

Abel's Prototype: Sociality as the Scaling of Aggression

Dr. Maxim Lepskiy

Zaporizhzhya National University

@ Email: waysensey@gmail.com

ID ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5604-641X>

Abstract

The article explores the prototype of Abel in connection with the figures of Cain and Moses, building on the methodological approach of Lipot Szondi. The author delves into defining Abel's characteristics as a radical by comparing six different forms or possibilities of fate, exploring attributes such as "change," and examining the system of censorship as a determinant of drive dynamics. The identified functional characteristics of Abel's radical include (a) obedience; (b) inclination toward sacrifice; (c) patience; (d) altruism; (e) diligence; (f) willingness to give and sacrifice; (g) self-mobilization; (h) adaptive thinking; (i) devotion to God, kin, and community; (j) enforcer of moral standards; (k) the prototype of a martyr.

Abel's type is marked by a reduction in rational censorship and the surrender of one's own understanding of life, transferring responsibility for one's life to figures like Cain or Moses. The victim with a martyr-like character is conditioned to endure adversity. The Abel-like image grants access to social advancement in authoritarian societies where individuals may not confront Cain directly. Abel exhibits a prevailing heteronomy, emphasizing the significance of external circumstances and socio-cultural norms over personal autonomy and goal-setting. In contrast, Cain and Moses emphasize autonomy, with Moses reconciling the contradiction into theonomy (religious leadership in the rational incorporation of the spiritual), while Cain is dominated by the autonomy of affects (such as anger and envy) with reduced rationality.

In a collective sense, Abel serves Cain or Moses through sociality, adaptability, obedience, and sacrifice, contributing to the scaling of destructive or constructive aggression. Abel shifts responsibility to the larger entities of which he is a part, emphasizing belonging and partisanship in the collective context.

Keywords

aggression, destructive, power, responsibility, scaling, religious archetypes

Introduction

The exploration of human nature, both at the individual and collective levels, occurs within the realms of conscious and unconscious aspects within the structure of the psyche and social interactions. This interest leads to a focus on ancient archetypes and religious prototypes, serving as indigenous factors that shape specific possibilities of fate for both individuals and segments of the population.

The article underscores the importance of studying the development, understanding, and scaling of aggression in both collective behavior and group activities. Consequently, the article's relevance lies in the significant impact of the religious prototype of Abel, examined in conjunction with the images of Cain and Moses (as extensively analyzed by Lipot Szondi). This examination aims to unravel the dynamics of constructive or destructive aggression within social relations.

The primary objective of the article is to delineate the key characteristics and social functional significance of Abel's prototype, particularly in correlation with the prototypes of Cain and Moses.

Methodology

The author pursues an extensive examination of the phenomenon of aggression, employing a methodological framework grounded in specific principles:

1. Historical forms of worldview, encompassing mythological, religious, and scientific-philosophical dimensions, are considered in a historical context based on their emergence. Importantly, the advent of a new historical worldview does not signify the disappearance of the preceding one; rather, it persists in subsequent stages of worldview development. This underscores the significance of considering mythological archetypes and religious prototypes, especially in situations marked by heightened personal tension, such as the phenomenon of aggression.
2. The earliest religious prototypes of aggression within the Western religious worldview are found in the Bible's narrative of Cain and Abel. While Lipot Szondi extensively explored Cain's prototype and its active overcoming in fate-analysis works like "Cain: Images of Evil" and "Moses: A Response to Cain," less attention was dedicated to Abel.
3. The article raises the crucial question of analyzing the prototype of Abel, emphasizing its reflection of victimhood in situations of destructive aggression or crime. Notably, Abel, driven by a motivation of belonging, often serves as a manifestation of both malignant, destructive aggression (represented by "Cain") and benign, constructive aggression (embodied by "Moses"). In defining the content of constructive and destructive aggression, the author aligns with the findings of Erich Fromm's study, "Anatomy of Human Destructiveness" (Fromm, 1992).
4. The research employs a comparative analysis framework, focusing on the primary functional manifestations and characteristics of the radical. The author follows, to the extent possible, the logic of Lipot Szondi's results in continuing the exploration of Abel within Szondi's methodology. Abel's characteristics are defined as a radical through a comparison of the six different forms or possibilities of fate, the attributes of "change," and the system of censorship as a determinant of drive dynamics.

Results

The findings from the examination of Abel's prototype in juxtaposition with the prototypes of Cain and Moses, deeply explored by Lipot Szondi, contribute to a comprehensive under-

standing of the central religious theologem concerning the holistic certainty of aggression prototypes. This theologem not only mirrors the preceding historical worldview type, the mythologeme with archetypes of the subject of death (Cain) and the subject of life (Moses), but also introduces the object of life (Abel). The object of life, often serving as the basis for scaling either destructive aggression (culminating in extreme violent death) or constructive aggression and life development through social adaptation, plays a pivotal role. In scientific and philosophical worldviews, the influence of previous historical forms persists, a trend evident in the phenomenon of aggression.

The relationship between the subject of life, the subject of death, and the object of life was previously explored in the author's doctoral dissertation, extending the conceptualization of these categories within the realm of aggression. The religious worldview, as reflected by the prototype of Abel, highlights characteristics of victimhood or scaling violence in interaction with the subject of death, while in interaction with the subject of life, it signifies social adaptation and scaling development.

Employing Lipot Szondi's methodology, which emphasizes a focus on depth psychology rather than religious studies, results in attributive characteristics of the Abel prototype. This outcome is derived from the application of Szondi's methodology in comparing the radicals of Cain and Moses, specifically examining the six different forms of fate possibilities, the attributes of "change," and the system of censors as the sphere determining the drive dynamics. The utilization of Lipot Szondi's "core of comparative methodology" not only unveils the characteristics of Abel's prototype and its socio-psychological certainty but also investigates the interplay of Cain-Moses-Abel prototypes within the phenomenon of aggression.

Discussion

Consideration of aggression in the religious worldview begins with the fact that this historical type of worldview is not completely replaced by the next, but has its own social and socio-psychological spaces. The processes of forming and nurturing personality in education are closely connected with vivid images that shape the perception of social relations. These processes also involve the formation of perceptions that occur through personal and social memory (Zhang et al., 2019), symbolization, and comprehension, as well as the transmission of cultural values through generations—the results of human activity (Spiro, 2020; see also Livi et al., 2015; Kashima et al., 2015; Putnam & Gartstein, 2017; Tamariz, 2019).

Let us consider the key images - prototypes in the religious worldview. Ultimately, these are the images of people, in the most general sense reflecting the relations of aggression and determining the mechanisms of domestication of aggression in social relations. Let us consider such key images in the systemic triad: thing (in this case, personality) - relation (in the removed form of the main image of the worldview relation) - properties of personality as a result of the relation (radical).

1. *To consider the radical, let us turn to Lipot Szondi's works "Cain, figures of evil" and "Moses. A Reply to Cain" (Szondi, 1969, 1971).*

The radical is the root factor which conditions certain specific possibilities of fate, both for the individual personality and for a part of the population. It is possible, writes K. Jaspers (1948), to find such basic qualities which, being extra-historical and biologically unchanged for millennia, permeate all experiences, behavior and manifestations of people, while remaining meaningfully non-specific. In this context, the figures of Cain and Moses are examined not from an ethical standpoint but rather from a perspective focused on the fate analysis of fate, i.e., a purely clinical examination (Szondi, 1969).

The images of Cain, Abel and Moses in the "Old Testament" are such reflections of the religious personality type in relations of aggression. Of this triad, only Abel has not been ex-

amined in detail by Lipot Szondi. Let us focus on a brief characterisation of these prototypes.

2. *Relations in the holy form as the main image in the religious worldview was fixed in the institutional images of the relations of sin and virtue.* Consider them as relations of affect of spontaneous behavior and institutionalized sociocultural behavior (ocultured behavior).

Description of Situation

Szondi (1969) describes a dialogue between Abel and Cain. When they encountered each other in the field, Cain said to Abel, that he has come to believe that the world was created without mercy, and it does not prioritize the rewards of good deeds. Its judgment is biased. Otherwise, why was Abel's offering accepted by God while Cain's was rejected? Abel responded, countering Cain's claim, "The world was indeed created with mercy, and it abounds with the fruits of good deeds. Its judgment is fair. My offering was accepted because the results of my labor were superior to yours and were presented before yours."

Szondi goes on to mention that Cain persisted, saying to Abel, that there is no justice, no judge, and no future in this world. The righteous receive no recompense, and the wicked face no punishment. To this, Abel replied that there is indeed justice, a judge, and a future in this world. It includes both rewards for righteousness and consequences for evil.

Without dwelling on the multitude of interpretations of refinements and details, let us give only the basic context of the murder of a brother by his brother. Let us consider only the fault lines. Firstly, as Szondi (1969) points out, Cain is not primarily characterized by his aggression, but by his affects, his "I". Cain's affects are an overflowing energy of rage and anger, hatred and spite, jealousy and revenge, distorted by a narcissistic desire to spread the exaltation of his person; on the side of the I, he is characterized by the desire to possess everything and to blame others (projection). It is true that - under certain circumstances - his "so-called evil deeds" may also be accompanied by the force of aggression, but it is not aggression, but gross affects and the particular I that distinguish Cain. In the doctrine of human drive, aggression is part of the drive for self-preservation, part of the sexual impulse.

Secondly, in the image of Abel the Church reflects the image of ethics, where Abel reflects not just symbols of righteousness, justice, God-fearing, morality, the prototype of "good", but our view and grounds for the institutionalization of ideas of virtue as the opposite of the sin concept. Cain is not just a symbol of "evil" but of life in evil, with the lord creating a stigma – the mark of Cain – which prevents him from killing but fix the curse for seven generations, in the last his great-grandson kills Cain properly by mistake.

Third, Lipot Szondi (1969) notes that what motivates fratricide in the oral histories from a psychological perspective is how little the nature of human motivations has changed over the intervening millennia. The same old needs, viz:

1. The need of the son for paternal love, rivalry and hatred of his brother.
2. The desire to possess, the desire to have everything (which is connected with the sacrifice to God of Cain the farmer, not accepted in the altar, and Abel the shepherd's sacrifice).
3. Religious differences and disputes over tradition and location; 4. Sexual drive and the accompanying instinctive desire for violence in disputes and wars, in the killing of one person as well as in the destruction of whole peoples (Szondi, 1969).

Sexual motivation is related to jealousy and envy, and in the story it is related to marriage to Cain's more attractive sister, with the result that Abel must get Abel and Abel's less attractive sister must get Cain (as a reduction of the incest load of the first generation of humans from Adam and Eve).

Fourth, consider Abel's affects: demonstration of humility as superiority, obedience (as transfer of responsibility to father, lineage, God), self-defense not brought to safety (Abel

according to one version won, but listened to Cain's entreaties and stopped - was killed), sacrifice (as passivity) and fear of father's will as submission, piety - fear of looking at the altar with the victim.

Let us clarify this position. On the one hand, it is obedience and performance as the basis of the scaling of the will of power, impossible without Abel, without discipline and obedience, devotion to the race and piety. On the other hand, executiveity and sacrifice means passivity, which is not subjectivity, but the translation of the large-scale subjects' subjectivity as sociality. It is about sociality as participation in social relations, but non-self, lack of identity, self-determination in obedience as partisanship but not in incorporation - diligence instead of spiritualisation do not resolve contradictions without combining them in activity. Instead of independent choice, Abel exercises the choice of the father or the precepts of sacrifice. On the other hand, Abel's sacrifice means a reduced capacity in his own choice of subjectivity, since sociocultural rules and sacrifice did not allow him to preserve life even in the victory of self-defense, because Abel did not act according to the requirements of the situation, for example, he applied fixation and jamming by the force of Cain's aggression (binding and immobilizing). His own understanding of the situation was mediated by socio-cultural rules but not by the tasks of self-preservation. This issue will be discussed in detail when exploring the problem of resisting evil by force.

Since often nonresistance to evil can mean indulging in it, and often victimising (sacrificial) provocation. Abel's narcissism in seeking to earn his father's love not as love for his son, but for deeds, evidence of "better works, fruit, sacrifices" should also be noted. This shows a longing for the way of the martyr, holiness in death. Moses was seen as the answer to Cain, Abel as the stage of overcoming Cain. Since we believe that the image of Moses is excellently worked out in the concept of Lipot Szondi (1971), we will give its main points and the correction of some provisions in the justification of the Abel-Cain-Moses relationship.

Firstly, a distinction is made between aggression (in its biological instinctive meaning) and violence (aggression in its social ultimate form - murder). Aggression, if we use Lipot Szondi's theory, is directly related to the pair of radicals "s" and "h" (Maltsev, 2018). Szondi pointed out that in C. Lorenz's book, "On Aggression," the behaviors observed in individuals are attributed not to the "Cain radical" but rather to the radical known as "aggression" or "sadism." The specific issue of murder, associated with Cain, falls within the "e/hy" radical pair (Szondi, 1969).

Secondly, Lipot Szondi (1969) defined the radical of violence and its opposite meaning, the basis of spiritual conscientiousness. He writes that the needs of Cain and respectively Abel = Moses are conditioned by the e radical. Its vector partner, the hy radical, acts with its aspirations for significance and for secrecy in all of Cain's functions, always playing, however, only a secondary role there. Here we shall dwell only on the functions of the radical "e".

In essence, as Szondi (1969) wrote, conditioned by the factor "e", all both the gross, affective acts of evil men - "Cain's" - and all the ethical acts of good and just men - "Moses" - are exposed to the light of God. Moses symbolizes a Cain figure who shares many similarities with Abel. The motivating radical that makes a man become capable of brutal affects of hatred and anger, rage and revenge, envy and jealousy, so that, having accumulated all these mental experiences, he can suddenly, explosively unleash them on the stunned people around him, becoming a murderer or putting the strangling hand of "Cain", but no longer on his brother, but on his own cerebral vessels, heart, intestines or limbs, turning this person into a "seizure-stricken" "homo paroxysmalis", grabbing, instead of an enemy, the tongue of a speaking person so that he begins to stammer, causing paralyzing fear in him both night and day, this radical is the factor 'e'. Szondi claims that the same factor 'e' is an instance awakening conscience in people, imposing a ban on intolerance and the desire to commit murder, carrying to people the commandments of ethical behavior, forcing "Cain" - which is in each of us - to incline to patience and justice, religiosity and charity, to helping the sick and creating religions.

Thirdly, according to fate-psychology, the two opposite natures of Cain ("who sold his soul to the devil") and Moses ("man of God") do not exclude but complement each other in a dialectic which is called "the Cain-Moses dialectic in six different forms or possibilities of fate."

1. *The Abrupt Change, the Alternative.* This abrupt change from one opposite to another occurs most often unconsciously and instantaneously. Lipot Szondi gives a number of examples of abrupt change in the human-God in the fits of anger, rage, and hatred.
2. *Synthesis, Both.* In this case the two opposite characters are actively at enmity with each other. The synthesis is evident in the way Moses' nature takes on a Cain-like quality, experiencing the suffering of the Cain complex and the distortion caused by the unconscious tendencies of latent Cain.
3. *Decision Making.* The occupying 'I' makes a conscious and voluntary choice in favor of one thing, completely excluding its opposite. This decision in favor of the 'Moses I' results in Cain-like unconscious manifestations in the form of seizures.
4. *Indecision: Neither One Nor the Other.* The personality has an ambivalent attitude towards its opposites. As soon as she feels like saying "yes", immediately she feels that she has to say "no". There is no Cain or Moses in her. Thus laws are not broken, but neither are they established. The biggest thing that remains is inevitability. Just here Szondi approached the dialectic of Cain and Abel, and in doing so he rejected indecision as something characteristic of mediocre individuals, as well as of those who fulfill their duties forcibly, in a state of uncertainty, and of those suffering from obsessive compulsive neurosis. This way of resolving dilemmas is absent in Moses. But it is precisely this way that is present in Abel.
5. *Socialization.* The personality attempts to defuse its polar opposite tendencies in the professional sphere. This contradiction, noted by Szondi (1944), is difficult to resolve, but success is possible in the professions of butchers, policemen. The soldier, etc., through the profession defuses the socially directed mentality as well as the blood-thirsty mentality.
6. *Sublimation.* The personality attempts to fulfill the needs of both the Cain nature and the Moses nature in the spiritual sphere, obtaining maximum satisfaction. This is a rare way of sublimation in religion, in art and science. Usually sublimation is defined as the search for sublime objects and goals to discharge the energy of certain lowly drives (Freud, 1930/1961). Which is complicated by simultaneous sublimation and search for a spiritual object for both Cain and Moses (Szondi, 1971).

Lipot Szondi is not justified in equating Abel with Moses. Let me explain this position. Abel has his own characteristics of change.

1. An abrupt change from anger, hatred, rage to agreeableness, obedience, when the impulse has passed or is restrained, in the guilt which makes a comfortable Abel, a performer.
2. The synthesis of Cain and Abel as bloodthirsty mentality and performativity was studied in detail by Stanley Milgram in his famous experiments, and this was also explored in Philip Zimbardo's Stanford Experiment in 1971 (Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo, 2007). Here the transfer of responsibility to large-scale subjects combined with the characteristics of the bloodthirsty Cain led to violence and cruelty. In this case, the affective side of Cain was compensated for by sociocultural justification for the behavior.
3. Since in the Cain-Abel relationship the choice in favor of one may not exclude the other, sociocultural systems of violence with sociocultural justification may be opted for, e.g. it is the fulfillment of criminal orders, since Abel's obedience in Cain's choice leads to such phenomena. I dare to boldly suggest that the choice of Abel in the orientation of the I often leads to systems of fraud, when both Abel's obedience, his non-violence, and Cain's activity with limited "physical bloodlust" but psychic, economic or other damage are satisfied. And many examples can be found of such manifestations.
4. Indecision, as we have already noted, may be a characteristic of Abel specifically, since it is not characteristic of either Cain or Moses. Thus in Moses there is both Abel and Cain,

but there is no Abel's indecision.

5. Socialization of exactly the dialectic of Cain and Abel is characteristic of the professional sphere of "angry performance" of cashiers, controllers, bureaucrats, etc., where anger is justified by executive discipline, sociocultural norms and rules, "the goodness of performance", "we were only following the rules", hidden aggressiveness, for example, in refusing to help another person in a difficult situation because of fear and dread or hidden revenge, or to protect an unjustifiably slandered person from the majority. The professional solution of Cain-like Abel can be the sphere of manipulation, fraud, illusion, technologies of creation of aggressive games, which can mean "the wrath of the little man" as a turning point to the way of Moses, and Abel's escape from aggressive conditions into manipulation and fraud. It is considerably more difficult with the Cain who has Abel characteristics, who retains his vengefulness and secretiveness, but disguises himself with socio-cultural and legal norms. In the realization of Cain's predominant nature we get "revenge in disguise".
6. Sublimation. For Abel sublimation is difficult because of obedience and fulfillment, but his sacrifice is quite sublimated in art, religion and science, simultaneously the nature of Cain is sublimated, exactly in this sublimation, in our opinion, the formation of the way of Moses takes place.

The following are the characteristics of Cain, Abel and Moses (Table 1).

	A. The nature of Cain according to L. Szondi	B. The Nature of Moses by L. Szondi	C. The Nature of Abel (author's interpretation)
1.	Lack of conscience	Conscientiousness	Obedience
2.	The desire to have everything, to possess everything — property, knowledge, positions	Tendency to restrict	Tendency to sacrifice
3.	Intolerance	Tolerance	Patience
4.	Malevolence	Benevolence	Altruism
5.	Secrecy, guile	Transparency	Diligence
6.	Willingness to harm	Willingness to help	Willingness to give, to sacrifice
7.	The desire to hurt	The desire to hurt	Self-injury
8.	Bloodthirsty mentality	Proper mindset	Adaptive mindset
9.	Godless	Devoted to God	God-fearing, devoted to the family, community
10.	Lawbreaker	Lawmaker	Enforcing the laws
11.	The prototype of a villain	The prototype of a righteous man	The prototype of a martyr

TABLE 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF CAIN, ABEL AND MOSES.

The first two columns show the results of L. Szondi (1969, 1971). In the theoretical assemblage of Abel's image in correlation with the images of Cain and Moses, let us turn to the system of censors, the sphere of determining dynamics, speed mode, intensifying or accelerating drives, with strengthened or weakened functions of realization.

Lipót Szondi unfolds the characterization of censors by stating that, according to the doctrine of fate analysis, it is believed that every human is born with a dual nature, embodying both Cain and Abel simultaneously, as an innate part of their hereditary makeup. There are two instances that determine whether both natures will be manifested in an individual alternately, or whether only one of them will function in him. This is the so-called censor system, the "middle" of man's motivational sphere, consisting of four factors, viz: (a) ethical; (b) moral; (c) rational, or mind; and (d) spiritual censors. Social environment, that is, mentality, conditioned by the close family circle and historical time, and still the worldview of the society (Szondi, 1971).

According to Szondi (1971), ethical censorship serves mainly to deny or accept the presence of Cain's bloodthirsty mentality: it is the sixth commandment of the Decalogue - thou shalt not kill! Moral censorship monitors the manifestation of man's desires, prescribing what he can show to society and what he needs to hide from society. Moral censorship also controls the overall impression of the manifesto and all other aspirations (exhibitionism in the sexual and social spheres, in the sphere of charity, and in other, similar spheres). Ethical and moral censorship manifest together in guilt, in piety, in the desire to atone, that is, as the first step of conscience. The rational, position-occupying censorship checks whether the actions, intentions, and claims of the drives are real or unreal. Freud calls this censorship the reality check. In sum, it says either "yes" or "no" to a person's intentions or actions in terms of reason. Spiritual censorship evaluates the intention, action, or claim of an drive from the perspective of the spiritual: God, religion, science, art, and literature. But spiritual censorship has a particularly important role in deciding whether an intentional action is humane or inhumane (Szondi, 1971).

When considering the type of Abel, it is necessary to note the decrease of exactly rational censorship of one's own comprehension of life and transfer of responsibility for one's life to Cain or Moses. Moral censorship demonstrates, first of all, submission, fulfillment, sacrifice, obedience, often in the victim's behavior towards the rapist and villain. Ethical censorship is oriented towards the denial of Cain, but along with the denial of bloodthirstiness, it often denies the capacity of one's own choice, submission to fatal mistakes and fate, and manifests the martyr character of the victim. It is like in the parable that for the happiness of future generations one should suffer and endure, but, as it turns out, no generation was happy and cannot teach this to the next generation, but only teaches to suffer and endure misfortunes (without achieving the joy of results). Various manifestations of Abel are given in art, most often with a positive connotation. For example, in a popular Soviet song there was such a characteristic of Abel (a girl) - "unrequited for anger, welcome for kindness...". There are also enough images of Abel in literature and cinema. In my opinion, the genius is the image of Savva Ignatyevich in the film "Pokrovskie Vorota", who fulfills all the instructions of his wife Margarita Pavlovna up to the forced relocation to a new flat of his wife's ex-husband Khobotov, because his wife said so (Kozakov, 1973). "Jawohl (from German - of course), Margarita Pavlovna!". His summarizing answer to the question, "And why do you need it? What joy do you want?" contains the quintessence of the sacrificial Abel: "One does not live for joy, but for conscience."

In a totalitarian society, it is safer to be Abel, but not a rebellious Moses. One must be a "simple Soviet man." It was the image of a prototype with Abel's characteristics that often provided access to social mobility within the hierarchy for performers who could not oppose Cain in an authoritarian or totalitarian society. In contrast to Abel, Moses is a conscious,

capable choice of the commandments of conscience as overcoming Cain while maintaining subjectivity. At Abel heteronomy prevails, logic of circumstances - external circumstances and socio-cultural norms are more important than own autonomy and goal-setting, in the image of Cain and Moses autonomy prevails, thus Moses removed the contradiction of autonomy and heteronomy in theonomy (activity of religious leader with incorporation). At the same time at Cain prevails autonomy of affects at the reduced rationality, anger, rage, revenge, envy, etc. Moses has a predominant rationality based on the incorporation of the spiritual ("God in the heart"). This contradiction was given much attention in his work by Paul Tillich (1999), whose way of resolving the contradiction of autonomy and heteronomy leads to theonomy in religious consciousness.

L. Szondi (1971), in analyzing the fate of Moses, was guided by the human rather than heroic aspect of the legends, and in his socio-cultural analysis of conscience he established the phases of the process that takes place in the souls of bandits and murderers: the blood-thirsty mentality of Cain, murder, guilt, confession of guilt, awareness (verbalisation) and condemnation of guilt, emergence of conscience, prohibitions of conscience, religion and God as the path in the soul of Moses from Cain to Abel in the formulation of the commandment of conscience in the Decalogue - "Thou shalt not kill!" (Szondi, 1971).

The difference between Abel and Moses is the difference between participation (reliance on external will - "the Lord will provide") and Moses' incorporation ("God has no other hands but ours"). Abel rather acts as a stage for Cain in comprehending the way of Moses. Recall, Moses, after killing an overseer in Egypt, fled and was a shepherd (Abel) in the house of the priest, and it is only after this stage of obedience that the Lord calls him as the leader of the liberation of the people to the path of theocracy.

Most Abels follow Cain or Moses, as talented wrote Konrad Lorenz (1963), most follow the leader, with deviant behavior, or as V. Vysotsky sang "there are few real violent ones - so there are no leaders" (Kirill, 2013).

Lipot Szondi (1971), at the end of his book "Moses. Response to Cain" described his understanding of the complexity of the collective Moses. He wrote that unfortunately, this response of Moses is addressed only to the individual Cain, the human being, and in no way to the collective Cain, the human masses in wars. Collective Cain rules the world in our time with the same brutality as before the proclamation of the Decalogue. Collective Cain will never leave himself without work, that is, without killing. Genus wages war against genus, race against race, state against state, nation against nation, class against class, denomination against denomination, and even continent wages war against continent - only with different weapons. However, a certain part of humanity is still waiting impatiently for the arrival of a new Moses, with a new Decalogue, who could lead a new exodus of humanity from the land of eternal wars to the abode of eternal peace. Here even the Church finds itself powerless. Weapons for warfare are as blessed today as they were in former times. Is this task, according to which the masses of men must serve God and the Holy Spirit with their evil impulses, such an impossible utopia of the wise men? Who knows? Let those who can believe it be happy Szondi (1971).

I think that just the presence of collective Abel creates the possibility of the activity of leaders to Cain or Moses. Cains do not negotiate with Abels, but are forced to reckon with Moses, with their capacity and power. It is Moses who puts even evil at the service of God. Let us demonstrate this position with the example of Gilbert K. Chesterton's work (Chesterton, 1911/2020).

These are the characteristics of Flambeau as an Cain-like Abel (i.e. Abel with Cain's characteristics): a fraudster, yet not inclined to murder. Simultaneously strong, but notably, he employed his strength only for non-lethal, albeit demeaning, actions towards his victims. He refrained from killing, but acknowledged his sublimation into fraud, engaging in acts of

thievery marked by cunning and grandeur. He later concealed the true extent of his deeds, leaving behind no traces. He tolerated these actions to avoid exposure, preserving Cain's secrecy in alignment with the rules of guilt concealment. These situations, such as tolerating salted coffee and paying an overpriced check, exemplify Cain's manifestation. Flambeau's rational censor diminished as he became more inclined to 'attack reason,' and he demonstrated a strong orientation towards socio-cultural norms and rituals. He was adept at understanding the laws of the game, often taking a step back and bowing low to Valanthe (Chesterton, 1911/2020).

Gilbert Keith Chesterton (1874-1936). The Innocence of Father Brown. From the story "The Blue Cross"

An admiring description of Flambeau, Father Brown's opponent:

It is many years now since this colossus of crime suddenly ceased keeping the world in a turmoil; and when he ceased, as they said after the death of Roland, there was a great quiet upon the earth. But in his best days (I mean, of course, his worst) Flambeau was a figure as statuesque and international as the Kaiser. Almost every morning the daily paper announced that he had escaped the consequences of one extraordinary crime by committing another. He was a Gascon of gigantic stature and bodily daring; and the wildest tales were told of his outbursts of athletic humour; how he turned the juge d'instruction upside down and stood him on his head,"to clear his mind"; how he ran down the Rue de Rivoli with a policeman under each arm. It is due to him to say that his fantastic physical strength was generally employed in such bloodless though undignified scenes; his real crimes were chiefly those of ingenious and wholesale robbery. But each of his thefts was almost a new sin, and would make a story by itself. (Chesterton, 1911/2020, p. 6)

Denouement:

Flambeau stopped in his stride forward.

"Behind that tree," said Father Brown, pointing,"are two strong policemen and the greatest detective alive. How did they come here, do you ask? Why, I brought them, of course! How did I do it? Why, I'll tell you if you like! Lord bless you, we have to know twenty such things when we work among the criminal classes! Well, I wasn't sure you were a thief, and it would never do to make a scandal against one of our own clergy. So I just tested you to see if anything would make you show yourself. A man generally makes a small scene if he finds salt in his coffee; if he doesn't, he has some reason for keeping quiet. I changed the salt and sugar, and you kept quiet. A man generally objects if his bill is three times too big. If he pays it, he has some motive for passing unnoticed. I altered your bill, and you paid it."

The world seemed waiting for Flambeau to leap like a tiger. But he was held back as by a spell; he was stunned with the utmost curiosity.

"Well," went on Father Brown, with lumbering lucidity,"as you wouldn't leave any tracks for the police, of course somebody had to. At every place we went to, I took care to do something that would get us talked about for the rest of the day. I didn't do much harm—a splashed wall, spilt apples, a broken window; but I saved the cross, as the cross will always be saved. It is at Westminster by now. I rather wonder you didn't stop it with the Donkey's Whistle."

"With the what?" asked Flambeau.

"I'm glad you've never heard of it," said the priest, making a face."It's a foul thing. I'm sure you're too good a man for a Whistler. I couldn't have countered it even with the Spots myself; I'm not strong enough in the legs."

"What on earth are you talking about?" asked the other.

"Well, I did think you'd know the Spots," said Father Brown, agreeably surprised."Oh, you can't have gone so very wrong yet!"

“How in blazes do you know all these horrors?” cried Flambeau.

The shadow of a smile crossed the round, simple face of his clerical opponent.

“Oh, by being a celibate simpleton, I suppose,” he said. “Has it never struck you that a man who does next to nothing but hear men’s real sins is not likely to be wholly unaware of human evil? But, as a matter of fact, another part of my trade, too, made me sure you weren’t a priest.”

“What?” asked the thief, almost gaping.

“You attacked reason,” said Father Brown. “It’s bad theology.”

And even as he turned away to collect his property, the three policemen came out from under the twilight trees. Flambeau was an artist and a sportsman. He stepped back and swept Valentin a great bow.

“Do not bow to me, mon ami,” said Valentin with silver clearness. “Let us both bow to our master.”

And they both stood an instant uncovered while the little Essex priest blinked about for his umbrella. (Chesterton, 1911/2020, p. 26-27)

The characterisation of Moses as portrayed by Father Brown: Cautious suspicion and rationality, the opposite of crime incapacitation (“You didn’t leave marks - someone had to leave them”), rational ethical censor, “evil in the service of God” (“I didn’t do much harm - poured soup on the wall, scattered apples, broke a window - but I saved the cross”), understanding of Cain and struggle against him, socialisation into the priestly profession, sublimation of the researcher and detective (“a man who listens all the time about sins must have some knowledge of worldly evil?”). It is true that not only the practice but also the theory of my case helped me to realise that you are not a priest”), faith in God and reason, incapacity as incorporation (“God has no other hands but ours”). The concept of sin in Moses’ service is diagnostic and therapeutic, virtue as the opposite of sin is the benchmark of capacity. Things are quite different in Cain, even having chosen the profession of priest. The concept of sin is an instrument of bloodthirstiness and affectivity, while virtue is a way of forming guilt in others as a realisation of revenge, jealousy and anger. With Abel, the concept of sin is taboo topics, guilt to be concealed by hiding “skeletons” in wardrobes, and the concept of virtues, that is, socio-cultural norms and rules to be conformed to in one’s “goodness”, obedience, submission and sacrifice.

Conclusions

The author has identified the functional attributes of Abel’s archetype as fundamentally radical, encompassing the following characteristics: (a) obedience; (b) inclination toward sacrifice; (c) patience; (d) altruism; (e) diligence; (f) willingness to give and sacrifice; (g) self-mobilization; (h) adaptive thinking; (i) devotion to God, kin, and community; (j) enforcer of moral standards; (k) the prototype of a martyr.

These traits are interrelated with the characteristics of the radicals Cain and Moses. When examining the Abel archetype, it is essential to recognize the diminishing role of rational censorship and the influence of motivation, one’s own understanding of life, and the transfer of life responsibilities to either Cain or Moses. Moral censorship is primarily manifested through submission, compliance, sacrifice, and obedience, often observed in the victim’s behavior towards aggressors and wrongdoers. Ethical censorship focuses on denying the qualities of Cain, but it also frequently involves the rejection of tendencies towards cruelty, the inability to make autonomous decisions, and yielding to inevitable mistakes and fate. The martyr-like qualities of the victim teach endurance in the face of adversity, often without achieving the satisfaction of positive outcomes.

The image of Abel often provides opportunities for social advancement within hierarchical structures, particularly for individuals who are unable to confront Cain in authoritarian or

totalitarian societies, or at least leadership positions. In contrast to Abel, Moses represents a deliberate and conscious choice of moral principles, effectively overcoming Cain while maintaining individual subjectivity. Abel is characterized by a prevailing sense of heteronomy, where external circumstances and socio-cultural norms take precedence over individual autonomy and goal-setting. In contrast, the images of Cain and Moses emphasize autonomy, with Moses transcending this contradiction by incorporating a sense of theonomy, which involves acting as a religious leader.

Future research perspectives and discussions revolve around issues of victimization, as well as the measurement and comparison of destructive and constructive aggression. The collective representation of Abel serves the interests of either the "real violent" figures, Cain or Moses. In terms of its social adaptability, docility, and willingness to sacrifice, Abel contributes to the scaling of either destructive or constructive forms of aggression, transferring responsibility to the larger entities of which it is a part in the executive subsystem, in affiliations, and in participation.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

References

- Barrett, H. C. (2020). Towards a cognitive science of the human: Cross-Cultural approaches and their urgency. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 24(8), 620–638. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.05.007>
- Castillo-Eito, L., Armitage, C. J., Norman, P., Day, M., Doğru, O. C., & Rowe, R. (2020). How can adolescent aggression be reduced? A multi-level meta-analysis. *Clinical Psychology Review*, 78, 101853. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2020.101853>
- Ceriello, A. (2020). Lessons from COVID-19: How human behaviour may influence the science. *Diabetes Research and Clinical Practice*, 169, 108491. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.diabres.2020.108491>
- Chester, D. S., & West, S. J. (2020). Trait aggression is primarily a facet of antagonism: Evidence from dominance, latent correlational, and item-level analyses. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 89, 104042. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104042>
- Chesterton, G. K. (2020). *The Innocence of Father Brown*. Wildside Press LLC. (Original work published 1911).
- Griese, E. R., Buhs, E. S., & Lester, H. F. (2016). Peer victimization and prosocial behavior trajectories: Exploring sources of resilience for victims. *Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology*, 44, 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appdev.2016.01.009>
- Crockett, M. J., & Lockwood, P. L. (2018). Extraordinary altruism and transcending the self. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 22(12), 1071–1073. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.09.003>
- Dolfen, M., Leonida, L., & Outada, N. (2017). Modeling human behavior in economics and social science. *Physics of Life Reviews*, 22–23, 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2017.06.026>

- Freud, S. (1961). Civilization and Its Discontents. In J. Strachey (Trans.), *The Standard Edition Of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Vol. 21, pp. 79–80). Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1930).
- Fromm, E. (1988). *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* by Fromm, Erich. Holt Paperbacks.
- Jaspers, K. (1948). *Allgemeine Psychopathologie* [General psychopathology]. Verlag Springer.
- Jones, K. (2020). Jungian Theory. In *Encyclopedia of Creativity* (3rd ed., pp. 12–19). <https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-809324-5.23875-3>
- Kashima, Y., Laham, S. M., Dix, J., Levis, B., Wong, D., & Wheeler, M. (2015). Social transmission of cultural practices and implicit attitudes. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 129, 113–125. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.05.005>
- Kirill, S. (2013, February 8). *Vladimir Vysockij - Pismo v redakciyu* [Vladimir Vysotsky - Letter to the Editor] [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ASYQxonY_kw
- Kozakov, M. (Director). (1973). *Pokrovskie vorota* [The Pokrovsky Gate] [Film]. Mosfilm.
- Livi, S., Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., & Kenny, D. A. (2015). Epistemic motivation and perpetuation of group culture: Effects of need for cognitive closure on trans-generational norm transmission. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 129, 105–112. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.09.010>
- Lorenz, K. (1963). *Das sogenannte Böse. Zur Naturgeschichte der Aggression*. [The So-Called Evil - Natural History of Aggression]. Dr. G. Borotha-Schoeler Verlag.
- Maltsev, O. V. (2018). *The Philosophy of Szondi*. Serednyak T. K.
- Milgram, S. (1974). *Obedience to Authority*. Harper & Row.
- Murray, R. M., Coffee, P., & Eklund, R. C. (2020). Adaptive thinking: Can adaptive dispositional attributions protect against the harmful effects of maladaptive situational attributions? *Psychology of Sport and Exercise*, 47, 101620. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2019.101620>
- Oda, R., Machii, W., Takagi, S., Kato, Y., Takeda, M., Kiyonari, T., Fukukawa, Y., & Hiraishi, K. (2014). *Personality and altruism in daily life. Personality and Individual Differences*, 56, 206–209. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.09.017>
- Parker, S. (2015). Human Factors Science: Brief History and Applications to Healthcare. *Current Problems in Pediatric and Adolescent Health Care*, 45(12), 390–394. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cppeds.2015.10.002>
- Putnam, S. P., & Gartstein, M. A. (2017). Aggregate temperament scores from multiple countries: Associations with aggregate personality traits, cultural dimensions, and allelic frequency. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 67, 157–170. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2016.07.009>
- Robinson, M. D., Traurig, E., & Klein, R. J. (2020). On looking versus leaping: A situated multilevel approach to trait anger and the anger-aggression relationship. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 164, 110130. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110130>
- Sherblom, S. A. (2017). Complexity-thinking and social science: Self-organization involving human consciousness. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 47, 10–15. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2017.03.003>
- Spiro, D. (2020). Multigenerational transmission of culture. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 188, 105037. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105037>
- Szondi, L. (1944). *Schicksalsanalyse* [Fate-Analysis]. Schwabe.
- Szondi, L. (1969). *Kain, Gestalten des Boesen* [Cain, figures of evil]. Hans Huber.
- Szondi, L. (1971). *Moses. Antwort auf Kain* [Moses. A Reply to Cain]. Hans Huber.
- Tamariz, M. (2019). Replication and emergence in cultural transmission. *Physics of Life Reviews*, 30, 47–71. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2019.04.004>
- Tillich, P. (1999). *The Essential Tillich* (F. Church, Ed.). University of Chicago Press.
- Weick, M. (2020). Power and aggression: making sense of a fickle relationship. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, 33, 245–249. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2019.10.003>

- Xu, L., Li, B., Lu, J., Li, J., Xue, J., & Che, X. (2020). The relationship between alexithymia, hostile attribution bias, and aggression. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 159, 109869. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.109869>
- Zhang, L., Cai, C., Wang, Z., Tao, M., Li, X., & Craig, W. (2019). Adolescent-to-Mother Psychological Aggression: The role of father violence and maternal parenting style. *Child Abuse & Neglect*, 98, 104229. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2019.104229>
- Zimbardo, P. G. (2007). *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding how Good People Turn Evil*. Random House.

Author Biography

Maxim Lepskiy is a professor in the Sociology Department at Zaporizhzhya National University in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine. He has both academic and governmental administrative experience and currently heads the Research Board in Social Forecasting of the Sociological Association of Ukraine. He is an Academician of the European Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Lepskiy is an author of 16 monographs, 13 workbooks, and 2 textbooks on such subjects as social and political forecasting, conflict modeling and resolution, and peacemaking and human development.

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) which allows reusers to distribute, remix, adapt, and build upon the material in any medium or format for non-commercial purposes only, and only so long as attribution is given to the creator.