

The Problem of Categorization of the Geopolitical Status of the State in Modern Geopolitics

Dr. Nataliia Lepska

Zaporizhzhia National University

✉ Email: lepskanv@gmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6010-423X>

Abstract

The following paper represents the review of the geopolitical status of the state as a category of geopolitics. The author introduces the comprehension dynamics of the geopolitical status of the state in the theories of classical geopolitics and modern researchers. The paper emphasizes the difficulties in categorizing the geopolitical status of the state as a subject of power distribution/redistribution, its resources and functions in the multidimensional geopolitical space. The concept of ‘geopolitical status of the state’ is clarified through an analysis of related concepts of ‘social status’, ‘legal status’, ‘political status’, as well as operationalization of the notion of ‘geopolitical space’. The author remarks with regard to the geopolitical status of the state, on the one hand, it structurally regulates the role configuration of the world order and allows the states to participate more effectively in the global competition. At the same time, on the other hand, it is often used as a manipulative technology in fixing the asymmetry of power relations between states in the ‘dominance – subordination’ format, as well as a technology of geopolitical stigmatization of states in their subjective marginalization.

Keywords

geopolitics, status, subject of geopolitics, world order, geopolitical space, geopolitical status of the state.

Introduction

The statement of the problem in general terms and the current state of its study, along with its relevance to significant scientific and practical objectives, revolve around the intricate and conflicting global transformations that have unfolded over recent decades (Bazilian et al., 2013; see also Balsa-Barreiro et al., 2019; Carr, 2020; Griffiths, 2019; Wallace et al., 2011).

These transformations are intricately linked to the fundamental reshaping of the architecture of the global geopolitical realm (Browning, 2018; Hobson & Lynch, 2016; Hughes, 2016; Overland, 2019). The foundation of this realm was established by the Westphalian system and subsequently fine-tuned through various modifications. Consequently, it is unsurprising that geopolitics, with its spatial lens focused on deciphering the patterns, principles, and mechanisms governing the distribution and redistribution of power within the geopolitical arena, is increasingly garnering attention from the academic and expert communities vested in global political matters (Alami & Dixon, 2020; Laketa, 2019; Myers, 2013; Robin & Acuto, 2018; Watanabe, 2018). With the onset of active digitalization, the vector of this research has also moved into this field (Bronk, 2015; Harris, 2020).

During the latter part of the 20th century, a degree of skepticism surrounded geopolitics. Its scientific validity was questioned, and it was often relegated to the realm of journalism. Even the core object of its study - the geopolitical space - was met with significant doubt, accused of being enshrouded in mystification, ideological bias, and even occultism. This skepticism stemmed partly from its controversial association with Nazism. Karl Haushofer, one of the founders of the German classical school of geopolitics, had certain ties to the National Socialist movement, though he was not a member of the NSDAP (Barnes & Abrahamsson, 2015). Haushofer played a pivotal role in institutionalizing geopolitics in Germany during the 1920s, but he became disillusioned in the late 1930s due to the distortion of his theories and their exploitation to advance the doctrine of Nazi expansionism. In the post-war era, geopolitics experienced a gradual resurgence and reclaimed its place within the spectrum of political sciences (Granieri, 2015). The theoretical, analytical, and applied tools of geopolitics were increasingly employed to substantiate strategies for the development of the global geopolitical landscape. Today, quite a few analytical works address the history of geopolitical ideas and events (Craggs, 2018; see also Brennetot, 2015; Korf & Rowan, 2020; Szulecki, 2015). Given the current environment characterized by rapid and transformative changes in the global order, there arises an imperative of a new discourse (Black, 2019; Last, 2015; Dalby, 2013; Scholten et al., 2020; Sharp, 2013). We need to reevaluate conventional geopolitical categories and cultivate novel ones. These categories form the bedrock of both the scientific and perceptual paradigms of geopolitics, shaping the comprehension of modern geopolitical necessities within the evolving framework of the global order.

The conventional categories of geopolitics, such as "thalassocracy," "tellurocracy," "heartland," "rimland," "living space," "expansion," and others, now constitute the mainstream of geopolitical inquiry in both theoretical and applied domains. Among these, the concept of a state's geopolitical status holds particular scientific interest (Larson & Shevchenko, 2019; Khong, 2019; Murray, 2018; Paul et al., 2014; Renshon, 2017). The state, serving as a pivotal subject of geopolitical interactions, is being examined not solely within the methodological framework of "geopolitics of the state," but rather as an integral component of "the state in geopolitical space."

Methodology

In the present geopolitical landscape, all existing states that engage within this sphere and operate using its resources embody some form of geopolitical status. This notion has become so prevalent in expert and analytical discourse that its scientific essence is often overlooked. In reality, the classification of geopolitical status of the state (hereafter referred to as GSS) poses considerable challenges. A universally accepted set of criteria for evaluating a state's power, the attributes that indicate its multifaceted strength, enabling it to secure a particular

standing in the hierarchical system of international relations, is yet to be established within scientific literature. At a cursory glance, ranking states according to their GSS could be influenced by factors such as their resource potential (physical-geographical, demographic, economic, military-technological, scientific-technical resources), their capacity for proactive foreign policy engagement (participation in international organizations and security structures, diplomatic initiatives, etc.), their reputation and image, and an array of other considerations. It is precisely the diversity of criteria in defining GSS and the inherently abstract nature of the concept that impede its theoretical formulation and practical application.

To address this issue scientifically, we have conceptualized the geopolitical status of the state by employing a systematic approach and categorical analysis. The comprehensive examination of the geopolitical status of the state is conducted within the systemic framework of “the state in geopolitical space.” Here, space is depicted as an organizational “superstructure” above the territory, encompassing intricate interstate relations and interactions across various levels (geographical, economic, informational, cultural, etc.) within the global geopolitical space. Consequently, a intricate framework of spatial development and systematically structured multi-level interactions among geopolitical actors is established. This pertains to the distribution or redistribution of geopolitical resources, along with alterations in the forms and extents of power control over them.

Drawing upon this systemic comprehension of geopolitical space, we have systematically analyzed the categorical aspects of the geopolitical status of the state. By examining the concept of “status” through the lenses of state and law theory, sociology, and political science, and considering pertinent advancements in geopolitics theory, we have put forth a conceptual definition for the geopolitical status of the state. The application of categorical analysis afforded us the chance to view the GSG as both a political and legal stance of the state, along with its role within the global spatial-geopolitical system. In light of diverse forms of state geopolitical behavior, we identified the following: geopolitical driverism, geopolitical conformism, geopolitical indifferentism, geopolitical clientelism, and geopolitical autarkism.

The utilization of the system approach and categorical analysis enabled us to perceive the geopolitical status of the state as a multifaceted integrative phenomenon. On one hand, states employ geopolitical status to construct the actual power distribution within the global order. Conversely, geopolitical status is frequently employed as a tool for geopolitical stigmatization by states, contributing to increased asymmetry in the world architecture and undermining its foundations.

Results

The conceptualization of a state’s geopolitical status is a nuanced undertaking, involving theoretical operationalization. Employing a systematic approach and the method of categorical analysis, this study has yielded a definition for the geopolitical status of a state. It is construed as the political and legal stance of the state and its role within the global spatial and geopolitical system. This position is shaped by the aggregate power of the state, its geopolitical subjectivity, and the extent of its geopolitical expansion. In the contemporary context of evolving world orders, the primary objective for most developed nations is the formulation and execution of effective competitive strategies, aiming to enhance their geopolitical subjectivity. Consequently, the attainment of a specific geopolitical status by a state holds a dual significance.

Geopolitical status, as a comprehensive and transformative characteristic of a state’s geopolitical competitiveness, establishes specific coordinates within the global architecture. The status of states shapes their power configuration, determining their potential capabili-

ties and prospects for participating in shaping the global agenda and balancing power in the geopolitical space. Different geopolitical statuses enable states to employ various geopolitical technologies to varying degrees, securing support for their national interests and international projects. Higher geopolitical status implies greater expansionist potential in the development of a multilevel geopolitical space.

However, geopolitical status is often utilized by states for both geopolitical hegemonization and geopolitical marginalization. In the former, a state positions itself as a global leader, influencing others to submit to its normative force. In the latter, a stronger state may stigmatize a weaker one, using terms like "rogue state" or "failed state," leading to discrimination and relegation to the margins of global development. Our ongoing research aims to address the complexities of modern geopolitical statuses, offering detailed characterization and systematic representation based on the current geopolitical landscape.

Discussion

Contemporary investigations into the phenomenon of "geopolitical status" remain somewhat cursory and fragmentary. Despite its active integration into geopolitical discussions, the theoretical foundation for examining GSS predominantly relies on the intellectual legacy of traditional geopolitical pioneers. These early theorists of geopolitics notably emphasized elucidating the geopolitical stance of a state in order to legitimize their theories and substantiate the imperative for expanding the state's living space. Friedrich Ratzel, a German anthropogeographer and ethnologist often regarded as the "father" of geopolitics and the founder of its continental paradigm, characterized the state's essential attributes based on its territory, location, capacity to adapt to its environment, and its potential for territorial expansion. An undeniable contribution of F. Ratzel (1897) lies in his establishment of seven fundamental laws of expansion, which retain relevance today as imperatives governing the spatial growth of states and the configuration of the global order. Ratzel also differentiated states based on their inclination towards land or sea civilization, a distinction that delineates the profitability and prospects of their living space (Barua, 2018; Chiantera-Stutte, 2018; Murphy, 2018).

Continuing the legacy of Ratzel's theory, the Swedish geographer, historian, statesman, and originator of the term "geopolitics," Johan Rudolf Kjellén (1930), formulated an innovative framework for comprehending the state. This framework extended far beyond the conventional purview of jurisprudence, encompassing the organization and operation of the state in all its dimensions, particularly its power. Of particular significance is Kjellén's concept of the state's "power," which can be perceived as a precursor to categorizing the geopolitical status of a state. He posited that the state incessantly seeks expansion to secure its existence, and its success hinges on its strength rather than merely adherence to the law (Kjellén, 1930).

Kjellén outlined five essential characteristics that illustrate the expression of state power, which can be articulated as follows: (a) state as population; (b) state as society; (c) state as geographic entity; (d) state as economic entity; and (e) state as governing body. Central to this notion is the idea that the management of force is the nucleus of the state's civilizing role. Through purposeful and autonomous action, the state endeavors to transcend the dominance of nature. Within his framework of state power, Kjellén introduced the concepts of "world" powers (e.g., Great Britain, USA, Russia, Germany) and "great" powers (e.g., France, Japan, Austria-Hungary, Italy). He argued that a state's strategic potential is determined by the unique amalgamation of three spatial factors: expansion of territory, territorial coherence, and freedom of movement. According to Kjellén, only the USA, among all world powers, demonstrates the maximum manifestation of all three factors.



Figure 1. Johan Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922) (left)

Figure 2. Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947) (right)

Halford John Mackinder, a prominent British geographer and politician who played a foundational role in the Anglo-Saxon maritime paradigm of geopolitics, established the groundwork for geostrategy as a practical geopolitical thinker. He introduced the concept of the “Heartland,” which roughly corresponds to the geographical area of Russia (Mackinder, 1904; see also Fettweis, 2015; Hochberg & Sloan, 2017; Sloan, 2020). The Heartland is a strategically crucial pivot point for exerting control over the entire world. It signifies a state’s dominant position and recognition of its leadership role in terms of strategic significance, representing a key hallmark of geopolitical status. Another influential figure, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan of the United States Navy, outlined a set of criteria for analyzing a state’s position or geopolitical status (Mahan, 1890; see also Lane & Pretes, 2020). These criteria encompass factors such as geographical location and access to the seas, the configuration of coastlines and the presence of ports crucial for trade and strategic defense, territorial extent, population size, national character, and political governance. Similar to the classic geopolitical theorists, Mahan framed the world order in terms of the duality between land and sea powers. He emphasized that strong maritime states, with the United States foremost among them, hold superior geopolitical positions due to their maritime orientation, enabling them to potentially dominate global affairs and counter continental powers.




Figure 3. Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) (left)

Figure 4. Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943) (right)

Nicholas Spykman, a significant figure in the development of the ideology of Atlanticism and classical realism within American international relations theory, served as the first director of the Yale Institute of International Studies. Building on Mahan's theory, Spykman delineated ten criteria for assessing a state's geopolitical power. These criteria encompass territory size and layout, border characteristics (natural, artificial, land, sea), population, mineral resource potential, economic and technological advancement, financial strength, and geopolitical status. The cumulative result of evaluating these factors determines a state's geopolitical capabilities. States with a high geopolitical status tend to score close to maximum across these indicators. If a state's overall assessment of geopolitical capabilities falls short, it often compels the state to integrate into a larger strategic alliance, relinquishing a portion of its sovereignty to enhance its strategic position (Spykman, 1944).

Without delving into a comprehensive review of the theories proposed by all the major figures in geopolitics, let us focus on characterizing the ideas put forth by the founders of the Tellurocratic ("power of the Land") and Thalassocratic ("power of the Sea") paradigms. It is evident that in the geopolitics of Sir Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947), the concept of "geopolitical location/position" of a state is emphasized more than the notion of "geopolitical status," even though status is being conceptualized. The discussion primarily revolves around the geographical determination of the global geopolitical configuration. Addressing status necessitates consideration of factors beyond the physical and geographical, which N. Spykman sought to highlight.

Contemporary geopolitics theorists now emphasize the "expansion" of the scope of the geopolitical status category, extending beyond its geographical dimension. For instance, as industrial development progressed, economic space emerged, and in the post-industrial era,

informational space manifested, encompassing information-cybernetic and information-ideological dimensions. Natalia Komleva's typology of spaces is particularly comprehensive, touching on various facets of modern geopolitics, such as world order, expansion, geospace, and a state's geopolitical status (Komleva, 2012). In the realm of analyzing the influence of status on international processes, several scholars have honed in on specific components of a state's geopolitical status. Esteemed researchers in modern geopolitics and international relations theory, including Z. Brzezinski (2000), G. Kissinger (2014), R. Keohane (2003), G. Modelski et al. (2007), J. Nye (2011), R. Haass (2007), F. Fukuyama (2018), N. Chomsky (2012), and others, have delved into these issues.

In the post-Soviet academic community, figures such as S. Vasilenko (Vasylenko & Vasylenko, 2007), K. Gadzhiev (2014), A. Galchinsky (2002), M. Dnistriansky (2010), N. Kapitonenko (2015), F. Rudich (2009), R. Slivka (2015), O. Tynyanova (2011), L. Fartushniak (2015), B. Shaptalov (2009), and more have dedicated their works to the realm of world politics. Their research often centers on topics like global leadership and dominance, the world order and states' positions within it, global instability, and states' images. Furthermore, they explore the state's role as a geopolitical actor in shaping goals, means, and resources for developing geopolitical space across its various levels.

However, the core question concerning the fundamental nature of a state's geopolitical status, along with a reevaluation of its functional significance, remains unaddressed. As a result, the primary objective of this article is to comprehensively examine the concept of the "geopolitical status of the state." This analysis will encompass both theoretical and practical dimensions, situated within the broader context of the "state in geopolitical space."

Before delving into the discussion of a state's geopolitical status, it is imperative to establish a clear understanding of the term "status." The term "status," derived from the Latin word "status" meaning position or state of an entity, refers to a collection of rights and obligations that define the legal standing of an individual, organization, institution, etc. across various contexts (Efremova, 2006). Within the realm of humanities and social sciences literature, the concept of "status" encompasses multifaceted definitions. In sociology, it signifies the position or role of an individual or group within a social system, determined by a range of economic, professional, ethnic, and other characteristics specific to that particular societal framework (Kravchenko, 2002).

From the standpoint of legal and political theory, the state represents a sovereign entity, officially acting on behalf of its society both domestically and on the international stage in relations with other states. Consequently, the legal status of a state is established through two parallel systems: domestic law and international law. A state must possess both a general and specific legal status. The general legal status is shaped by the tenets (rights and responsibilities) of its constitution within its own legal framework, while in the sphere of international law, it is shaped by the norms (rights and responsibilities) of the international community that apply universally to all participating states.

The distinct characteristic of a state as a subject of international law lies not only in its possession of rights and obligations under international law but also in its capacity to partake in the formulation of international norms and principles. As a result, each state holds a shared general international legal status. However, a state's specific legal status depends on the unique and diverse legal relationships in which it engages, both within its own borders and on the global stage. It is insightful to adopt the concept of the "legal status of the state," which encapsulates the combination of general (domestic and international) legal status and specific legal statuses arising from the state's participation in legal relationships. The clarity and stability of a state's legal status, as governed by domestic law norms, positively impact its international legal standing, fostering credibility, and offering ample opportunities for collaboration with other states (Skakun, 2000).

To synthesize the concept of status, a comprehensive definition can be formulated: it denotes a position within a specific framework of social relations, occupied by an entity within an existing hierarchical system. It encompasses a set of rights, obligations, and subsequently responsibilities, determining the legal stance of an individual, public or international organization, governmental body, and indeed the state itself. From the realm of political science, the term "state" (derived from the Latin "status," meaning position or state) refers to a unified political organization of society situated within a particular territory, with its governing authorities possessing the exclusive right to centralized control and utilization of coercive measures. Consequently, based on this definition, the political status of a state characterizes its political standing, primarily in terms of power and resource capacities, as it engages in intra-political and interstate relations. Identifying attributes of a state's political status encompass aspects such as the nature of its political regime, power sovereignty, the legality and legitimacy of its entire governance structure, the extent and scale of state property, its legal position, and universal international legal persona.

Given the context of our article, where we explore geopolitical status within the comprehensive framework of "state in geopolitical space," it becomes essential to clarify the concept of geopolitical space. Our prior publications have been dedicated to the analysis of spatial elements in geopolitics (Lepska, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; 2018a; 2018b). Within the scope of this article, it is pertinent to emphasize that state development corresponds to the spatial organization of territories. Spaces, including geopolitical ones, emerge when states transition from extensive territorial development to intensive forms, and natural and political boundaries fail to confine state actions.

As articulated by Nikolay Kosolapov, space represents a component of the organizational superstructure over a territory, where specific spatial forms and relations are established on a regular basis, fostering a comprehensive utilization of the territory for the benefit of humanity, society, and the state (Strezhnev, 2011). As such, space is not merely "flat" but possesses "volumetric" characteristics. On one hand, it encompasses the territory as a physical and geographical reality, often quantitatively expressed, thereby constituting the foundational geographical level of geopolitical space. On the other hand, space is qualitative in nature, evolving through the inclusion of new levels resulting from society's and the state's dynamic influence on the basic geographical level, ultimately shaping a "subject-object" system within the spatial domain.

Within the global world system, intricate interactions occur between states and non-state entities, influencing the development of geopolitical global space. This complex dynamic gives rise to a more intricate spatial development structure denoted as "subject-subject-object" (SSO). Consequently, geopolitical space is not a static characteristic solely determined by a state's territorial and geographical parameters, but a dynamic, integrative phenomenon shaped by multi-level, intricately organized interrelations and interactions of SSO nature. These interactions involve various aspects, including the distribution and redistribution of geopolitical resources and changes in the forms and extents of power control over these resources. Such an understanding of geopolitical space is pivotal as the state's status within it is a multifaceted phenomenon.

A concept of geopolitical status of the state developed by N. Komleva seems particularly comprehensive and deserving of attention. Komleva defines the geopolitical status of a state as its position within the hierarchy of states during a specific era, determined by its overall power and the scope of its geopolitical expansion. Power, in this context, constitutes an integral feature of a state, signifying its competitive capabilities within the geopolitical arena – its practical potential for expansion across various spatial dimensions. Geopolitical expansion pertains to the enlargement of space, serving as a primary goal and principal type of geopo-

litical conduct for actors of diverse nature. Conversely, the contraction of geopolitical space occurs when it diminishes and contracts (Komleva, 2010).

However, we find the characterization of the geopolitical status of a state as merely a position within a hierarchy of states to be somewhat simplistic. Associating status with a place implies a sense of stability and fixity. Yet, the dynamics of geopolitical space stem from the active engagements of geopolitical actors in geospace resource development. States, as primary agents in geopolitics, possess rights and obligations governed by international law. They concurrently play roles in geospace development within the constantly evolving framework of the global order.

V. Baranekov, in his discussion of legal status, defines it as the “role position” that a subject occupies in legal relationships, a certain level of legal position development, the attainment of which brings about a significant transformative change and the emergence of a new legal state (Baranekov, 2008). In the context of delineating a state’s geopolitical status, it is beneficial to draw a parallel with this operationalization of legal status. The geopolitical status of a state within the geopolitical system and the global order can be seen as the state’s role within this system, its behavior. The aggregation of roles that a state plays – such as peacemaker, negotiator, transit state, stabilizer, or enforcer – constitutes its role system. While these geopolitical roles are frequently informal, they can sometimes be formalized within international legal documents. Among various forms of a state’s geopolitical behavior, underlying corresponding geopolitical statuses and roles, several can be identified: geopolitical “driverism” (proactively influencing geopolitical processes), geopolitical conformism (adapting to and accepting geopolitical realities without will to change them), geopolitical indifferentism (detachment from geopolitical realities), geopolitical clientelism (subservience to a geopolitical leader, dependence on them), and geopolitical “autarkism” (deliberate self-sufficiency).

When referring to states as geopolitical subjects, it is important to emphasize that we are discussing sovereign states. In theory, all sovereign states possess equal rights, freedoms, and opportunities in global geopolitical space. However, in practice, the degree of a state’s geopolitical agency varies, fundamentally determined by its geopolitical potential (resource base), and under specific geopolitical circumstances, it is converted or remains unconverted into the state’s geopolitical power and its capacity for geopolitical expansion.

In conclusion, building on the understanding of geopolitical status elucidated by N. Komleva, we can propose the following definition: it signifies the state’s political and legal position along with its role within the global spatial-geopolitical system. This positioning is shaped by the state’s overall power, its geopolitical agency, and the scope of its geopolitical expansion. Geopolitical status is contingent on the degree of a state’s genuine sovereignty, its capacity to independently manage and develop its resource potential, and its capability to bolster its power not only within existing levels of geopolitical space but also to proactively anticipate innovative scientific and technological trends that could shape its future and secure leadership positions. F. Ratzel’s statement that the state’s choice of a vital-spatial concept and how it extends its vital space are of utmost importance remains strikingly relevant.

Certainly, the geopolitical status of states varies, leading to an asymmetry in the configuration of the geopolitical landscape. It is important to underscore that the concept of geopolitical status can encompass both objective indicators, such as economy, military strength, population, and territory, as well as subjective indicators like the authority of the government, state sovereignty, and strategic direction. The assessment of these indicators is often the task of experts. The process of a state acquiring a certain status is intricate and grounded in empirical evaluation, involving competitive rivalry between states. The outcome of this process might be informally recognized through rankings of states, often without formal documentation, or it could be articulated in certain international legal documents. However, obtaining unconditional legitimacy recognized by all members of the global community might be a challenge.

It is plausible that a state systematically pursuing geopolitical dominance could establish a reputation as a global leader and advocate for the status of a superpower. States following a similar geopolitical path might acknowledge this status. Nevertheless, competitors and adversaries might be unwilling to acknowledge such a status.

On the contrary, the notion of "geopolitical status of a state" could also be perceived as a manipulative label, akin to a symbolic construct. Stigmatization through labeling enables powerful states to operate by their rules on the global stage, implanting negative stereotypes about weaker states, imposing prejudiced narratives and images on them and other states in the global realm of meanings, and carrying out informational neo-colonization in line with their expansionist geostrategies. This process could further heighten geopolitical asymmetry, making it extremely challenging for marginalized states to later restore, or even significantly alter, the status quo.

Conclusions

Indeed, the concept of geopolitical status of a state is a multifaceted and complex category, particularly when it comes to its theoretical operationalization. In the present context of a shifting world order, nearly all developed nations prioritize crafting and implementing effective competitive strategies to bolster their geopolitical influence. As a result, the attainment of a specific geopolitical status by a state holds a dual significance.

On one hand, geopolitical status functions as a comprehensive transformed characteristic of a state's competitive potential in geopolitics. It establishes a set of coordinates within the global framework, shaping the power configuration of states. This configuration determines their available capabilities and future prospects for active participation in shaping the global agenda, as well as modeling the equilibrium of power in the geopolitical realm. The possession of a certain geopolitical status empowers states to utilize varying degrees of geopolitical strategies in advancing their national interests and international initiatives, often gaining support from other actors. A higher geopolitical status corresponds to greater potential for expansion within the multilayered geopolitical space. On the other hand, states often employ their geopolitical potential as a means of both geopolitical hegemony and marginalization. In the former scenario, a state positions itself as a global leader, asserting its authority and shaping the world according to its own norms and values. Other states then find themselves influenced by this normative force. Conversely, in the latter scenario, a powerful state may stigmatize a weaker one with labels like "pariah state" or "failed state," effectively isolating it from the international community and relegating it to the periphery of global development. Exploring the intricacies of modern types of geopolitical statuses of states is a topic of ongoing research.

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Author Biography

Nataliia Lepska is an associate professor in the Political Science Department at Zaporizhzhia National University in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine. Her most recent publications have appeared in the Armenian State Pedagogical University's Journal Wisdom and the International Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences.

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