 2012,

p. 175). In direct contrast when Fulani warriors fight, they exhibit no visible physiological reactions and their emotional responses are very different: 'They fight each other with sticks; when hit by opponents from other clans, they show no emotion in spite of the pain. They are proud of the scars they consequently receive' (Doob, 1981, p. 35).

The third phenomenon that further challenges the simple biological universalist explanations of emotional dynamics is the cultural difference in emotional expression. In other words, the emotional reactions of soldiers tend to be culturally specific. For example, although most human beings express pain and grief when somebody close to them dies the grieving process is culturally diverse. Whereas in European societies grief and loss are associated with gloomy posture, sombre behaviour, or crying and weeping, in other cultural settings grieving involves other emotional and physical reactions. For instance, in some parts of Bali laughter is a part of the grieving process. As Wikan (1989, p. 297) ethnographic study indicates losing a close family member is often associated with jokes and giggles. Following a funeral of one's fiancé the grieving friends and relatives, including the 'poised and bright' partner of the deceased gathered around their shared photos and started laughing. They all agreed with the comment from the one of the grievers: 'This was nothing to be sad about! The boy was dead, so what would be the use? Where one stick is broken, another grows… No use grieving over one. Go on, be happy, let bygones be bygones! The world is bigger than a kelor leaf!'. These different cultural framings of emotional displays are just as visible on the battlefield. Some cultural contexts allow soldiers to express a full range of emotions while in other cultural settings the battlefield is firmly framed through the limited and regulated emotional experiences. As Barkawi (2017, p. 156) demonstrates in his analysis of Indian armies under British control during the WWII most Indian recruits had to be trained in a very different emotional regime than British officers associated with the proper soldering. Hence 'instructors had to teach recruits forms of self-control and mastery of their emotions in these excruciating situations'. In many instances the British officers relied on shame to mould young and inexperienced recruits into a fully-fledged military force. In this context they utilised the caste divisions, gender and age differences to demean those who resisted or were reluctant to fight for the British empire: 'the instructors came out to harangue the trainees for being weak, childish, feminine, and unable to control themselves. Sometimes the trainees would be made to put on saris, i.e. women's clothes, to emphasise the point' (Barkawi, 2017, p. 156).

There is no doubt that shaming soldiers using hard patriarchal categories of masculinity and femininity is something that is present throughout the world. This practice has been identified in different cultural settings. However, there is still a strong element of difference in how precisely battlefields are gendered and how soldiers' emotional reactions frame their sense of masculinity. For example, the actions of both British and Italian recruits during WWI were strongly associated with typical 20th century notions of masculinity such as virility, courage and determination. Nevertheless, as Wilcox (2012, p. 175) argues the soldiers emotional expressions were rather different in a sense that while many UK soldiers subscribed to 'the British working-class model of stoical endurance' including 'an assumption of confidence in the outcome of war, rather than indifference or doubt' the masculinity of many Italian soldiers was defined by 'peasant endurance and the capacity for silent suffering' regardless of the war outcome. Hence while both the Italian and British soldiers would express similar emotional responses associated with one's strong sense of manhood the social sources of these emotional displays would in fact be very different.

None of this is to say that the cultural framing of emotions is fixed and inflexible or that it does not change in time. On the contrary cultural difference is influential precisely because it can change different cultural contexts and also be changed by other cultural practices. The scholars of the French revolution have demonstrated convincingly how the cult of sensibility inaugurated and promoted by the leaders of the revolution has gradually permeated different social strata in France and has also impacted on the emotional responses of French soldiers during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (Germani, 2016; Reddy, 2001). The cult of sentimentalism was in part built on the notion that 'nature was the well-spring of authentic, patriotic emotion' and the revolutionary leaders propagated the idea that one should differentiate between the nature as 'a blind, natural force and nature as a moral imperative' (Germani, 2016, p. 187). Drawing on Rousseau's view of the collective will the revolutionaries rejected the traditional aris-

tocratic concepts of fighting for one's family and king and in this process transformed the notion of filial attachments into a sense of moral obligation towards the community of equals: 'The heroism of revolutionary soldiers represented the triumph of the moral individual over natural man, a triumph made possible only because of a regenerative revolution' (Germani, 2016, pp. 187–188). In a similar way the 19th century Russian military practice was significantly influenced by teachings of Mikhail Dragomirov who was a general and a military writer responsible for the doctrine of what Plamper (2009) calls 'controlled berserkerdom'. This doctrine centred on the idea of channeling fear into a military virtue of self-sacrifice through denial. Dragomirov played a key role in the reorganisation of the military education system in Russia which under his influence promoted this idea of self-denial as the ultimate military virtue. Relying on drill and the training of obedience the Russian soldiers were taught to focus on self-denial as an 'effective antidote to fear'. These new military principles had some impact on changing the existing emotional regime within the Russian military thus indicating that flexibility of cultural frames (Plamper, 2009).

CONCLUSION

The soldiers often emphasise that combat is a profoundly emotional experience. As an Iraqi war US veteran Phil Klay (2014, pp. 42–43) writes in his memoir *Redeployment*: 'Somebody said combat is 99 percent sheer boredom and 1 percent pure terror. They weren't an MP in Iraq. On the roads I was scared all the time. Maybe not pure terror… But a kind of low-grade terror that mixes with boredom. So, it's 50 percent boredom and 49 percent normal terror, which is a general feeling that you might die at any second and that everybody in this country wants to kill you. Then, of course, there's the 1 percent pure terror, when your heart rate skyrockets, and your vision closes in and your hands are white, and your body is humming. You can't think. You're just an animal, doing what you've been trained to do. And then you go back to normal terror, and you go back to being a human, and you go back to thinking.' Fighting in war generates strong emotional reactions where fear and anxiety often mix with rage, anger, shame, honour, sadness, guilt, pride, elation and joy. The conventional interpretations emphasise that human psychological and physiological reactions on the battlefield are universal in a sense that similar emotions are triggered by similar external stimuli and thus all soldiers are likely to experience the same emotional reactions in the combat zone. In this article I have questioned this biological determinism arguing that emotional reactions on the battlefields are highly diverse and situationally flexible. More specifically the article advances an argument that although most human beings are regularly affected by the exceptional circumstances of the battlefields their emotional responses are rarely uniform. Taking part in the theatres of war is likely to enact the physiological and psychological changes in most soldiers. However, cross-cultural and historical research indicates that almost identical situations of close-range violence can generate very different individual and collective emotional dynamics. Hence emotions cannot be reduced

to physiology and rather than being 'triggered' by external stimuli emotional changes are largely shaped by historical and cultural forces. There are no emotional essences which are detached from their historical and cultural contexts. Instead all emotional responses are embedded in specific social situations. This is not to say that biology does not matter but only that physiological responses are only part of the picture where they together with the wider cultural and historical dynamics shape the emotional reactions in the combat zone.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

REFERENCES

Bahr, A. 2016. Magical Swords and Heavenly Weapons: Battlefield Fear(lessness) in the Seventeenth Century. In: Kuijpers, E. and C. der Haven (eds) *Battlefield Emotions 1500–1800: Practices, Experience, Imagination*. London: Palgrave.

Barkawi, T. 2017. *Soldiers of Empire: Indian and British Armies in World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bausman, C. 2016. *U. S. Military Methods for Fear Inoculation*. https://mtntactical.com/research/u-s-military-methods-fear-inoculation/

Baker, M. 1982 Nam: *The Vietnam War in the Words of the Men and Women Who Fought There*. New York: Morrow.

Beevor, A. 2009. *D-Day: The Battle for Normandy*. London: Penguin.

Berkovich, I. 2016. Fear, Honour and Emotional Control on the Eighteenth-Century Battlefield. In: Kuijpers, E. and C. der Haven (eds) *Battlefield Emotions 1500–1800: Practices, Experience, Imagination*. London: Palgrave.

Blake, J. (1970). The Organisation as Instrument of Violence: The Military Case. *Sociological Quarterly* 11: 331–350.

Bourke, J. 2000. *An Intimate History of Killing*. London: Granta.

Burleigh, M. 2011. *Moral Combat: A History of World War II*. New York: HarperCollins.

Caputo, P. 1977. *A Rumour of War*. New York: Ballantine.

Collins, R. 2008. *Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

De Man, H. 1920. *The Remaking of a Mind*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Demiéville, P. (2010). 'Buddhism and War.' In: M. K. Jerryson and M. Juergensmeyer (eds.), *Buddhist Warfare*. Oxford: Oxford University

du Picq, A. (2006) [1903]. *Battle Studies*. New York: Bibliobazar.

Fajans, J. 1997. *They Make Themselves: Work and Play among the Baining of Papua New Guinea*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fussel, M. 2016. Emotions in the Making: The Transformation of Battlefield Experiences during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). In: Kuijpers, E. and C. der Haven (eds) *Battlefield Emotions 1500–1800: Practices, Experience, Imagination*. London: Palgrave.

Germani, I. 2016. Mediated Battlefields of the French Revolution and Emotives at Work. In: Kuijpers, E. and C. der Haven (eds) *Battlefield Emotions 1500–1800: Practices, Experience, Imagination*. London: Palgrave.

Goldstein, J.S. 2001. *War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grossman D. 1996. *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Hempel A. A., Levine R. D., Meloy J. D., Westermeyer J. D. 2000. Cross-cultural review of sudden mass assault by a single individual in the oriental and occidental cultures. *Journal of Forensic Sciences*. 45 (3): 582–588

Hochschild, A. 2012. *To End all Wars — a story of loyalty and rebellion,* 1914–1918. New York: Mariner Books.

Holmes, R. 1985. *Acts of War*. New York: Free Press.

Homer 2017. *Iliad*. London: Vintage Classics.

Houghton, F. 2019. *The Veterans' Tale: British Military Memoirs of the Second World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

James, F. 2009. William Calley Makes First Public Apology for Vietnam War's My Lai Massacre. *NPR Newsletter* https://www.npr.org/

Junger, S. 2010. *War*. New York: Grand Central.

Jünger, E. 2016 [1920] *Storm of Steel*. London: Penguin.

Keegan, J. 1994. A History of Warfare. New York: Random House.

King, A. 2011. *The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Klein, C. 2016. *Instinct Combat Shooting*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

Klay, P. 2014. *Redeployment*. London: Penguin.

Krys, K at al. 2016. Be Careful Where You Smile: Culture Shapes Judgments of Intelligence and Honesty of Smiling Individuals. *Journal of Nonverbal Behaviour*. 40:101–116.

Kuijpers, E. and C. der Haven 2016. Battlefield

Emotions 1500–1800: Practices, Experience, Imagination. In: Kuijpers, E. and C. der Haven (eds) *Battlefield Emotions 1500–1800: Practices, Experience, Imagination*. London: Palgrave.
Levi, P. 1995. *If Not Now, When?* London: Penguin.
Litz, B et al 2009. Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A Preliminary Model and Intervention Strategy. *Clinical Psychology Review* 29(8):695–706.
Lutz, C. 1988. *Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Malešević, S. 2010. *The Sociology of War and Violence*. *Cambridge*: Cambridge University Press.
Malešević, S. 2017. *The Rise of Organised Brutality: A Historical Sociology of Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Malešević, S. 2020. The Act of Killing: Understanding the Emotional Dynamics of Violence on the Battlefield. *Critical Military Studies*. 10.1080/23337486.2019.1673060
Mann, M. 2019. Fear, Loathing, and Moral Qualms on the Battlefield. *Thesis Eleven*, 154 (1): 11–27.
Marlantes, K. 2011. *What it is Like to Go to War*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.
Marshall, S.L.A. 1947. *Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command*. New York: Morrow.
McManus, J. 2007. *The Deadly Brotherhood: The American Combat Soldier in World War II*. New York: Random House.
McNeill, W. 1997. *Keeping together in time. Dance and Drill in the human history*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Moynihan, M. 1980. *Greater Love. Letters Home* 1914–1918. London: W. H. Allen.
Munson, C 2016. *Battlefield Commission*. Bloomington, IN: Author House.
Shey. J. 2014. Moral Injury. *Psychoanalytic Psychology*. 31 (2): 182–191.
Skelly, J. (2006) Iraq, Vietnam, and the dilemmas of United States soldiers. *Open Democracy*. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/iraq_vietnam_3588jsp/
Pettegrew, J. 2015. *Light It Up: The Marine Eye for Battle in the War for Iraq*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Plamper, J. 2009. Emotional Turn? Feelings in Russian History and Culture. Introduction. *Slavic Review,* 68(2), pp. 229–237.
Plamper, J. 2017. *History of Emotions: An Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reddy, W. 2001. *The Navigation of Feeling*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosenwein, B. 2010. *Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions Passion in Context*. https://www.passionsincontext.de/uploads/media/01_Rosenwein.pdf
Scheer, M. 2012. Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (and Is That What Makes Them Have a History)? A Bourdieuan Approach to Understanding Emotion. *History and Theory* 51(2):193–220.
Spiller, R. 1988. S. L. A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire. *RUSI Journal,* 133(4): 63–71.
Stouffer, SA et al 1949. *The American Soldier*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
van der Haven, C. 2016. Drill and Allocution as Emotional Practices in Seventeenth-century Dutch Poetry, Plays and Military Treatises. In: Kuijpers, E. and C. der Haven (eds) *Battlefield Emotions 1500–1800: Practices, Experience, Imagination*. London: Palgrave.
von Schell, A. 2013. *Battle Leadership*. Brattleboro, VT: Echo Point Books.
Wikan, U. 1989. Managing the Heart to Brighten Face and Soul: Emotions in Balinese Morality and Health Care. *American Ethnologist* 16 (2): 294–312.
Wilcox, V. 2012. 'Weeping tears of blood': Exploring Italian soldiers' emotions in the First World War. *Modern Italy*. 17(2): 171–184.

SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL "NEWSLETTER ON THE RESULTS OF SCHOLARLY WORK IN SOCIOLOGY, CRIMINOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE"

Anschrift:
Neuwiehler Str. 33, D-51674 Wiehl

Telefon: +49 (0)151 54284669
E-Mail: hello@sci-result.de

Geschäftsführer:
Sergej Engelmann

Verantwortlicher gem. §55 Abs. 2 RStV: Sergej Engelmann

Ust: 212/5052/2947

www.sci-result.de

https://doi.org/10.61439/RSW39510